Adam Tamas Tuboly | Hungarian Academy of Sciences (original) (raw)

Papers by Adam Tamas Tuboly

Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics, 2021

Naturphilosophie, or its English counterpart, philosophy of nature, has a long and fascinating hi... more Naturphilosophie, or its English counterpart, philosophy of nature, has a long and fascinating history and has undergone significant changes over time. 1 During the 19th and 20th centuries, many forms of philosophy of nature emerged, from monographs of philosophical remarks by physicistsoften written as diversions and philosophically naïve-and the treatises of the German idealists-often ambiguous and scientifically naïve-to the philosophically motivated writings of revolutionary scientists. The logical empiricists' philosophy of nature and science, however, stands out for its ability to synthesize various forms of inquiries: while its roots reach deep into the neo-Kantian "Wissenschaftslehre" of its day, it was framed in the empiricist traditions of English philosophers and scientists of the modern era. It developed both traditions further with the help of Frege's and Russell's logic and amalgamated them with contemporary French thinking about the conventionalist theory and practice of science. (Katherine Dunlop discusses conventionalism in her contribution to this volume, especially with reference to Poincaré and Neurath.) As Hans Reichenbach (1931/1978, 383) claimed in his programmatic pamphlet on philosophy of nature, philosophy of nature constitutes a great triumph of rationalism.. .. However, modern philosophy of nature must also be regarded as a triumph of empiricism.. .. Modern empiricism does not contradict rationalism because knowledge is conceived as a system constructed by reason upon which experience exerts a regulative and selective influence.

Synthese, 2022

Our main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach's own naturalism in our cont... more Our main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach's own naturalism in our contemporary context, with special attention to competing versions of the concept. By exploring the idea of Reichenbach's naturalism, we will argue that he defended a liberating, therapeutic form of naturalism, meaning that he took scientific philosophy (or philosophy of nature, Naturphilosophie) to be a possible cure for bad old habits and traditional ways of philosophy. For Reichenbach, naturalistic scientific philosophy was a well-established form of liberation. We do not intend to suggest that Reichenbach acted as an inventor of naturalism; nonetheless, invoking the term and the idea of 'naturalism' is more than a simple rhetorical strategy for rehabilitating Reichenbach as a forerunner of this field. We think that his ideas can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates, and that he presents an interesting case among the other scientifically oriented proponents of his time. After presenting a short reconstruction of the meaning of naturalism-or, more appropriately, naturalisms-in order to be able to correctly situate Reichenbach within his own as well as a systematic context, we discuss Reichenbach's naturalism against the background of his scientific philosophy, his views on the relation of commonsense knowledge to science, and his efforts at popularization. To delve deeper into this topic, we present a case study to show how Reichenbach argued that in both scientific and philosophical discussions (assuming their naturalistic continuity), it is necessary to move from the request and value of truth to probability. And, finally, we argue that the liberation of knowledge and nature was a socio-political program for Reichenbach, who talked about his own scientific philosophy as "a crusade." By emphasizing this aspect of Reichenbach's naturalism, we may be in a better position to situate him in the history of analytic philosophy in general, and in the yet-to-bewritten narrative of the naturalistic movement in particular.

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HOPOS: The Journal of the Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2021

Most accounts of "logical empiricism in America" take logical empiricism to be a monolithic, or a... more Most accounts of "logical empiricism in America" take logical empiricism to be a monolithic, or at least a one-dimensional, philosophical group. This picture of logical empiricism has come under well-reasoned attack during the past two decades, but some of the relevant conclusions for the reception-history of the movement were not drawn, or were not drawn as thoroughly as they could have been. Thus, if we want to understand the reception of logical empiricism, we should not talk about "the" reception of "logical empiricism" as such, but rather, should provide a more stratified and differently balanced account. This paper aims to draw the contours of one more stratified account, by pointing out differences in the reception-history of logical empiricism with respect to pragmatism in particular. Namely, I will examine and defend an account according to which the more pragmatist-naturalist wing of logical empiricism was welcomed by the majority of American pragmatists, while the more technical wing came immediately under pragmatist attack from various sides.

