Kacper Szulecki | Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (original) (raw)

Papers: Climate & Energy by Kacper Szulecki

Our chapter brings together four Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) scholars into a conversatio... more Our chapter brings together four Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) scholars into a conversation about their research and policy engagements, working within History, Political Science, Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies. We develop a socio-technical perspective and turn that into a conceptual tool pack, to interrogate and explore the

Energy democracy' has evolved from a slogan used by activists demanding a greater say in energy-r... more Energy democracy' has evolved from a slogan used by activists demanding a greater say in energy-related decision-making to a term used in policy documents and scholarly literature on energy governance and energy transitions. This article reviews the academic literature using a combination of three methodological elements: (1) keyword searches of major bibliographical databases for quantification purposes; (2) an innovative method referred to as 'circulation tracing' to assess impact; and (3) in-depth discussion of the theoretical underpinnings, implications and interconnections of different parts of the literature. A conceptual framework is developed around three divergent understandings of the term 'energy democracy': (1) a process driven forwards by a popular movement; (2) an outcome of decarbonisation; and (3) a goal or ideal to which stakeholders aspire. The review also highlights some weaknesses of the literature: fragmentation between its European and American branches, which barely relate to each other; implicit or absent linkages between 'energy democracy' and broader theories of democracy; a tendency to idealise societal grassroots; confusion about the roles of the state, private capital and communities; and lack of attention to the threat posed by energy populism. Proponents should not assume that more energy democracy will inherently mean faster decarbonisation, improved energy access or social wellbeing. Finally, more emphasis should be placed on the role of research in providing evidence to ground energy democracy-related analyses and discussions.

Environmental Politics, 2019

While political environmentalism played an important role in social mobilization against communis... more While political environmentalism played an important role in social mobilization against communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe before 1989, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s conservationism appeared to be in decline across the region, and external pressure from European institutions and Western donors influenced environmental policy. What explains the effectiveness of protest since the environmental movement emerged in the 1980s? We trace the emergence and evolution of Polish political environmentalism, looking at three levels of the environmental movement’s legitimacy: the level of practices, societal support, and discourse. Each phase identified between 1980s and 2017 saw shifts on different levels of legitimacy, and each ended with a spectacular environmental protest or a decision, bearing implications for the following phase. Since 2010, we see a deep polarization of Polish politics, limiting the effectiveness of environmental protest despite the movement’s regained triple legitimacy in large parts of the society.

Why did Poland, Europe’s most coal-dependent economy, in 2015 adopt highly technology-specific au... more Why did Poland, Europe’s most coal-dependent economy, in 2015 adopt highly technology-specific auctioning as its main support scheme for renewable energy, since 2016 combined with net-metering for prosumers? This chapter explains the evolution of Polish renewables policy until the end of 2016, exploring how Polish political and organizational fields have influenced the renewables support mix. The European environment has been very important for the development of renewables policy in Poland since the 1990s, but EU influence in other areas has also had repercussions for the Polish renewable energy mix. The organizational field has become consolidated, and its impact on policy has grown over time. We also find that the dominant institutional logics of the organizational ‘conquers’ the political. This is linked to the fact that in the case of Poland, it is difficult to draw a clear line between the two, although the organizational field appears dominant. Poland’s current renewable energy policy mix appears optimal for the actors that dominate the organizational field. Changing that situation would require a deep paradigm shift, with a total reversal of the political economy of the energy sector.

Poland is also one of the EU countries with the least ambitious climate protection policies, havi... more Poland is also one of the
EU countries with the least
ambitious climate protection
policies, having achieved a
“low” ranking in the 2018
Climate Change Performance
Index

This editorial introduces the thematic issue "EU Energy Policy: Towards a Clean Energy Transition... more This editorial introduces the thematic issue "EU Energy Policy: Towards a Clean Energy Transition?", nesting it in broader discussion on European Union's (EU) energy policy. For over a decade, the EU has displayed an interest and political motivation to integrate climate policy priorities into its energy governance. However, the history of European energy governance does not start there, though political science scholarship has tended to downplay the importance of energy sector regulation. Recent years have finally seen the merging of two distinct research programs on European energy politics, and the emergence of a more inclusive and historically accurate approach to energy governance in Europe. This thematic issue follows that new paradigm. It is divided into three sections. The first investigates the EU Energy Union, its governance and decarbonization ambitions. The second section looks at the increasing overlaps between energy and competition policies, particularly the role of State Aid Guidelines in influencing energy subsidies-for renewable as well as conventional energy. Finally, the third section analyses the energy and climate policy of "new" EU members and the relationship between the EU and non-members in the energy sector.

As energy security becomes a key topic of policy debates, not least in Central and Eastern Europe... more As energy security becomes a key topic of policy debates, not least in Central and Eastern European states, which are vulnerable to gas supply disruptions from Russia, it has been suggested that EU energy policy becomes 'securitized'. However, full securitization attempts, which not only identify threats but also call for exceptional measures to deal with them, are relatively rare in the energy sector. Why do governmental actors initiate securitizing moves aimed at implementing exceptional measures in the energy sector, and what explains the acceptance of certain moves or measures and dismissal of others? This paper looks at Poland, comparing two examples of such moves. Drawing on a primary document analysis, the paper shows how a shared socio-technical imaginary provided an anchor for the successful securitization of the nuclear project, while liberal market discourses limited audience acceptance of the securitizing move in the power sector. Securitization appears to be a mechanism triggered when core state powers over energy are challenged from below (civil society, market actors) and above (supranational institutions), particularly in already securitized contexts. The paper concludes with the value added of Securitization Theory for energy policy studies and lays out a Critical Energy Security Studies agenda, which can build on it.

If we agree that the oil price is a social institution, embedded in socioeconomic and political p... more If we agree that the oil price is a social institution, embedded in socioeconomic and political practices, this means that it is not only the outcome of these practices but also a causal factor. Using the case of Russia, this chapter looks at how oil price changes are perceived and made sense of by the actors involved, providing an interpretivist take on the far-reaching imprint that oil price fluctuations, representations, and expectations regarding the future price levels can have on a society and a political system. Russia is one of the world's top oil and gas producers, and its economy depends heavily on hydrocarbon export revenues. While the government, more or less directly influencing energy sector companies, is in control of export volumes, it has very limited capacity to control the prices. With control beyond reach, Russian authorities have to rely upon prediction-and that often proves very difficult in the volatile energy sector. The chapter identifies three tropes that can be observed in the blame game Russian officials play in their talk about the problem of booms and busts. The first one is a general blind-blaming of "globalization economic powers", without pointing to any clear agency. The second trope is securitization, pointing to some kind of an international plot, with Western or American influence. Finally, the third trope is scapegoating, providing a conspiracy theory about a hidden narrow elite-a group or some individuals who steer the world economy and politics like puppeteers.

The impact of renewables on the energy markets-falling wholesale electricity prices and lower inv... more The impact of renewables on the energy markets-falling wholesale electricity prices and lower investment stability-are apparently creating a shortage of energy project financing, which in future could lead to power supply shortages. Governments have responded by introducing payments for capacity, alongside payments for energy being sold. The increasing use of capacity mechanisms (CMs) in the EU has created tensions between the European Commission, which encourages crosscountry cooperation, and Member States that favour backup solutions such as capacity markets and strategic reserves. We seek to trace the influence of the European Commission on national capacity markets as well as learning between Member States. Focusing on the United Kingdom, France and Poland, the analysis shows that energy security concerns have been given more emphasis than the functioning of markets by Member States. Policy developments have primarily been domestically driven, but the European Commission has managed to impose certain elements, most importantly a uniform methodology to assess future supply security, as well as specific requirements for national capacity markets: interconnectors to neighbouring countries, demand side responses and continuous revision of CMs. Learning from other Member States' experiences also play a role in policy decisions.

