Colette Mazzucelli | New York University (original) (raw)

Papers by Colette Mazzucelli

Routledge eBooks, Sep 11, 2002

Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2017

Anthem Press eBooks, Apr 23, 2021

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2006

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to crimina... more Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

Introduction Given present concerns about proliferation in the Middle East, it is useful to inqui... more Introduction Given present concerns about proliferation in the Middle East, it is useful to inquire as to the influence of a subgroup of European Union (EU) member states in the negotiation process with Iran. These negotiations, which began in 2002-2003, address the issue of nuclear diplomacy. This paper concentrates on France's contributions within the Troika. This is a subgroup consisting of the 'big Three,' Britain, France and Germany, which focus their diplomatic efforts in a unique, ad hoc case in the Union's external security. This analysis is a response to the lack of theoretical literature concerning the actual process of the multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues between the EU3 and Iran. In this context, we must distinguish between the early agreements that were achieved between the EU3 and Iran during 2003 and 2004, and the stalemate that followed, which led to the imposition of sanctions against Iran by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006 and 2007. The initial national preferences of Britain, France and Germany were not the sole determinant of the outcomes in multilateral negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program. Our inquiry is motivated by the fact that it is not enough to investigate national preferences to determine the outcome of EU3-Iranian multilateral negotiations. There are indications that negotiations matter in translating national preferences into the agreements achieved between the EU3 and Iran. We must also review the record of empirical data to date to consider how negotiations can make a difference to move from stalemate to agreement among the states concerned about Iran's nuclear program. This paper has the following goals. Empirically, we investigate some of the dynamics in key issue areas of the negotiations, particularly the enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil and the provision of 'objective guarantees' that Iran's nuclear program is a peaceful one. Existing competing theories are tested vis-à-vis the empirical record. In the concluding remarks, preliminary steps are taken to suggest a next generation theory on multilateral negotiation focusing more on actual bargaining processes than existing theory. Research Design This paper investigates key factors in the 2003 and 2004 EU3-Iranian bargaining process that determined how national preferences were translated into the final agreements. The analysis is structured around two central theoretical debates to test competing theories vis-à-vis the empirical record regarding key issues. Hypotheses are developed from each theory in order to create a more rigorous empirical analysis. This analysis aims to remove some of the bias inherent in a single theory design thereby avoiding the tendency only to select data that confirms a chosen theory. The research design is that which inspires Derek Beach's insightful analysis 'Negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty: When Theory Meets Reality,' which in turn references Moravcsik's The Choice for Europe. 1 Given the very circumscribed role of institutional actors in the EU3-Iranian negotiations, this paper addresses the question what factors determine actor power. In Moravcsik's argument, governmental power is based on asymmetric interdependence. Using a realist approach, the paper argues government power can be based upon the distribution of capabilities and resources, not actor dependence on agreement. The line of inquiry continues to follow realist thinking asking if the outcomes of the EU3-Iranian negotiations in 2003 and 2004 closely follow preferences of the most powerful actors, primarily France and Germany, and not patterns of asymmetric interdependence among states. Theoretical Questions Sources of Actor Power An investigation of actor power references international negotiations theories, which agree that a actor power is determinant in a large part of negotiation outcomes. Realist theory emphasizes that actor power is determined by the relative static distribution of power resources or capabilities among actors, traditionally defined as strategic resources. Multilateral negotiation outcomes reflect the preferences of the strongest actors. In the EU3-Iranian case, we inquire as to whether the outcome is reflective of Britain, France and Germany's preferences. For the French, the Iran initiative offered the opportunity for diplomatic negotiations to profile Europe on the world stage at a time when the United States refused to engage the Islamic Republic directly. For the Germans, EU3 nuclear diplomacy with Iran offered the most likely prospect of conflict prevention in an area of the world already torn by civil war and sectarian violence. These countries aimed in 2003-2003 to speak for Europe in the Middle East through their opposition to the American-led and British supported engagement in Iraq. The British were most concerned about the differences between France and Germany and the other European states and the open rift this caused within the Atlantic Alliance. The British saw EU3-Iran nuclear diplomacy as a means to end the transatlantic rift. The asymmetric interdependence approach views power as based upon actor dependence on agreement. In this approach, the strongest actor in terms of assets, politico-administrative or socioeconomic , is not the strongest actor at the table. In the EU3-Iran context, France and Germany, despite their relative nuclear and economic strengths, are each dependent on securing an agreement with Iran owing to its energy resources and its strategic position in the Middle East vis-à-vis Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. The relative weakness of each in terms of external security is the difficulty each has, as two of the big Three, to maintain a decisive influence in the EU27. The Union's geographic borders are changing and may in time reach Iran. The logic of diversity, in Hoffmann's definition, increasingly alters the interest calculations for each of these states, which together no longer form integration's core.