In Sebastian Lutz and Adam Tamas Tuboly (ed.), Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics. New York/London: Routledge, 2021

This paper details how, besides his work on theoretical physics, Philipp Frank continued to remai... more This paper details how, besides his work on theoretical physics, Philipp Frank continued to remain interested in the philosophical questions of physics throughout his entire career. While this interest surfaced in different forms in different periods, Frank's late approach (developed mainly in the United States) constituted a sophisticated and complex inquiry into what he called the "humanistic background of science". Frank argued that we need to understand the physical (or scientific) endeavor as a whole. In this project, as it turned out, metaphysics could play a crucial role. Frank's American activities thus involved two core issues: (1) interpreting metaphysics in a way that would make it a meaningful enterprise for empiricists; and (2) investigating to what extent metaphysics, in this interpretation, can contribute to a better understanding of the natural sciences. Using the results of the latter, Frank tried to bridge the gap between the natural and social sciences.

A.T. Tuboly (ed.), The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic (Palgrave), 2020

This chapter serves as an introduction to the content and context of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth ... more This chapter serves as an introduction to the content and context of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. It argues that Ayer's book did more than just misrepresent some of the theses of the Vienna Circle, but on the contrary, provided fresh insights into some of the debates among its members. While the influence of Ayer's book is undeniable, this chapter invites readers to reevaluate their knowledge about Ayer's work by reexamining his place and role in the history of analytic philosophy.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

In 1948, A.J. Ayer was attacked on the pages of The New Statesman and Nation magazine where it wa... more In 1948, A.J. Ayer was attacked on the pages of The New Statesman and Nation magazine where it was claimed that his views were partly responsible for increasingly Fascist attitudes at Oxford. Ayer was charged with promoting a philosophy of values (or one lacking therein) that allowed Fascism to fill the moral vacuum. Ayer noted that he knew who had written the article (and the ones that followed) and that this person had done so for entirely contingent and non-philosophical reasons. This paper aims to examine the historical context by discussing the article and the events that followed it; to show that the specific charges against Ayer were rooted in deeper philosophical/ practical issues, namely the nature and status of philosophy; and to demonstrate that logical empiricism, or rather logical positivism as a movement, was indeed especially sensitive to political issues.

History of European Ideas , 2020

Perspectives on Science, 2020

Science popularization might take different forms. In the early twentieth century, Sir James Jean... more Science popularization might take different forms. In the early twentieth century, Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington presented the most successful endeavors. Philosophers were highly unimpressed and disturbed by these popular works and various authors declared their disagreement with the physicists' philosophical books against their own philosophical background. I will discuss three different philosophers, L. Susan Stebbing, C. E. M. Joad and Philipp Frank, whose three lines of criticism represent three different forms of philosophy, social engagement, and scientific outlook. What is interesting is that there was a point when the most diverse philosophers (of science) agreed in contrast of their common enemy, namely, those popularizing scientists that have their reputation and use it to propagate false, or at least misleading views about science, culture, and values. What we shall see is how far this agreement went among these figures and how the divergent strategies culminated in very similar results regarding knowledge dissemination.

The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge: The Mission of Logical Empiricism (eds. Damböck - Tuboly), 2020

Jordi Cat and A. T. Tuboly (ed.) Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives. Cham: Springer., 2019

The Viennese-born polymath Otto Neurath died on 22 December 1945 in Oxford, a few months after th... more The Viennese-born polymath Otto Neurath died on 22 December 1945 in Oxford, a few months after the end of World War Two. A social engineer and sociologist of happiness, Neurath was not only a socially sensitive educator, advocating for any institute and organization that was concerned with the well-being of people; he was also a trained scientist and philosopher. Studying mathematics, economics, history, philosophy, and physics in Vienna and then in Berlin during the early years of the long twentieth century, Neurath became involved in many of the disputes among social and natural scientists that shaped the course of the fields.

Jordi Cat – Adam Tamas Tuboly (Eds.), Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives. Dordrecht: Springer.

The aim of this paper is to give a biographical, historical, and philosophical reconstruction of ... more The aim of this paper is to give a biographical, historical, and philosophical reconstruction of Neurath's final years in England. Besides reconstructing Neurath's arrival to England, in the context of his life and philosophical introduction at Oxford, I will argue that since the 1930s, Neurath was eager to develop a brand for logical empiricism. This brand was based not on theoretical commitments, but on practical considerations and decisions. Using a detailed case study on Neurath's relation to the Hungarian sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim, I show that the development of their connections documents how Neurath gave more and more priority to practical aims during his English years. Finally, the concluding section points to some further considerations on Neurath's legacy.

