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Papers by Catherine Driscoll

Biology & Philosophy, 2018

This paper addresses the question of how to understand the relationship between Cultural Evolutio... more This paper addresses the question of how to understand the relationship between Cultural Evolutionary Science (CES) and the social sciences, given that they coexist and both study cultural change. I argue that CES is best understood as having a unificatory or integrative role between evolutionary biology and the social sciences, and that it is best characterized as a bridge field; I describe the concept of a bridge field and how it relates to other non-reductionist accounts of unification or integration used in the philosophy of science literature.

Philosophy of Science, 2017

Most attempts to define culture as used in the cultural evolution literature treat culture as a s... more Most attempts to define culture as used in the cultural evolution literature treat culture as a single phenomenon that can be given a single nondisjunctive definition. In this article I argue that, really, cultural evolutionists employ a variety of distinct but closely related concepts of culture. I show how the main prominent attempts to define a culture concept fail to properly capture all the uses of “culture” employed in cultural evolutionary work. I offer a description of some of the most important culture concepts used by cultural evolutionists.

Biology & Philosophy, 2017

Philosophical Psychology, 2013

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and n... more David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most “central” psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations.

Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 09515080600806575, Dec 12, 2006

Biology Philosophy, 2008

Abstract This paper tries to explain how individuals manage adaptive individual choice (ie, the d... more Abstract This paper tries to explain how individuals manage adaptive individual choice (ie, the decision to acquire a fitter than average behavior or idea rapidly and tractably) in cultural evolution, despite the fact that acquiring fitness information is very difficult. I argue that the ...

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2009

This paper discusses problems associated with the use of optimality models in human behavioral ec... more This paper discusses problems associated with the use of optimality models in human behavioral ecology. Optimality models are used in both human and non-human animal behavioral ecology to test hypotheses about the conditions generating and maintaining behavioral strategies in populations via natural selection. The way optimality models are currently used in behavioral ecology faces significant problems, which are exacerbated by employing the so-called 'phenotypic gambit': that is, the bet that the psychological and inheritance mechanisms responsible for behavioral strategies will be straightforward. I argue that each of several different possible ways we might interpret how optimality models are being used for humans face similar and additional problems. I suggest some ways in which human behavioral ecologists might adjust how they employ optimality models; in particular, I urge the abandonment of the phenotypic gambit in the human case.

Philosophy of Science, 2013

Biology & Philosophy, 2014

Against the grain: the Vayda tradition in …, 2008

Chapter 11 Vayda Blues: Explanation in Darwinian Ecological Anthropology Catherine Driscoll and S... more Chapter 11 Vayda Blues: Explanation in Darwinian Ecological Anthropology Catherine Driscoll and Stephen Stich Introduction Human behavioral ecology or Darwinian Ecological Anthropology (DBA) is one among many approaches that applies insights from Darwinian evolutionary ...

This paper critiques the competing ‘‘Grandmother Hypothesis’’ and ‘‘Embodied Capital Theory’’ as ... more This paper critiques the competing ‘‘Grandmother Hypothesis’’ and ‘‘Embodied Capital Theory’’ as evolutionary explanations of the peculiarities of human life history traits. Instead, I argue that the correct explanation for human life history probably involves elements of both hypotheses: long male developmental periods and lives probably evolved due to group selection for male hunting via increased female fertility, and female long lives due to the differential contribution women’s complex foraging skills made to their children and grandchildren’s nutritional status within groups provisioned by male hunting.

