Zachary Hoskins | University of Nottingham (original) (raw)
Books (authored) by Zachary Hoskins
People convicted of crimes are subject to a criminal sentence, but they are also subject to a hos... more People convicted of crimes are subject to a criminal sentence, but they are also subject to a host of other legal measures: Some are denied access to jobs, housing, welfare, the vote, or other goods. Some may be deported. Others are subject to continued detention. Many have their criminal records made publicly accessible. These measures are often more burdensome than an offender’s formal sentence. This is the first book-length philosophical examination of these burdensome legal measures, called collateral legal consequences (CLCs). The book draws on resources in moral, legal, and political philosophy to shed light on whether these measures are ever morally justified. It analyzes the various kinds of CLCs imposed in different legal systems and the important moral challenges they raise, and it makes the case that these challenges have been largely overlooked by philosophers. The book examines whether CLCs can ever be justified as forms of criminal punishment—whether they are consistent with the values and principles that we believe should govern punishment. Then it considers whether CLCs are ever justifiable as civil measures, and specifically what could justify the state in imposing additional burdensome measures on offenders in addition to their punishment. Whether CLCs function as forms of punishment or as civil measures, the book contends that they are justifiable in a far narrower range of cases than we find in current legal practice.
Books (edited) by Zachary Hoskins
This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underl... more This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. The essays collected in this volume consider a range of epistemological issues raised by trials, such as how much credence jurors should give to eyewitness testimony, the admissibility and role of statistical evidence, and the appropriate standards of proof in different contexts.
There is no more vivid example of a state’s power over its citizens than the criminal law. By cri... more There is no more vivid example of a state’s power over its citizens than the criminal law. By criminalizing various behaviours, the state sets boundaries on what we can and cannot do. And the criminal law is in many ways unique in the harshness of its sanctions. But traditional criminal law theory has for too long focussed on the questions, “what is a crime?” and “what is the justification of punishment?” The significance of the criminal law extends beyond these questions; indeed, critical philosophical questions underlie all aspects of the criminal justice system. The criminal law engages us not just as offenders or potential offenders, but also as victims, suspects, judges and jurors, prosecutors and defenders—and as citizens. The authors in this volume go beyond traditional questions to challenge our conventional understandings of the criminal law. In doing so, they draw from a number of disciplines including philosophy, history, and social science.
This anthology brings together legal and philosophical theorists to examine the normative and con... more This anthology brings together legal and philosophical theorists to examine the normative and conceptual foundations of international criminal law. In particular, through these essays the international group of authors addresses questions of state sovereignty; of groups, rather than individuals, as perpetrators and victims of international crimes; of international criminal law and the promotion of human rights and social justice; and of what comes after international criminal prosecutions, namely, punishment and reconciliation. International criminal law is still an emerging field, and as it continues to develop, the elucidation of clear, consistent theoretical groundings for its practices will be crucial. The questions raised and issues addressed by the essays in this volume aid in this important endeavor.
Articles by Zachary Hoskins
Sentencing the Self-Convicted: The Ethics of Pleading Guilty, 2023
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
A criminal conviction can trigger numerous burdensome legal consequences beyond the formal senten... more A criminal conviction can trigger numerous burdensome legal consequences beyond the formal sentence. Some charge that these “collateral” legal consequences (CLCs) constitute additional measures of punishment, which raises the further question of whether judges should consider these CLCs when making sentencing decisions, reducing the formal sentence in proportion to the severity of the CLCs the defendant will face. The idea that all CLCs constitute forms of punishment reflects a particular conception of punishment, which I call the “minimalist view.” In this paper, I argue against the minimalist view. I contend that on a more adequate conception of punishment, some but not all CLCs constitute punishment. I also argue that whether judges should consider CLCs in sentencing decisions depends on whether the relevant CLCs constitute punishment.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2022
Critics of state punishment have frequently pointed out that its imposition sometimes involves t... more Critics of state punishment have frequently pointed out that its imposition sometimes involves the infliction of burdens on innocent people: namely, those falsely convicted of crimes and punished. Punishment also creates significant burdens for innocent children and other dependents of those punished (social stigma, financial stress, direct abuse, and so on). But these burdens on innocents have received much less philosophical attention than the burdens created for the falsely convicted. This article examines five lines of argument that might lead one to the conclusion that the burdens punishment creates for the falsely convicted are more morally troubling than the burdens it creates for innocent dependents of those punished. I offer reasons to be sceptical about each of these arguments. I contend that we should regard the burdens state punishment creates for innocent dependents of those punished as no less morally troubling than the burdens it creates for innocent, falsely convicted people. In the article's final section, I discuss some implications of my account.