History and Philosophy of Logic, 2018

The aim of the paper is show that that W. V. O. Quine's animadversions against modal logic did no... more The aim of the paper is show that that W. V. O. Quine's animadversions against modal logic did not get the same attention that is considered to be the case nowadays. The community of logicians focused solely on the technical aspects of C. I. Lewis' systems and did not take Quine's arguments and remarks seriously – or at least seriously enough to respond. In order to assess Quine's place in the history, however, his relation to Carnap is considered since their notorious break was about the status of extensionality and modal logic (and analyticity was much more of a second issue). Since much of the works about the history of analytic philosophy is centered on the relationship of Quine and Carnap, their break about modality deserves much more attention – it also sheds some light on why should anyone wonder about Quine's early arguments against modal logic. The paper ends with some further considerations regarding the early formation of modal logic and hitherto unconsidered problematic issues.

The aim of this paper is to provide context for and historical exegesis of Carnap's alleged move ... more The aim of this paper is to provide context for and historical exegesis of Carnap's alleged move from syntax to semantics. The Orthodox Received View states that there was a radical break, while the Unorthodox Received View holds that Carnap's syntactical period already had many significant semantical elements. I will argue that both of them are partly right, both of them contains a kernel of truth: it is true that Carnap's semantical period started after his Logical Syntax of Language – in one sense of semantics. But it is also true, that Carnap had semantical ideas already in LSL: though not (just) in the sense as URV maintained it. This latter sense of semantics is related to what is usually called inferentialism, and by getting a clearer picture of Carnap's original aims, context, and concept-usage, we might be in a better position to approach his alleged inferentialism.

Studies in East European Thought, 2017

Studies in East European Thought, 2017

Keywords: Philipp Frank, sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, logical empiricism, philos... more Keywords: Philipp Frank, sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, logical empiricism, philosophy of science

Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy, edited by Peter Stone, 2017

The aim of this paper is consider the context and possible influences on Rudolf Carnap’s Principl... more The aim of this paper is consider the context and possible influences on Rudolf Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance (PoT). My thesis is the following: One can acknowledge the important influence of Hans Hahn, Karl Menger and Otto Neurath (i.e. the left wing of the Vienna Circle) along with Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann (i.e. the right wing of the Vienna Circle) and try to place the PoT in the context of Carnap’s immediate allies and opponents. But one can and actually have to locate it in a broader context, namely in the philosophy of logic of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. As is it less known, Russell introduced a certain pragmatic freedom into the considerations of logic but to obtain Carnap’s PoT we have to extend the boundaries of Russell’s freedom. To do this, Carnap accepted the idea of Wittgenstein, namely that logic is devoid of empirical content. Since logic is tautological (which Russell denied) we have the relevant freedom which resulted in the PoT. Hence Carnap’s writings about logic and philosophy in the 1930s could be seen and reconstructed as a(n either intended or unintended) syntheses or special combination of Russell’s inductive and pragmatical considerations on logic and Wittgenstein’s idea of an empty logic.

[If you refer to the paper, please send me a message.] The textbook-like history of analytic phil... more [If you refer to the paper, please send me a message.] The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, re-ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of ana-lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified modal logic and thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpreta-tion of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be presented here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal-logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further considera-tion.

[Please send me an email or a message if you are citing this paper, thank you very much.] The aim... more [Please send me an email or a message if you are citing this paper, thank you very much.] The aim of this paper is twofold: to consider Rudolf Carnap’s ideas about the so-called geistige Gegenstände, i.e. the products of the human mind in his Der logische Aufbau der Welt and to locate these considerations in the context of Hans Freyer. I will argue that if one takes a look at Hans Freyer’s Theorie des Objektiven Geistes and Carnap’s Aufbau the similarities are quite striking: taking into account their shared experiences in the German Youth Movement (Jugendwebegung), their continuous friendship and discussions from the early 1910s until 1933, the similarities seem not to be merely superficial or accidental. Consequently, when one considers the impact of Freyer and the so-called ‘Dilthey School’, even the continental and especially the German roots of Carnap’s Aufbau go much deeper than they are usually thought.

Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics, 2021

Naturphilosophie, or its English counterpart, philosophy of nature, has a long and fascinating hi... more Naturphilosophie, or its English counterpart, philosophy of nature, has a long and fascinating history and has undergone significant changes over time. 1 During the 19th and 20th centuries, many forms of philosophy of nature emerged, from monographs of philosophical remarks by physicistsoften written as diversions and philosophically naïve-and the treatises of the German idealists-often ambiguous and scientifically naïve-to the philosophically motivated writings of revolutionary scientists. The logical empiricists' philosophy of nature and science, however, stands out for its ability to synthesize various forms of inquiries: while its roots reach deep into the neo-Kantian "Wissenschaftslehre" of its day, it was framed in the empiricist traditions of English philosophers and scientists of the modern era. It developed both traditions further with the help of Frege's and Russell's logic and amalgamated them with contemporary French thinking about the conventionalist theory and practice of science. (Katherine Dunlop discusses conventionalism in her contribution to this volume, especially with reference to Poincaré and Neurath.) As Hans Reichenbach (1931/1978, 383) claimed in his programmatic pamphlet on philosophy of nature, philosophy of nature constitutes a great triumph of rationalism.. .. However, modern philosophy of nature must also be regarded as a triumph of empiricism.. .. Modern empiricism does not contradict rationalism because knowledge is conceived as a system constructed by reason upon which experience exerts a regulative and selective influence.

Synthese, 2022

Our main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach's own naturalism in our cont... more Our main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach's own naturalism in our contemporary context, with special attention to competing versions of the concept. By exploring the idea of Reichenbach's naturalism, we will argue that he defended a liberating, therapeutic form of naturalism, meaning that he took scientific philosophy (or philosophy of nature, Naturphilosophie) to be a possible cure for bad old habits and traditional ways of philosophy. For Reichenbach, naturalistic scientific philosophy was a well-established form of liberation. We do not intend to suggest that Reichenbach acted as an inventor of naturalism; nonetheless, invoking the term and the idea of 'naturalism' is more than a simple rhetorical strategy for rehabilitating Reichenbach as a forerunner of this field. We think that his ideas can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates, and that he presents an interesting case among the other scientifically oriented proponents of his time. After presenting a short reconstruction of the meaning of naturalism-or, more appropriately, naturalisms-in order to be able to correctly situate Reichenbach within his own as well as a systematic context, we discuss Reichenbach's naturalism against the background of his scientific philosophy, his views on the relation of commonsense knowledge to science, and his efforts at popularization. To delve deeper into this topic, we present a case study to show how Reichenbach argued that in both scientific and philosophical discussions (assuming their naturalistic continuity), it is necessary to move from the request and value of truth to probability. And, finally, we argue that the liberation of knowledge and nature was a socio-political program for Reichenbach, who talked about his own scientific philosophy as "a crusade." By emphasizing this aspect of Reichenbach's naturalism, we may be in a better position to situate him in the history of analytic philosophy in general, and in the yet-to-bewritten narrative of the naturalistic movement in particular.

[

HOPOS: The Journal of the Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2021

Most accounts of "logical empiricism in America" take logical empiricism to be a monolithic, or a... more Most accounts of "logical empiricism in America" take logical empiricism to be a monolithic, or at least a one-dimensional, philosophical group. This picture of logical empiricism has come under well-reasoned attack during the past two decades, but some of the relevant conclusions for the reception-history of the movement were not drawn, or were not drawn as thoroughly as they could have been. Thus, if we want to understand the reception of logical empiricism, we should not talk about "the" reception of "logical empiricism" as such, but rather, should provide a more stratified and differently balanced account. This paper aims to draw the contours of one more stratified account, by pointing out differences in the reception-history of logical empiricism with respect to pragmatism in particular. Namely, I will examine and defend an account according to which the more pragmatist-naturalist wing of logical empiricism was welcomed by the majority of American pragmatists, while the more technical wing came immediately under pragmatist attack from various sides.

In Sebastian Lutz and Adam Tamas Tuboly (ed.), Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics. New York/London: Routledge, 2021

This paper details how, besides his work on theoretical physics, Philipp Frank continued to remai... more This paper details how, besides his work on theoretical physics, Philipp Frank continued to remain interested in the philosophical questions of physics throughout his entire career. While this interest surfaced in different forms in different periods, Frank's late approach (developed mainly in the United States) constituted a sophisticated and complex inquiry into what he called the "humanistic background of science". Frank argued that we need to understand the physical (or scientific) endeavor as a whole. In this project, as it turned out, metaphysics could play a crucial role. Frank's American activities thus involved two core issues: (1) interpreting metaphysics in a way that would make it a meaningful enterprise for empiricists; and (2) investigating to what extent metaphysics, in this interpretation, can contribute to a better understanding of the natural sciences. Using the results of the latter, Frank tried to bridge the gap between the natural and social sciences.