Keywords Philosophy of biology Life history theory Grandmother hypothesis Embodied capital theory Group selection

Optimality models are used in both human and non-human animal behavioral ecology to test hypothes... more Optimality models are used in both human and non-human animal behavioral ecology to test hypotheses about the conditions generating and maintaining behavioral strategies in populations via natural selection. The way optimality models are currently used in behavioral ecology faces significant problems, which are exacerbated by employing the so-called ‘phenotypic gambit’: that is, the bet that the psychological and inheritance mechanisms responsible for behavioral strategies will be straightforward. I argue that each of several different possible ways we might interpret how optimality models are being used for humans face similar and additional problems. I suggest some ways in which human behavioral ecologists might adjust how they employ optimality models; in particular, I urge the abandonment of the phenotypic gambit in the human case

This paper tries to explain how individuals manage adaptive individual choice (i.e., the decision... more This paper tries to explain how individuals manage adaptive individual choice (i.e., the decision to acquire a fitter than average behavior or idea rapidly and tractably) in cultural evolution, despite the fact that acquiring fitness information is very difficult. I argue that the means of solving this problem suggested in the cultural evolution literature largely are various types of decision rules employing representations of fitness correlated properties or states of affairs. I argue that the problem of adaptive individual choice is best solved where some of these learning rule representations are socially transmitted and some are biologically transmitted.

Keywords Cultural evolution; Adaptive decision making; Social learning

Geoffrey Miller argues that we can account for the evolution of human art and altruism via the ac... more Geoffrey Miller argues that we can account for the evolution of human art and altruism via the action of sexual selection. He identifies five characteristics supposedly unique to sexual adaptations: fitness indicating cost; involvement in courtship; heritability; variability; and sexual differentiation. Miller claims that art and altruism possess these characteristics. I argue that not only does he not demonstrate that art and altruism
possess these characteristics, one can also explain the origins of altruism via a form of group selection and traits with the five characteristics in terms of a process I call ‘‘cultural sexual selection.’’

Keywords: Evolutionary Psychology; Psychology of Art; Evolutionary Explanations of Altruism; Sexual Selection; Group Selection; Cultural Evolution

Sarah Hrdy argues that women (1) possess a reproductive behavioral strategy including infanticide... more Sarah Hrdy argues that women (1) possess a reproductive behavioral strategy including infanticide, (2) that this strategy is an adaptation and (3) arose as a response to stresses mothers faced with the agrarian revolution. I argue that while psychopathological and cultural evolutionary accounts for Hrdy’s data fail, her suggested psychological architecture for the strategy suggests that the behavior she describes is really only the consequence of the operation of practical reasoning mechanism(s) – and consequently there is no reproductive strategy including infanticide as such, nor could the alleged strategy be sufficiently mosaic to count as an adaptation. What might count as an adaptation is a ‘window’ before bonding that permits practical reasoning about the reproductive value of infants and hence variable maternal investment, and which, contra (3) arose early in hominid history due to a combination of increases in infant dependency and increased human abilities for conditional practical reasoning.

Key words: Cultural evolution, Infanticide, Psychological adaptations, Sarah Hrdy, Sociobiology

Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths (Sterelny 1992, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999) have argued that soc... more Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths (Sterelny 1992, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999) have argued that sociobiology is unworkable because it requires that human behaviors can be adaptations; however, behaviors produced by a functionalist psychology do not meet Lewontin’s quasi-independence criterion and therefore cannot be adaptations. Consequently, an evolutionary psychology—which regards psychological mechanisms as adaptations —should replace sociobiology. I address two interpretations of their argument. I argue that the strong interpretation fails because functionalist psychology need not prevent behaviors from evolving independently, and it relies on too strong an interpretation of the quasi-independence criterion. The weaker interpretation does not undermine sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology would be vulnerable to the same criticism. Finally, I offer reasons to think that both mental mechanisms and behaviors can be adaptations.

Biology and Philosophy, Jan 1, 2008

This paper tries to explain how individuals manage adaptive individual choice (i.e. the decision ... more This paper tries to explain how individuals manage adaptive individual choice (i.e. the decision to acquire a fitter than average behavior or idea rapidly and tractably) in cultural evolution, despite the fact that acquiring fitness information is very difficult. I argue that the means of solving this problem suggested in the cultural evolution literature largely are various types of decision rules employing representations of fitness correlated properties or states of affairs. I argue that the problem of adaptive individual choice is best solved where some of these learning rule representations are socially transmitted and some are biologically transmitted.