Social Science Research Network, 2009

Abstract: In a European Union of 27+ member states, it is essential to question the capacity for ... more Abstract: In a European Union of 27+ member states, it is essential to question the capacity for leadership to drive the integration process forward in the 21st century. In this context, how probable is it to open a negotiation space in which as many members as possible can ...

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers eBooks, Feb 19, 2010

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2006

From the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 to the 2003–04 IGC that agreed to a European Constitut... more From the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 to the 2003–04 IGC that agreed to a European Constitutional Treaty, member states and institutions of the European Union (EU) have engaged in a process of almost continuous treaty revisions. As a participant in European Community (EC) treaty reform in the early 1990s observed: ‘negotiation about the future direction of the EC is, in fact, the norm rather than the exception’ (Corbett 1992). As a founding member of the European Communities,1 the Netherlands evidences a traditional concern about domination by the large member states. The fear is that Dutch interests will be subordinate to those of the ‘Big Three’ – Germany, France and Britain. This serves as a historical and sociological basis for Dutch attitudes vis-a-vis the Presidency of the Council. It also explains why the Dutch traditionally sought an independent European Commission as an ally (Jensen 1985).

German Politics and Society, Mar 1, 2013

The 2011 Libya campaign highlighted the divergence of interests between France and Germany within... more The 2011 Libya campaign highlighted the divergence of interests between France and Germany within the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in matters of Middle East and global security. This divergence calls for a reassessment of the meaning of their bilateral cooperation, as defined in the Treaty of Friendship between France and Germany, otherwise known as the Élysée Treaty, signed on 22 January 1963 by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle. This article focuses on France, which engaged militarily in Libya cooperating with the United Kingdom as its principal European partner. Germany, for reasons explained by its history, political culture, and the nature of its federal system, chose to abstain in the United Nations vote to authorize the campaign. These differences between France and Germany suggest a contrast in their respective security and, particularly defense, policy objectives on the fiftieth anniversary of the Élysée Treaty.

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2012

The decision to create the European Union (EU), a unique achievement in the history of European c... more The decision to create the European Union (EU), a unique achievement in the history of European construction, was a decisive step taken in the Kantian tradition of international relations. In 1991, the member states of the European Community (EC) negotiated the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to establish a single European currency and to create a new supranational institution, the European Central Bank (ECB). National governments decided to delegate their decision-making in monetary affairs to the ECB and to pool sovereignty in a key sector of domestic responsibility. The landmark agreement to place Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the first, or EC, pillar of the newly formed European Union was depicted by Commission President Jacques Delors as the ‘tiger in the tank’ of European integration. Two other pillars, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFPS) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were created as a result of agreement in the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (ICG-PU), which concluded at the same time as that of the Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union (IGC-EMU). Integration did not advance as far or as deep in negotiations on Political Union.

Choice Reviews Online, Sep 1, 1997

... Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel and his wife, Imogen Schaetzel, of the Jean Monnet Council and... more ... Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel and his wife, Imogen Schaetzel, of the Jean Monnet Council and Clifford P. Hackett provided valuable ... Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Francois Mitterrand sustained the momentum toward political union in a series of three Franco ...