‘Energy democracy’ epitomizes hopes in energy transformation, but remains under-defined, a politi... more ‘Energy democracy’ epitomizes hopes in energy transformation, but remains under-defined, a political buzzword rather than a real concept. After presenting its activist roots and mapping its usage, ‘energy democracy’ is positioned in relation to similar normatively derived concepts: environmental, climate, and energy justice, and environmental democracy. Drawing on insights from political theory and political sociology, it is shown what is democratic in energy democracy. Referencing the question of experts and democratic publics in complex technological areas, the paper explains why it is desirable for energy governance to be more democratic. To show what is unique in ‘energy democracy’ beyond increased participation in energy policy, the prosumer is introduced as the ideal-typical citizen, highlighting the importance of the energy transition, the agency of material structures and a new emergent governmentality. ‘Energy democracy’ is conceptualized as an analytical and decision-making tool, defined along three dimensions: popular sovereignty, participatory governance and civic ownership, and operationalized with relevant indicators.

This introductory chapter begins with a review of the academic discussion on the way 'energy secu... more This introductory chapter begins with a review of the academic discussion on the way 'energy security' should be understood. After presenting the most conventional definition, I distinguish between three main approaches to elaborating and (re)defining that notion, and argue for the importance of an analytical concept of 'energy security', allowing to distinguish it properly from other areas of security and other policy fields. Defining energy security as 'low vulnerability of vital energy systems' (Cherp and Jewell 2014), allows for the operationalization of the general research problem posed earlier. I then present the rationale of the two parts of the book, and the research questions they try to answer, and conclude with an overview of the chapters.

The chapter looks at the electricity sector, which is very rarely the object of interest in Secur... more The chapter looks at the electricity sector, which is very rarely the object of interest in Security Studies and political science, despite its clear importance as a vital energy sector sustaining vital functions and values of (post)modern societies. We trace security debates in two sub-sectors – renewables and nuclear energy and in two neighbouring countries, Germany and Poland. Germany is often lauded as the frontrunner of an energy transition while Poland – perceived as a carbon-locked in veto payer in European decarbonization. We show that energy security discourses play a role in informing policy choices, and certainly lead to that kind of divergent rhetoric, but in reality the two countries share a commitment to coal at least in the medium term. In Poland, renewables are often framed as a threat for the electricity system. The German debate, less securitized, seems to be closer to the 'objective' systemic vulnerabilities, whereas in Poland the major vulnerability of the power sector – weak and inadequate grid – remains a non-issue. An instrumental use of securitisation and security jargon is visible among pro-renewable environmental activist in both countries, who mimic the securitising moves known from the gas sector to portray renewables as a solution to national security problems. In the nuclear sector we also find a strong example of a successful and full securitising move, with the announcement of the nuclear project as a national security issue, followed by proposed and implemented extraordinary measures. We find that politicians are more prone to use and accept security jargon, while technical experts in energy are most active in de-securitisation, even of such serious and problematic issues as uncontrolled electricity flows. The more international the energy issue, the more likely it is to see spill-overs from foreign policy and securitising moves drawing on a broader 'security imaginary'.

Poland’s energy mix is dominated by indigenous coal, and since the country joined the European Un... more Poland’s energy mix is dominated by indigenous coal, and since the country joined the European Union in 2004 it has been clear that it will do much to safeguard its domestic coal sector and resist pressures for ambitious harmonized decarbonization efforts. At the same time, Poland is meeting its renewable energy targets and its onshore wind capacity is growing at a significant pace. In 2015 and 2016, a new renewable energy policy mix has been put in place, relying on tenders for renewable energy volume in large scale RES and a micro-installations support scheme. In parallel, a capacity mechanism is still on the table, though its details are only being worked out. What explains this particular choice of instruments? In this article I focus on four explanatory factors: the influence of the European environment; domestic political and organizational fields and the material and structural constraints of the energy system and resource endowment. I provide a historical overview of renewable energy policy in Poland since the early 1990s, showing how policy evolved, new actors and coalitions emerged, and how the influence of the EU changed overtime. The preliminary findings suggest that the European environment has been crucial in pushing for stronger RES support policies, while the inherently instable domestic political field explains the soap opera of renewable energy policy legislation: drafts, new plans, amendments and legal instability. On the other hand, the choice of particular instruments, within the confines of options acceptable by the EU, is best explained by the stable and segmented organizational field, dominated by a professional logic of the centralized, engineer-lead coal sector, which in turn is linked to the importance of the country’s resource endowment. In these conditions, the current renewable energy policy mix seems optimal for the actors dominating the organizational field, and a deep paradigm shift and overturning the political economy of the energy sector would be needed to change that

The recently proposed overarching concept of a European " Energy Union " stresses the importance ... more The recently proposed overarching concept of a European " Energy Union " stresses the importance of regional cooperation, as it has become clear that absent increased coordination and cross-border cooperation, more obstacles than synergies may emerge. Looking at Germany and Poland, this policy brief examines how discrepancies between European Union (EU) member states' understanding and articulation of energy security impede the development of a common European energy policy.

In October 2014 the European Council agreed on the 2030 climate and energy framework, part of whi... more In October 2014 the European Council agreed on the 2030 climate and energy framework, part of which was to create a ‘reliable and transparent governance system’ for the EU to meet its energy goals: to reduce GHG emissions by 40% relative to 1990 levels, to increase the share of renewables to 27% of energy consumption (with flexibility left to member states regarding their national plans) and to improve energy efficiency (European Council, 2014 European Council. (2014). European council (23 and 24 October 2014) ‒ Conclusions. Retrieved from: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-169-2014-INIT/en/pdf, p. 9). The 2030 framework continues along the path of the earlier 2020 climate and energy package, later incorporated into the wider Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission, 2010 European Commission. (2010). Communication from the Commission. Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF). The framework was also a signal of Europe’s commitment to the global climate policy agenda. After the successful Paris United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreement, this mid-term strategy becomes even more important. In parallel, by announcing the Energy Union Package in February 2015 the Commission initiated a debate on making the European energy sector more secure, competitive and sustainable.

The keyword now is ‘governance’, and its scope should not be restricted only to the formalized governance mechanism that the 2030 framework promised, but also include informal cooperation between different levels of policy-making. The 2020 strategy’s experience to date is a valuable lesson from which future EU energy and climate governance should learn if we are to decarbonize efficiently and effectively by 2050.

The “Energy Union” can be seen as the most significant policy idea that seeks to reform European ... more The “Energy Union” can be seen as the most significant policy idea that seeks to reform European energy governance, policy and regional cooperation. However, so far the concept is mostly an empty box in which every stakeholder tries to put whatever is on the top of their priority list. This paper reviews three major theoretical approaches to the analysis of European integration and EU policy which can be used to study the ongoing process of “Energy Union” formation. It then tries to structure the discussion by showing the evolution of the “Energy Union” concept, focusing on proposals by D. Tusk, J-C. Juncker and the European Commission, followed by a comparative analysis of four country cases representing different energy mixes and energy policy directions: Germany, France, Poland and Norway. All these proposals are described and assessed according to their emphasis on the three dimensions of energy policy: security, affordability and sustainability. We sketch two possible scenarios for the future of EU energy policy, as suggested by the intergovernmentalist and supranationalist approach and emphasize the potential impact of “Energy Union’s” governance mechanism which can reach far beyond what is expected and provide welcome coherence in Europe’s energy and climate policy.

POLICY RELEVANCE: The paper structures the policy debate on the "Energy Union", discussing the different elements and instruments proposed by key EU actors ND provides a useful overview of national interests of some important players, set in the context of their wider systemic conditions and policy goals. The framework for comparing the different proposals and national positions is built around the “energy policy triangle”. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible future scenarios, as well as an in-depth discussion of the potential role of the governance mechanism.