A.T. Tuboly (ed.), The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic (Palgrave), 2020

This chapter serves as an introduction to the content and context of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth ... more This chapter serves as an introduction to the content and context of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. It argues that Ayer's book did more than just misrepresent some of the theses of the Vienna Circle, but on the contrary, provided fresh insights into some of the debates among its members. While the influence of Ayer's book is undeniable, this chapter invites readers to reevaluate their knowledge about Ayer's work by reexamining his place and role in the history of analytic philosophy.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

In 1948, A.J. Ayer was attacked on the pages of The New Statesman and Nation magazine where it wa... more In 1948, A.J. Ayer was attacked on the pages of The New Statesman and Nation magazine where it was claimed that his views were partly responsible for increasingly Fascist attitudes at Oxford. Ayer was charged with promoting a philosophy of values (or one lacking therein) that allowed Fascism to fill the moral vacuum. Ayer noted that he knew who had written the article (and the ones that followed) and that this person had done so for entirely contingent and non-philosophical reasons. This paper aims to examine the historical context by discussing the article and the events that followed it; to show that the specific charges against Ayer were rooted in deeper philosophical/ practical issues, namely the nature and status of philosophy; and to demonstrate that logical empiricism, or rather logical positivism as a movement, was indeed especially sensitive to political issues.

History of European Ideas , 2020

Perspectives on Science, 2020

Science popularization might take different forms. In the early twentieth century, Sir James Jean... more Science popularization might take different forms. In the early twentieth century, Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington presented the most successful endeavors. Philosophers were highly unimpressed and disturbed by these popular works and various authors declared their disagreement with the physicists' philosophical books against their own philosophical background. I will discuss three different philosophers, L. Susan Stebbing, C. E. M. Joad and Philipp Frank, whose three lines of criticism represent three different forms of philosophy, social engagement, and scientific outlook. What is interesting is that there was a point when the most diverse philosophers (of science) agreed in contrast of their common enemy, namely, those popularizing scientists that have their reputation and use it to propagate false, or at least misleading views about science, culture, and values. What we shall see is how far this agreement went among these figures and how the divergent strategies culminated in very similar results regarding knowledge dissemination.

The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge: The Mission of Logical Empiricism (eds. Damböck - Tuboly), 2020

Jordi Cat and A. T. Tuboly (ed.) Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives. Cham: Springer., 2019

The Viennese-born polymath Otto Neurath died on 22 December 1945 in Oxford, a few months after th... more The Viennese-born polymath Otto Neurath died on 22 December 1945 in Oxford, a few months after the end of World War Two. A social engineer and sociologist of happiness, Neurath was not only a socially sensitive educator, advocating for any institute and organization that was concerned with the well-being of people; he was also a trained scientist and philosopher. Studying mathematics, economics, history, philosophy, and physics in Vienna and then in Berlin during the early years of the long twentieth century, Neurath became involved in many of the disputes among social and natural scientists that shaped the course of the fields.

Jordi Cat – Adam Tamas Tuboly (Eds.), Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives. Dordrecht: Springer.

The aim of this paper is to give a biographical, historical, and philosophical reconstruction of ... more The aim of this paper is to give a biographical, historical, and philosophical reconstruction of Neurath's final years in England. Besides reconstructing Neurath's arrival to England, in the context of his life and philosophical introduction at Oxford, I will argue that since the 1930s, Neurath was eager to develop a brand for logical empiricism. This brand was based not on theoretical commitments, but on practical considerations and decisions. Using a detailed case study on Neurath's relation to the Hungarian sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim, I show that the development of their connections documents how Neurath gave more and more priority to practical aims during his English years. Finally, the concluding section points to some further considerations on Neurath's legacy.

History and Philosophy of Logic, 2018

The aim of the paper is show that that W. V. O. Quine's animadversions against modal logic did no... more The aim of the paper is show that that W. V. O. Quine's animadversions against modal logic did not get the same attention that is considered to be the case nowadays. The community of logicians focused solely on the technical aspects of C. I. Lewis' systems and did not take Quine's arguments and remarks seriously – or at least seriously enough to respond. In order to assess Quine's place in the history, however, his relation to Carnap is considered since their notorious break was about the status of extensionality and modal logic (and analyticity was much more of a second issue). Since much of the works about the history of analytic philosophy is centered on the relationship of Quine and Carnap, their break about modality deserves much more attention – it also sheds some light on why should anyone wonder about Quine's early arguments against modal logic. The paper ends with some further considerations regarding the early formation of modal logic and hitherto unconsidered problematic issues.

