Dax Bennington, Ph.D. | North Central Texas College (original) (raw)

Drafts by Dax Bennington, Ph.D.

Many thanks to Mark Boone for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I'd also like to ... more Many thanks to Mark Boone for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I'd also like to thank Dr. David Naugle for being a model of a Christian philosopher to me. Additionally, I'd like to thank my confirmation saint, St. Thomas Aquinas, for his help and example. Last, and most importantly, I want to thank my Lord Jesus Christ for providing an opportunity to write on this topic.

The fundamental problem of the incarnation is that the conciliar texts pertaining to Christology ... more The fundamental problem of the incarnation is that the conciliar texts pertaining to Christology appear to attribute incompatible predicates of Christ. For example, the conciliar texts state that Christ was both passible and impassible. It seems, by attributing incompatible predicates of the same thing, that the doctrine of the incarnation, at least prima facie, entails a contradiction.
There are numerous solutions to the fundamental problem of the incarnation. In this paper, I focus on the relative identity solution to the fundamental problem. The version of the relative identity solution I focus on is proposed by Joseph Jedwab.
In this paper, I argue that relative identity theories face theoretical disadvantages in at least two ways. The first disadvantage is that relative identity theories cannot provide a straightforward reading of the conciliar texts. I will explain how the relative identity theories can show how ‘Christ is passible’ and ‘Christ is impassible’ do not entail a contradiction, but that ‘Christ is passible and impassible’, on a relative identity theory, ends up being false. But this is how the conciliar documents word the Christological doctrines. So, either the relative identity theorist’s results are incompatible with the conciliar texts or relative identity theories must apply a non-straightforward reading of the text. I believe either of these options count as a theoretical disadvantage. I call this the Conciliar texts dilemma.
The second theoretical disadvantage that relative identity theories face is that they are constrained to the view that God is temporal. Ultimately, the relative identity theorist might not mind this constraint, but ceteris paribus, a solution to the fundamental problem that does not remain theoretically neutral with respect to God’s relationship to time counts as a theoretical disadvantage for the solution. I call this the problem of theoretical neutrality.
My paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain the fundamental problem of the incarnation. Second, I explicate the relative identity solution to the fundamental problem. Third, I argue that the relative identity solution faces at least two theoretical disadvantages: the dilemma concerning the conciliar texts and the problem of theoretical neutrality.

Mark Murphy (2011) argues that natural theory (NLT) is not a viable theistic explanation of moral... more Mark Murphy (2011) argues that natural theory (NLT) is not a viable theistic
explanation of moral law (TEM).1 Murphy thinks that NLT does not meet
the immediacy desiderata which he takes to be crucial for a viable TEM. I
argue that Murphy is mistaken with respect to the immediacy desiderata for a viable theistic explanation of moral law. Murphy incorrectly characterizes the NLT position and his arguments rest on two false premises. I show that when properly understood, NLT does satisfy immediacy.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, I discuss Murphy's account of a
viable TEM, focusing on the immediacy desiderata. Second, I present Mur-
phy's objection to NLT from its failure to satisfy the immediacy desiderata.
Third, I argue that Murphy is mistaken on two accounts: First, Murphy's
argument against NLT rests on a false premise: that NLT entails that the goodness of created goods exists independent of God (e.g. that there is some
sort of competition between our loyalty to created goods and God). I present
a defense of NLT as a viable TEM in light a clear understanding of the view.
I show that God is not in competition with his creation and the NLT position is not analogous to mere conservationism. The NLT position denies that
there is such a thing as existential inertia, or that there can be causal activity independent of God, and that it's not the case that God merely sustains
substances in existence. Rather, I will explicate the divine premotion view
which I take to be more representative of the natural law position, in order
to show that Murphy's criticism of NLT as a viable TEM fails.

In his paper, "The God Beyond Time", Hugh McCann argues for divine atemporality. Divine atemporal... more In his paper, "The God Beyond Time", Hugh McCann argues for divine
atemporality. Divine atemporality is the thesis that God exists apart from,
or outside of time. Divine atemporality has it's critics, particularly within
contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.

