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Books by J. F. Humphrey
Depoliticization: The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism follows in the path blazed by Hann... more Depoliticization: The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism follows in the path blazed by Hannah Arendt and Cornelius Castoriadis, where politics is seen as a mode of freedom; the possibility for individuals to consciously and explicitly create the institutions of their own societies. Starting with such problem as: What is capital? How can we characterize the dominant economic system? What are the conditions for its existence, and how can we create alternatives?, the articles examine the central institutions of modern Western societies, market capitalism, representative liberal democracy, and science. To elucidate the problem of depoliticization, the authors engage a number of thinkers from Karl Marx, Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen to Cornelius Castoriadis, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Stanley Kubrick.
Table of Contents
Introduction – Ingerid S. Straume and J. F. Humphrey
PART I: ECONOMY
The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism – Ingerid S. Straume
Capitalism in Context: Sources, Trajectories, and Alternatives – Johann P. Arnason
Castoriadis, Veblen, and the ‘Power Theory of Capital – D. T. Cochrane
From Market Economy to Capitalistic Planned Economy – Anders Lundkvist
The Transcendental Power of Money – J. F. Humphrey
PART II: POLITICS
Jacques Rancière and the Question of Political Subjectivization – Kåre Blinkenberg
Foucault, Relativism, and Political Action – Mogens Chrom Jacobsen
‘Learning’ and Signification in Neoliberal Governance – Ingerid S. Straume
Deterioration of Trust: The Political Warning in Kubrick’s “Eyes Wide Shut” – Håvard Friis Nilsen
Papers by J. F. Humphrey
Partnerships: A Journal of Service-Learning & Civic Engagement,
Democracy, to be fully realized as inclusive and participatory, requires public spaces in which d... more Democracy, to be fully realized as inclusive and participatory, requires public spaces in which different views are able to be spoken and heard, and where opinions are formed and informed through interactions among people with diverse interests. This article considers how a multi-institutional/community collaborative course set out to both teach democratic thinking and model democratic processes. In doing so, we consider how the curriculum, teaching style, and activities in one course, Reclaiming Democracy, have been designed to resist the many forms of exclusion that exist both in higher education and community settings. Just as the course has been developed in partnership with six professors, a community organizer, and past students, so too has this article been created, written, edited, and revised by the six faculty members of the teaching team; hence, it is a multi-vocal presentation representing the goals, values, and outcomes of this way of teaching. We focus on what political philosopher Iris Marion Young calls the greeting, rhetoric, and narrative as communicative features that could improve the quality of public discussion and deliberation. Pairing that understanding with Westheimer and Kahne’s three models of citizenship and the curricular models designed to foster them, we specify a number of our own pedagogical choices, offer some examples of student responses, and consider other examples of democratic inclusiveness from the course. Taken together, we argue that these practices make for a rich, democratically engaging and fun experience and may effectively motivate students to seek out and form other democratic communities throughout the course of their lives.
REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE TRANSCENDENTAL CHARACTER OF MONEY: AN EXPOSITION OF KARL ... more REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE TRANSCENDENTAL CHARACTER OF MONEY:
AN EXPOSITION OF KARL MARX’S ARGUMENT IN THE GRUNDRISSE
Abstract
An exposition of Karl Marx’s argument in the Grundrisse for the logical development of money, this essay is divided into three parts. Since Marx is concerned to distinguish himself and his method from that of the seventeenth century political economists, I begin my paper with a brief reflection on “the scientifically correct method: or the “theoretical method” (Grundrisse 100). In this context, Marx argues against the historical method of the seventeenth century political economists, because this approach has failed to distinguish the concepts relevant to an understanding of political economics. Instead of beginning with the “imagined concrete” (i.e., concepts like “population,” “class,” etc.), Marx maintains that according to the correct scientific method the concrete is something to be attained. Reality is not transparent to the understanding; it is not immediately accessible to political economists; reality must be understood. Beginning with the simplest determinations, the political economist brings chaotic conceptions to conceptual clarity by identifying “a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations” which “lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought” (Grundrisse 100 and 101). Hence, political economists do not produce reality as the product of thought; rather, they proceed correctly by conceptualizing reality in thought.
