Max Abrahms | Northeastern University (original) (raw)
Papers by Max Abrahms
Orbis, 2004
This past January, a young Palestinian mother, feigning a limp and requesting medical help, blew ... more This past January, a young Palestinian mother, feigning a limp and requesting medical help, blew herself up at a security checkpoint leading from the Gaza Strip into Israel. The attack killed four Israeli security personnel, along with the Hamas bomber herself, who left behind a three-year-old son and a one-year-old daughter. As the news spread, exultant neighbors spray-painted the woman's name and an Islamic blessing on city walls near her home. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) automatically shut down the industrial zone, sending home the 5,000 Palestinians employed in its factories. Within hours a general closure was enacted, barring some 20,000 Gazan commuters from working in Israel. 1 With 60 percent of Palestinians living on less than $2 a day, 2 one could question whom the attack hurt more, the Israelis or the Palestinians themselves. Why do terrorist groups engage in such self-defeating behavior? The answer, according to most experts, is simple: over the long-run, terrorism works. Therefore, groups that use it are acting rationally. The most recent proponent of this position is Robert Pape, whose yearlong study published in the American Political Science Review last year concludes: The ferocious escalation of the pace of suicide terrorism that we have witnessed the past several years cannot be considered irrational.. .. Rather, it is simply the result of the lesson that terrorists have quite reasonably learned from their experience of the previous two decades: Suicide terrorism pays. 3
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International Business Review
Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. Thes... more Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. These studies reveal the negative impact of terrorism on national economies, but neglect to theorize and examine how terrorism drives institutional escapism by promoting outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) to countries with lower risk levels. This study proposes and tests a rationalist explanation that builds on the concept of institutional escapism for how terrorism encourages increased levels of OFDI, particularly to countries with reduced risk. Drawing on the resilience, political violence, and international business literatures, we demonstrate through a unique global dataset of 22,873 observations, 5584 home-host country pairs, and 153 countries over 16 years (1995-2010) that terrorism induces institutional escapism in terms of OFDI.
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The Atlantic, 2023
By day, I teach Introduction to International Relations to undergraduate students at Northeastern... more By day, I teach Introduction to International Relations to undergraduate students at Northeastern University. By night, I consume the latest punditry about Ukraine. What strikes me is the frequent disconnect between international-relations scholarship and commonly espoused views in Western media about the war. Although other scholars would surely highlight different findings, I believe the most relevant ones urge greater caution in America’s approach to countering Russia.
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International Business Review, 2023
Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. Thes... more Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. These studies reveal the negative impact of terrorism on national economies, but neglect to theorize and examine how terrorism drives institutional escapism by promoting outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) to countries with lower risk levels. This study proposes and tests a rationalist explanation that builds on the concept of institutional escapism for how terrorism encourages increased levels of OFDI, particularly to countries with reduced risk. Drawing on the resilience, political violence, and international business literatures, we demonstrate through a unique global dataset of 22,873 observations, 5584 home-host country pairs, and 153 countries over 16 years (1995-2010) that terrorism induces institutional escapism in terms of OFDI.
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Contemporary Terrorism Studies
This chapter looks into the rationality of terrorism. It starts off by looking into the paradox o... more This chapter looks into the rationality of terrorism. It starts off by looking into the paradox of terrorism. Political scientists typically view terrorists as rational political actors. However, empirical research on terrorism suggests that terrorism is in fact an ineffective political tactic. Evidence indicates that in instances where there has been terrorist attacks on civilians, governments rarely grant concessions. This might explain why terrorism is often selected as a tactic only if alternative options are no longer viable. The chapter uses Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as case studies to examine broader patterns of terrorism. Knowing the priority of terrorists is vital for governments when considering counterterrorism actions. Having an understanding of the grievances of terrorists helps political actors predict which targets the terrorists will attack.