I respond to a particular argument raised against McCann's argument
in favor of divine atemporality (DA). Roughly, the objection to McCann's
argument is that his view entails that God necessarily creates the world. I
show that this argument fails to undermine McCann's argument for (DA)
by appealing to the distinction between God's essentially intrinsic properties and Cambridge changes in God.My paper proceeds in the following way: First, I outline McCann's argument for DA. Next, I explicate the objection to McCann's argument: that DA entails necessary creation (NC). Third, I explain the distinction between God's essentially intrinsic properties and Cambridge changes in God in order to demonstrate how the objection to McCann's argument is unsuccessful.

John Donahue (2014) argues against a reply to the consequential critique (CC) against skeptical t... more John Donahue (2014) argues against a reply to the consequential critique
(CC) against skeptical theism (ST) offered by David Anderson (2012).1. In
this paper, I show that Donahue's reply to Anderson is mistaken. Donahue's
criticism of Anderson's defense fails because conflates a crucial distinction:between humans knowing that they always have an obligation to prevent some state of affairs S from obtaining and know what particular reason God has in mind for permitting S.
I argue that it is not inconsistent to hold that humans can know they
always have an obligation to intervene while also not knowing why God
might have reason to not intervene. I provide some thought experiments to
support this distinction.My paper proceeds in the following manner. First, I'll explain skeptical theism (ST) and the consequential critique of ST. Second, I'll give Anderson's response to the consequential critique of ST and present Donahue's reply to Anderson. Last, I'll argue that Donahue's reply fails.

In this paper, I seek to draw out the implications of brute theism. Brute theism is the view that... more In this paper, I seek to draw out the implications of brute theism. Brute theism is the view that it is logically possible that God does not exist in some world and nothing that depends on God for its existence exists in that world.1 Before drawing out some of the implications of brute theism, I provide some of the reasons that motivate brute theism’s defenders to offer the view as a viable alternative in the logical space.
Next, I discuss the possible implications of brute theism and clarify what metaphysical commitments the brute theist must adopt. In particular, I argue that the brute theist must either adopt a Platonist view regarding God and abstract objects or adopt the notion that there exists at least one empty world. Last, I will argue that neither of these options are to be preferred over the traditional view that God necessarily exists and the costs that come with that view.

In Constructing the World, David Chalmers (2012) argues that disagreement between philosophers re... more In Constructing the World, David Chalmers (2012) argues that disagreement between philosophers regarding truths about mathematics, morality, and normative concepts does not undermine his scrutability thesis.1 The reason Chalmers thinks this is because he thinks that our disagreement as non-ideal reasoners is at best weak evidence of what would happen on ideal reflection.
In this paper, I challenge Chalmers' response that non-ideal disagreement
among philosophers is at best weak evidence for what would happen on ideal reasoning as a response to the prima facie tension between disagreement and the scrutability thesis.
My challenge to Chalmers consists in three objections: first, I argue
that there is a larger difference between `philosophical truths' and `non-philosophical truths' than Chalmers thinks. Second, I disagree with Chalmers that appeals to non-ideal reasoning solves the problem of disagreement. Third, Chalmers' move to put the issues that philosophers disagree on in the base seems to push the problem back. Philosophers would disagree on what should and shouldn't go in the base, so this doesn't look like a promising move for Chalmers.

My paper proceeds as follows: First, I will explain Chalmers' scrutability
thesis and the problem the disagreement of philosopher poses for his thesis. Next, I'll discuss Chalmers' response to this putative problem: that either disagreement in non-ideal reasoning is at best weak evidence for what would happen in ideal reasoning or to put the disputed issues in the base. Third, I offer my three objections to Chalmers' response.