Zum ersten Mal seit 1989 liegt die Regierungsverantwortung in Polen vollständig bei einer Partei ... more Zum ersten Mal seit 1989 liegt die Regierungsverantwortung in Polen vollständig bei einer Partei – die Mehrheiten im Sejm und im Senat werden von Recht und Gerechtigkeit (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) gestellt und auch der Präsident stammt aus ihren Reihen. Das bedeutet, dass sie die ganze Verantwortung dafür übernimmt, den polnischen Energiesektor auf die vielen Herausforderungen vorzubereiten, die sich aus den fehlenden grundsätzlichen Reformen in den letzten Jahren sowie aus der sich dynamisch verändernden Umwelt ergeben haben. Abgesehen von der Wiederholung des Slogans von der Kohle als polnischem nationalem Schatz hat die neue Regierung jedoch keine klare Strategie für die Energie- und Klimapolitik.

In October 2014 the European Council agreed to create a “reliable and transparent governance syst... more In October 2014 the European Council agreed to create a “reliable and transparent governance system (…) to ensure that the EU meets its energy policy goals”. With the announcement of the Energy Union Package in February 2015, the Commission initiated a debate on how to make the European energy sector more secure, sustainable and competitive. The keyword now is therefore ‘governance’, the scope of which should not be restricted only to the formalized governance mechanism that the 2030 framework for energy and climate promised, and the Energy Union Package tries to bring to life, but also includes informal cooperation between different levels of the policy-making process, namely European, regional, national and sub-national. The role of these different levels of governance has to be better understood in the context of the political economy of the energy sector and its impact on the European industry.

Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Governance and Politics, F. Zelli and P. Pattberg (eds.)

Renewable energy is a type of energy acquired from resources that are rapidly (in human scale) re... more Renewable energy is a type of energy acquired from resources that are rapidly (in human scale) regenerated through a natural mechanism (e.g. precipitation or photosynthesis), or acquired from on-going mechanisms themselves (e.g. ocean tides or the photovoltaic effect). Most renewable energy comes from the sun, either directly (solar) or indirectly (wind, hydro, biomass), with geothermal and tidal energy being exceptions.

Now framed as innovative “technologies of the future”, renewables arguably pre-date both the age of oil and the age of coal.

The “Energy Union” can be seen as the most significant policy idea that seeks to reform European ... more The “Energy Union” can be seen as the most significant policy idea that seeks to reform European energy governance, policy and regional cooperation. However, so far the concept is mostly an empty box in which every stakeholder tries to put whatever is on the top of their priority list. This paper tries to structure the discussion by first showing the roots and evolution of the “Energy Union” concept in the EU, focusing on proposals by D. Tusk, J-C. Juncker and the European Commission. It then provides a comparative analysis of four country cases representing different energy mixes and energy policy directions: Germany, France, Poland and Norway. Having analysed the different interests and standpoints we move on to exploring the possible scenarios for the future of EU energy policy, emphasizing the potential impact of “Energy Union’s” governance mechanism which can reach far beyond what is expected and provide welcome coherence in Europe’s energy and climate policy.

Environmental Politics, 2019

Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Governance and Politics, F. Zelli and P. Pattberg (eds.)

Now framed as innovative “technologies of the future”, renewables arguably pre-date both the age of oil and the age of coal.

The “Energy Union” can be seen as the most significant policy idea that seeks to reform European ... more The “Energy Union” can be seen as the most significant policy idea that seeks to reform European energy governance, policy and regional cooperation. However, so far the concept is mostly an empty box in which every stakeholder tries to put whatever is on the top of their priority list. This paper tries to structure the discussion by first showing the roots and evolution of the “Energy Union” concept in the EU, focusing on proposals by D. Tusk, J-C. Juncker and the European Commission. It then provides a comparative analysis of four country cases representing different energy mixes and energy policy directions: Germany, France, Poland and Norway. Having analysed the different interests and standpoints we move on to exploring the possible scenarios for the future of EU energy policy, emphasizing the potential impact of “Energy Union’s” governance mechanism which can reach far beyond what is expected and provide welcome coherence in Europe’s energy and climate policy.

Why has the Polish government decided to give in to environmental protesters in the widely public... more Why has the Polish government decided to give in to environmental protesters in the widely publicised case of the Rospuda River (2006-2007) but choses to ignore both EU pressure and domestic activism the ongoing protests against the logging of the Białowieża forest? It is difficult to understand the difference without an in-depth analysis of domestic political conditions and ways in which external stimuli and global processes are accommodated. That is why in this paper we go quite far back in history, to trace the roots, emergence and evolution of Polish political environmentalism – not restricted to protest groups, social movements, or green parties, but covering all forms of political engagement in the name of environmental protection. The paper begins with a brief reconstruction of the ideational and socio-political evolution of environmentalism in Po-land, and the history of the rise and fall of the mass environmental protest movement between 1985 and 1990. The analysis that follows traces three levels of the movement’s legitimacy: on the level of practices, breadth and discourse. Our analysis is structured chronologically, dividing the period until 2017 into histori-cally significant phases. Each phase sees shifts on different levels of legitimacy, and each ends with a spec-tacular environmental protest or a decision linked to it: Żarnowiec in 1989, Czorsztyn in 1992, Mount St. Anne in 1998, Rospuda in 2007 and the ongoing campaigns around the issues of nuclear energy, smog and the Białowieża Forest. The results of these most spectacular and remembered protests had implications for the following phase, the trajectory of the movement or were a kind of litmus test for the legitimacy of political environmental protest at those points in time.

The Polish environmental movement is generally perceived as relatively weak, and mass mobilizatio... more The Polish environmental movement is generally perceived as relatively weak, and mass mobilization on environmental issues is scarce. While this can arguably describe today’s Polish NGO scene, subjected to professionalization and grant-dependency, it is surely not the whole story. The second half of the 1980s and the brief period after the negotiated transition from socialism in 1989 saw examples of mass protest focused on different environmental issues such as nuclear energy or air pollution. This article reconstructs the emergence of environmental issues within the opposition, describes its strategies, and highlights the main protest actions, with an emphasis on the anti-nuclear mobilization against the Żarnowiec power plant. Finally, it tries to account for the collapse of the environmental movement in the 1990s. Since the anti-nuclear protests in Poland extended beyond 1989 they provide a unique case allowing us to observe the nature of transition from socialism to post-socialism in Poland and more broadly in Central Europe, today constituting an important point of contention between different ideological camps.

The paper looks at the case of a large and widely publicised environmental controversy in Poland,... more The paper looks at the case of a large and widely publicised environmental controversy in Poland, and asks why the authorities chose the “pro-environmental” option in the end. Taking into account the wider political and social context of the controversy, we also try to show what the role of the European Union (EU) was in that conflict. We adopt a rhetorical approach to show the discursive struggle around the environmental protection norms, as well as the idea of participation. We engage in a theoretical discussion with constructivist research on normative change, arguing for the need to take domestic agency, as well as local ideational structures, into account while also questioning the usefulness of the concept of “socialisation” and the notion of “norm diffusion” in the debate on Europeanisation. Instead, normative change could be perceived as the empowerment and legitimisation of certain norms and values at the cost of a relative de-legitimisation of others. The EU, apart from its legal impact, can be seen as an important reference point, both as a source of powerful discourses and of legitimacy, while the agency is mostly on the domestic side. We contend, however, that such normative shifts are very context dependent and unstable.