Criminal Justice Ethics, 2022
Chad Flanders has argued that retributivism is inconsistent with John Rawls’s core notion of publ... more Chad Flanders has argued that retributivism is inconsistent with John Rawls’s core notion of public reason, which sets out those considerations on which legitimate exercises of state power can be based. Flanders asserts that retributivism is grounded in claims about which people can reasonably disagree and are thus not suitable grounds for public policy. This essay contends that Rawls’s notion of public reason does not provide a basis for rejecting retributivist justifications of punishment. I argue that Flanders’s interpretation of public reason is too exclusionary: on it, public reason would rule out any prominent rationale for punishment. On what I contend is a better interpretation of public reason, whether retributivism would be ruled out as a rationale for punishment depends on whether a retributivist account can be constructed from shared political commitments in a liberal democracy. Some prominent versions of retributivism meet this requirement and so are consistent with public reason.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment, 2021
This chapter aims to help resuscitate scholarly interest in hybrid approaches to the justificatio... more This chapter aims to help resuscitate scholarly interest in hybrid approaches to the justification of punishment. I discuss the diversity of ways in which different moral considerations might be brought together into at least prima facie plausible hybrid views. I then address three general lines of objection to hybrid strategies. The first claims that in standard hybrid accounts, retributivism is relegated to too minor a role. The second contends that crime reductive and retributivist perspectives yield incompatible pictures of those subjected to punishment. And the third raises concerns about the strategy itself of disaggregating the problem of punishment’s justification into multiple questions. I contend that none of these objections gives us good reason to abandon the hybrid approach to justifying punishment.
The Ethics of Anger, 2020
A critique of retributivist theories of punishment that has gained prominence in recent years foc... more A critique of retributivist theories of punishment that has gained prominence in recent years focuses on retributivism’s links to anger. This line of critique has been developed in somewhat different forms, most notably by Martha Nussbaum and Joshua Greene. The gist is that retributivist theories are essentially rationalizations of retributive emotions, especially anger, and that anger is an unsavory basis for making decisions about whether and how to punish; thus retributivist theories are not well supported. This chapter first examines the relevance of anger to various normative questions about whether and how we punish. Then the bulk of the chapter focuses on the anger-based critique of retributivist theories of punishment. I examine some prominent versions of this line of objection and consider possible retributivist responses. I contend that the anger-based objections to retributivism are less damaging than their proponents suggest.
Predictive Sentencing: Normative and Empirical Perspectives, 2019
In this chapter, I argue that punishing to incapacitate people based on assessments of their risk... more In this chapter, I argue that punishing to incapacitate people based on assessments of their riskiness is unjustified. I first discuss some common lines of objection to incapacitative sentencing, based on the imprecise nature of risk-assessment tools and the perceived tensions between risk reduction and retributivism. Next, I set out a different argument against incapacitative punishment, one that in my view cuts more deeply than arguments based on concerns about risk-assessment tools or retributivism. After setting out the case against incapacitative punishment, I consider and respond to potential responses that defenders of the practice might offer. Ultimately, I conclude that all but one of these defences is unsuccessful, and that the remaining defence succeeds to such a limited extent as to be likely unsatisfying for proponents of incapacitative punishment.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 2019
Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2018
Convicted offenders face a host of so-called ''collateral'' consequences: formal measures such as... more Convicted offenders face a host of so-called ''collateral'' consequences: formal measures such as legal restrictions on voting, employment, housing, or public assistance, as well as informal consequences such as stigma, family tensions, and financial insecurity. These consequences extend well beyond an offender's criminal sentence itself and are frequently more burdensome than the sentence. This essay considers two respects in which collateral consequences may be relevant to the question of what the state should, or may, criminalize. First, they may be relevant according to specific accounts of criminalization, including plausible versions of the harm principle and legal moralism. Second, they may be relevant to the legitimacy of state criminalization more generally. Thus for legal theorists concerned with the issue of legitimate criminalization, normative questions raised by collateral consequences are of central importance.