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Rules for Rebels
This chapter examines the effects of removing militant leaders in so-called decapitation strikes.... more This chapter examines the effects of removing militant leaders in so-called decapitation strikes. Leadership decapitation has become a cornerstone of counterterrorism strategy. Most research on this topic assesses whether killing the leader “works” by reducing the lifespan of the group or its ability to produce violence. But this chapter suggests a more nuanced finding. If militant leaders often restrain the rank-and-file, then taking them out should make their groups even more extreme in their targeting choices. More than the quantity of violence, decapitation reduces its quality. This chapter presents a battery of evidence that removing the leaders of most militant groups leads to more indiscriminate violence by empowering lower-level members to have less restraint about civilians.
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Rules for Rebels
How can the militant leader help to ensure that members faithfully execute his targeting preferen... more How can the militant leader help to ensure that members faithfully execute his targeting preferences? That is, how can he promote task cohesion in the ranks so subordinates refrain from targeting civilians? For the militant leader, the key to task cohesion is centralizing the organization. Centralizing the organization helps the leader to communicate his tactical instructions to the rank-and-file, discipline wayward members for attacking civilians, and vet out high-risk recruits prone to subverting the cause with terrorism. The leader has considerable agency over the degree to which his group is centralized. This chapter explains the benefits of centralizing it before quantifying them statistically.
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Rules for Rebels, 2018
The first two rules for rebels are important for the leader in minimizing terrorism. Even in the ... more The first two rules for rebels are important for the leader in minimizing terrorism. Even in the best-run groups, though, some militants may occasionally commit terrorism due to ignorance, stupidity, carelessness, bad luck, or for personal reasons like revenge. Regardless of the exact cause, civilian attacks are a public relations fiasco for the organization. Like the head of any organization, militant leaders must act strategically to minimize the fallout to its reputation whenever members blunder. The third rule for rebels is for the leader to brand the organization as moderate even when members act otherwise. In practice, this means denying organizational involvement (DOI) in civilian attacks. This chapter explains the scientific basis of DOI and its pervasiveness in militant groups with smart leaders.
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The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, 2019
The dominant paradigm on terrorism is what I call the Strategic Model of Terrorism. This model po... more The dominant paradigm on terrorism is what I call the Strategic Model of Terrorism. This model posits that perpetrators of terrorism attack civilians because of the unmatched effectiveness in pressuring government concessions. The strategic model is rooted in bargaining theory, which emphasizes how under anarchy escalating signals the will and ability to punish the target for non-compliance. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to coerce government concessions. In fact, terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels and go on the offensive. These empirical findings raise important questions about why people use terrorism given the negative political return.
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Foreign Affairs, 2017
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Entrepreneurship and the Sustainable Development Goals, 2018
Abstract This chapter examines the impact of national membership in international organizations o... more Abstract This chapter examines the impact of national membership in international organizations on female entrepreneurship. Drawing on the institution-based view from global strategy and civil society theory from international relations, we show how international organizations can promote entrepreneurship opportunities for women with respect to the United Nations’ sustainable development goals (SDGs). This research has both practical and social implications. From a practical perspective, it provides important insights for policy makers and entrepreneurs. Policy makers can use the findings to understand how the international organizations that countries join affect entrepreneurship, particularly the United Nation’s SDGs Entrepreneurs can also use the findings to advocate mutually beneficial conditions for host environments, particularly those dedicated to female empowerment. A sample of 44 countries, 5 years of data, and 130 country-year observations finds robust support for our assertions.
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International Security, 2018
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Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2018
Since 9/11, terrorism has been widely perceived as the foremost threat to the United States, its ... more Since 9/11, terrorism has been widely perceived as the foremost threat to the United States, its allies, and the broader international community. Political scientists have historically paid little attention to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism; in the subfield of international relations (IR), the focus of research of the dominant realist tradition was on great power politics, not on substate violence. In the post-9/11 world, IR scholars have begun to show interest in the causes and consequences of terrorism. Studies undertaken since October 2001 have been increasingly quantitative, employing a mixture of descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. Yet this heightened scholarly attention has yielded few uncontested insights. Fundamental methodological, empirical, and theoretical questions about terrorism have become the subject of intense discussions. The definition of terrorism in particular remains problematic. Scholars also debate over the virtues of large-n studie...