Czy ochrona środowiska może stanowić fundament dla pokojowego współżycia społeczności w rejonach ... more Czy ochrona środowiska może stanowić fundament dla pokojowego współżycia społeczności w rejonach konfliktu? Bazując na koncepcji zaawansowanego zapobiegania konfliktom (ACP) uznajemy, że taka sytuacja jest możliwa dzięki (często ukrytym) mechanizmom desekurytyzacji i depolityzacji jakie wiążą się z zacieśnianiem współpracy ekologicznej na poziomie transnarodowym. Staramy się odpowiedzieć na to pytanie poprzez analizę doświadczeń pozarządowej organizacji Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME), działającej na terenie Izraela, Jordanii i Autonomii Palestyńskiej i będącej jedyną trójstronną organizacją ekologiczną w tym regionie. Korzystając z materiałów tej organizacji, wywiadów oraz dostępnych wypowiedzi kluczowych aktorów politycznych, staramy się prześledzić proces desekurytyzacji i pokazać w jakich warunkach jest on możliwy.

papers.ssrn.com

Are environmental norms uniform in the EU and if yes – how does that happen? This article demonst... more Are environmental norms uniform in the EU and if yes – how does that happen? This article demonstrates the process through which norms are transnationally enforced in Europe. It also engages in a theoretical discussion with constructivist research on normative change, arguing for the need to take domestic agency, as well as local ideational structures, into account while also questioning the usefulness of the concept of “socialization” and the notion of “norm diffusion” in the debate on Europeanization. Instead, normative change could be perceived as the empowerment of certain norms and values at the cost of others. A four stage model of norm empowerment is developed, utilizing the mechanism of rhetorical coercion, and tested on the case of a recent environmental controversy over the preservation of the Rospuda river valley in Poland. It is argued that normative change on the level of domestic discourses can be observed and analyzed parallel to the rhetorical practices of societal actors. Mobilization and contestation thus resembles electoral campaigns, and framing, rhetorical coercion as well as entrapment are the most important mechanisms in play, while the EU can be seen as a stabilizer of the normative “status quo” which is the result of the conflict.

Stosunki Międzynarodowe-International Relations, Jan 1, 2009

Tschernobylkatastrophe bei der Entstehung und Entwicklung einer „grünen“ Opposition in Polen, ins... more Tschernobylkatastrophe bei der Entstehung und Entwicklung einer „grünen“ Opposition in Polen, insbesondere bei den öffentlichen Protesten von Wolność i Pokój spielte.3 Die Kernschmelze von Tschernobyl wird weithin als „Katalysator“ der zivilgesellschaftlichen Mobilisierung in Osteuropa angesehen. Ich werde versuchen zu präzisieren, was genau dieses Ereignis im spätsozialistischen Polen bewirkte, wobei ich sowohl für die Protestmethoden als auch für die aufgegriffenen Themen einen Wandel aufzeigen werde.4 Die Auswirkungen von Tschernobyl auf die Kernkraftdebatte im Lande werden anhand des Baus eines Atomkraftwerks (AKW) in Żarnowiec an der Ostseeküste sowie anhand eines geplanten Endlagers für Atommüll in Międzyrzecz in Westpolen nachgezeichnet. Grüne Ideen und Anti-Atomkraft-Initiativen existierten zwar schon vor Tschernobyl, und sie erhielten in Folge der Kernschmelze verstärkten Zulauf. Dies hatte jedoch keine direkten gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen auf die Wahrnehmung der Atomkraft. Nach dem Sturz des kommunistischen Regimes 1989 konnte die neue Solidarność-Regierung erst durch einige verzweifelt anmutende Maßnahmen der Anti-Atomkraft-Bewegung und mehrere transnationale Kampagnen dazu bewogen werden, ihre Idee des „polnischen Atoms“ aufzugeben.

Speaking truth to powers-that-be and overthrowing a "regime of lies" were both dissident trademar... more Speaking truth to powers-that-be and overthrowing a "regime of lies" were both dissident trademarks during the Cold War era. But what if overreliance on such an idealized and static notion of Truth can be a problem in an age of post-factual politics and information warfare? In this essay, I first problematize the idea that "truth will set us free" and re-read Václav Havel's The Power of the Powerless together with a contemporary work-the film Camouflage by Krzysztof Zanussi-to find other foundations for political strategies, beyond the "struggle for truth," that might transcend the posttotalitarian situation and inform our normative choices and political agency today. In a reality over-flooded with information, where spreading doubt and forging counternarratives has become a weapon, and where conspiracy theories seem to gain ground, relying on a self-evident distinction between Truth and Lies no longer has the power for political mobilization. It is individual conscience-nesting moral and political responsibility within the individual-rather than an externally existing Truth that might prove a more productive compass in a world of multiple vantage points and continuous re-interpretations.

A poznáte pravdu, a pravda vás vysvo-bodí. (…) A poněvadž pravdu pravím, proč vy mi nevěříte? Jan... more A poznáte pravdu, a pravda vás vysvo-bodí. (…) A poněvadž pravdu pravím, proč vy mi nevěříte? Jan 8: 32 a 46 (Bible kralická)

Mezi axiomy, na nichž se zakládá Havlova morální politická strategie, je jeden nejnápadnější. Není jeho vynálezem ani není výsadou jeho vlastního psaní. Co je to? Prosté přesvědčení: Pravda vítězí. A to nás osvobodí. Alespoň tak jsme si to mysleli.

Proč se v Evropě stalo tak populární „geopolitické” myšlení? Proč je to nebezpečná tendence, a ja... more Proč se v Evropě stalo tak populární „geopolitické” myšlení? Proč je to nebezpečná tendence, a jak se jí postavit? Ve chvíli rozpadu evropského systému postaveného na Závěrečném aktu KBSE a ve chvíli, kdy se před námi zjevuje přízrak nové studené války, je na místě se vrátit k zapomenutému odkazu středoevropských disidentů. Ti v 80. letech provedli přesvědčivou kritiku geopolitického myšlení. Jejich neortodoxní přístup k mezinárodním otázkám zda se dnes kacířskou geopolitiku.

Rethinking Order. Idioms of Stability and De-stabilization.

In 1981, during the heyday of the »Solidarity« movement in Poland, in a recreational suburb of Wa... more In 1981, during the heyday of the »Solidarity« movement in Poland, in a recreational suburb of Warsaw, an angry mob was about to lynch two policemen. A man tried to stop them, but to no avail, it seemed. Only when the man jumped onto the roof of a van and shouted: »Listen, I’m Adam Michnik, the anti-socialist element!« did the crowd calm down, and the situation was settled in regular peaceful terms. It is admittedly a peculiar scene. Let us hold onto it for a while and dissect it, referring to the categories of (dis)order and (de)stabilization. In a moment of unrest and disorder, a man – widely known in the country as an enemy of the system, a professional dissenter, a permanent destabilizer – defends the regular law-enforcers by calling himself an anti-systemic element. He admits this identity, which he neither created nor chose, in defense of human dignity, rights – to settle things in a proper way, to be civilized, humane. In other words – he appeals to a higher still ordering system, and to yet another identity – being civilized, not barbaric. Doing things the way they ought to be done in Europe. After all, that was the heart of Europe, wasn’t it?

This paper analyses the emergence, spread and demise of a coherent program of radical geopolitica... more This paper analyses the emergence, spread and demise of a coherent program of radical geopolitical revision developed in East European dissident circles in the 1980s. Its foundation was the insistence on the need to completely overthrow the post-Yalta, bipolar division of Europe, combined with an emphasis on the priority of human rights in political and peace issues, as well as the belief in the value of the CSCE process. It was also marked by explicit consent for the reunification of Germany as well as the insistence on the need for a democratic Russia to be part of a wider European setup. Through seminal documents, such as the Prague Appeal of 1985 intellectuals, like Jaroslav Šabata, as well as his Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian counterparts, were able to convince large parts of the western peace movement and some political circles to adopt the “heretic” perspective. The paper also shows how a seemingly “cultural” discourse of Central Europe, put forth by intellectuals and artists can, together with the “Yalta debate” of the mid-1980s, be read as a specific (critical) geopolitical project. Finally, the post-communist foreign policies of the dissident-led governments are investigated in an attempt to explain the partial demise of “heretical geopolitics”.

