Adriana Renero | New York University (original) (raw)

Papers by Adriana Renero

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's ... more Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 's...

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2017

We examine the relationship between the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and Plat... more We examine the relationship between the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and Plato’s theory about it as expounded in the Theaetetus. Considering Socrates’ remarks in the Theaetetus brings us to some concerns raised by Turing and to Wittgenstein’s famous comment explanations come to an end somewhere. We present two simple technical results which bear on the question. Finally, we look at the pragmatic aspects of knowledge attributions. In an Appendix we say a few words about Indian epistemology and Gettier problems.

... Lectura: 1) El único sendero para volver al pasado, a la juventud oa la edad dorada es el rec... more ... Lectura: 1) El único sendero para volver al pasado, a la juventud oa la edad dorada es el recuerdo, sólo éste puede recuperar el tiempo y hacerlo permanecer, él también participa como daimon (Mnemosyne) para el poeta ... BERLIN, Isaiah, Las raíces del romanticismo, [trad. ...

Diánoia. Revista de Filosofía, 2016

Méthexis, 2013

In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi's controversial thesis that there is a 'simultaneit... more In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi's controversial thesis that there is a 'simultaneity and indissolubility' if not an 'identity' of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle's philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142al2-30 and VI. 11, 1143a33-bl5, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi's view is unpersuasive. I will show that Aristotle considers nous to be a different capacity than mere perception and one through which particulars and indemonstrable principles become intelligible. Moreover, I will show that Aristotle considers that the objects of nous differ in kind from those that sensation (our senses) and perception (inference from our senses) grasp. After examining critically Baracchi's thesis in light of a close reading of those two rel...

Journal of Consciousness Studies

The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the ... more The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts that organize our experience. Although my proposals could be adapted to fit with other theories of consciousness, here I expand David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory and his quality-space theory, and show their usefulness for analysing our auditory experience. I use quality-space to account for pitch, timbre, loudness, and sound location. I further show that our higher-order thoughts capture qualitative aspects of our auditory sensations. I conclude by demon...

Crítica (México D. F. En línea)

En desacuerdo con la afirmación de Jerrold Levinson: que ser consciente de la forma musical a gra... more En desacuerdo con la afirmación de Jerrold Levinson: que ser consciente de la forma musical a gran escala no es esencial para comprender la música, sostendré que nuestra conciencia de la estructura musical es significante para alcanzar comprensión. Mostraré que el modelo experiencial no es incompatible con el modelo analítico y que ambos pueden ser reconciliados mediante una noción de comprensión más amplia. Después de llevar a cabo está reconciliación mediante la nueva concepción que propongo, concluiré discutiendo algunas razones para aceptar una noción de comprensión musical enriquecida que incluye niveles y grados de comprensión.

Philosophia

Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a ... more Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as (what I call) modes of introspective access, actually broaden the notion of introspection. I then propose a useful distinction between (what I call) stimuli-induced introspection-i.e., a receptive process whereby some specific mental states induce introspection-and (what I call) self-triggered introspection-i.e., a selective process whereby the individual's own interest and volition initiates introspection. I argue that that distinction may eliminate the false dichotomy which claims that only one of those types of awareness, either the causal one or the direct one, is conducive to introspection or is defined as introspection.

Estudios: filosofía, historia, letras

En Claves Del Pensamiento, Nov 1, 2007

En Claves Del Pensamiento, 2007

Diánoia, 2007

El tema central que nos ofrece María Antonia González Valerio es el estrecho vínculo que existe e... more El tema central que nos ofrece María Antonia González Valerio es el estrecho vínculo que existe entre la estética y la hermenéutica de Hans–Georg Gadamer. Mediante una comparación de la estética gadameriana con otras teorías y reflexiones estéticas que la anteceden, tales ...

Philosophia, 2018

Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a ... more Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as (what I call) modes of introspective access, actually broaden the notion of introspection. I then propose a useful distinction between (what I call) stimuli-induced introspection-i.e., a receptive process whereby some specific mental states induce introspection-and (what I call) self-triggered introspection-i.e., a selective process whereby the individual's own interest and volition initiates introspection. I argue that that distinction may eliminate the false dichotomy which claims that only one of those types of awareness, either the causal one or the direct one, is conducive to introspection or is defined as introspection.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 21, Numbers 9-10, 2014, pp. 179-204(26), 2014

The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the ... more The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts that organize our experience. Although my proposals could be adapted to fit with other theories of consciousness, here I expand David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory and his quality-space theory, and show their usefulness for analysing our auditory experience. I use quality-space to account for pitch, timbre, loudness, and sound location. I further show that our higher-order thoughts capture qualitative aspects of our auditory sensations. I conclude by demonstrating how a hypothetical listener in possession of a refined vocabulary describes and reports her higher-order thoughts about her musical experience.