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Foreign Policy Analysis
Through the use of survey methods, the study presents the first systematic comparison of America-... more Through the use of survey methods, the study presents the first systematic comparison of America-based international relations professors to think tank employees (TTEs) in terms of their preferred conduct of the United States in international affairs. The difference between the two groups in their support for military intervention is stark. TTEs are 0.47 standard deviations more hawkish than professors based on a standard measure of militant internationalism (MI). Controlling for self-described ideology mitigates this effect although it remains statistically significant. Beyond quantifying their relative foreign policy preferences, this study helps to resolve why TTEs tend to assume more hawkish policies. The authors find evidence that hawkishness is associated with proximity to power. Professors who have worked for the federal government score higher on MI, as do TTEs based at institutions located closer to Capitol Hill. In general, the results point to a self-selection mechanism whereby those who favor interventionist policies are more likely to pursue positions to increase their policy influence, perhaps because they know that powerful institutions are more likely to hire hawks. Alternative explanations for differences, such as levels or kinds of foreign policy expertise, have weaker empirical support.
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Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 2022
Have you ever wondered why terrorist groups don't take credit for some of their attacks? In theor... more Have you ever wondered why terrorist groups don't take credit for some of their attacks? In theory, terrorism is a political communication strategy to amplify their grievances and the costs of non-compliance. Why, then, do they withhold taking responsibility for their work? My op-ed with Joseph Mroszczyk answers this question which has been a real puzzle for terrorism scholars, political scientists, and counterterrorism practitioners.
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International Security, 2008
This is the first article to analyze a large sample of terrorist groups in terms of their policy... more This is the first article to analyze a large sample of terrorist groups in terms of their policy effectiveness. It includes every foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001. The key variable for FTO success is a tactical one: target selection. Terrorist groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumber attacks on military targets do not tend to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. Contrary to the prevailing view that terrorism is an effective means of political coercion, the universe of cases suggests that, first, contemporary terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives and, second, the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. The bulk of the article develops a theory for why countries are reluctant to make policy concessions when their civilian populations are the primary target.
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International Security, 2008
What do terrorists want? No question is more fundamental for devising an effective counterterrori... more What do terrorists want? No question is more fundamental for devising an effective counterterrorism strategy. The international community cannot expect to make terrorism unprofitable and thus scarce without knowing the incentive structure of its practitioners. The strategic model—the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies—posits that terrorists are political utility maximizers. According to this view, individuals resort to terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest. The strategic model has widespread currency in the policy community; extant counterterrorism strategies seek to defeat terrorism by reducing its political utility. The most common strategies are to fight terrorism by decreasing its political benefits via a strict no concessions policy; decreasing its prospective political benefits via appeasement; or decreasing its political benefits relative to nonviolence via democracy promotion. Despite its policy relevance, the strategic model has not been tested. This is the first study to comprehensively assess its empirical validity. The actual record of terrorist behavior does not conform to the strategic model's premise that terrorists are rational actors primarily motivated to achieving political ends. The preponderance of empirical and theoretical evidence is that terrorists are rational people who use terrorism primarily to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists. Major revisions in both the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies and the policy community's basic approach to fighting terrorism are consequently in order.
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Security Studies, 2007
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Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, Feb 24, 2022
Within political science, the strategic model is the dominant paradigm for understanding terroris... more Within political science, the strategic model is the dominant paradigm for understanding terrorism. The strategic model of terrorism posits that people turn to terrorism because of its effectiveness in pressuring government concessions. The strategic model Is a specific type of rational actor model with intellectual roots in bargaining theory, which emphasizes in the field of international relations how violence enhances the credibility of threats under anarchy, elevating the odds of government compliance. The strategic model is stronger theoretically than empirically. Terrorism indeed enhances the credibility of threats by demonstrating that nonstate actors possess the will and means to inflict physical pain for political noncompliance. Under anarchy, targets cannot otherwise be certain that aggrieved nonstate actors have the ability and intent to impose physical costs for maintaining the political status quo; the use of terrorist violence against civilians enhances the credibility of the threat by leaving no doubt that withholding concessions to the perpetrators will be costly. Although terrorism enhances the credibility of the threat under anarchy, the empirical record demonstrates that terrorist violence is generally ineffective—even counterproductive—at coercing government concessions. Not only is terrorism highly correlated with political failure, but this form of violence appears to lower the likelihood of government compliance, often by empowering hardliners most opposed to political accommodation. This finding holds across a variety of methodological approaches, raising questions about why terrorism underperforms as a coercive tactic despite enhancing the credibility of nonstate threats.