In this paper, I criticize Theodore Sider's (2011) project. Sider argues that the central questio... more In this paper, I criticize Theodore Sider's (2011) project. Sider argues that
the central questions of metaphysics are about structure. Additionally, structure is what is fundamental or metaphysically basic and it is what carves nature at its joints. The claim I take issue with in this paper is that the non-fundamental does not carve nature at its joints. Non-fundamental notions, particularly those found in the special sciences, do mark real distinctions in nature while not being fundamental.
Concepts used in the special sciences do in fact carve nature at its joints.
The literature on Ceteris paribus laws in the philosophy of science illustrate the joint-carving nature of the special sciences. The existence of ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences do in fact mark real distinctions in nature that cannot be reduced to the laws of physics, and hence can be non-fundamental, yet joint-carving, contrary to Sider's structure thesis.

My paper proceeds as follows: First, I explicate Sider's structure thesis:
that metaphysics is about structure and that structure is what is fundamental. Next, I introduce the notion of ceteris paribus laws. In this section, I focus on the arguments offered by Marc Lange (2002) in support of ceteris paribus laws and their irreducibility to the laws of physics. Last, I argue that the evidence of ceteris paribus laws gives us good reason to think that Sider's thesis that only the fundamental is joint-carving is false. The existence of ceteris paribus laws gives us reason to believe that the special sciences mark real distinctions in nature.

Robert Trivers' evolutionary account of self deception, in which self-deception facilitates inter... more Robert Trivers' evolutionary account of self deception, in which self-deception facilitates interpersonal deception, is an inadequate account of self-deception. My reasons for this are the following: Trivers' account of self-deception, qua explanatory hypothesis, fails to capture a crucial kind of self-deception, namely, what Funkhouser calls, strategically conflicted self-deception. Trivers' account fails to adequately explain strategically conflicted self-deception because according to Trivers' hypothesis, the self-deceived are better at deceiving others because they do not give o as many cues as the straightforward deceiver.

In this paper, I argue that there Trivers' account is too narrow in scope as
an explanatory hypothesis of self-deception. There is a kind of self-deception, namely { strategically conflicted self-deception that does not facilitate inter-personal deception.
The paper will go as follows: First, I'll discuss Trivers'
understanding of the nature of self-deception and his evolutionary account
of self-deception. Second, I'll discuss Funkhouser's account of a specific kind of self-deception: strategically conflicted self-deception. Next, I'll look at how Trivers' evolutionary account fails to adequately explain strategically conflicted self-deception. Fourth, I'll discuss the difference between the cues given by the straightforward self-deceiver and the cues given by the strategically self-conflicted. Last, I will expand on the case of strategically conflicted self-deception, highlighting the complexity that Trivers' account fails to explain, in which there are two cases that both look like conflicted self-deception, but the first case is conflicted self-deception while the latter is not.

There is a wealth of empirical literature concerning dual-process theories of cognition. Epistemo... more There is a wealth of empirical literature concerning dual-process theories of cognition. Epistemologists have considered the epistemic implications dual-process theories of cognition have for traditional theories of epistemic justification and the standard analytic approach to epistemology. Bishop and Trout (2005) argue that the empirical studies undermine the traditional standard analytic approach to epistemology.
In this paper, I argue that epistemologists ought to adopt epistemological
pluralism for the sake of preserving standard analytic epistemology (SAE).
My argument depends on the intuition that cognitive science is relevant to
epistemology and that neither epistemic internalism, nor epistemic externalism, better explains the empirical data from cognitive science. Furthermore, I argue that if internalism or externalism cannot better explain the data, then either we abandon must SAE or adopt epistemological pluralism. My paper proceeds as follows: First, I shall briefly discuss dual-process theories of cognition and internalist and externalist theories of epistemic justification. Second, I'll o er my main argument for adopting epistemological pluralism. Third, I'll consider the objection that the move to pluralism is ad hoc. Last, I'll consider an objection based on a strong a priori argument.