The second part of this paper considers how Marx justifies beginning his reflection with the concept of production in general. To understand the importance that Marx attributes to production, one must also appreciate the way in which distribution, exchange, and consumption belong to the sphere of production. Indeed, in his “Introduction” to the Grundrisse Marx is concerned to demonstrate the way in which previous political economists have gone astray in separating distribution, exchange and consumption from production in general. Marx, however, does not argue that “production, distribution, exchange, and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality; they are distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well” (Grundrisse, p. 99). In the remaining pages of this section of my paper, then, I attempt to reconstruct Marx’s argument for the way in which these concepts (distribution, exchange, and consumption) are to be understood in relation to the sphere of production.
Finally, in the last part of this paper identifies four conceptual moments of money as it moves from a mere medium of exchange to a commodity necessary for the productive process. The four following moments of money are discussed: 1) Money as the “measure of commodity exchange” (Grundrisse, p. 146); 2) Money as the “medium of exchange” (Grundrisse, p. 146); 3) Money as the “representative of commodities” (Grundrisse, p. 146); and 4) Money as a “general commodity along side particular commodities” (Grundrisse, p. 146).
Book Reviews by J. F. Humphrey
Depoliticization: The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism follows in the path blazed by Hann... more Depoliticization: The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism follows in the path blazed by Hannah Arendt and Cornelius Castoriadis, where politics is seen as a mode of freedom; the possibility for individuals to consciously and explicitly create the institutions of their own societies. Starting with such problem as: What is capital? How can we characterize the dominant economic system? What are the conditions for its existence, and how can we create alternatives?, the articles examine the central institutions of modern Western societies, market capitalism, representative liberal democracy, and science. To elucidate the problem of depoliticization, the authors engage a number of thinkers from Karl Marx, Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen to Cornelius Castoriadis, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Stanley Kubrick.
Table of Contents
Introduction – Ingerid S. Straume and J. F. Humphrey
PART I: ECONOMY
The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism – Ingerid S. Straume
Capitalism in Context: Sources, Trajectories, and Alternatives – Johann P. Arnason
Castoriadis, Veblen, and the ‘Power Theory of Capital – D. T. Cochrane
From Market Economy to Capitalistic Planned Economy – Anders Lundkvist
The Transcendental Power of Money – J. F. Humphrey
PART II: POLITICS
Jacques Rancière and the Question of Political Subjectivization – Kåre Blinkenberg
Foucault, Relativism, and Political Action – Mogens Chrom Jacobsen
‘Learning’ and Signification in Neoliberal Governance – Ingerid S. Straume
Deterioration of Trust: The Political Warning in Kubrick’s “Eyes Wide Shut” – Håvard Friis Nilsen
Partnerships: A Journal of Service-Learning & Civic Engagement,
Democracy, to be fully realized as inclusive and participatory, requires public spaces in which d... more Democracy, to be fully realized as inclusive and participatory, requires public spaces in which different views are able to be spoken and heard, and where opinions are formed and informed through interactions among people with diverse interests. This article considers how a multi-institutional/community collaborative course set out to both teach democratic thinking and model democratic processes. In doing so, we consider how the curriculum, teaching style, and activities in one course, Reclaiming Democracy, have been designed to resist the many forms of exclusion that exist both in higher education and community settings. Just as the course has been developed in partnership with six professors, a community organizer, and past students, so too has this article been created, written, edited, and revised by the six faculty members of the teaching team; hence, it is a multi-vocal presentation representing the goals, values, and outcomes of this way of teaching. We focus on what political philosopher Iris Marion Young calls the greeting, rhetoric, and narrative as communicative features that could improve the quality of public discussion and deliberation. Pairing that understanding with Westheimer and Kahne’s three models of citizenship and the curricular models designed to foster them, we specify a number of our own pedagogical choices, offer some examples of student responses, and consider other examples of democratic inclusiveness from the course. Taken together, we argue that these practices make for a rich, democratically engaging and fun experience and may effectively motivate students to seek out and form other democratic communities throughout the course of their lives.
REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE TRANSCENDENTAL CHARACTER OF MONEY: AN EXPOSITION OF KARL ... more REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE TRANSCENDENTAL CHARACTER OF MONEY:
AN EXPOSITION OF KARL MARX’S ARGUMENT IN THE GRUNDRISSE
Abstract
An exposition of Karl Marx’s argument in the Grundrisse for the logical development of money, this essay is divided into three parts. Since Marx is concerned to distinguish himself and his method from that of the seventeenth century political economists, I begin my paper with a brief reflection on “the scientifically correct method: or the “theoretical method” (Grundrisse 100). In this context, Marx argues against the historical method of the seventeenth century political economists, because this approach has failed to distinguish the concepts relevant to an understanding of political economics. Instead of beginning with the “imagined concrete” (i.e., concepts like “population,” “class,” etc.), Marx maintains that according to the correct scientific method the concrete is something to be attained. Reality is not transparent to the understanding; it is not immediately accessible to political economists; reality must be understood. Beginning with the simplest determinations, the political economist brings chaotic conceptions to conceptual clarity by identifying “a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations” which “lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought” (Grundrisse 100 and 101). Hence, political economists do not produce reality as the product of thought; rather, they proceed correctly by conceptualizing reality in thought.
The second part of this paper considers how Marx justifies beginning his reflection with the concept of production in general. To understand the importance that Marx attributes to production, one must also appreciate the way in which distribution, exchange, and consumption belong to the sphere of production. Indeed, in his “Introduction” to the Grundrisse Marx is concerned to demonstrate the way in which previous political economists have gone astray in separating distribution, exchange and consumption from production in general. Marx, however, does not argue that “production, distribution, exchange, and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality; they are distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well” (Grundrisse, p. 99). In the remaining pages of this section of my paper, then, I attempt to reconstruct Marx’s argument for the way in which these concepts (distribution, exchange, and consumption) are to be understood in relation to the sphere of production.
Finally, in the last part of this paper identifies four conceptual moments of money as it moves from a mere medium of exchange to a commodity necessary for the productive process. The four following moments of money are discussed: 1) Money as the “measure of commodity exchange” (Grundrisse, p. 146); 2) Money as the “medium of exchange” (Grundrisse, p. 146); 3) Money as the “representative of commodities” (Grundrisse, p. 146); and 4) Money as a “general commodity along side particular commodities” (Grundrisse, p. 146).
Two Paradigms in Plato’s Theaetetus J. F. Humphrey In four previous papers, “Socrates’ In... more Two Paradigms in Plato’s Theaetetus
J. F. Humphrey
In four previous papers, “Socrates’ Interpretation of His Own Wisdom,” “Socrates and Achilles: A Shift in Paradigms,” and “Plato’s Paradigm in the Apology of Socrates” I have been concerned with Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher as represented in the character of Socrates. In particular, I have examined what Socrates means when claims that the god used his name in order to make him a pattern [paradeigma], “as if he would say, ‘That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom’” (Ap. 23a-b). Considering Socrates as the paradigm of the philosopher, led to an investigation of Socrates’ allusion to Achilleus, the paradigmatic warrior in the Apology (Ap. 28b-29a), where Socrates implies that the philosopher, the paradigmatic rational individual, should replace the warrior, the paradigmatic individual governed by thymos. But just what sort of paradigm is Socrates? Juxtaposing Socrates to Achilles, on the one hand, and to Oedipus, who for Sophocles is the unenviable paradigm of human beings because he is mortal and enjoys only fleeting happiness, on the other, I argued that instead of suffering his fate, Socrates embraces it and thus becomes enviable because, in the face of the limits of human finitude, he is a paradigm of a life guided by and subject to reason – a noble human life that, by embracing the human condition, transcends it. Consideration of Plato’s paradigm of Socrates the philosopher led me to ask what precisely does Plato mean by “paradigm”? Hence, in a fourth paper, “Plato’s Republic: The Polis as a Paradigm,” I examined Plato’s use of the word “paradigm” in the Republic V where Socrates asks, “Weren’t we … also making a paradeigma in speech of a good city?” (472d-e). There I argued that the city in speech is a paradigm that, according to Socrates, is absent in the life of evil individuals, but is one on which good individuals may model their lives.
