Brian Cutter | University of Notre Dame (original) (raw)

Drafts by Brian Cutter

Russellian monism is an increasingly popular view about the relationship between consciousness an... more Russellian monism is an increasingly popular view about the relationship between consciousness and the physical world that combines elements from traditional forms of physicalism and dualism. This paper defends an analogous Russellian-monist-style view of color and other so-called secondary qualities. I contend that the main arguments for a Russellian monist view of consciousness provide at least as much support—and in some cases provide more support—for the analogous view of the secondary qualities. I conclude with a brief discussion of the relationship between the Russellian monist view of consciousness and my own Russellian-monist-style view of the secondary qualities, suggesting that the latter may serve as a new foundation for the former.

Papers by Brian Cutter

Imagine your mirror-inverted counterpart on Mirror Earth, a perfect mirror image of Earth. Would ... more Imagine your mirror-inverted counterpart on Mirror Earth, a perfect mirror image of Earth. Would her experiences be the same as yours, or would they be phenomenally mirror-inverted? I argue, first, that her experiences would be phenomenally the same as yours. I then show that this conclusion gives rise to a puzzle, one that I believe pushes us toward some surprising and philosophically significant conclusions about the nature of perception. When you have a typical visual experience as of something to your left, the following three claims seem very plausible: (1) No one could have an experience phenomenally just like yours without thereby having an experience as of something to her left. (2) Your experience is veridical. (3) Your experience doesn’t differ from that of your mirror-inverted counterpart with respect to veridicality. But (1)-(3) jointly contradict the claim that you and your mirror-inverted counterpart would have the same experiences. I argue that any viable response to this puzzle will embrace the following disjunction: either there is a degree of independence between perceptual phenomenology and representational content, contrary to popular intentionalist views of perception, or spatial subjectivism is true, where spatial subjectivism is the view that the spatial properties presented in perception are either mind-dependent or illusory.

This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori, with except... more This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori, with exceptions for necessary falsehoods and a few other odd cases. The argument for this conclusion has two main premises: (i) Odd exceptions aside, if it is possible that p, then it is possible that someone knows innately that p. (ii) Necessarily, whatever is known innately is known a priori. After defending (i) and (ii), I conclude by suggesting that the best way to recover a reasonably limited and interesting conception of the a priori is to adopt an anthropocentric notion of a priori knowability, one that is relativized to our own innate cognitive capacities. However, this proposal has consequences that contradict prevailing views about the a priori. More importantly, this proposal has the result that many philosophical applications of the notion of apriority are misguided.

Russellian monism represents a middle ground between physicalist and dualist views of consciousne... more Russellian monism represents a middle ground between physicalist and dualist views of consciousness, a refuge for those who reject physicalism for the usual reasons but wish to avoid the extravagancies of dualism. I argue that this middle-ground position is unstable. Those who reject physicalism on the basis of the usual epistemic arguments should reject Russellian monism on similar grounds and embrace some form of dualism. Conversely, those unwilling to go all the way to dualism must reject the epistemic arguments against physicalism. In either case, these arguments cannot be used to motivate Russellian monism.

Consciousness is morally significant: the overall goodness or badness of a world, or the overall ... more Consciousness is morally significant: the overall goodness or badness of a world, or the overall quality of one's life, at least partly depends on the conscious states included in it. I argue that the moral significance of consciousness has ramifications in metaethics and philosophy of mind, placing constraints on which metaethical positions can be combined with which positions on the metaphysics of consciousness. The main conclusion of this paper is that reductive materialism about consciousness is false if robust moral realism is true. The argument for this conclusion proceeds by drawing out a conflict between reductive materialism about consciousness and certain metaethical principles which I argue to be consequences of robust moral realism, including the following (here stated very roughly): (i) The most fundamental moral expressions do not exhibit semantic indeterminacy. (ii) The question of whether a certain moral concept applies to a situation is always a substantive question, never merely a “verbal” question (at least when the question is framed in terms of the most fundamental moral concepts). (iii) The most fundamental moral expressions are semantically stable, in the sense that their meanings are not sensitive to miniscule changes in usage. A secondary conclusion of this paper, then, is that reductive materialism about consciousness is false if any of (i)-(iii) are true. This secondary conclusion is significant apart from its role in establishing my main conclusion, since any of (i)-(iii) could be accepted by someone who rejects robust moral realism.