Ethics & International Affairs, Mar 1, 2002

cials to have a sense of acco u n t a bi l i ty, a n d k n owl ed ge of the differen ce bet ween ... more cials to have a sense of acco u n t a bi l i ty, a n d k n owl ed ge of the differen ce bet ween ri gh t and wron g. In trad i ti onal soc i eties su ch as the Nso Fon dom of Ca m eroon , s ocial and m oral edu c a ti onal sch emes insti ll ed and emphasized accountability in leaders, but in postcolonial societies, far too many officials l ack any sense of acco u n t a bi i ty to those wh om they govern . Wi n go recom m ends a revival of the methods of moral instruction that brought good government to traditional societies. And in the volume’s concluding e s s ay, Kwasi Wi redu wri tes passion a tely about the prospects for democracy in Africa. He makes two argumen t s : Th ere are many paths to a democratic society, and consensus is the essence of democracy. Since the Western model of majority rule and party politics has proved unwork a bl e , i f n o t destructive,in the severely divided countries of Africa, he suggests that Africans develop and adopt nonpar ty systems of consensual government such as were common in traditi onal soc i eti e s . Ba s ed upon free po l i ti c a l a s s oc i a ti on , this propo s ed form of government would go a long way toward lessening ethnic ten s i ons and po l i tical alien a ti on while prom o ting the rei n tegra ti on of s t a te and civil soc i ety and narrowing the ga p bet ween word and deed . And pre su m a bly, con s en sual govern m ents wi ll be able to m a ke good on the promises of i n depen dence. It remains to be seen wh en and how Af ri c a wi ll em er ge from its tro u bl e s . The essays in this mu ch n eeded vo lume of fer en co u ra ging sign s . Th ey are inform ed , i n s i gh tf u l , and instru ctive . Ac ademics and po l i c ym a kers wi ll find thems elves ch a ll en ged to tu rn po l i tical thought into po l i tical acti on . And one can hope that, fif ty ye a rs from now, the peoples of Af rica wi ll fin d t h em s elves living within po l i tical stru ctu res that m eet their ex pect a ti ons for a just and good life . —Lester P. Lee, Jr. Northeastern University

Journal of science & technology policy management, Jul 3, 2017

Purpose The purpose of this study is to navigate the challenges irregular migratory flows generat... more Purpose The purpose of this study is to navigate the challenges irregular migratory flows generate for cities and urban systems. The migration and refugee crises that challenged Europe in 2015-2016 revealed that the developed world cities and urban areas are largely unprepared to address challenges that irregular migratory flows generate. This paper queries the smart and resilient cities’ debates, respectively, to highlight that migration-related challenges and opportunities have not been explicitly addressed in those deliberations. This creates a disconnect between what these debates promise and what cities/urban systems increasingly need to address on a daily basis. Subsequently, a way of bridging that disconnect is proposed and its policy-making implications discussed. Design/methodology/approach To suggest ways of navigating irregular migration-inflicted challenges cities/urban areas face, a nexus between the smart cities and resilient cities’ debates is established. By placing advanced sophisticated information and communication technologies (ICTs) at the heart of the analysis, a novel dynamic ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems is developed. The framework’s dynamics is defined by two hierarchically interconnected levers, i.e. that of ICTs and that of policy-design and policy-making. Drawing from qualitative analysis and process tracing, the cross-section of policy design and policy-making geared towards the most efficient and ethically sensitive use of sophisticated ICTs is queried. Subsequently, options available to cities/urban systems are discussed. Findings The ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems integrates the effectiveness of migrants and refugees’ policy design and policy-making in human-centred thinking, planning and policy-design for resilient urban systems. It places resilient approaches in the spotlight of research and policy-making, naming them the most effective methods for promoting a humanistic smart cities and resilient urban systems vision. It highlights critical junctions that urban systems’ stakeholders must consider if the promise of emerging sophisticated ICTs is to be employed effectively for the entire society, including its most vulnerable members. Research limitations/implications First, when designing ICTs’ enabled integrated resilient urban systems, the key stakeholders involved in the policy-design and policy-making process, including local, national and regional authorities, must employ a holistic view to the urban systems seen through the lens of hard and soft concerns as well as considerations expressed by the receiving and incoming populations. Second, the third-sector representatives, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors, need to be seen as peers in integrated humanistic networks, thereby contributing critical, unbiased knowledge flows to infrastructures, which promote fair and inclusive participation of migrants and refugees in local economies. Practical implications The ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems promotes a humanistic smart cities’ and resilient urban systems’ vision. It suggests how to design and implement policies apt to meet the needs of both receiving and incoming populations along value chains specific to smart and resilient cities. It promotes emerging sophisticated ICTs as the subtle, yet key, enabler of data ecosystems and customized services capable of responding to critical societal needs of the receiving and the incoming populations. In addition, the framework suggests options, alternatives and strategies for urban systems’ stakeholders, including the authorities, businesses, NGOs, inhabitants and ICTs’ providers and vendors. Originality/value The value added of this paper is three-fold. At the conceptual level, by bringing together the smart cities and resilient cities debates, and incorporating sophisticated ICTs in the analysis, it makes a case for their usefulness for cities/urban areas in light of challenges these cities/urban areas confront each day. At the empirical level, this analysis maps the key challenges that cities and their stakeholders face in context of migratory flows and highlights their dual nature. At the policy-making level, this study makes a case for a sound set of policies and actions that boost effective use of ICTs beyond the smart technology hype.