In his paper, \Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: the `Bad Basis' Counterexamples... more In his paper, \Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: the
`Bad Basis' Counterexamples", Matthew McGrath (2013) discusses the putative `bad basis' counterexamples to the principle of phenomenal conservatism.1 The `bad basis' counterexamples are instances of cognitive penetration a ecting the evidential force that perceptual seemings are supposed to give a subject. The `bad basis' counterexamples are supposed to render the principle of phenomenal conservatism (PC) false. PC is the view that if it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S is prima facie justi ed in believing that P. McGrath o ers three ways someone might respond in defense of PC. I will argue that one of the responses in particular, the defeat response, is far better than McGrath makes it out to be. I believe that McGrath too easily concedes to the presenters of the `bad basis' counterexamples (Siegel 2012, 2013, Markie 2006) that the defeat approach fails to preserve PC. In section two, I will motivate the epistemological worry that the `bad basis' counterexamples are supposed to raise against PC. In section three, I will
discuss McGrath's analysis of the defeat response and argue that McGrath
is too quick to dismiss the defeat response as a viable option for the PC
defender.

One of the central concerns of McGrath's paper is that it seems, at least
prima facie, that the `bad basis' counterexamples presented by Siegel and
Markie, undermine the principal of phenomenal conservatism (PC). In this
section, I will explain the principle of phenomenal conservatism and why
it's epistemologically signi cant. Moreover, I will explain in detail what the
bad basis counterexamples are and how they create a worry for the defender
of PC. Last, I will discuss three possible responses that McGrath o ers on
behalf of the PC defender | namely, the defeat response, the distinguish
epistemic statuses response, and McGrath's receptivity response. I will also
mention the fourth option of denying PC.

The principle of phenomenal conservatism, where S stands for the subject
and P stands for the relevant proposition, can be formulated as follows:
(PC): if it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S is
prima facie justi ed in believing that P.

PC is epistemologically relevant for a number of reasons. First, it is a
fundamental foundationalist principle.3 Second, PC solves the `speckled hen'
problem for foundationalists.4 Third, dogmatism, or the restriction of PC to
perceptual seemings, is able to properly diagnose where the skeptical arguments against knowledge go wrong.5 Given the epistemological signi cance of PC, particularly for foundationalists, it's understandable why PC defenders are reluctant to give up this epistemic principle.6 If PC is true, then foundationalists have solutions to many problems their view faces, but, if PC is false, then it seems that there are many intractable problems for the foundationalist.

In my paper, I will explore the historical line of thought in Scottish Commonsensism, particularl... more In my paper, I will explore the historical line of thought in Scottish Commonsensism, particularly relating to the notion of experience. I will look at how the Scottish philosophers George Campbell and Alexander Campbell understood the notion of experience. Next, I will look at how these thinkers used the notion of experience to respond to Hume's argument from miracles.

Last, I will argue that Campbell's and Campbell's use of the distinction be-
tween personal and derived experience suciently rebuts Humes argument
against miracles. I will begin by summarizing Hume's argument against miracles, specifically what has come to be known as Hume's maxim: that no amount of
testimonial evidence is sucient to overcome the improbability of a miraculous event.

Next, I will trace the historical line of thought from George Campbell to Alexander Campbell. I will focus on the distinction made by George Campbell between personal experience and experience derived from the testimony of others and trace this distinction to Alexander Campbell. In the last section, I will argue that this distinction suciently undercuts Hume's argument against miracles.

A brief introduction to evidentialism with objections and replies.

n their 2008 paper, Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support, McGrew and McGrew argue tha... more n their 2008 paper, Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support,
McGrew and McGrew argue that the putative problem of mutual support
for foundationalism can be accounted for in foundationalist terms.1 They
demonstrate this by arguing that the appearance of evidential support in
loops arises from a failure to distinguish between di erent synchronic lines of
evidential force. Given the distinctions noted above, the McGrews are able
to give a foundationalist account of mutual support that bans all examples
of evidential loops.

An example of a probabilistic case not accounted for in the McGrew
2008 paper is found in McGrew (2003).2 The case involves the gravitational lensing hypothesis such that the hypothesis makes highly justi ed
non-foundational beliefs more positively relevant to each other rather than
screening them o from each other. This particular case is not discussed in
the McGrew 2008 paper and is in need of some conceptual analysis.
In this paper, I will provide a conceptual analysis of this particular case
of gravitational lensing in the spirit of the McGrew (2008) paper. I will
cov er the concept of 'supporting in virtue of' to explain what is going on
probabilistically. My account is not a counterexample to the McGrew paper,
but rather a conceptual analysis of a new case that I believe their account,
with proper modi cation can explain. My paper is novel in that I provide
further reason for thinking that the foundationalist can account for cases of
mutual support and 'support in virtue of' without appeal to evidential loops.