One of the most important objections to sense data theory comes from the phenomenon of indetermin... more One of the most important objections to sense data theory comes from the phenomenon of indeterminate perception, as when an object in the periphery of one’s visual field looks red without looking to have any determinate shade of red. Since sense data are supposed to have precisely the properties that sensibly appear to us, sense data theory evidently has the implausible consequence that a sense datum can have a determinable property without having any of its determinates. In this paper, I show that a parallel objection applies to standard forms of color relationism. In light of the phenomenon of indeterminate perception, the color relationist must either reject intuitively obvious facts about the determinate-determinable structure of color space (e.g., that red is a determinable) or reject the plausible and widely accepted principle that nothing can have a determinable without having one of its determinates.

The consequence argument is widely regarded as the most important argument for incompatibilism. I... more The consequence argument is widely regarded as the most important argument for incompatibilism. In this paper, I argue that the consequence argument, though it may be sound in its standard formulations, does not support any thesis that could reasonably be called “incompatibilism.” Joseph Campbell has argued for a related conclusion—namely, that the consequence argument cannot establish the strict incompatibility of freedom and determinism—on the grounds that the “fixity of the past” premise is merely a contingent truth. However, as many have observed, Campbell’s argument has a severe limitation. It leaves open the possibility that the consequence argument nonetheless succeeds in establishing some restricted incompatibility thesis worthy of the name "incompatibilism," i.e. some thesis to the effect that freedom and determinism are incompatible for agents relevantly like us. My argument, which focuses instead on the contingency of the “fixity of the laws” premise, does not have this limitation.

This paper defends a non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities—roughly, the view that ... more This paper defends a non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities—roughly, the view that the sensible qualities are (i) really instantiated by the external objects of perception, and (ii) not reducible to response-independent physical properties or response-dependent relational properties. I begin by clarifying and motivating the non-reductive realist view. I then consider some familiar difficulties for the view. Addressing these difficulties leads to the development and defense of a general theory, inspired by Russellian Monist theories of consciousness, of how the sensible qualities (especially the so-called 'secondary qualities') relate to physical reality. I conclude by showing how this theory, which I call 'Secondary Quality Russellian Monism', resolves the most significant difficulties for the non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities.

In recent work, David Chalmers argues that “Edenic shapes”—roughly, the shape properties phenomen... more In recent work, David Chalmers argues that “Edenic shapes”—roughly, the shape properties phenomenally presented in spatial experience—are not instantiated in our world. His reasons come largely from the theory of Special Relativity. Although Edenic shapes might have been instantiated in a classical Newtonian world, he maintains that they could not be instantiated in a relativistic world like our own. In this essay, I defend realism about Edenic shape (RES), the thesis that Edenic shapes are instantiated in our world, against Chalmers’s challenge from Special Relativity. I begin by clarifying the notion of an Edenic shape by reference to Chalmers’s notion of the “Edenic” (or “presentational”) content of perceptual experience. I then reconstruct Chalmers’s argument that Edenic shapes could not be instantiated in a relativistic world. His reasoning proceeds from two assumptions. The first is that the only shape properties instantiated in a relativistic world are those which somehow involve relations to frames of reference. This is thought to follow from the phenomenon of Lorentz contraction, a consequence of Special Relativity. The second assumption is that Edenic shapes do not involve relations to frames of reference. One reason to accept the second assumption is that it seems that Edenic shapes could be instantiated in a classical Newtonian world, where the notion of a frame-relative shape has no meaningful application. I then proceed to defend RES against Chalmers’s argument by arguing that Special Relativity, properly understood, provides no support for Chalmers’s first assumption. More generally, I argue, by way of a careful analysis of the geometric structure of Minkowski space–time (the space–time postulated by Special Relativity) and Galilean space–time (the space–time of (neo-)Newtonian physics), that Edenic shapes are no less at home in a relativistic world than in a classical Newtonian world.