"Central European dissidents, although in many ways constrained by their post-totalitarian regime... more "Central European dissidents, although in many ways constrained by their post-totalitarian regimes, were nevertheless taking part in a transnational circulation of ideas. This article is inspired by contemporary studies of cultural (g)localization and links them
to the research on dissent to show that the dissident intellectuals in Central Europe (the particular contexts of Czechoslovakia and Poland are investigated) were not only the receivers, but also retransmitters and “generators,” of “universal” ideas. To grasp their role and to understand the nature of “universal” ideas, it is necessary to look into domestic contexts to see how internationally functioning ideas are localized—that is, recontextualized and translated. What is more, locally altered meanings can influence the international “originals” so that a new meaning can be renegotiated. Central European opposition found a firm foundation and a source of empowerment in the internationally recognized discourse of human rights. However, with time, dissident groups in the Eastern Bloc struggled to reinterpret these ideas and extend their mobilizing effect onto
other issues. Certain themes present in Western debates were taken up in Central Europe and merged with human rights issues. The two analyzed here are pacifism and environmentalism,
ideas that were metaphorically “hijacked” and used by the dissidents. The article shows how the translation and renegotiation of these ideas proceeded and to what extent they were successful both locally and transnationally."

in: V. Lomellini and A. Varsori (eds.) "Dal Sessantotto al crollo del Muro. I movimenti di protesta in Europa a cavallo tra i due blocchi"

Gli anni Sessanta-Ottanta del Novecento sono stati decenni di protesta e di rielaborazione delle ... more Gli anni Sessanta-Ottanta del Novecento sono stati decenni di protesta e di rielaborazione delle culture politiche e sociali in Italia e, più in generale, in Europa. Il vecchio continente, diviso dalla Guerra Fredda, si trovò ad essere unito nella contestazione di forme politiche ritenute obsolete ed oppressive: dalla politica estera al ruolo della famiglia, dall'educazione alla permanenza al potere di una classe dirigente tradizionalista, molti furono gli obiettivi della protesta e non poche furono le sue conseguenze nel plasmare la società.
Non solo il Sessantotto dunque, ma un intreccio più complesso di movimenti che percorsero e scossero la società europea e che si svilupparono nel corso di almeno tre decenni.
Dieci saggi basati su documentazione d'archivio e due riflessioni di largo respiro che aprono un percorso di ricerca ancora poco battuto, quello della contestazione nell'Italia e nell'Europa della Guerra Fredda, sottolineando insospettabili punti di contatto ed imprevedibili diversità.

""The chapter looks at the interactions across the Iron Curtain and across internal bloc borders,... more ""The chapter looks at the interactions across the Iron Curtain and across internal bloc borders, which in the 1980s lead to the emergence of a pan-European peace movement. In looking at the contacts between the Western peace movement and the Central European dissidents in the 1980s, my aim is not merely a recapitulation of the various open letters and encounters. I show the circulation of ideas across the divided Europe, and argue that the dissident movements played an important role in this dialogue. In fact, they influenced the peace movement so that it changed its course from disarmament to the idea of ‘indivisible peace’ – that freedom and peace are indivisible and cannot be played off against each other.

Needing to select only the most important elements of the transnational network of peace groups, I focus on the Czechoslovak Charter 77 and the Polish WiP as well as the Societal Resistance Committee (KOS). On the western side I look at those parts of the peace movements that were, first of all, willing to discuss the fundamentals, and secondly, were interested in maintaining contacts with the independent groups in the East. That means especially the European Nuclear Disarmament (END), as well as other Western European organizations, independent but linked to END (i.e. the Dutch IKV – Inter-church Peace Council, the French CODENE - The Committee for the Denuclearization of Europe), as well as the German ‘Greens’.

I begin with a review of theoretical and empirical literature constituting the ‘transnational approach’ to position my work within it. I then move on to the story of the dialogue between the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents and the Western peace activists, showing the way in which the definition of peace and the priorities of the peace movement were altered because of the transnational exchange.""

"Listy", 4/2013, ss. 44-48

Jsou intelektualove casta oznacovanf jako disidenti a pochazejfd ze zemf "mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem"... more Jsou intelektualove casta oznacovanf jako disidenti a pochazejfd ze zemf "mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem", ktere samy se be chtejf oznacovat za Strednf Evropu, strazci odkazu mimoradne zkusenosti a univerzalnf pravdy 0 vztahu cloveka a moci? A skr-yva se v one zkusenosti take neco, co muze vdechnout novou energii znudene a pochybovacske Evrope? Radi si to myslfme a jeste radeji jsme, kdyz nam to rfka nekdo zvencl. Jenze je to pravda?

Na tle krajobrazu polskiej opozycji demokratycznej, Ruch Wolność i Pokój jest zjawiskiem nieco za... more Na tle krajobrazu polskiej opozycji demokratycznej, Ruch Wolność i Pokój jest zjawiskiem nieco zapomnianym. Na pewno pisze się o nim nieproporcjonalnie mało w stosunku do jego historycznego znaczenia. Co jednak ciekawe, pisze się o nim więcej za granicą niż w Polsce. Czemu tak jest?

"Does anti-Communism imply rightwing views? Not necessarily, although such an oversimplified judg... more "Does anti-Communism imply rightwing views? Not necessarily, although such an oversimplified judgment is popular. This article looks at three generations of Polish Left (socialist and liberal) intellectuals, and their ideational trajectories towards and away from Soviet Communism. The first generation is that of pre-War leftists, symbolized by the poet Czesław Miłosz. The key to understanding this generation's initial fascination and, later,
disillusionment with Communism is his political/philosophical essay "The Captive Mind". The second generation, which grew up on the wave of the early post-war enthusiasm, is symbolized by the pedagogue and oppositionist Jacek Kuroń. The key book is his The Evil I cause, a re-evaluation of leftist idealism in a Communist reality. The third generation is one who, from the beginning, were influenced by forms of political opposition and who soon became the leaders of anti-Communist (yet still leftwing) dissent, exemplified by Adam Michnik‟s essays. Such a history of "heresy" within the Left is therefore an attempt to
problematize the notion of anti-Communism as the "cardinal folly of our time" and as a reactionary and predominantly conservative ideational standpoint. It also gives a brief overview of the evolution of Polish dissidence."

The dissertation project presented here constitutes an attempt to approach the question of the fa... more The dissertation project presented here constitutes an attempt to approach the question of the fall of Communism and the histories of Central European opposition movements in a new way. Instead of retelling, once again, the story of popular revolutions of 1989 it focuses on a specific group of actors that took part in the events leading to the Autumn of Peoples – the democratic dissidents. They are treated not as a specific group, but as representatives of a “Dissident” figure, the outcome of complex identity building processes. The theoretical explanation, involving a presentation of the web of identities and representations on the frontier of the “East” and the “West” is pronounced. The project also involves a second perspective, shifting from looking at the “dissidents” as objects of other, mostly Western agency, to seeing them as independent agents making use of the empowerment they received. A strategy of analysing the discourses of the dissidents is proposed, with special emphasis on the localization practices, through which the “dissidents” reconciled the constructions of a Central European identity as at the same time part of the West and separate from it. An empirical example of the localization of Human Rights, and other universalizing discourses in Poland and Czechoslovakia, based on some preliminary research of mostly primary sources, is presented as an illustration.

Human rights and liberal democratic values are universal and it is only a matter of time before t... more Human rights and liberal democratic values are universal and it is only a matter of time before they spread globally – or so the modernist argument went. What if the apparent universal and global character of human rights (HR) has to be reinforced, or even produced, through the localization of these ideas and the conscious work towards making them resonate with pre-existing discourses and narratives? In other words, what if human rights are not simply imposed from the top down, but rather retold in locally familiar ways (and so – localized) from the bottom up?