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Orbis, 2004
This past January, a young Palestinian mother, feigning a limp and requesting medical help, blew ... more This past January, a young Palestinian mother, feigning a limp and requesting medical help, blew herself up at a security checkpoint leading from the Gaza Strip into Israel. The attack killed four Israeli security personnel, along with the Hamas bomber herself, who left behind a three-year-old son and a one-year-old daughter. As the news spread, exultant neighbors spray-painted the woman's name and an Islamic blessing on city walls near her home. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) automatically shut down the industrial zone, sending home the 5,000 Palestinians employed in its factories. Within hours a general closure was enacted, barring some 20,000 Gazan commuters from working in Israel. 1 With 60 percent of Palestinians living on less than $2 a day, 2 one could question whom the attack hurt more, the Israelis or the Palestinians themselves. Why do terrorist groups engage in such self-defeating behavior? The answer, according to most experts, is simple: over the long-run, terrorism works. Therefore, groups that use it are acting rationally. The most recent proponent of this position is Robert Pape, whose yearlong study published in the American Political Science Review last year concludes: The ferocious escalation of the pace of suicide terrorism that we have witnessed the past several years cannot be considered irrational.. .. Rather, it is simply the result of the lesson that terrorists have quite reasonably learned from their experience of the previous two decades: Suicide terrorism pays. 3
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International Business Review
Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. Thes... more Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. These studies reveal the negative impact of terrorism on national economies, but neglect to theorize and examine how terrorism drives institutional escapism by promoting outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) to countries with lower risk levels. This study proposes and tests a rationalist explanation that builds on the concept of institutional escapism for how terrorism encourages increased levels of OFDI, particularly to countries with reduced risk. Drawing on the resilience, political violence, and international business literatures, we demonstrate through a unique global dataset of 22,873 observations, 5584 home-host country pairs, and 153 countries over 16 years (1995-2010) that terrorism induces institutional escapism in terms of OFDI.
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The Atlantic, 2023
By day, I teach Introduction to International Relations to undergraduate students at Northeastern... more By day, I teach Introduction to International Relations to undergraduate students at Northeastern University. By night, I consume the latest punditry about Ukraine. What strikes me is the frequent disconnect between international-relations scholarship and commonly espoused views in Western media about the war. Although other scholars would surely highlight different findings, I believe the most relevant ones urge greater caution in America’s approach to countering Russia.
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International Business Review, 2023
Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. Thes... more Prior empirical research has examined the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment. These studies reveal the negative impact of terrorism on national economies, but neglect to theorize and examine how terrorism drives institutional escapism by promoting outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) to countries with lower risk levels. This study proposes and tests a rationalist explanation that builds on the concept of institutional escapism for how terrorism encourages increased levels of OFDI, particularly to countries with reduced risk. Drawing on the resilience, political violence, and international business literatures, we demonstrate through a unique global dataset of 22,873 observations, 5584 home-host country pairs, and 153 countries over 16 years (1995-2010) that terrorism induces institutional escapism in terms of OFDI.
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Contemporary Terrorism Studies
This chapter looks into the rationality of terrorism. It starts off by looking into the paradox o... more This chapter looks into the rationality of terrorism. It starts off by looking into the paradox of terrorism. Political scientists typically view terrorists as rational political actors. However, empirical research on terrorism suggests that terrorism is in fact an ineffective political tactic. Evidence indicates that in instances where there has been terrorist attacks on civilians, governments rarely grant concessions. This might explain why terrorism is often selected as a tactic only if alternative options are no longer viable. The chapter uses Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as case studies to examine broader patterns of terrorism. Knowing the priority of terrorists is vital for governments when considering counterterrorism actions. Having an understanding of the grievances of terrorists helps political actors predict which targets the terrorists will attack.