Phenomenal qualities can be understood, roughly and intuitively, as the qualities associated with... more Phenomenal qualities can be understood, roughly and intuitively, as the qualities associated with a conscious state that constitute " what it's like " to be in that state. Many of the enduring questions in philosophy of mind are about phenomenal qualities. For example, one dimension of the mind-body problem is the problem of integrating phenomenal qualities into the picture of reality presented by the physical sciences. Phenomenal qualities also take center stage in the philosophy of perception. Are sensory colors objective properties of external surfaces, or properties of inner states or sense data that we erroneously project onto external objects? Must a sensory quality be instantiated whenever it is present to conscious awareness, or might it be merely represented without being instantiated? Phenomenal qualities are also involved in recent debates about the nature and existence of cognitive phenomenology, which can be understood as debates about what kinds of phenomenal qualities there are. This volume contains 14 essays by a cast of top-rate philosophers of mind (and one vision scientist) on the topic of phenomenal qualities, along with a philosophically substantive introduction by the editors. The volume does a good job covering the breadth of philosophical and empirical issues associated with phenomenal qualities. However, because these issues range so widely, the collection often feels a bit diffuse and unfocused. Nonetheless, the contributions are, for the most part, high-quality and interesting. Below is a summary of the volume's four sections, with a selective focus on two chapters from each section. Section I, " The Ontology of Phenomenal Qualities " (chapters 1-4), discusses the metaphysical nature of phenomenal qualities and their relation to the properties that figure in the physical sciences. With the exception of David Rosenthal's contribution, " Quality Spaces and Sensory Modalities, " all the essays in this section are critical of standard physicalist accounts of phenomenal qualities. Sam Coleman's ambitious essay, " Neuro-Cosmology " (ch. 2), develops a comprehensive metaphysical framework founded on the doctrine of " panqualityism, " the view that the basic building blocks of reality are qualities. Qualities can be understood roughly as properties that are " not merely relational " (p. 73). His argument for panqualityism begins with the putative datum that we instantiate qualities—for example, the qualities present to conscious awareness in sensory experience, like the " occurrent pinkness " presented in a perception of a pink ice cube. (He rejects the idea that these sensory qualities are merely represented by sensory experience, maintaining that they are necessarily instantiated whenever we are conscious of them.) Given the further assumptions that we are wholly composed of matter, that no qualitative property is implied by any collection of non-qualitative properties, and that high-level properties are intelligibly grounded in the basic properties of matter, he concludes that " basic matter is qualitative " (p. 77). Qualities are invisible to physical science, which can only describe the world's relational structure. But what ultimately underlies the abstract web of relations described by science is a vast mosaic of active qualities in " absolute process, " qualities of a kind with those that figure in ordinary episodes of human consciousness.

Many philosophers, especially in the wake of the 17th century, have favored an inegalitarian view... more Many philosophers, especially in the wake of the 17th century, have favored an inegalitarian view of shape and color, according to which shape is mind-independent while color is mind-dependent. In this essay, I advance a novel argument against inegalitarianism. The argument begins with an intuition about the modal dependence of color on shape, namely: it is impossible for something to have a color without having a shape (i.e. without having some sort of spatial extension, or at least spatial location). I then argue that, given reasonable assumptions, inegalitarianism contradicts this modal-dependence principle. Given the plausibility of the latter, I conclude that we should reject inegalitarianism in favor of some form of egalitarianism—either a subjective egalitarianism on which both shape and color are mind-dependent or an objective egalitarianism on which both shape and color are mind-independent.

Chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain, ed. Jennifer Corns (forthcoming)

In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a rec... more In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at eliminating the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If representationalism were true, she claims, then the act of taking pain killers would be just as irrational as the act of a ruler who responds to bad tidings by killing the messenger. This paper aims to show that these charges are mistaken.

Representationalism is the thesis that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on it... more Representationalism is the thesis that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Tracking representationalism is the conjunction of representationalism with a “tracking” or causal-covariation account of the content of experience. Several philosophers have maintained that the experience of pain poses a serious challenge to tracking representationalism. In particular, tracking representationalism is thought to be unable to account for the negative affective quality or “painfulness” of pain. In this paper we defend tracking representationalism against this challenge. We argue that pain has both descriptive and evaluative content and that pain has its negative affective quality in virtue of its (negative) evaluative content. We then show how a tracking theory of experiential content can accommodate this view of the content of pain. We conclude by noting some advantages of our account over a rival representationalist account, which explains the negative affective quality of pain in terms of imperative content rather than evaluative content.

Chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain, ed. Jennifer Corns (forthcoming)