John W. Carroll | North Carolina State University (original) (raw)
Uploads
Papers by John W. Carroll
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2003
Our topic is the ontology and persistence conditions of material objects. One widely held doctrin... more Our topic is the ontology and persistence conditions of material objects. One widely held doctrine is that identity-over-time has causal commitments. Another is that identity-over-time is just identity (simpliciter) as it relates one object that exists at two times. We believe that a tension exists between these two apparently sensible positions: very roughly, if identity is the primary conceptual component of identity-over-time and—as is plausible—identity is noncausal, then the conceptual origins of the causal commitments of identity-over-time become a mystery. We will begin by formulating the two widely held doctrines and our puzzle more fully and more carefully. Then, the remainder of the paper will be devoted to analyzing views one might adopt that could minimize the tension.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2005
Do folk objects exist? A selective eliminativism says that some do and some don't. One eye-catchi... more Do folk objects exist? A selective eliminativism says that some do and some don't. One eye-catching version of this says that tennis players exist, although tennis balls and tennis rackets do not. In our paper, we focus critical attention upon a defense of such a view presented by Trenton Merricks in his book, Objects and Persons. We will show that the argument advanced by Merricks shows either too much or too little. I On the folk account of the matter, it happens that a certain baseball strikes and shatters a certain window. The impact of the ball causes the window to break. That is opposed by the No Overdetermination Argument (NOA-1): (1) The baseball (if it exists) is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent atoms, acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window. (2) The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert. (3) The shattering of the window is not overdetermined; therefore, (4) The baseball (if it exists) does not cause the shattering of the window.
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There ar... more Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There are many principles that were for a long time thought to be laws that turned out to be useful approximations, like Newton’s gravitational principle. There are others that were thought to be laws and still are considered laws, like Einstein’s principle that no signals travel faster than light. Laws of nature are not just important to scientists. They are also of great interest to us philosophers, though primarily in an ancillary way. Qua philosophers, we do not try to discover what the laws are. We care about what it is to be a law, about lawhood, the essential difference between something’s being a law and something’s not being a law. It is one of our jobs to understand lawhood and convey our understanding to others. Causation is also central to science and to philosophy. Molecular bonding, planetary orbits, human decisions and life itself are all causal processes. A scientific explanation...
Metascience, Mar 1, 2011
It is a pleasure to comment on Marc Lange's rich and provocative book, Laws and Lawmakers (L... more It is a pleasure to comment on Marc Lange's rich and provocative book, Laws and Lawmakers (LL). I will focus on just one of the guiding ideas in LL—the connection between lawfulness and stability. I agree with Lange about the centrality of this notion to the understanding of laws but favor a somewhat different interpretation of stability. Section 1 describes my own view, making use of the framework developed in my (2003). Section 2 considers Lange's treatment. 1
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
IntroductionTed Sider aptly and concisely states the self-visitation paradox thus: ‘Suppose I tra... more IntroductionTed Sider aptly and concisely states the self-visitation paradox thus: ‘Suppose I travel back in time and stand in a room with my sitting 10-year-old self. I seem to be both sitting and standing, but how can that be?’ (2001, 101). I will explore a relativist resolution of this paradox offered by, or on behalf of, endurantists. It maintains that the sitting and the standing are relative to the personal time or proper time of the time traveler and is intended to yield the result that Ted is sitting at a certain initial personal/proper time but is not standing relative to that time. Similarly, it is also supposed to yield that Ted is standing relative to a later personal/proper time, but not sitting relative to that time. Such a traveler-time relativism has been offered by Paul Horwich (1975, 433-5; 1987, 114-15) and also by Simon Keller and Michael Nelson (2001, 344). I will show that this relativist approach is a non-starter. It is so because Ted is sitting and standing a...
The Philosophical Quarterly
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1987
The British Journal For the Philosophy of Science, 2012
A Time Travel Dialogue, 2014
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
... Page 13. Acknowledgments This book's first three chapters and its first appe... more ... Page 13. Acknowledgments This book's first three chapters and its first appendix derive from two journal articles: "Ontology and the Laws of Nature" Australa-sian Journal of Philosophy (Carroll 1987), and "The Humean Tradi-tion" Philosophical Review (Carroll 1990). ...
Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There ar... more Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There are many principles that were for a long time thought to be laws that turned out to be useful approximations, like Newton's g ravitational principle. There are others that were thought to be laws and still are considered laws, like Einstein's principle that no signals travel faster than light. Laws of nature are not just important to scientists. They are also of great interest to us philosophers, though primarily in an ancillary way. Qua philosophers, we do not try to discover what the laws are. We care about what it is to be a law, about lawhood, the essential difference between something's being a law and something's not being a law. It is one of our jobs to understand lawhood and convey our understanding to others.