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's ... more Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 's...

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2017

We examine the relationship between the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and Plat... more We examine the relationship between the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and Plato’s theory about it as expounded in the Theaetetus. Considering Socrates’ remarks in the Theaetetus brings us to some concerns raised by Turing and to Wittgenstein’s famous comment explanations come to an end somewhere. We present two simple technical results which bear on the question. Finally, we look at the pragmatic aspects of knowledge attributions. In an Appendix we say a few words about Indian epistemology and Gettier problems.

... Lectura: 1) El único sendero para volver al pasado, a la juventud oa la edad dorada es el rec... more ... Lectura: 1) El único sendero para volver al pasado, a la juventud oa la edad dorada es el recuerdo, sólo éste puede recuperar el tiempo y hacerlo permanecer, él también participa como daimon (Mnemosyne) para el poeta ... BERLIN, Isaiah, Las raíces del romanticismo, [trad. ...

Diánoia. Revista de Filosofía, 2016

Méthexis, 2013

In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi's controversial thesis that there is a 'simultaneit... more In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi's controversial thesis that there is a 'simultaneity and indissolubility' if not an 'identity' of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle's philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142al2-30 and VI. 11, 1143a33-bl5, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi's view is unpersuasive. I will show that Aristotle considers nous to be a different capacity than mere perception and one through which particulars and indemonstrable principles become intelligible. Moreover, I will show that Aristotle considers that the objects of nous differ in kind from those that sensation (our senses) and perception (inference from our senses) grasp. After examining critically Baracchi's thesis in light of a close reading of those two rel...

Journal of Consciousness Studies

The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the ... more The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts that organize our experience. Although my proposals could be adapted to fit with other theories of consciousness, here I expand David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory and his quality-space theory, and show their usefulness for analysing our auditory experience. I use quality-space to account for pitch, timbre, loudness, and sound location. I further show that our higher-order thoughts capture qualitative aspects of our auditory sensations. I conclude by demon...

Crítica (México D. F. En línea)

En desacuerdo con la afirmación de Jerrold Levinson: que ser consciente de la forma musical a gra... more En desacuerdo con la afirmación de Jerrold Levinson: que ser consciente de la forma musical a gran escala no es esencial para comprender la música, sostendré que nuestra conciencia de la estructura musical es significante para alcanzar comprensión. Mostraré que el modelo experiencial no es incompatible con el modelo analítico y que ambos pueden ser reconciliados mediante una noción de comprensión más amplia. Después de llevar a cabo está reconciliación mediante la nueva concepción que propongo, concluiré discutiendo algunas razones para aceptar una noción de comprensión musical enriquecida que incluye niveles y grados de comprensión.

Philosophia

Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a ... more Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as (what I call) modes of introspective access, actually broaden the notion of introspection. I then propose a useful distinction between (what I call) stimuli-induced introspection-i.e., a receptive process whereby some specific mental states induce introspection-and (what I call) self-triggered introspection-i.e., a selective process whereby the individual's own interest and volition initiates introspection. I argue that that distinction may eliminate the false dichotomy which claims that only one of those types of awareness, either the causal one or the direct one, is conducive to introspection or is defined as introspection.

Estudios: filosofía, historia, letras

En Claves Del Pensamiento, Nov 1, 2007

En Claves Del Pensamiento, 2007

Diánoia, 2007

El tema central que nos ofrece María Antonia González Valerio es el estrecho vínculo que existe e... more El tema central que nos ofrece María Antonia González Valerio es el estrecho vínculo que existe entre la estética y la hermenéutica de Hans–Georg Gadamer. Mediante una comparación de la estética gadameriana con otras teorías y reflexiones estéticas que la anteceden, tales ...

Philosophia, 2018

Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a ... more Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as (what I call) modes of introspective access, actually broaden the notion of introspection. I then propose a useful distinction between (what I call) stimuli-induced introspection-i.e., a receptive process whereby some specific mental states induce introspection-and (what I call) self-triggered introspection-i.e., a selective process whereby the individual's own interest and volition initiates introspection. I argue that that distinction may eliminate the false dichotomy which claims that only one of those types of awareness, either the causal one or the direct one, is conducive to introspection or is defined as introspection.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 21, Numbers 9-10, 2014, pp. 179-204(26), 2014

The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the ... more The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts that organize our experience. Although my proposals could be adapted to fit with other theories of consciousness, here I expand David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory and his quality-space theory, and show their usefulness for analysing our auditory experience. I use quality-space to account for pitch, timbre, loudness, and sound location. I further show that our higher-order thoughts capture qualitative aspects of our auditory sensations. I conclude by demonstrating how a hypothetical listener in possession of a refined vocabulary describes and reports her higher-order thoughts about her musical experience.