This essay discusses the often used, but rarely problematized category of a political “dissident”... more This essay discusses the often used, but rarely problematized category of a political “dissident”. It looks at the roots of the term in the context of Central-Eastern Europe before the democratic revolutions of 1989. The main suggestion is that the analytical concept of “oppositionists” or “dissenters” differs from the idiomatic and politically charged category of “dissidents”. The latter is a political-rhetorical figure, playing a special bridging role on the artificially created, but effectively existing West-East divide. The problem with “dissidents” is their symbolic reception as a synecdoche of the repressed societies. This complicated relationship between the prominent oppositionists, the authorities and the West is seen as the reason for the failure of many political and cultural “dissident” projects after the end of the Cold War.

Certainly, there is more than one history of the Cold War. Students of International Relations (I... more Certainly, there is more than one history of the Cold War. Students of International Relations (IR), security, and the heirs of ‘Sovietology’ can tell us one story, which is perhaps the dominant narrative in Western scholarship. But there are different, less prominent although surely not less valid or interesting narratives coming from other disciplinary perspectives and regional vantage points. In his article, Robert Brier proposes an approach drawing on cultural history and, at the same time, one that is told from an Eastern European view point. His in fact is a counter-narrative, because the underlying scholarly goal is visibly polemic, and the regional perspective is underrepresented to date. It is therefore a highly interesting contribution and a worthwhile read for historians, IR scholars, and a general audience interested in recent European history.

Central European Journal of International and Security Studies

Global environmental deterioration is commonly acknowledged and yet, ‘despite rapid advances in h... more Global environmental deterioration is commonly acknowledged and yet, ‘despite rapid advances in human development, economic progress and […] technology,’ as well as the existence of a vast institutional setup for governing the environment, things ‘appear to be getting worse’ (p. 1). Why is that? The nexus of socio-economic and political conditions commonly termed “capitalism” is to blame; argues Peter Newell. Is ‘the very idea of sustainable development in a context of globalization an oxymoron?’ (p. 3). Although slightly inconclusive and set on a priori judgments, this is definitely a distinguished and an important book. It puts together a wide array of problems, juggles an impressive amount of empirical evidence, and brings many significant theoretical insights, the last aspect perhaps the most important strength of the volume.

Kwartalnik LIteracki "Wyspa", Feb 26, 2009

Sprawy Międzynarodowe 3, 2012, Dec 1, 2012

This edited collection highlights the different meanings that have been attached to the notion of... more This edited collection highlights the different meanings that have been attached to the notion of energy security and how it is taken to refer to different objects. Official policy definitions of energy security are broadly similar across countries and emphasize the reliability and affordability of access to sufficient energy resources for a community to uphold its normal economic and social functions. However, perceptions of energy security vary between states causing different actions to be taken, both in international relations and in domestic politics.

Energy Security in Europe moves the policy debates on energy security beyond a consideration of its seemingly objective nature. It also provides a series of contributions that shed light on the conditions under which similar material factors are met with very different energy security policies and divergent discourses across Europe. Furthermore, it problematizes established notions prevalent in energy security studies, such as whether energy security is ‘geopolitical’, and an element of high politics, or purely ‘economic’, and should be left for the markets to regulate.

This book will be of particular relevance to students and academics in the fields of energy studies and political science seeking to understand the divergence in perspectives and understandings of energy security challenges between EU member states and in multilateral relationships between the EU as a whole.

Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions and Policy Challenges, 2017

It has now been a quarter of a century since we celebrated the wave of democratic transitions in ... more It has now been a quarter of a century since we celebrated the wave of democratic transitions in 1989, but the general feeling of the public in Europe has significantly shifted. The ‘Euromaidan’ revolt and the change of government in Kyiv were meant to serve as a way to ‘europeanize’ Ukraine in a spirit of liberty and democratic values. Instead, these events have caused the most serious European crisis since the end of the Cold War. Vladimir Putin did not hesitate to challenge the fundamental norms of the international order: respect for territorial integrity, peaceful negotiations, and the sanctity of human rights. At the same time, Europe is facing further problems. In the south of the EU, particularly in Greece, people have lost their Euro-enthusiasm. Amidst this atmosphere of crisis, populist parties have made impressive electoral gains in a growing number of Western European countries, while Hungary’s open shift towards an illiberal democracy is alarming.

Until recently, the Helsinki Final Act provided a foundation for international security as well as the importance of human rights, and common European values as a basis for political cooperation, not only between the European member states.

Now, as this order once built upon human rights and mutual respect is being challenged by the Ukrainian crisis and the growth of illiberal sentiments in Europe, we are required to bring together our historical lessons learnt with a sensible reflection of these new challenges we face

Stability is at the core of every discussion of order, organization or institutionalization. From... more Stability is at the core of every discussion of order, organization or institutionalization. From an »inside« perspective, the stability of each order-constituting element is assumed. In contrast, in critical discourses instability (e.g. through ambiguity, or non-control) is located at the outside of the social order as its negative. By treating this argumentative symmetrical structure as »idioms of stability and de-stabilization«, the articles try to rethink order: How can we describe structures from a perspective in which instability, non-control and irrationality are not contrary to ordering systems, but contribute to their stability? How might the notions of identity, knowledge and institution in social and cultural studies be contested by this change of perspective?

Why has it become so fashionable in Europe to think in terms of " geopolitics " ? Why is this ten... more Why has it become so fashionable in Europe to think in terms of " geopolitics " ? Why is this tendency dangerous , and how do we defy it? As we face the disintegration of the European system built on the Helsinki Accords and the specter of a new Cold War, it is worth reexamining the forgotten legacy of Central European dissents who presented a brilliant critique of geopo-litical thinking. Their heretical, unorthodox approach to international affairs could today be described as liberal geopolitics.

Ustawić Polske w Centrum. 25 lat wolności i co dalej?, Sep 2014

Energetyczne sny o potędze miał już Edward Gierek. W czasach generała Jaruzelskiego rozpoczęto b... more Energetyczne sny o potędze miał już Edward Gierek. W czasach
generała Jaruzelskiego rozpoczęto budowę elektrowni jądrowej
w Żarnowcu. Od niedawna znów słyszymy o powrocie
do pomysłów z czasów Polski Ludowej. Tymczasem wokół nas
zachodzą zupełnie nowe zjawiska – zmiany klimatu i postęp
technologiczny wymuszają gruntowne przewartościowanie
naszego sposobu myślenia o produkcji energii. Ćwierćwiecze
demokratycznej Polski to dobry moment na refleksję nad
transformacją w tym wymiarze.

The European Circle

Global energy markets have never been a straightforward and easy to follow sector since (geo)poli... more Global energy markets have never been a straightforward and easy to follow sector since (geo)political interests, huge amounts of money and the provision of absolutely fundamental services for the whole of humanity all converge there. What are EU policymakers doing in the face of these global challenges? As a collective: not much, because national egotism still dominates and only lip service is paid to issues like solidarity, sustainability and – last but not least – security.

IWM Transit Online, Feb 26, 2014

Poland has become a part of Western Europe – for better or for worse. In the face of the escalati... more Poland has become a part of Western Europe – for better or for worse. In the face of the escalating Ukrainian conflict it definitely seems for worse. The Poles have become wealthy enough to forget where they were 25 years ago. The memories of our own poor condition are so faded that we can no longer empathize with the Ukrainians’ violent struggle. And yet it seems so easy to keep convincing everyone in Brussels that Poland will teach its European partners to think in terms of solidarity.

Gazeta Wyborcza

Nauczyliśmy sie wierzyć ekonomistom, zwłaszcza gdy pokazują nam liczby. Wyższość ekonomii nad inn... more Nauczyliśmy sie wierzyć ekonomistom, zwłaszcza gdy pokazują nam liczby. Wyższość ekonomii nad innymi naukami społecznymi wynika pewnie w części z jej przywiązania do matematycznego języka, który sugeruje obiektywizm. Ale czy ekonomiści potrafią przewidywać przyszłość?