The aim of this paper is to provide context for and historical exegesis of Carnap's alleged move ... more The aim of this paper is to provide context for and historical exegesis of Carnap's alleged move from syntax to semantics. The Orthodox Received View states that there was a radical break, while the Unorthodox Received View holds that Carnap's syntactical period already had many significant semantical elements. I will argue that both of them are partly right, both of them contains a kernel of truth: it is true that Carnap's semantical period started after his Logical Syntax of Language – in one sense of semantics. But it is also true, that Carnap had semantical ideas already in LSL: though not (just) in the sense as URV maintained it. This latter sense of semantics is related to what is usually called inferentialism, and by getting a clearer picture of Carnap's original aims, context, and concept-usage, we might be in a better position to approach his alleged inferentialism.

Studies in East European Thought, 2017

Studies in East European Thought, 2017

Keywords: Philipp Frank, sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, logical empiricism, philos... more Keywords: Philipp Frank, sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, logical empiricism, philosophy of science

Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy, edited by Peter Stone, 2017

The aim of this paper is consider the context and possible influences on Rudolf Carnap’s Principl... more The aim of this paper is consider the context and possible influences on Rudolf Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance (PoT). My thesis is the following: One can acknowledge the important influence of Hans Hahn, Karl Menger and Otto Neurath (i.e. the left wing of the Vienna Circle) along with Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann (i.e. the right wing of the Vienna Circle) and try to place the PoT in the context of Carnap’s immediate allies and opponents. But one can and actually have to locate it in a broader context, namely in the philosophy of logic of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. As is it less known, Russell introduced a certain pragmatic freedom into the considerations of logic but to obtain Carnap’s PoT we have to extend the boundaries of Russell’s freedom. To do this, Carnap accepted the idea of Wittgenstein, namely that logic is devoid of empirical content. Since logic is tautological (which Russell denied) we have the relevant freedom which resulted in the PoT. Hence Carnap’s writings about logic and philosophy in the 1930s could be seen and reconstructed as a(n either intended or unintended) syntheses or special combination of Russell’s inductive and pragmatical considerations on logic and Wittgenstein’s idea of an empty logic.

[If you refer to the paper, please send me a message.] The textbook-like history of analytic phil... more [If you refer to the paper, please send me a message.] The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, re-ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of ana-lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified modal logic and thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpreta-tion of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be presented here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal-logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further considera-tion.

[Please send me an email or a message if you are citing this paper, thank you very much.] The aim... more [Please send me an email or a message if you are citing this paper, thank you very much.] The aim of this paper is twofold: to consider Rudolf Carnap’s ideas about the so-called geistige Gegenstände, i.e. the products of the human mind in his Der logische Aufbau der Welt and to locate these considerations in the context of Hans Freyer. I will argue that if one takes a look at Hans Freyer’s Theorie des Objektiven Geistes and Carnap’s Aufbau the similarities are quite striking: taking into account their shared experiences in the German Youth Movement (Jugendwebegung), their continuous friendship and discussions from the early 1910s until 1933, the similarities seem not to be merely superficial or accidental. Consequently, when one considers the impact of Freyer and the so-called ‘Dilthey School’, even the continental and especially the German roots of Carnap’s Aufbau go much deeper than they are usually thought.

The last unpublished book manuscript of Philipp Frank from the Harvard Archives, edited by George... more The last unpublished book manuscript of Philipp Frank from the Harvard Archives, edited by George Reisch and Adam Tamas Tuboly. Forthcoming volume.

Palgrave Macmillan, 2020

A volume, discussing the history and philosophical relevance of Ayer's notorious LTL.