Sentencing Multiple Crimes, 2018
This chapter examines one intuitively appealing legal practice for which retributivist accounts s... more This chapter examines one intuitively appealing legal practice for which retributivist accounts struggle to find justification: multiple-offense sentencing discounts. It also considers several proposed strategies for justifying bulk discounts on the basis of retributivism. Three strategies are discussed: those that appeal to an absolute punishment maximum, those that appeal to interpersonal practices of blame and making amends, and those that suggest that perpetrators of multiple offenses sometimes have reduced culpability. The chapter argues that each of these strategies either is implausible as a ground for bulk-sentencing discounts or is plausible only insofar as it incorporates nonretributivist considerations into its account—thus is in fact a hybrid view. It concludes by looking at hybrid theories as an alternative, suggesting that such approaches not only can provide justification for bulk-sentencing discounts, but are also more plausible in general than is often assumed.
Criminal Law Reform Now, 2018
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2018
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017
Ethics in Politics: The Rights and Obligations of Individual Political Agents, 2017
In this chapter, I contend that prosecutors should be centrally responsible for ensuring that def... more In this chapter, I contend that prosecutors should be centrally responsible for ensuring that defendants considering whether to plead guilty have access to the range of likely legal consequences of such a plea. As we will see, this is in some respects a modest suggestion. But given various realities of current legal practice in the United States, especially the pervasiveness of so-called “collateral” consequences of conviction, the proposal offered in this chapter could have potentially radical effects. In what follows, I first discuss some broader developments in criminal justice that have made the issue of informed guilty pleas — and in particular, the question of whose responsibility it is to ensure that defendants are informed — especially important. Then I develop and defend the proposal that prosecutors should bear greater responsibility than they currently do, indeed central responsibility, for ensuring that defendants have access to the information relevant to making an informed plea decision. I contend that this proposal is both justifiable in principle and attractive in its practical implications.
The New Philosophy of Criminal Law, 2016
This chapter examines whether so-called “collateral” restrictions should be treated as civil meas... more This chapter examines whether so-called “collateral” restrictions should be treated as civil measures or as forms of punishment. I first say a bit about what’s at stake in whether we treat the restrictions as forms of punishment or civil measures. I then flesh out and critically assess two general approaches to thinking about the question: an approach that appeals to the practical implications of treating them one way or another, and an approach that looks to the functions of punishment and asks whether the various restrictions are punitive in their function. I argue that we should opt for the second approach. If we do, we’ll find that traditional legal practice’s blanket treatment of these restrictions as civil measures is untenable, but we should equally find problematic the view that all burdensome legal consequences of a criminal conviction constitute punishment. Instead, if we focus on the distinctive features of criminal punishment itself, then we should expect that whether restrictive legal measures constitute punishment will depend on the particular measure, its purpose(s) and social meaning. In the final section, I address various implications of this conclusion for legal practice and the philosophy of criminal law.
People convicted of crimes are subject to a criminal sentence, but they are also subject to a hos... more People convicted of crimes are subject to a criminal sentence, but they are also subject to a host of other legal measures: Some are denied access to jobs, housing, welfare, the vote, or other goods. Some may be deported. Others are subject to continued detention. Many have their criminal records made publicly accessible. These measures are often more burdensome than an offender’s formal sentence. This is the first book-length philosophical examination of these burdensome legal measures, called collateral legal consequences (CLCs). The book draws on resources in moral, legal, and political philosophy to shed light on whether these measures are ever morally justified. It analyzes the various kinds of CLCs imposed in different legal systems and the important moral challenges they raise, and it makes the case that these challenges have been largely overlooked by philosophers. The book examines whether CLCs can ever be justified as forms of criminal punishment—whether they are consistent with the values and principles that we believe should govern punishment. Then it considers whether CLCs are ever justifiable as civil measures, and specifically what could justify the state in imposing additional burdensome measures on offenders in addition to their punishment. Whether CLCs function as forms of punishment or as civil measures, the book contends that they are justifiable in a far narrower range of cases than we find in current legal practice.