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Rules for Rebels
This chapter examines the effects of removing militant leaders in so-called decapitation strikes.... more This chapter examines the effects of removing militant leaders in so-called decapitation strikes. Leadership decapitation has become a cornerstone of counterterrorism strategy. Most research on this topic assesses whether killing the leader “works” by reducing the lifespan of the group or its ability to produce violence. But this chapter suggests a more nuanced finding. If militant leaders often restrain the rank-and-file, then taking them out should make their groups even more extreme in their targeting choices. More than the quantity of violence, decapitation reduces its quality. This chapter presents a battery of evidence that removing the leaders of most militant groups leads to more indiscriminate violence by empowering lower-level members to have less restraint about civilians.
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Rules for Rebels
How can the militant leader help to ensure that members faithfully execute his targeting preferen... more How can the militant leader help to ensure that members faithfully execute his targeting preferences? That is, how can he promote task cohesion in the ranks so subordinates refrain from targeting civilians? For the militant leader, the key to task cohesion is centralizing the organization. Centralizing the organization helps the leader to communicate his tactical instructions to the rank-and-file, discipline wayward members for attacking civilians, and vet out high-risk recruits prone to subverting the cause with terrorism. The leader has considerable agency over the degree to which his group is centralized. This chapter explains the benefits of centralizing it before quantifying them statistically.
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Rules for Rebels, 2018
The first two rules for rebels are important for the leader in minimizing terrorism. Even in the ... more The first two rules for rebels are important for the leader in minimizing terrorism. Even in the best-run groups, though, some militants may occasionally commit terrorism due to ignorance, stupidity, carelessness, bad luck, or for personal reasons like revenge. Regardless of the exact cause, civilian attacks are a public relations fiasco for the organization. Like the head of any organization, militant leaders must act strategically to minimize the fallout to its reputation whenever members blunder. The third rule for rebels is for the leader to brand the organization as moderate even when members act otherwise. In practice, this means denying organizational involvement (DOI) in civilian attacks. This chapter explains the scientific basis of DOI and its pervasiveness in militant groups with smart leaders.
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The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, 2019
The dominant paradigm on terrorism is what I call the Strategic Model of Terrorism. This model po... more The dominant paradigm on terrorism is what I call the Strategic Model of Terrorism. This model posits that perpetrators of terrorism attack civilians because of the unmatched effectiveness in pressuring government concessions. The strategic model is rooted in bargaining theory, which emphasizes how under anarchy escalating signals the will and ability to punish the target for non-compliance. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to coerce government concessions. In fact, terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels and go on the offensive. These empirical findings raise important questions about why people use terrorism given the negative political return.
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Foreign Affairs, 2017
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Entrepreneurship and the Sustainable Development Goals, 2018
Abstract This chapter examines the impact of national membership in international organizations o... more Abstract This chapter examines the impact of national membership in international organizations on female entrepreneurship. Drawing on the institution-based view from global strategy and civil society theory from international relations, we show how international organizations can promote entrepreneurship opportunities for women with respect to the United Nations’ sustainable development goals (SDGs). This research has both practical and social implications. From a practical perspective, it provides important insights for policy makers and entrepreneurs. Policy makers can use the findings to understand how the international organizations that countries join affect entrepreneurship, particularly the United Nation’s SDGs Entrepreneurs can also use the findings to advocate mutually beneficial conditions for host environments, particularly those dedicated to female empowerment. A sample of 44 countries, 5 years of data, and 130 country-year observations finds robust support for our assertions.
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International Security, 2018
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Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2018
Since 9/11, terrorism has been widely perceived as the foremost threat to the United States, its ... more Since 9/11, terrorism has been widely perceived as the foremost threat to the United States, its allies, and the broader international community. Political scientists have historically paid little attention to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism; in the subfield of international relations (IR), the focus of research of the dominant realist tradition was on great power politics, not on substate violence. In the post-9/11 world, IR scholars have begun to show interest in the causes and consequences of terrorism. Studies undertaken since October 2001 have been increasingly quantitative, employing a mixture of descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. Yet this heightened scholarly attention has yielded few uncontested insights. Fundamental methodological, empirical, and theoretical questions about terrorism have become the subject of intense discussions. The definition of terrorism in particular remains problematic. Scholars also debate over the virtues of large-n studie...