In this paper, I shall return to Plato’s conception of a “paradigm,” not as it appears in the Apology, nor the Republic. Instead, I will consider the two paradigms that Socrates identifies in the Theaetetus in the context of “a digression” (177b-c): “the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched” (176e). While Socrates does not develop these two paradigms in the dialogue, we can understand them in light of his conversation with Glaucon in Republic III where he distinguishes the individual who has “a good soul” from the one who is “clever and suspicions” and has “done many unjust things” (409c-d). Focusing on these two paradigms, we will see that the first paradigm, the divine, is the life of the philosopher and the second, the life of the evil individual who has only a confused paradigm within his or her soul. Moreover, each individual must “pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and … unless they depart from their ‘cleverness,’ the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves – evil men associating with evil …” (Theaetetus, 177a). Thus, I will argue that the use of “paradigm” in the Theaetetus is consistent with Plato’s use of the term in the Republic; indeed, understanding the two paradigms in the former work amplifies our understanding and appreciation of the importance of paradigms in the Republic and the Apology.
"Title: What kind of Community? An Inquiry into Teaching Practices that move Beyond Exclusion ... more "Title: What kind of Community? An Inquiry into Teaching Practices that move Beyond Exclusion
In Inclusion and Democracy, Iris Marion Young distinguishes between external exclusion in a decision-making process from internal exclusion. External exclusion happens when people “are kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making.” The more subtle way people are often effectively excluded from decision-making is through what Young calls “internal exclusion,” that is, “ways that people lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making.”
“Reclaiming Democracy” was intentionally designed in content and structure, not merely to recognize the problem of exclusion, but to act to combat—and to teach others to combat—both forms of exclusion. After articulating the problem of exclusion and what “inclusive” political communication looks like for Young, this panel will describe the course, its founding, and how its very structure moves beyond external exclusions. It will also describe how the curriculum, style and day-to-day activities of the course set out to combat internal exclusions that might otherwise hamper the real partnerships and real learning that occurs in the course. We will conclude with a discussion of the kind of community we try to create in the class, the challenges we faced, and how this experience encourages students to practice and to improve their democratic thinking.
Now heading into its fourth iteration, “Reclaiming Democracy” is a multi-institutional/community partnership intended to engage students and community members in local questions about democracy, about what makes it possible, what makes it likely, what barriers exist to enacting democracy in the local community. The class is co-taught by faculty at 6 different institutions of higher learning and a community activist, and the students enrolled in the class come from all 6 institutions and from the community at large. The course thus brings together public and private schools, HBCU’s and non-HBCU’s, large schools and small schools, and members of the community who are not currently enrolled in school. This panel will focus on its last iteration, which examined the role of education in Greensboro, NC (USA) and the relationship between education and democracy. The bringing together of such a diverse group of people makes it possible to discuss, for example, racial inequality in education with those who have been very privileged and those who have been much less privileged by our current educational institutions and practices in ways that would be largely impossible on many of the campuses that participate in the course. This is made all the more vivid with the inclusion of members of the Greensboro community, who range in age from college age to into their 70’s, and often speak powerfully about their own experiences with democracy and the challenges to democracy in Greensboro.
The panel will then take up several ways the course addresses the more subtle problem of internal exclusion; we will follow Young’s threefold distinction to discuss how we have set up: 1. greetings, the “condition for all solidarity,” including sharing snacks, sharing music and other gestures of goodwill; 2. the “affirmative uses of rhetoric” which allows everyone to “fashion claims and arguments in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation,” and 3. opportunities for everyone in the class to offer “narrative and situated knowledge” and thus to engage and let others engage in ways that open people up to listen to others, focusing on one of the initial assignments, a discussion of and an autoethnographic writing framed by Jean Anyon’s “Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work.”
Finally, we will explore the implication of Westheimer and Kahne’s article, “What Kind of Citizen? The Politics of Educating for Democracy”; these authors argue that different teachers and different courses often teach for different types of citizens. Here, we acknowledge an analogy: that different types of learning communities prepare students for different types of extra-curricular communities. We will thus conclude by describing the type of community that we are trying to create and to prepare students for and describe the thinking necessary to be successful therein. We will also describe the challenges to doing so.
This abstract was written by Professor Stephen Bloch-Schulman, Department of Philosophy, Elon University"
Reclaiming Democracy was a course offered in the Fall, 2011 that involved approximately 90 studen... more Reclaiming Democracy was a course offered in the Fall, 2011 that involved approximately 90 students.
Reclaiming Democracy draws on multiple academic disciplines to examine and model democracy. The course brings together students from Bennett College, Elon University, Greensboro College, Guilford College, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, the University of North Carolina, Greensboro and the greater Greensboro community.