This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underl... more This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. The essays collected in this volume consider a range of epistemological issues raised by trials, such as how much credence jurors should give to eyewitness testimony, the admissibility and role of statistical evidence, and the appropriate standards of proof in different contexts.
There is no more vivid example of a state’s power over its citizens than the criminal law. By cri... more There is no more vivid example of a state’s power over its citizens than the criminal law. By criminalizing various behaviours, the state sets boundaries on what we can and cannot do. And the criminal law is in many ways unique in the harshness of its sanctions. But traditional criminal law theory has for too long focussed on the questions, “what is a crime?” and “what is the justification of punishment?” The significance of the criminal law extends beyond these questions; indeed, critical philosophical questions underlie all aspects of the criminal justice system. The criminal law engages us not just as offenders or potential offenders, but also as victims, suspects, judges and jurors, prosecutors and defenders—and as citizens. The authors in this volume go beyond traditional questions to challenge our conventional understandings of the criminal law. In doing so, they draw from a number of disciplines including philosophy, history, and social science.
This anthology brings together legal and philosophical theorists to examine the normative and con... more This anthology brings together legal and philosophical theorists to examine the normative and conceptual foundations of international criminal law. In particular, through these essays the international group of authors addresses questions of state sovereignty; of groups, rather than individuals, as perpetrators and victims of international crimes; of international criminal law and the promotion of human rights and social justice; and of what comes after international criminal prosecutions, namely, punishment and reconciliation. International criminal law is still an emerging field, and as it continues to develop, the elucidation of clear, consistent theoretical groundings for its practices will be crucial. The questions raised and issues addressed by the essays in this volume aid in this important endeavor.
Sentencing the Self-Convicted: The Ethics of Pleading Guilty, 2023
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
A criminal conviction can trigger numerous burdensome legal consequences beyond the formal senten... more A criminal conviction can trigger numerous burdensome legal consequences beyond the formal sentence. Some charge that these “collateral” legal consequences (CLCs) constitute additional measures of punishment, which raises the further question of whether judges should consider these CLCs when making sentencing decisions, reducing the formal sentence in proportion to the severity of the CLCs the defendant will face. The idea that all CLCs constitute forms of punishment reflects a particular conception of punishment, which I call the “minimalist view.” In this paper, I argue against the minimalist view. I contend that on a more adequate conception of punishment, some but not all CLCs constitute punishment. I also argue that whether judges should consider CLCs in sentencing decisions depends on whether the relevant CLCs constitute punishment.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2022
Critics of state punishment have frequently pointed out that its imposition sometimes involves t... more Critics of state punishment have frequently pointed out that its imposition sometimes involves the infliction of burdens on innocent people: namely, those falsely convicted of crimes and punished. Punishment also creates significant burdens for innocent children and other dependents of those punished (social stigma, financial stress, direct abuse, and so on). But these burdens on innocents have received much less philosophical attention than the burdens created for the falsely convicted. This article examines five lines of argument that might lead one to the conclusion that the burdens punishment creates for the falsely convicted are more morally troubling than the burdens it creates for innocent dependents of those punished. I offer reasons to be sceptical about each of these arguments. I contend that we should regard the burdens state punishment creates for innocent dependents of those punished as no less morally troubling than the burdens it creates for innocent, falsely convicted people. In the article's final section, I discuss some implications of my account.