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Foreign Policy Analysis
Through the use of survey methods, the study presents the first systematic comparison of America-... more Through the use of survey methods, the study presents the first systematic comparison of America-based international relations professors to think tank employees (TTEs) in terms of their preferred conduct of the United States in international affairs. The difference between the two groups in their support for military intervention is stark. TTEs are 0.47 standard deviations more hawkish than professors based on a standard measure of militant internationalism (MI). Controlling for self-described ideology mitigates this effect although it remains statistically significant. Beyond quantifying their relative foreign policy preferences, this study helps to resolve why TTEs tend to assume more hawkish policies. The authors find evidence that hawkishness is associated with proximity to power. Professors who have worked for the federal government score higher on MI, as do TTEs based at institutions located closer to Capitol Hill. In general, the results point to a self-selection mechanism whereby those who favor interventionist policies are more likely to pursue positions to increase their policy influence, perhaps because they know that powerful institutions are more likely to hire hawks. Alternative explanations for differences, such as levels or kinds of foreign policy expertise, have weaker empirical support.
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Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 2022
Have you ever wondered why terrorist groups don't take credit for some of their attacks? In theor... more Have you ever wondered why terrorist groups don't take credit for some of their attacks? In theory, terrorism is a political communication strategy to amplify their grievances and the costs of non-compliance. Why, then, do they withhold taking responsibility for their work? My op-ed with Joseph Mroszczyk answers this question which has been a real puzzle for terrorism scholars, political scientists, and counterterrorism practitioners.
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International Security, 2008
This is the first article to analyze a large sample of terrorist groups in terms of their policy... more This is the first article to analyze a large sample of terrorist groups in terms of their policy effectiveness. It includes every foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001. The key variable for FTO success is a tactical one: target selection. Terrorist groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumber attacks on military targets do not tend to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. Contrary to the prevailing view that terrorism is an effective means of political coercion, the universe of cases suggests that, first, contemporary terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives and, second, the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. The bulk of the article develops a theory for why countries are reluctant to make policy concessions when their civilian populations are the primary target.
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International Security, 2008
What do terrorists want? No question is more fundamental for devising an effective counterterrori... more What do terrorists want? No question is more fundamental for devising an effective counterterrorism strategy. The international community cannot expect to make terrorism unprofitable and thus scarce without knowing the incentive structure of its practitioners. The strategic model—the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies—posits that terrorists are political utility maximizers. According to this view, individuals resort to terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest. The strategic model has widespread currency in the policy community; extant counterterrorism strategies seek to defeat terrorism by reducing its political utility. The most common strategies are to fight terrorism by decreasing its political benefits via a strict no concessions policy; decreasing its prospective political benefits via appeasement; or decreasing its political benefits relative to nonviolence via democracy promotion. Despite its policy relevance, the strategic model has not been tested. This is the first study to comprehensively assess its empirical validity. The actual record of terrorist behavior does not conform to the strategic model's premise that terrorists are rational actors primarily motivated to achieving political ends. The preponderance of empirical and theoretical evidence is that terrorists are rational people who use terrorism primarily to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists. Major revisions in both the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies and the policy community's basic approach to fighting terrorism are consequently in order.