LSE EUROPP, Sep 4, 2013

In March 2011 the European Council formulated plans to create a common European energy market by ... more In March 2011 the European Council formulated plans to create a common European energy market by 2014. However, as Lidia Puka and Kacper Szulecki write, a real common energy market will also require a pan-European electricity grid, with improved bilateral links between European countries. They note that despite presenting obvious benefits for participating states, attempts to strengthen cross-border connections between countries such as France and Spain, or Germany and Poland, have faced a number of challenges. One of the primary problems in this respect is that EU level governance can only offer part of the solution, with Member State governments largely responsible for improving their own electricity links with neighbouring states.

LSE EUROPP, Aug 21, 2013

Debates are currently taking place over the EU’s energy and climate targets for 2030. Andrzej Anc... more Debates are currently taking place over the EU’s energy and climate targets for 2030. Andrzej Ancygier and Kacper Szulecki note that Germany has so far kept an unusually low profile in the talks, which is at odds with the country’s active promotion of ambitious renewable energy and climate targets during its EU presidency in 2007. Using the case of Poland, which has so far shown reluctance to making the transition to renewable energy technology, as an example, they argue that there will be significant costs for both the German economy and European climate policy if the German government does not take a leading role over the issue.

„Kultura Liberalna” nr 229 (22/2013) May 28th 2013

The Energiewende is more than just the nuclear phase out. We have four decades of radical energy ... more The Energiewende is more than just the nuclear phase out. We have four decades of radical energy policy change ahead of us, but the direction has to be decided now. The opponents of energy transformation argue that it is not achievable in this relatively short period, that the nuclear phase out will cause electricity supply shortages. However, by 2022, when the last seven nuclear power plants in Germany will be shut down, there will be enough renewable energy and power from coal and gas to replace nuclear. Nobody expects the final transition to renewable energy by then. For that we have time until 2050.

„Kultura Liberalna” nr 229 (22/2013) May 28th 2013.

Already in the 1970s, the Polish United Workers Party leadership dreamed of energy might. In the ... more Already in the 1970s, the Polish United Workers Party leadership dreamed of energy might. In the era of General Jaruzelski’s junta, the construction of a nuclear power plant at Żarnowiec was started. Lately, again we’ve been hearing of returning to ideas from the Communist era. Meanwhile, new phenomena emerge around us – ones that we can hardly understand if we merely draw on the past.

„Kultura Liberalna” nr 229 (22/2013) z 28 maja 2013 r.

Energiewende to więcej niż tylko odejście od energii atomowej. Mamy przed sobą cztery dekady rady... more Energiewende to więcej niż tylko odejście od energii atomowej. Mamy przed sobą cztery dekady radykalnej zmiany polityki energetycznej, jednak jej kierunek musi zostać wyznaczony już dziś. Przeciwnicy transformacji energetycznej głoszą, że jest niewykonalna w tym relatywnie krótkim okresie, że rezygnacja z atomu spowoduje przerwy w dostawach prądu. Jednak kiedy w 2022 roku wyłączonych zostanie siedem ostatnich niemieckich elektrowni jądrowych, będzie dość energii z odnawialnych źródeł oraz z gazu i węgla, by je zastąpić. Nikt nie oczekuje całkowitego przejścia na energię odnawialną. Na osiągnięcie tego celu mamy czas do roku 2050.

Deliberately Considered, Jan 13, 2012

Who would have thought that twenty-two years after the fall of communism in Hungary that György K... more Who would have thought that twenty-two years after the fall of communism in Hungary that György Konrád, the respected writer and one of the most famous Central European dissidents, would have to sign yet another open letter defending fundamental rules of democracy in his home country? And that the letter would be a strong accusation addressed to that young man with soot black hair whose hard-shell speech in 1989, at the symbolic funeral of the martyrs of the ’56 revolution, electrified Budapest – one Viktor Orbán?

Deliberately Considered, Dec 22, 2011

He never was a politician. He never wanted to be one. In this, he embodied the post-communist dre... more He never was a politician. He never wanted to be one. In this, he embodied the post-communist dream of an anti-political politics. Many, very many Czechs could not forgive him just that. When they put him at the Prague Castle, when they saw him in the legendary president T.G. Masaryk’s seat – they wanted him to play a statesman. And play he did, throughout his life he was a man of the theater. But he was a playwright, not an actor. As time went by, voices were heard that he is not fit for the position he holds. When people now say “he was an intellectual, a playwright, and a politician – in that order” it sounds more like a judgment than a description. Yet, little of that domestic criticism seemed to trickle through the borders of the Republic, and so the discrepancy between the international appreciation and the domestic disenchantment grew. Disenchantment is a good word. It was not Havel that changed. It was the Czechs who changed their expectations. He enchanted them with his charisma, his life-story and charm. And they (many of them) later did everything, to escape and deny that enchantment, as if they were ashamed of it. Inarguably, they owe him a lot. And so do the other nations in the region, because to our luck it was him and not any other former oppositionist that became the face of Central Europe in the early 1990s.

Without strong German leadership, the adoption of an ambitious renewable energy policy across Eur... more Without strong German leadership, the adoption of an ambitious renewable energy policy across Europe will be impossible. blogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2013/08/21/without-strong-german-leadership-the-adoption-of-an-ambitiousrenewable-energy-policy-across-europe-will-be-impossible/ Debates are currently taking place over the EU's energy and climate targets for 2030. Andrzej Ancygier and Kacper Szulecki note that Germany has so far kept an unusually low profile in the talks, which is at odds with the country's active promotion of ambitious renewable energy and climate targets during its EU presidency in 2007. Using the case of Poland, which has so far shown reluctance to making the transition to renewable energy technology, as an example, they argue that there will be significant costs for both the German economy and European climate policy if the German government does not take a leading role over the issue.

The Oxford Handbook of Energy Politics, 2020

States have increasingly become linked through regional energy-related institutions, markets, inf... more States have increasingly become linked through regional energy-related institutions, markets, infrastructure, and politics. ASEAN, EU, SADC, ECOWAS, Eurasian Union, NAFTA, and UNASUR, inter alia, have formal agreements and institutions covering energy. Renewable, nuclear, and fossil fuel energy sources, as well as pipelines and electricity grids, are all covered in the variety of regional formal and informal arrangements. In parallel, the scholarly body of literature on comparative regionalism is expanding, but generally without energy as a focus area. In a systematic review of eighty-six international relations and politics journals, this chapter finds fifty-two articles over a seventeen-year period linking regions and energy. While scholars are giving more attention to the empirics of energy regionalism, research now needs to turn to more systematic theory building along with comparisons between regions and across energy sources and infrastructure types. The chapter concludes with...

Every search for an authoritative standard time shows how much time depends on a stable order of ... more Every search for an authoritative standard time shows how much time depends on a stable order of social practices and technological conditions. The introduction of a uniform world-time in the 19 th Century was preceded by political, scientific, and economic struggles for an authoritative model of a temporal order. Only if social practices and technological conditions are met, can time limit the different local times around the world in their scope, assign clearly defined boundaries of time zones, lead to a standardized reference system, and thus make time predictable in its difference. That the division of the globe into time zones , with 15° steps each demarcating the interval of one hour, follows the division into longitudes, and that the prime meridian marking the world time runs through British Greenwich, is due to historical conventions of worldwide maritime navigation, which has long used the Royal Observatory as a basis for measurement. There is little astronomical benefit or any other scientifically plausible reason for privileging Greenwich. Any other longitude-designated as such by other practices-could have been the zero meridian and thus have caused conventions of the order of time different from those established at the International Meridian Conference in 1884 under the hegemony of the British Empire (Blaise 2002, 94; Bartky 2007, 4). To conclude from the order and measurement of time a strictly »social nature of time« and to declare it a product of collective experience that distances the human events from natural rhythms (Lee and Liebenau 2000, 45-47), would, however, be far too simple. Without denying the relevance of clock times, calendars, and standard times, the sociologist Barbara Adam demands a »time-sensitive social science« (Adam 1995, 10) that contributes to the complexity of diverse temporalities of the everyday. Personal memories, anticipations, experiences of travel time during the rapid traversing of time zones in airplanes, technological processes, and new media of communication, weather, and environmental conditions shape the everyday experience of time as well as schedules and clocks. Adam suggests that »a multitude of times which interpenetrate and permeate our daily Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-p72tjv51qxmf6 This text was published in Falkenhayner, Nicole et al. (eds.), Rethinking order : idioms of stability and destabilization, transcript Bielefeld, 2015.

