John Waterman | University of New England (original) (raw)
Papers by John Waterman
Philosophical Studies, 2016
Most explanations of the rational authority of testimony provide little guidance when evaluating ... more Most explanations of the rational authority of testimony provide little guidance when evaluating individual pieces of testimony. In practice, however, we are remarkably sensitive to the varying epistemic credentials of testimony: extending trust when it is deserved, and withholding it when it is not. A complete account of the epistemology of testimony should, then, have something to say about when it is that testimony is trustworthy. In the typical case, to judge someone trustworthy requires judging them to be competent and sincere. In this essay we develop an exchange-based account of testimony that shows how those who receive testimony are in a position to evaluate the sincerity of speakers.
In "Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations," Sinan Dogramaci develops a causal account of how ... more In "Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations," Sinan Dogramaci develops a causal account of how communities coordinate epistemic procedures, which he calls 'epistemic communism'. In "Epistemic Free-Riders and Reasons to Trust Testimony" we argue that the theory faces a free-rider problem, and that the causal mechanism of influence at its heart tends to undermine rational self-trust.
Social Epistemology
Sinan Dogramaci has recently developed a view according to which epistemic evaluations -like call... more Sinan Dogramaci has recently developed a view according to which epistemic evaluations -like calling someone's behavior 'rational' or 'irrational' -encourages or discourages the behavior evaluated. This view promises to explain the rational authority of testimony, by guaranteeing that, in the long run, epistemic procedures will be shared throughout a community. We argue that Dogramaci's view is unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First, the social practice at its heart is vulnerable to free riders. Second, even if the problem of free riders can be solved, it 'alienates' epistemic agents from the testimony that they receive, in that, though they will accept testimony from their fellows, they will have no reason to do so. We argue that a more satisfactory view can be had if we couple the genuine insights that are to be found in Dogramaci's proposal with the recognition that testimony is an excludible good that is often distributed according to market forces. It is this fact about testimony that discourages free riding, and, when coupled with an amended version of Dogramaci's view, provides agents with a reason to trust testimony.
Intuitions Aren't a Natural Kind A pretty common conception of philosophical methodology is that... more Intuitions Aren't a Natural Kind
A pretty common conception of philosophical methodology is that it relies on appeals to intuitions about cases to generate evidence for and against candidate theories of things like reference, moral- ity, and knowledge. Experimental philosophers have recently questioned this 'standard justificatory procedure'. They argue that intuitions vary widely among different populations, and therefore aren't good evidence for such theories. More traditionally minded philosophers have responded that intui- tions, properly understood, can serve as evidence. I argue that this whole debate is founded on the mistaken assumption that intuitions are a natural kind of mental event. They are not. I show that some typical instances of the counterfactual thinking philosophers engage in don't involve any sin- gle common cognitive mechanism. Consequently, both the pessimistic conclusions of the experi- mentalists, and the optimistic conclusions of the traditionalists, are unsound.
Epistemic contextualism's semantic theory is usually paired with an irrationality theory to expl... more Epistemic contextualism's semantic theory is usually paired with an irrationality theory to explain, or explain away, problems like Cartesian skepticism. The semantic theory claims "know" is context sensitive. The irrationality theory claims that while most people make context-sensitive knowledge attributions, they do not recognize the logical commitments of those attributions. Accordingly, the theory claims (i) we know in low scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; (ii) we do not know in high scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; and, (iii) we fail to recognize this is not a contradiction. While the semantic theory has become the object of intense, largely negative experimental scrutiny, the cognitive failure theory has received none. I present data that suggests (i) contrary to prevailing results there is evidence for contextualism's semantic thesis, but that (ii) the cognitive failure theory is not robust enough to explain away the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Contextualism is correct, but The Demon abides.
Website by John Waterman
Philosophical Studies, 2016
Most explanations of the rational authority of testimony provide little guidance when evaluating ... more Most explanations of the rational authority of testimony provide little guidance when evaluating individual pieces of testimony. In practice, however, we are remarkably sensitive to the varying epistemic credentials of testimony: extending trust when it is deserved, and withholding it when it is not. A complete account of the epistemology of testimony should, then, have something to say about when it is that testimony is trustworthy. In the typical case, to judge someone trustworthy requires judging them to be competent and sincere. In this essay we develop an exchange-based account of testimony that shows how those who receive testimony are in a position to evaluate the sincerity of speakers.
In "Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations," Sinan Dogramaci develops a causal account of how ... more In "Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations," Sinan Dogramaci develops a causal account of how communities coordinate epistemic procedures, which he calls 'epistemic communism'. In "Epistemic Free-Riders and Reasons to Trust Testimony" we argue that the theory faces a free-rider problem, and that the causal mechanism of influence at its heart tends to undermine rational self-trust.
Social Epistemology
Sinan Dogramaci has recently developed a view according to which epistemic evaluations -like call... more Sinan Dogramaci has recently developed a view according to which epistemic evaluations -like calling someone's behavior 'rational' or 'irrational' -encourages or discourages the behavior evaluated. This view promises to explain the rational authority of testimony, by guaranteeing that, in the long run, epistemic procedures will be shared throughout a community. We argue that Dogramaci's view is unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First, the social practice at its heart is vulnerable to free riders. Second, even if the problem of free riders can be solved, it 'alienates' epistemic agents from the testimony that they receive, in that, though they will accept testimony from their fellows, they will have no reason to do so. We argue that a more satisfactory view can be had if we couple the genuine insights that are to be found in Dogramaci's proposal with the recognition that testimony is an excludible good that is often distributed according to market forces. It is this fact about testimony that discourages free riding, and, when coupled with an amended version of Dogramaci's view, provides agents with a reason to trust testimony.
Intuitions Aren't a Natural Kind A pretty common conception of philosophical methodology is that... more Intuitions Aren't a Natural Kind
A pretty common conception of philosophical methodology is that it relies on appeals to intuitions about cases to generate evidence for and against candidate theories of things like reference, moral- ity, and knowledge. Experimental philosophers have recently questioned this 'standard justificatory procedure'. They argue that intuitions vary widely among different populations, and therefore aren't good evidence for such theories. More traditionally minded philosophers have responded that intui- tions, properly understood, can serve as evidence. I argue that this whole debate is founded on the mistaken assumption that intuitions are a natural kind of mental event. They are not. I show that some typical instances of the counterfactual thinking philosophers engage in don't involve any sin- gle common cognitive mechanism. Consequently, both the pessimistic conclusions of the experi- mentalists, and the optimistic conclusions of the traditionalists, are unsound.
Epistemic contextualism's semantic theory is usually paired with an irrationality theory to expl... more Epistemic contextualism's semantic theory is usually paired with an irrationality theory to explain, or explain away, problems like Cartesian skepticism. The semantic theory claims "know" is context sensitive. The irrationality theory claims that while most people make context-sensitive knowledge attributions, they do not recognize the logical commitments of those attributions. Accordingly, the theory claims (i) we know in low scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; (ii) we do not know in high scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; and, (iii) we fail to recognize this is not a contradiction. While the semantic theory has become the object of intense, largely negative experimental scrutiny, the cognitive failure theory has received none. I present data that suggests (i) contrary to prevailing results there is evidence for contextualism's semantic thesis, but that (ii) the cognitive failure theory is not robust enough to explain away the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Contextualism is correct, but The Demon abides.