Routledge eBooks, Sep 11, 2002

Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2017

Anthem Press eBooks, Apr 23, 2021

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2006

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to crimina... more Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

Introduction Given present concerns about proliferation in the Middle East, it is useful to inqui... more Introduction Given present concerns about proliferation in the Middle East, it is useful to inquire as to the influence of a subgroup of European Union (EU) member states in the negotiation process with Iran. These negotiations, which began in 2002-2003, address the issue of nuclear diplomacy. This paper concentrates on France's contributions within the Troika. This is a subgroup consisting of the 'big Three,' Britain, France and Germany, which focus their diplomatic efforts in a unique, ad hoc case in the Union's external security. This analysis is a response to the lack of theoretical literature concerning the actual process of the multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues between the EU3 and Iran. In this context, we must distinguish between the early agreements that were achieved between the EU3 and Iran during 2003 and 2004, and the stalemate that followed, which led to the imposition of sanctions against Iran by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006 and 2007. The initial national preferences of Britain, France and Germany were not the sole determinant of the outcomes in multilateral negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program. Our inquiry is motivated by the fact that it is not enough to investigate national preferences to determine the outcome of EU3-Iranian multilateral negotiations. There are indications that negotiations matter in translating national preferences into the agreements achieved between the EU3 and Iran. We must also review the record of empirical data to date to consider how negotiations can make a difference to move from stalemate to agreement among the states concerned about Iran's nuclear program. This paper has the following goals. Empirically, we investigate some of the dynamics in key issue areas of the negotiations, particularly the enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil and the provision of 'objective guarantees' that Iran's nuclear program is a peaceful one. Existing competing theories are tested vis-à-vis the empirical record. In the concluding remarks, preliminary steps are taken to suggest a next generation theory on multilateral negotiation focusing more on actual bargaining processes than existing theory. Research Design This paper investigates key factors in the 2003 and 2004 EU3-Iranian bargaining process that determined how national preferences were translated into the final agreements. The analysis is structured around two central theoretical debates to test competing theories vis-à-vis the empirical record regarding key issues. Hypotheses are developed from each theory in order to create a more rigorous empirical analysis. This analysis aims to remove some of the bias inherent in a single theory design thereby avoiding the tendency only to select data that confirms a chosen theory. The research design is that which inspires Derek Beach's insightful analysis 'Negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty: When Theory Meets Reality,' which in turn references Moravcsik's The Choice for Europe. 1 Given the very circumscribed role of institutional actors in the EU3-Iranian negotiations, this paper addresses the question what factors determine actor power. In Moravcsik's argument, governmental power is based on asymmetric interdependence. Using a realist approach, the paper argues government power can be based upon the distribution of capabilities and resources, not actor dependence on agreement. The line of inquiry continues to follow realist thinking asking if the outcomes of the EU3-Iranian negotiations in 2003 and 2004 closely follow preferences of the most powerful actors, primarily France and Germany, and not patterns of asymmetric interdependence among states. Theoretical Questions Sources of Actor Power An investigation of actor power references international negotiations theories, which agree that a actor power is determinant in a large part of negotiation outcomes. Realist theory emphasizes that actor power is determined by the relative static distribution of power resources or capabilities among actors, traditionally defined as strategic resources. Multilateral negotiation outcomes reflect the preferences of the strongest actors. In the EU3-Iranian case, we inquire as to whether the outcome is reflective of Britain, France and Germany's preferences. For the French, the Iran initiative offered the opportunity for diplomatic negotiations to profile Europe on the world stage at a time when the United States refused to engage the Islamic Republic directly. For the Germans, EU3 nuclear diplomacy with Iran offered the most likely prospect of conflict prevention in an area of the world already torn by civil war and sectarian violence. These countries aimed in 2003-2003 to speak for Europe in the Middle East through their opposition to the American-led and British supported engagement in Iraq. The British were most concerned about the differences between France and Germany and the other European states and the open rift this caused within the Atlantic Alliance. The British saw EU3-Iran nuclear diplomacy as a means to end the transatlantic rift. The asymmetric interdependence approach views power as based upon actor dependence on agreement. In this approach, the strongest actor in terms of assets, politico-administrative or socioeconomic , is not the strongest actor at the table. In the EU3-Iran context, France and Germany, despite their relative nuclear and economic strengths, are each dependent on securing an agreement with Iran owing to its energy resources and its strategic position in the Middle East vis-à-vis Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. The relative weakness of each in terms of external security is the difficulty each has, as two of the big Three, to maintain a decisive influence in the EU27. The Union's geographic borders are changing and may in time reach Iran. The logic of diversity, in Hoffmann's definition, increasingly alters the interest calculations for each of these states, which together no longer form integration's core.

