Edward A Lenzo | Muhlenberg College (original) (raw)
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Papers by Edward A Lenzo
I no longer subscribe to the main claims, methods, and overall orientation of this manuscript.
Middle Voices, 2022
In recent years, there have been a number of attempts to connect enactivism with the work of Emma... more In recent years, there have been a number of attempts to connect enactivism with the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This essay is such an attempt. Its major theme is the relationship between affectivity and ethics. My touchstones in enactivist thought are Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrances’ “Emotion and Ethics: an (inter-)enactive account” (2009) and the influential concept of participatory sense-making developed by Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). With respect to Levinas, I deploy major insights from Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. I first show that enactivist thought (thus represented) and Levinas roughly agree on three points: the fundamentality of human affectivity; the ethical significance of affective response to the other; the interpersonal nature of sense-making. I then consider some difficulties with Colombetti and Torrance’s conception of interaction-responsibility, which is based on De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s formulation of interaction-autonomy, and use Levinas to draw attention to the role of passivity and asymmetry in interaction in a way so far overlooked by enactivist thinkers. Working through a problem case yields insights for both perspectives. I argue, first, that ethics does not arise from interaction but instead should be considered foundational for interaction as such. Second, we must distinguish between a participant and observer perspective on interaction in a way not yet carried out by enactivist thinkers. Third, the method of enactivist research exemplified by Colombetti and Torrance can help make phenomenologically manifest important insights into Levinas’ difficult concept of “the third”.
In Christian Tewes & Giovanna Stanghellini (eds.), Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches. Cambridge, UK: (forthcoming), 2020
Studies of depression indicate the existence of temporal abnormalities, particularly as related t... more Studies of depression indicate the existence of temporal abnormalities, particularly as related to the perspectival and agentive aspects of lived experience in persons who undergo depression. With reference to these anomalies, there is a long-standing view in phenomenological psychopathology, reinforced by empirical studies, that depression involves a disruption of “intrinsic temporality.” This view is widely incorporated into contemporary enactivist approaches to cognition, which link such a disruption to disorders involving affect, affordances, and narrative aspects of experience. We argue that classical phenomenological accounts of temporal abnormalities in depression do not warrant the supposition of a disruption to “intrinsic temporality,” and that this term itself is ambiguous. Instead, we understand depressive experience primarily in terms of affectivity, which does indeed feedback into the experience of lived time. Our view demonstrates a deeper consensus between phenomenological psychopathology and “4E” approaches, including work on both Gibsonian affordances and narrative, than is typically recognized.
Through explicating Husserlian time-form, I provide a precise analysis of Shaun Gallagher's "mini... more Through explicating Husserlian time-form, I provide a precise analysis of Shaun Gallagher's "minimal sense of agency" and his correspondent understanding of schizophrenic alienation phenomena, e.g., thought insertion and delusions of bodily control. I argue that Husserlian time-form - which Gallagher takes a foundational for his account of schizophrenic alienation phenomena - is incompatible with Gallagher's account: Gallagher's central notion referred to as "protentional malfunction" is impossible, and grounded in a misunderstanding of time-form as a kind (or kinds) of causal mechanism.
Gallagher is right, however, to look to time-form and future-directedness for an understanding of schizophrenic alienation. Using this insight and my explication of time-form, I propose an alternative description and explanation of schizophrenic alienation phenomena (drawn heavily from Husserlian notions of synthesis and Humean principles of association), and demonstrate how my account might be used to drive our philosophic and scientific investigation of schizophrenia.
Thesis Chapters by Edward A Lenzo
Master's Thesis, 2014. Disclaimer: My views have changed drastically since writing this paper. Wh... more Master's Thesis, 2014. Disclaimer: My views have changed drastically since writing this paper. While I still endorse some of its claims, I disavow others.
The central work of this thesis is to compare and contrast two phenomenological notions of self: the minimal self, a Husserlian notion articulated by Dan Zahavi, and SESMET, as developed by Galen Strawson. The minimal self conception takes the self to be a kind of diachronically unified owner of experience and agent of action, but takes unification and ownership to entail more than may be justified. Strawson neglects to construe diachronicity appropriately, misconstruing the phenomenological nature of the stream and rejecting agency in toto, but covertly reintroduces agency in a metaphysical guise. Neither conception is an appropriate notion of self, but I propose a “hybrid” account that incorporates appropriately nuanced views of persistence and agency. I conclude by suggesting potential problems for this view, while highlighting its applications.
In Chapter 1 I explicate and critique Strawson’s SESMET, detailing its insights into the investigation of self and developing concerns with the account. In Chapter 2 I analyze Edmund Husserl’s account of internal time-consciousness, which serves as the foundation of Zahavi’s minimal self. In Chapter 3 I link this Husserlian framework to the basic sense of self (the feeling of being a self), proceeding by philosophical and psychopathological considerations, clearly define the minimal self, compare it to SESMET, and argue that these notions are prima facie equally legitimate. In Chapter 4 I contrast these notions, focusing on issues raised throughout and the resolutions available for each “self”. I reject both notions, but use their respective strengths and weaknesses to propose a promising hybrid view. I then suggest possible faults of this view.
Teaching Documents by Edward A Lenzo
In the Hymn of Creation, the Rg Veda poses the question: 'What precedes and explains being? What ... more In the Hymn of Creation, the Rg Veda poses the question: 'What precedes and explains being? What is its efficient and material cause? Is it non-being, or (prior) being?' In that passage, the question is understood as a paradox - something cannot come from nothing, but it seems we have an infinite regress on our hands if being comes from prior being - and the answer is left a mystery.