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Security Studies, 2007
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Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, Feb 24, 2022
Within political science, the strategic model is the dominant paradigm for understanding terroris... more Within political science, the strategic model is the dominant paradigm for understanding terrorism. The strategic model of terrorism posits that people turn to terrorism because of its effectiveness in pressuring government concessions. The strategic model Is a specific type of rational actor model with intellectual roots in bargaining theory, which emphasizes in the field of international relations how violence enhances the credibility of threats under anarchy, elevating the odds of government compliance. The strategic model is stronger theoretically than empirically. Terrorism indeed enhances the credibility of threats by demonstrating that nonstate actors possess the will and means to inflict physical pain for political noncompliance. Under anarchy, targets cannot otherwise be certain that aggrieved nonstate actors have the ability and intent to impose physical costs for maintaining the political status quo; the use of terrorist violence against civilians enhances the credibility of the threat by leaving no doubt that withholding concessions to the perpetrators will be costly. Although terrorism enhances the credibility of the threat under anarchy, the empirical record demonstrates that terrorist violence is generally ineffective—even counterproductive—at coercing government concessions. Not only is terrorism highly correlated with political failure, but this form of violence appears to lower the likelihood of government compliance, often by empowering hardliners most opposed to political accommodation. This finding holds across a variety of methodological approaches, raising questions about why terrorism underperforms as a coercive tactic despite enhancing the credibility of nonstate threats.
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What compels a group or an individual to choose terrorism as a strategy to advance a cause? Dr. M... more What compels a group or an individual to choose terrorism as a strategy to advance a cause? Dr. Max Abrahms will engage participants in an exploration of the nature of terrorism through historical and current perspectives. His research focuses on the consequences of terrorism, its motives, and the implications for counterterrorism strategy.
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Terrorism and Counterterrorism Spring 2021 Syllabus
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This course investigates national security policy, including both traditional and non-traditional... more This course investigates national security policy, including both traditional and non-traditional threats to the United States. We will cover a variety of different perspectives on U.S. national security, challenges to it, and potential countermeasures. Our focus will be on contemporary threats to the country such as great power conflict, international hot spots such as Syria and Libya, so-called rogue states, nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, domestic extremism, pandemic, and climate change as well as possible government responses. There are two main goals: to understand some of the main (1) threats facing the United States and (2) ways of potentially mitigating them as explored in the international security literature.
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In theory, terrorism is a political communication strategy for groups to convey their grievances ... more In theory, terrorism is a political communication strategy for groups to convey their grievances and the costs of ignoring them. In practice, though, terrorist groups take responsibility for just a small portion of their attacks. Rather than getting credit for the violence, terrorist leaders generally deny their operatives committed it. This theoretical and empirical disconnect may explain why scholars have ignored the subject of unclaimed attacks despite the fact that they are the norm. With a mixed-methods research design, our study helps to fill this lacuna by proposing and testing a new theory to help account for variation in which attacks are claimed.
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What I do is find patterns in terrorist group behavior by analyzing thousands and thousands of te... more What I do is find patterns in terrorist group behavior by analyzing thousands and thousands of terrorist attacks from all over the world starting around 1970. I'll very briefly share with you my main empirical findings. The first is that not all kinds of violence are equally beneficial for terrorist groups. From a political perspective, the quality of an attack depends on the target selection. Specifically, terrorist groups are much more likely to successfully pressure governments into making political concessions when the violence is directed against their military or other government targets. By contrast, governments are much more likely to dig in their political heels and go on the offensive when terrorist groups attack their civilians. This is because countries tend to move to the political right and become more hawkish when their civilians are struck. An illustrative example is what happened in the United States after the San Bernardino attack. This ISIS-inspired attack made the American public much more hawkish. Hawkish candidates like Trump and Rubio and Cruz soared in the polls, while more dovish candidates like Rand Paul fell out of the race. By contrast, after American troops were attrited in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, the American public became less interested in fighting
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Ever wonder why militant groups behave as they do? For instance, why did Al Qaeda attack the Worl... more Ever wonder why militant groups behave as they do? For instance, why did Al Qaeda attack the World Trade Center whereas the African National Congress tried to avoid civilian bloodshed? Why does Islamic State brag over social media about its gory attacks, while Hezbollah denies responsibility or even apologizes for its carnage?
This book shows that militant group behavior depends on the strategic intelligence of the leaders. The author has extensively studied the political plights of hundreds of militant groups throughout world history and reveals that successful militant leaders have followed three rules. These rules are based on original insights from the fields of political science, psychology, criminology, economics, management, marketing, communication, and sociology.
It turns out there's a science to victory in militant history. But even rebels must follow rules.
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