Criminal Justice Ethics, 2022
Chad Flanders has argued that retributivism is inconsistent with John Rawls’s core notion of publ... more Chad Flanders has argued that retributivism is inconsistent with John Rawls’s core notion of public reason, which sets out those considerations on which legitimate exercises of state power can be based. Flanders asserts that retributivism is grounded in claims about which people can reasonably disagree and are thus not suitable grounds for public policy. This essay contends that Rawls’s notion of public reason does not provide a basis for rejecting retributivist justifications of punishment. I argue that Flanders’s interpretation of public reason is too exclusionary: on it, public reason would rule out any prominent rationale for punishment. On what I contend is a better interpretation of public reason, whether retributivism would be ruled out as a rationale for punishment depends on whether a retributivist account can be constructed from shared political commitments in a liberal democracy. Some prominent versions of retributivism meet this requirement and so are consistent with public reason.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment, 2021
This chapter aims to help resuscitate scholarly interest in hybrid approaches to the justificatio... more This chapter aims to help resuscitate scholarly interest in hybrid approaches to the justification of punishment. I discuss the diversity of ways in which different moral considerations might be brought together into at least prima facie plausible hybrid views. I then address three general lines of objection to hybrid strategies. The first claims that in standard hybrid accounts, retributivism is relegated to too minor a role. The second contends that crime reductive and retributivist perspectives yield incompatible pictures of those subjected to punishment. And the third raises concerns about the strategy itself of disaggregating the problem of punishment’s justification into multiple questions. I contend that none of these objections gives us good reason to abandon the hybrid approach to justifying punishment.
The Ethics of Anger, 2020
A critique of retributivist theories of punishment that has gained prominence in recent years foc... more A critique of retributivist theories of punishment that has gained prominence in recent years focuses on retributivism’s links to anger. This line of critique has been developed in somewhat different forms, most notably by Martha Nussbaum and Joshua Greene. The gist is that retributivist theories are essentially rationalizations of retributive emotions, especially anger, and that anger is an unsavory basis for making decisions about whether and how to punish; thus retributivist theories are not well supported. This chapter first examines the relevance of anger to various normative questions about whether and how we punish. Then the bulk of the chapter focuses on the anger-based critique of retributivist theories of punishment. I examine some prominent versions of this line of objection and consider possible retributivist responses. I contend that the anger-based objections to retributivism are less damaging than their proponents suggest.
Predictive Sentencing: Normative and Empirical Perspectives, 2019
In this chapter, I argue that punishing to incapacitate people based on assessments of their risk... more In this chapter, I argue that punishing to incapacitate people based on assessments of their riskiness is unjustified. I first discuss some common lines of objection to incapacitative sentencing, based on the imprecise nature of risk-assessment tools and the perceived tensions between risk reduction and retributivism. Next, I set out a different argument against incapacitative punishment, one that in my view cuts more deeply than arguments based on concerns about risk-assessment tools or retributivism. After setting out the case against incapacitative punishment, I consider and respond to potential responses that defenders of the practice might offer. Ultimately, I conclude that all but one of these defences is unsuccessful, and that the remaining defence succeeds to such a limited extent as to be likely unsatisfying for proponents of incapacitative punishment.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 2019
Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2018
Convicted offenders face a host of so-called ''collateral'' consequences: formal measures such as... more Convicted offenders face a host of so-called ''collateral'' consequences: formal measures such as legal restrictions on voting, employment, housing, or public assistance, as well as informal consequences such as stigma, family tensions, and financial insecurity. These consequences extend well beyond an offender's criminal sentence itself and are frequently more burdensome than the sentence. This essay considers two respects in which collateral consequences may be relevant to the question of what the state should, or may, criminalize. First, they may be relevant according to specific accounts of criminalization, including plausible versions of the harm principle and legal moralism. Second, they may be relevant to the legitimacy of state criminalization more generally. Thus for legal theorists concerned with the issue of legitimate criminalization, normative questions raised by collateral consequences are of central importance.