Theory and Decision, 1987
Theory and Decision, 1993
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2003
Our topic is the ontology and persistence conditions of material objects. One widely held doctrin... more Our topic is the ontology and persistence conditions of material objects. One widely held doctrine is that identity-over-time has causal commitments. Another is that identity-over-time is just identity (simpliciter) as it relates one object that exists at two times. We believe that a tension exists between these two apparently sensible positions: very roughly, if identity is the primary conceptual component of identity-over-time and—as is plausible—identity is noncausal, then the conceptual origins of the causal commitments of identity-over-time become a mystery. We will begin by formulating the two widely held doctrines and our puzzle more fully and more carefully. Then, the remainder of the paper will be devoted to analyzing views one might adopt that could minimize the tension.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2005
Do folk objects exist? A selective eliminativism says that some do and some don't. One eye-catchi... more Do folk objects exist? A selective eliminativism says that some do and some don't. One eye-catching version of this says that tennis players exist, although tennis balls and tennis rackets do not. In our paper, we focus critical attention upon a defense of such a view presented by Trenton Merricks in his book, Objects and Persons. We will show that the argument advanced by Merricks shows either too much or too little. I On the folk account of the matter, it happens that a certain baseball strikes and shatters a certain window. The impact of the ball causes the window to break. That is opposed by the No Overdetermination Argument (NOA-1): (1) The baseball (if it exists) is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent atoms, acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window. (2) The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert. (3) The shattering of the window is not overdetermined; therefore, (4) The baseball (if it exists) does not cause the shattering of the window.
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There ar... more Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There are many principles that were for a long time thought to be laws that turned out to be useful approximations, like Newton’s gravitational principle. There are others that were thought to be laws and still are considered laws, like Einstein’s principle that no signals travel faster than light. Laws of nature are not just important to scientists. They are also of great interest to us philosophers, though primarily in an ancillary way. Qua philosophers, we do not try to discover what the laws are. We care about what it is to be a law, about lawhood, the essential difference between something’s being a law and something’s not being a law. It is one of our jobs to understand lawhood and convey our understanding to others. Causation is also central to science and to philosophy. Molecular bonding, planetary orbits, human decisions and life itself are all causal processes. A scientific explanation...
Metascience, Mar 1, 2011
It is a pleasure to comment on Marc Lange's rich and provocative book, Laws and Lawmakers (L... more It is a pleasure to comment on Marc Lange's rich and provocative book, Laws and Lawmakers (LL). I will focus on just one of the guiding ideas in LL—the connection between lawfulness and stability. I agree with Lange about the centrality of this notion to the understanding of laws but favor a somewhat different interpretation of stability. Section 1 describes my own view, making use of the framework developed in my (2003). Section 2 considers Lange's treatment. 1
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
IntroductionTed Sider aptly and concisely states the self-visitation paradox thus: ‘Suppose I tra... more IntroductionTed Sider aptly and concisely states the self-visitation paradox thus: ‘Suppose I travel back in time and stand in a room with my sitting 10-year-old self. I seem to be both sitting and standing, but how can that be?’ (2001, 101). I will explore a relativist resolution of this paradox offered by, or on behalf of, endurantists. It maintains that the sitting and the standing are relative to the personal time or proper time of the time traveler and is intended to yield the result that Ted is sitting at a certain initial personal/proper time but is not standing relative to that time. Similarly, it is also supposed to yield that Ted is standing relative to a later personal/proper time, but not sitting relative to that time. Such a traveler-time relativism has been offered by Paul Horwich (1975, 433-5; 1987, 114-15) and also by Simon Keller and Michael Nelson (2001, 344). I will show that this relativist approach is a non-starter. It is so because Ted is sitting and standing a...
The Philosophical Quarterly
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1987
The British Journal For the Philosophy of Science, 2012
A Time Travel Dialogue, 2014
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 2009
... Page 13. Acknowledgments This book's first three chapters and its first appe... more ... Page 13. Acknowledgments This book's first three chapters and its first appendix derive from two journal articles: "Ontology and the Laws of Nature" Australa-sian Journal of Philosophy (Carroll 1987), and "The Humean Tradi-tion" Philosophical Review (Carroll 1990). ...
Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There ar... more Some scientists try to discover and report laws of nature. And, they do so with success. There are many principles that were for a long time thought to be laws that turned out to be useful approximations, like Newton's g ravitational principle. There are others that were thought to be laws and still are considered laws, like Einstein's principle that no signals travel faster than light. Laws of nature are not just important to scientists. They are also of great interest to us philosophers, though primarily in an ancillary way. Qua philosophers, we do not try to discover what the laws are. We care about what it is to be a law, about lawhood, the essential difference between something's being a law and something's not being a law. It is one of our jobs to understand lawhood and convey our understanding to others.
Theory and Decision, 1987
Theory and Decision, 1993