My paper will proceed as follows: First, I will briefly discuss what the
foundationalist thesis is and how it contrasts with other theories of epistemic
justi cation. Second, I will explain the notions of mutual support and evidential loops and how they raise problems for the foundationalist. Third, I will present McGrew's solution to the problem of mutual support and a new probabilistic case from gravitational lensing. The new case cannot be accounted for by the notions McGrew uses to solve the problem of mutual support. Fourth, I will present my new notion of `support in virtue of", or `condiional support", to account for the new case.

In his work, A Short and Easy Method with Deists, Charles Leslie (1841) provides an argument for ... more In his work, A Short and Easy Method with Deists, Charles Leslie (1841) provides an argument for the truth of Christianity.1 Leslie seeks to establish the “...truth of the Christian religion, and at the same time distinguish it from the impostures of Mahomet, and of the old Pagan world." The nature of Leslie's proof is one that we do not “...come to directly, but by many inferences."
The methodology for Leslie's argument requires two steps: First, he lays down the rules for evaluating the truth of matters of fact in general. If the matters of fact satisfy all of the rules, then the conclusion necessarily follows. Second, Leslie shows that the matters of fact concerning Christianity do satisfy all of the rules, and that the matters of fact pertaining to Islam and Paganism do not.
In this paper, I will reconstruct Leslie's argument in favor of Christianity. My motivations for doing this are the following: First, Leslie's argument is deductively invalid. Second, Leslie's argument is unable to capture what is correct about Islam and Paganism. My reconstruction will overcome both of these problems.
My paper will proceed in the following way. In section one, I will present Leslie's original argument. In section two, I discuss how the satisfaction of all four of Leslie's rules does not entail the conclusion that the putative matter of fact is authentic. In section three, I will reconstruct Leslie's argument in a more modest fashion and clarify the structure of this reconstructed version. My reconstruction of Leslie's argument will take the form of an abductive argument, or what is also known as an inference to the best explanation.
In section four, I will discuss the advantages that my reconstruction has over Leslie's argument. First, my argument is logically valid, where Leslie's is not. Second, my reconstruction captures the notion that successful explanations come in degrees, something that Leslie's argument cannot capture. Last, I will argue that my reconstruction is a successful C-inductive argument for Christianity.

In his paper, Resurrecting Biological Essentialism", Michael Devitt (2008) argues that biological... more In his paper, Resurrecting Biological Essentialism", Michael Devitt (2008)
argues that biological species are best understood as having essences that
are comprised of essential intrinsic properties. Devitt argues against the
relational essentialist view by demonstrating that relational essentialism is
insucient for explaining why a particular organism has a particular trait
and why a particular organism belongs to a particular species.
Marc Ereshefsky (2010), in his paper, \What's Wrong with the New Es-
sentialism?" argues against both Devitt's intrinsic biological essentialism and
relational essentialism. Ereshefsky agrees with Devitt that the relational ac-
count gives an unsatisfactory answer to why a particular organism has a
particular trait, but he disagrees with Devitt in thinking that a particular
organism belongs to a particular species because of an intrinsic essence.
In this paper, I will respond to Ereshefsky's criticisms of intrinsic biologi-
1
cal essentialism (IE). My response will focus on the taxon question: why is a
particular organism a member of a particular species. My argument will cri-
tique Ereshefsky's relational account and argue that IE is the most plausible
hypothesis regarding biological species.
In section two, I will present Michael Devitt's view, speci cally highlight-
ing the two questions he thinks that must be answered when developing a
theory of biological species. In section three, I will discuss Ereshefsky's crit-
icisms of Devitt's view. I will focus on Ereshefsky's criticisms of Devitt's
answer to the taxon question. In section four, I will give my reasons for
thinking that Ereshefsly's relational account is inadequate and that at least
with respect to the taxon question, the intrinsic biological species hypothesis
is more plausible.