Sentencing Multiple Crimes, 2018
This chapter examines one intuitively appealing legal practice for which retributivist accounts s... more This chapter examines one intuitively appealing legal practice for which retributivist accounts struggle to find justification: multiple-offense sentencing discounts. It also considers several proposed strategies for justifying bulk discounts on the basis of retributivism. Three strategies are discussed: those that appeal to an absolute punishment maximum, those that appeal to interpersonal practices of blame and making amends, and those that suggest that perpetrators of multiple offenses sometimes have reduced culpability. The chapter argues that each of these strategies either is implausible as a ground for bulk-sentencing discounts or is plausible only insofar as it incorporates nonretributivist considerations into its account—thus is in fact a hybrid view. It concludes by looking at hybrid theories as an alternative, suggesting that such approaches not only can provide justification for bulk-sentencing discounts, but are also more plausible in general than is often assumed.
Criminal Law Reform Now, 2018
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2018
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017
Ethics in Politics: The Rights and Obligations of Individual Political Agents, 2017
In this chapter, I contend that prosecutors should be centrally responsible for ensuring that def... more In this chapter, I contend that prosecutors should be centrally responsible for ensuring that defendants considering whether to plead guilty have access to the range of likely legal consequences of such a plea. As we will see, this is in some respects a modest suggestion. But given various realities of current legal practice in the United States, especially the pervasiveness of so-called “collateral” consequences of conviction, the proposal offered in this chapter could have potentially radical effects. In what follows, I first discuss some broader developments in criminal justice that have made the issue of informed guilty pleas — and in particular, the question of whose responsibility it is to ensure that defendants are informed — especially important. Then I develop and defend the proposal that prosecutors should bear greater responsibility than they currently do, indeed central responsibility, for ensuring that defendants have access to the information relevant to making an informed plea decision. I contend that this proposal is both justifiable in principle and attractive in its practical implications.
The New Philosophy of Criminal Law, 2016
This chapter examines whether so-called “collateral” restrictions should be treated as civil meas... more This chapter examines whether so-called “collateral” restrictions should be treated as civil measures or as forms of punishment. I first say a bit about what’s at stake in whether we treat the restrictions as forms of punishment or civil measures. I then flesh out and critically assess two general approaches to thinking about the question: an approach that appeals to the practical implications of treating them one way or another, and an approach that looks to the functions of punishment and asks whether the various restrictions are punitive in their function. I argue that we should opt for the second approach. If we do, we’ll find that traditional legal practice’s blanket treatment of these restrictions as civil measures is untenable, but we should equally find problematic the view that all burdensome legal consequences of a criminal conviction constitute punishment. Instead, if we focus on the distinctive features of criminal punishment itself, then we should expect that whether restrictive legal measures constitute punishment will depend on the particular measure, its purpose(s) and social meaning. In the final section, I address various implications of this conclusion for legal practice and the philosophy of criminal law.
Social Philosophy Today, 2015
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2014
Individuals convicted of crimes are often subject to numerous restrictions — on housing, employme... more Individuals convicted of crimes are often subject to numerous restrictions — on housing, employment, the vote, public assistance, and other goods — well after they have completed their sentences, and in some cases permanently. The question of whether — and if so, when — ex-offender restrictions are morally permissible has received surprisingly little philosophical scrutiny. This article first examines the significance of completing punishment, of paying one's debt to society, and contends that when offenders' debts are paid, they should be restored to full standing as citizens. Thus all ex-offender restrictions are presumptively unjustified. Nonconsequentialist defences of these restrictions are ultimately unsuccessful in defeating the presumption against them. In a limited range of cases, consequentialist considerations — namely, of risk reduction — may be sufficient to override the presumptive case against these restrictions. The article concludes by suggesting a number of criteria for assessing whether particular restrictive measures are permissible on grounds of risk reduction.
International Criminal Law Review, 2014
Proponents of punishing states often claim that such punishment would not distribute to members o... more Proponents of punishing states often claim that such punishment would not distribute to members of the state, and so it would not subject innocent citizens – those who did not participate in the crimes, or dissented, or even were among the victims – to guilt by association. This essay examines three features of state punishment that might be said not to distribute to citizens: it is burdensome, it is intentionally so, and it expresses social condemnation. Ultimately, I contend that when a state is punished, the burdens do distribute to citizens as intended, condemning burdens – that is, as punishment. Thus the nondistribution of punishment thesis fails as a response to the guilt-by-association objection.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014
Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2020
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2014
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2013
Philosophical Books, 2008