To understand what we mean by “democracy,” we explore the different traditions that drive public policy, governance, and citizen engagement. As we turn our gaze toward democracy in Greensboro more specifically, we consider the city’s rich history in civil rights and economic justice, as well as the even more powerful desire for civility that has impacted our ability to have deep, community-wide discussion of the area’s struggles.
Participants in the class learn together within a large classroom and also in smaller study groups. We use interactive technology to stimulate pre-class questions and discussions for that week’s readings.
To set the tone for communal engagement, we augment traditional academic learning with other experiences within music, stories, film, and creativity of other sorts.
The class approaches our study through the following broad questions:
What is democracy?
In what ways is Greensboro democratic/undemocratic?
What is the role of education in a democratic society?
What is the role of democracy in education?
What do these considerations require of us?
In our presentation, we discussed both the pleasures and the challenges of teaching an interdisciplinary course involving students from very different campus environments and cultures.
2011 SAGP CONFERENCE PAPER PLATO’S PARADIGM in the Apology of Socrates Abstract J. F. Humphrey... more 2011 SAGP CONFERENCE PAPER
PLATO’S PARADIGM in the Apology of Socrates
Abstract
J. F. Humphrey, Ph.D.
In Plato’s Apology of Socrates, Socrates tells the jury that when Chaerephon went to the Oracle at Delphi to ask whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates, the Pythia responded that there was no one wiser. Socrates explains that since he knew he was not wise – “either much or little” (Ap. 21b), he attempted to disprove the oracle. He describes how he tested the divination by going to those presumed to be wise the politician, the poets, and the manual artisans. While he does not consider himself wise, after questioning the politician he realizes that although neither he nor the politician knew “anything noble and good” (Ap. 21d), the politician believed that he knew when he did not know; hence, Socrates concludes, he is a little wiser than this man because he does not suppose that he knows when he does not know. After the politician, he next went to the poets. To demonstrate that there are others wiser than he was, Socrates studied their poems and questioned them thoroughly about the meaning of their work. However, he is disappointed to discover that “almost everyone present … would have spoken better than the poets did about the poetry that they themselves had made” (Ap. 22b). The poets “do not make what they make by wisdom, but by some sort of nature and while inspired (phusei tini kai enthousiazontes), like the diviners and those who deliver oracles. For they too say many noble things, but they know nothing of what they speak” (Ap. 22b-c). Furthermore, because of their poetry, the poets believe themselves to be wise in other subjects, but they were not. Thus, from his encounters with the poets Socrates draws a similar conclusion as the one he drew from his experience with the politician – he was wiser than the poets because he did not claim to know what he did not know. Finally, Socrates explains, he went to the manual artisans believing “that they, at least, had knowledge of many noble things” (Ap. 22d). Even though each artisan has a techne and is defined by this techne, they are no different than the poets; they suppose that because they are able to perform their particular techne, they must be wise “in other things, the greatest things” (Ap. 22d). Hence, Socrates concludes that he is better off being as he is – admitting that he does not know when he does not know, than being like the artisans, who have a techne, but who believe that because of this knowledge they have wisdom, i.e., knowledge of the greatest things. From these experiences, Socrates gives an interpretation of his own wisdom. “It is probable,” Socrates claims, “that really the god is wise, and that in this oracle he is saying that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. And he appears to say this of Socrates and to have made use of my name in order to make me a pattern (paradeigma), as if he would say, “That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom” (Ap. 23a-b). Similarly, in Plato’s Republic (Book IX, 592a-b) Socrates tells Glaucon that the polis in speech is not really meant to be an actuality; rather, it is a “pattern (paradeigma) … laid up for the man who wants to see and found a city within himself on the basis of what he sees. It doesn’t make any difference whether it is or will be somewhere. For he [the good man] would mind the things of this city alone, and of no other.”
In this paper, I examine the nature of the paradigms that Socrates employs in these two claims: 1) that he himself is a paradigm of the wisest man because he admits that he does not know when he does not know and 2) that the polis is a paradigm to which one might look if one desires to see and found a city within oneself. I will argue that for Plato’s Socrates, a paradigm is not a form (eidos). Additionally, I shall argue that in Plato’s Republic a paradigm, according to Socrates, is absent in the life of the evil person, but that in the life of the good person it is a pattern according to which he or she may model his or her life. Focusing on paradigms raises questions about their ontological and epistemic status and about our understanding of Socrates and the philosophic task. Indeed, we must consider the possibility that the Apology of Socrates is not really Socrates’ attempt to defend himself from the charges brought against him, but a defense of the life devoted to philosophy, i.e., a defense of philosophy. And that the Republic is not intended to found an ‘ideal polis’ as so many have claimed, but an attempt to defend the life devoted to justice.