European Security, Jun 16, 2022

Springer eBooks, Oct 14, 2017

If EU Member States face similar energy security challenges, but often opt for differing interpre... more If EU Member States face similar energy security challenges, but often opt for differing interpretations and policy solutions, how can we assess their potential for energy cooperation? An important divisive factor is the divergent understanding of 'energy security'. How does it differ between states, energy sectors and within each sector? These are the main questions that the entire edited volume tries to answer. This introductory chapter begins with a broad literature review on the way ‘energy security’ should be understood. After presenting the most conventional definition which originates in the policy realm and visibly dominates the field, I discuss three approaches to elaborating and (re)defining 'energy security'. These are dubbed: inductive, abductive and deductive. I then argue for the importance of a 'deductively' acquired analytical concept of ‘energy security’, allowing to distinguish it properly from other areas of security and other policy fields. Defining energy security as ‘low vulnerability of vital energy systems’ (Cherp and Jewell, Energy Policy 75:415–421, 2014), allows for the operationalisation of the general research problem posed earlier. I then present the rationale of the two parts of the book, and conclude with an overview of the chapters.

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jul 14, 2023

The EU is one of the major emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the world, both historically an... more The EU is one of the major emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the world, both historically and in terms of the situation prevailing in the 2020s. By international standards, its energy mix is relatively diverse, encompassing fossil fuels, nuclear power and renewables. While the shift towards a greater share of renewables progresses apace, fossil fuels are still reckoned to account for 72 per cent of its energy mix, compared with an 80 per cent share globally (IEA 2020). Recognizing this context, the EU has long tried to act as a leader in international climate policy, both in terms of shaping evolving international institutional arrangements and developing policies and measures to reduce its own emissions. Dating from the early 1990s, its climate-related policy activities have had enormous influence within its own borders and beyond, and over time have gradually expanded to encompass a widening range of economic sectors. Indeed, climate action now has quasi constitutional status in EU law. Although the EU's founding treaties do not explicitly define climate policy, Article 191(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) refers to combating climate change as one of the core objectives of its policy on protecting the environment (Stoczkiewicz 2018). In 2019, with much fanfare, climate change moved to the very top of the EU's legislative agenda when the European Commission launched proposals for a European Green Deal: a package of measures aiming to reduce net EU emissions to zero by mid-century, in the context of a wider set of environmental and social goals (European Commission 2019). Among the countries and organizations subscribing to the objective of 'climate neutrality' by the middle of the twenty-first century, the EU is nonetheless a rather distinctive actor, whose long-standing efforts to deliver decarbonization deserve particularly close attention. With 450 million citizens and a €14.5 trillion economy (European Union 2022), it is neither a sovereign state nor an international organization. The EU's efforts have been shaped by its characteristics as a complex multi-level institutional landscape, a supranational organization, and a set of 27 Member States of varying levels of wealth and economic size, with different and at times contradictory interests, visions, domestic political dynamics and willingness to act collectively. Although overall the EU is dependent on fossil fuel imports, especially for oil and gas (IEA 2020), some Member States host significant fossil fuel production and supply industries, underpinned by powerful vested interests. In others, the continuation of carbon-intensive economic sectors has powerful backers; in each case, climate policy is rendered economically and politically sensitive at national and EU levels. European ways of life, moreover, are heavily associated with per capita GHG emissions that, although gradually falling, continue to exceed the global average (IEA 2022). Nevertheless, in view of its economic and institutional strength, the EU can be looked upon as a rather benign 'critical case': 'if [it] cannot develop effective climate policies, then the implications for the globe are grim' (Wettestad 2000: 26).

The 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe was not only a human and ecological disaster, but also a political... more The 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe was not only a human and ecological disaster, but also a political-ideological one, severely discrediting Soviet governance and galvanizing dissidents in the Eastern Bloc. In the case of Poland, what began as isolated protests against the Soviet nuclear site grew to encompass domestic nuclear projects in general, and in the process spread across the country and attracted new segments of society. This innovative study, combining scholarly analysis with oral histories and other accounts from participants, traces the growth and development of the Polish anti-nuclear movement, showing how it exemplified the broader generational and cultural changes in the nation’s opposition movements during the waning days of the state socialist era.

Nature Energy, Feb 27, 2023

ACADEMIA. Magazyn Polskiej Akademii Nauk

m a g a z y n p o l s k i e j a k a d e m i i n a u k 1/65/2021 Czy jej spalanie może być przyjaz... more m a g a z y n p o l s k i e j a k a d e m i i n a u k 1/65/2021 Czy jej spalanie może być przyjazne dla klimatu?

Springer eBooks, Dec 15, 2022

This chapter explores migrants' perspectives on voting in country-of-origin elections and on part... more This chapter explores migrants' perspectives on voting in country-of-origin elections and on participation in democratic politics in countries of origin in Central and East Europe. We build on 80 semistructured interviews with migrants from Poland and Romania, living in Barcelona, Spain, and Oslo, Norway. The chapter offers an analysis of their thoughts on and experiences of practicing external voting, as well as choosing not to cast a ballot in any given election. The first part explores the reasons why migrants door do not-vote "back home," offering illustrations from our data, focusing on motivations for external voting, practicalities that impede or facilitate external voting, and discussing intersecting scales of motivation. These discussions are set within the context of migrants' broader motivations to engage in politics transnationally, and intimately connected with their reflections on the principled question of the democratic legitimacy of external voting. The second part of the chapter extends the view from external voting to migrants' own perspectives on transnational political engagement, including but not limited to external voting, as set within often transnational lifeworlds affected by both "here" and "there" in varying ways.

External Voting

This chapter takes stock of the evidence gathered in the empirical sections and summarizes the ma... more This chapter takes stock of the evidence gathered in the empirical sections and summarizes the main findings. We discuss the differences between diaspora voting and homeland results, the ideological differences, as well as the question of low turnout and its determinants. We then move to the broader problem of legitimacy and normative consideration of external voting. Building on the interviews presented in Chap. 4, we also ask how external voting plays into the broader mechanism of political remittances and whether migrants necessarily desire to be agents of political change in their homelands. We conclude with an overview of the areas for future research, presenting both the empirical knowledge needs and normative questions to be tackled.

Energy Security in Europe, 2017

Drawing on Buzan, Waever and Wilde—central to the so-called Copenhagen School in Security Studies... more Drawing on Buzan, Waever and Wilde—central to the so-called Copenhagen School in Security Studies—the chapter proposes a way of applying the classic formulation of the securitisation model to energy security. Signalling some important critique that the Copenhagen School model picked up over the last two decades, we propose some reformulations. This proves necessary, as ‘securitisation theory’ does not provide clear guidance for empirical research. Most importantly, extra-ordinary measures which should result from a securitising move—and so, the changes in political practice going beyond what is usually accepted—are specified in a way which enables empirical research of securitisation in the energy sector. Furthermore, we expand the idea of a security speech act, and shift the focus onto securitised discourses, rather than individual utterances. Finally, we delineate ‘securitisation proper’ from similar notions of riskification, security jargon and draw a (de-)securitisation ‘pendulum’, which can move from de-politicisation, through politicisation to securitisation.