Organon F 26 (3): 318-540, 2019

Edited with Matteo Pascucci

A volume on Neurath's Life and Works, with the translation of Neurath's papers on logic and the e... more A volume on Neurath's Life and Works, with the translation of Neurath's papers on logic and the entire 1940-45 Carnap-Neurath correspondence

Ha a hétköznapi és tudományos gyakorlatainkra gondolunk, akkor tagadhatatlan a modalitás, a modál... more Ha a hétköznapi és tudományos gyakorlatainkra gondolunk, akkor tagadhatatlan a modalitás, a modális kifejezések -úgy, mint szükségszerű, lehetséges, lehetetlen, esetleges -kulcsfontosságú szerepe. Modális kifejezések segítségével intjük egymást óvatosságra és figyelmeztetjük a másikat, a lehetőségekbe vetett hiteink késztetnek minket megbánásra, ez által pedig befolyásoló erővel bírnak erkölcsi érzéseinkre. Továbbá a különféle törvényszerűségek megfogalmazása során is modális kifejezésekre támaszkodunk, és a segítségükkel bástyázzuk körbe a legszigorúbbnak ítélt tudományainkat, a matematikát és a logikát. A könyvben Tuboly Ádám Tamás a modális kifejezéseket leíró logikának, a modális logikának a huszadk századi történetével foglalkozik, kiváltképp W. V. O. Quine logikai és filozófiai kritikáit veszi górcső alá és mutat rá arra, hogy azokat sokáig félreértették, így téves és félrevezető "bevett nézetek" alakultak ki. A kötet különösebb logikai előképzettség nélkül is olvasható, és igényt tarthat mindazok figyelmére, akik a huszadik századi logika és filozófia története iránt érdeklődnek.

Előzetes tartalomjegyzék.

Budapest: MTA BTK Filozófiai Intézet, 2018

History and Philosophy of Logic , 2020

Journal of Economic Methodology , 2019

Review of Radical Political Economics, 2019

Review of Michael Turk's Otto Neurath and the History of Economics.

Comparative and Continental Philosophy, 2019

Romanticism, Hellenism, and the Philosophy of Nature

Philosophy in Review, 2019

Review of Kevin C. Elliott's Tapestry of Values

Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy, 2018

Forthcoming in Kriterion

Philosophy in Review, 2019

Forthcoming in Philosophy in Review

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2018

After his thoroughgoing review of the torturous map of Nietzsche's texts, van Tongeren devotes th... more After his thoroughgoing review of the torturous map of Nietzsche's texts, van Tongeren devotes the latter portions of the book to the history of the reception of Nietzsche's nihilism, with particular attention to the thought of Martin Heidegger (pp. 104-14), Gianni Vattimo (pp. 115-22), and Wolfgang Müller-Lauter (as a representative of the ranks of Nietzsche's most recent interpreters). The writing style does not make this book an easy read, but its rich content makes study of it deeply worthwhile.

Philosophy in Review, 2019

Forthcoming

HOPOS

Review of Husserl, Cassirer, Schlick: “Wissenschaftliche Philosophie” im Spannungsfeld von Phänom... more Review of Husserl, Cassirer, Schlick: “Wissenschaftliche Philosophie” im Spannungsfeld von Phänomenologie, Neukantianismus und logischem Empirismus; Logical Empiricism and Pragmatism; The Significance of the Lvov- Warsaw School in the European Culture.

Berlin Review of Books

http://berlinbooks.org/brb/2017/06/unity-inter-nationalism-and-science/

Once upon a time, logical empiricism, or logical positivism, was buried under its (allegedly) def... more Once upon a time, logical empiricism, or logical positivism, was buried under its (allegedly) defeated, dogmatic, intellectualist and abstract-technical package of problems and paradoxes. As a prominent member of the movement, after his death in 1945, Otto Neurath was regarded also as a bad guy, a narrow-minded logical positivist. He was attacked from various angles already: in the early-and mid-1940s, the New York philosopher, Horace Kallen eagerly insisted that Neurath was a(n at least pink) fellow-traveler and his ideal of social and economic planning was not compatible with the democratic, liberal, and anti-communist era of the (Cold War) United States. But Neurath had problems also with his Vienna Circle friends: Moritz Schlick and Carl G. Hempel claimed that his style was commercial-like, ambiguous, lacking solid and precise argumentations; he fell out with Rudolf Carnap over semantics and probability, furthermore disliked Friedrich Waismann's and Herbert Feigl's uncritical attraction towards Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was no accident that Neurath's usual signature at the end of his letters was a huge and clumsy elephant.

Workshop Abstract The aim of the Workshop is to throw light on the history of logic in Central an... more Workshop Abstract The aim of the Workshop is to throw light on the history of logic in Central and Eastern Europe through the reception of Hilbert's axiomatic method. It will be held in Brno at the