Submitted by:
John Fredrick Humphrey,
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University
Department of Liberal Studies
A-311 New Classroom Building
1601 E. Market Street
Greensboro, North Carolina 27411
In Plato's Apology, Socrates distinguishes two sets of accusers: the first accusers and the later... more In Plato's Apology, Socrates distinguishes two sets of accusers: the first accusers and the later accusers (18 b). Although the first set of accusers did not actually bring the philosopher to court, Socrates attributes the following accusations to them: "Socrates does injustice and is meddlesome, by investigating the things under the earth and the heavenly things, and making the
2010 SAGP CONFERENCE PAPER SOCRATES AND ACHILLES: A SHIFT IN PARADIGMS Abstract J. F. Humphrey... more 2010 SAGP CONFERENCE PAPER
SOCRATES AND ACHILLES: A SHIFT IN PARADIGMS
Abstract
J. F. Humphrey, Ph.D.
In Plato’s Apology of Socrates after completing his defense against Meletus, Lycon, and Anytus, Socrates says, “Perhaps, then, someone might say, ‘Then are you not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed the sort of pursuit from which you now run the risk of dying?” (Ap. 28b). In response to his supposed opponent, Socrates refers to Achilles – although not by name – and argues that he is not afraid of death for to fear death is ignoble. Furthermore, he claims, “This is the way it is, men of Athens, in truth. Wherever someone stations himself, holding that it is best, or wherever he is stationed by a ruler, there he must stay and run the risk, as it seems to me, and not take into account death or anything else compared to what is shameful” (Ap. 28d). Socrates’ claim, however, raises difficult questions. Does Socrates mean wherever someone stations himself, holding that it is best, there he must stay and run the risk and not take into account death or anything else compared to what is shameful? Or, does he mean wherever he is stationed by a ruler, there he must stay and run the risk and not take into account death or anything else compared to what is shameful? In the context of his assertion, Socrates seems to mean the later and he maintains that he has been commanded to philosophize by the god, who, in the Apology, would appear to be Apollo.
In this paper, I examine the dilemma that Socrates presents. In particular, I will argue that we must consider the possibility that while in the context of Socrates’ statement he seems to mean the latter, i.e., wherever a person is stationed by a ruler, there he must stay and run the risk and not take into account death or anything else compared to what is shameful, it is instructive to consider the possibility that he means the former, namely, wherever someone stations himself, holding that it is best, there he must stay and run the risk and not take into account death or anything else compared to what is shameful. Additionally, if we follow out this line of reasoning, we will see that Socrates’ claims about being commanded by the god in the Apology must be reconsidered. Finally, I will argue that while Socrates seems to be praising Achilles, he is actually criticizing the warrior and calling for a new paradigmatic human being, namely, the Socratic philosopher.
Abstract In Plato’s Apology (29a-b), Socrates agues that he does not fear death; indeed, to fear... more Abstract
In Plato’s Apology (29a-b), Socrates agues that he does not fear death; indeed, to fear death is a sign of ignorance. It is to claim to know what one in fact does not know (Ap. 29 a-b). Perhaps, Socrates suggests, death is not a great evil after all, but “the greatest of all goods.” At the end of the dialogue, after the judges have voted on the final verdict and Socrates has received the death penalty, the philosopher considers two common views of death: that death is a long dreamless sleep and that death is a journey to another place - Hades. According to Socrates, either of these views of death would be acceptable to him; the one, because he would receive a wonderful rest with no dreams to disturb him; the other, because he would be able to talk philosophy with those who had gone before with impunity. In this paper, I will examine Socrates’ view of death, and I will argue that, according to Socrates, there could be a third perspective on death that will not only make him truly immortal in a certain way, but will also immortalize the practice of Socratic philosophy. Hence, Socrates embraces his sentence because dying at the right time and dying in the right way provides him the possibility of a good death.
Key Words: Plato’s Apology, Socrates, ‘good death,’ immortality.
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