Book Reviews by Dax Bennington, Ph.D.

Dissertation by Dax Bennington, Ph.D.

Dissertation, University of Arkansas, Ph.D, Philosophy, 2021

Much of our knowledge of the world depends on the testimony of experts. Experts sometimes change ... more Much of our knowledge of the world depends on the testimony of experts. Experts sometimes change their minds and disagree with each other. What ought a novice do when an expert changes their mind? This dissertation provides an account of when expert conversion is epistemically significant and how the novice ought to rationally defer to expert conversion. In answering when expert conversion is epistemically significant, I provide a diagnostic tool that emphasizes the conversion seeming to be evidence-based and that there is an absence of cognitive biases on the part of the converting expert. In answering how the novice ought to rationally defer to a converting expert I give two principles. First, I give a principle for determining when an expert is trustworthy and second under what further conditions a novice rationally or legitimately trusts a converting expert.

A brief introduction to evidentialism with objections and replies.

Dissertation, University of Arkansas, Ph.D, Philosophy, 2021

The Good, the True, the Beautiful: A Multidisciplinary Tribute to Dr. David K. Naugle , 2021

My task for this paper is threefold. First, I'll discuss the notion of a Christian worldview whic... more My task for this paper is threefold. First, I'll discuss the notion of a Christian worldview which has been aptly articulated and defended by David Naugle. In particular, I'll focus on the way in which a worldview in general is a systematic way of thinking, and how a Christian worldview in particular, is structured in terms of the creation, fall, redemption, and consummation of all things. Second, I'll discuss Alvin Plantinga's advice to Christian philosophers in light of what has been said about developing a Christian worldview in which I'll focus on how developing a Christian worldview and the particular tasks of a Christian philosopher are uniquely and intricately linked. Third, I'll discuss the life and work of St. Thomas Aquinas who I'll argue provides a model for developing a Christian worldview and accomplishing the tasks of the Christian philosopher.

A Catholic Christian Extended A/C Model

In his book, Warranted Christian Belief, Alvin Plantinga (2000) develops the extended A/C model o... more In his book, Warranted Christian Belief, Alvin Plantinga (2000) develops the extended A/C model of Warranted Christian Belief. Plantinga’s A/C model provides an account of how Christian belief can be warranted in a properly basic sort of way. In this paper, I will develop a Catholic Christian A/C Model in which I will argue that the normative set of beliefs for Warranted Christian Beliefs should be everything that the Catholic Church, through her teaching magisterium, teaches as binding. Drawing from Linda Zagzebski’s work on epistemic authority and an epistemology of trust to I will argue that warranted Christian belief should be warranted Catholic Christian belief. The Catholic Church is trustworthy and trust in the teaching authority of the Catholic Church is a properly basic warranted belief.
I will give a brief overview of Plantinga’s extended A/C model of Christian belief and then present a problem for Plantinga’s extended model. Next, I will discuss Zagzebski’s account of epistemic authority, specifically focusing on her discussion of religious authority and the authority of communities and argue that she has the conceptual resources to provide an answer to the problem I raised for Plantinga’s model. I will conclude by arguing that a plausible solution to Plantinga’s problem which draws from Zagzebski’s work on epistemic authority renders belief in a specifically Catholic Christian model of warranted Christian belief as the most likely to be true of Christian models of warrant.

Much of our knowledge of the world depends on the testimony of experts. Experts sometimes change ... more Much of our knowledge of the world depends on the testimony of experts. Experts sometimes change their minds and disagree with each other. What ought a novice do when an expert changes their mind? This dissertation provides an account of when expert conversion is epistemically significant and how the novice ought to rationally defer to expert conversion. In answering when expert conversion is epistemically significant, I provide a diagnostic tool that emphasizes that epistemically significant expert conversion seems to be evidence-based and that there is an absence of cognitive biases on the part of the converting expert. In answering how the novice ought to rationally defer to a converting expert I give two principles. First, I give a principle for determining when an expert is trustworthy. Second, I answer under what further conditions a novice rationally or legitimately trusts in a converting expert