The Advaita Vedantins provide an answer to this fundamental metaphysical question. This document is an overview of this response, with an emphasis on epistemology, metaphysics, and soteriology. The document was prepared as an aid in teaching undergraduate Indian Philosophy
I no longer subscribe to the main claims, methods, and overall orientation of this manuscript.
Middle Voices, 2022
In recent years, there have been a number of attempts to connect enactivism with the work of Emma... more In recent years, there have been a number of attempts to connect enactivism with the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This essay is such an attempt. Its major theme is the relationship between affectivity and ethics. My touchstones in enactivist thought are Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrances’ “Emotion and Ethics: an (inter-)enactive account” (2009) and the influential concept of participatory sense-making developed by Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). With respect to Levinas, I deploy major insights from Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. I first show that enactivist thought (thus represented) and Levinas roughly agree on three points: the fundamentality of human affectivity; the ethical significance of affective response to the other; the interpersonal nature of sense-making. I then consider some difficulties with Colombetti and Torrance’s conception of interaction-responsibility, which is based on De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s formulation of interaction-autonomy, and use Levinas to draw attention to the role of passivity and asymmetry in interaction in a way so far overlooked by enactivist thinkers. Working through a problem case yields insights for both perspectives. I argue, first, that ethics does not arise from interaction but instead should be considered foundational for interaction as such. Second, we must distinguish between a participant and observer perspective on interaction in a way not yet carried out by enactivist thinkers. Third, the method of enactivist research exemplified by Colombetti and Torrance can help make phenomenologically manifest important insights into Levinas’ difficult concept of “the third”.
In Christian Tewes & Giovanna Stanghellini (eds.), Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches. Cambridge, UK: (forthcoming), 2020
Studies of depression indicate the existence of temporal abnormalities, particularly as related t... more Studies of depression indicate the existence of temporal abnormalities, particularly as related to the perspectival and agentive aspects of lived experience in persons who undergo depression. With reference to these anomalies, there is a long-standing view in phenomenological psychopathology, reinforced by empirical studies, that depression involves a disruption of “intrinsic temporality.” This view is widely incorporated into contemporary enactivist approaches to cognition, which link such a disruption to disorders involving affect, affordances, and narrative aspects of experience. We argue that classical phenomenological accounts of temporal abnormalities in depression do not warrant the supposition of a disruption to “intrinsic temporality,” and that this term itself is ambiguous. Instead, we understand depressive experience primarily in terms of affectivity, which does indeed feedback into the experience of lived time. Our view demonstrates a deeper consensus between phenomenological psychopathology and “4E” approaches, including work on both Gibsonian affordances and narrative, than is typically recognized.
Through explicating Husserlian time-form, I provide a precise analysis of Shaun Gallagher's "mini... more Through explicating Husserlian time-form, I provide a precise analysis of Shaun Gallagher's "minimal sense of agency" and his correspondent understanding of schizophrenic alienation phenomena, e.g., thought insertion and delusions of bodily control. I argue that Husserlian time-form - which Gallagher takes a foundational for his account of schizophrenic alienation phenomena - is incompatible with Gallagher's account: Gallagher's central notion referred to as "protentional malfunction" is impossible, and grounded in a misunderstanding of time-form as a kind (or kinds) of causal mechanism.
Gallagher is right, however, to look to time-form and future-directedness for an understanding of schizophrenic alienation. Using this insight and my explication of time-form, I propose an alternative description and explanation of schizophrenic alienation phenomena (drawn heavily from Husserlian notions of synthesis and Humean principles of association), and demonstrate how my account might be used to drive our philosophic and scientific investigation of schizophrenia.
Master's Thesis, 2014. Disclaimer: My views have changed drastically since writing this paper. Wh... more Master's Thesis, 2014. Disclaimer: My views have changed drastically since writing this paper. While I still endorse some of its claims, I disavow others.
The central work of this thesis is to compare and contrast two phenomenological notions of self: the minimal self, a Husserlian notion articulated by Dan Zahavi, and SESMET, as developed by Galen Strawson. The minimal self conception takes the self to be a kind of diachronically unified owner of experience and agent of action, but takes unification and ownership to entail more than may be justified. Strawson neglects to construe diachronicity appropriately, misconstruing the phenomenological nature of the stream and rejecting agency in toto, but covertly reintroduces agency in a metaphysical guise. Neither conception is an appropriate notion of self, but I propose a “hybrid” account that incorporates appropriately nuanced views of persistence and agency. I conclude by suggesting potential problems for this view, while highlighting its applications.
In Chapter 1 I explicate and critique Strawson’s SESMET, detailing its insights into the investigation of self and developing concerns with the account. In Chapter 2 I analyze Edmund Husserl’s account of internal time-consciousness, which serves as the foundation of Zahavi’s minimal self. In Chapter 3 I link this Husserlian framework to the basic sense of self (the feeling of being a self), proceeding by philosophical and psychopathological considerations, clearly define the minimal self, compare it to SESMET, and argue that these notions are prima facie equally legitimate. In Chapter 4 I contrast these notions, focusing on issues raised throughout and the resolutions available for each “self”. I reject both notions, but use their respective strengths and weaknesses to propose a promising hybrid view. I then suggest possible faults of this view.
In the Hymn of Creation, the Rg Veda poses the question: 'What precedes and explains being? What ... more In the Hymn of Creation, the Rg Veda poses the question: 'What precedes and explains being? What is its efficient and material cause? Is it non-being, or (prior) being?' In that passage, the question is understood as a paradox - something cannot come from nothing, but it seems we have an infinite regress on our hands if being comes from prior being - and the answer is left a mystery.
The Advaita Vedantins provide an answer to this fundamental metaphysical question. This document is an overview of this response, with an emphasis on epistemology, metaphysics, and soteriology. The document was prepared as an aid in teaching undergraduate Indian Philosophy