Social Science Research Network, 2009

Abstract: In a European Union of 27+ member states, it is essential to question the capacity for ... more Abstract: In a European Union of 27+ member states, it is essential to question the capacity for leadership to drive the integration process forward in the 21st century. In this context, how probable is it to open a negotiation space in which as many members as possible can ...

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers eBooks, Feb 19, 2010

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2006

From the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 to the 2003–04 IGC that agreed to a European Constitut... more From the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 to the 2003–04 IGC that agreed to a European Constitutional Treaty, member states and institutions of the European Union (EU) have engaged in a process of almost continuous treaty revisions. As a participant in European Community (EC) treaty reform in the early 1990s observed: ‘negotiation about the future direction of the EC is, in fact, the norm rather than the exception’ (Corbett 1992). As a founding member of the European Communities,1 the Netherlands evidences a traditional concern about domination by the large member states. The fear is that Dutch interests will be subordinate to those of the ‘Big Three’ – Germany, France and Britain. This serves as a historical and sociological basis for Dutch attitudes vis-a-vis the Presidency of the Council. It also explains why the Dutch traditionally sought an independent European Commission as an ally (Jensen 1985).

German Politics and Society, Mar 1, 2013

The 2011 Libya campaign highlighted the divergence of interests between France and Germany within... more The 2011 Libya campaign highlighted the divergence of interests between France and Germany within the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in matters of Middle East and global security. This divergence calls for a reassessment of the meaning of their bilateral cooperation, as defined in the Treaty of Friendship between France and Germany, otherwise known as the Élysée Treaty, signed on 22 January 1963 by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle. This article focuses on France, which engaged militarily in Libya cooperating with the United Kingdom as its principal European partner. Germany, for reasons explained by its history, political culture, and the nature of its federal system, chose to abstain in the United Nations vote to authorize the campaign. These differences between France and Germany suggest a contrast in their respective security and, particularly defense, policy objectives on the fiftieth anniversary of the Élysée Treaty.

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2012

The decision to create the European Union (EU), a unique achievement in the history of European c... more The decision to create the European Union (EU), a unique achievement in the history of European construction, was a decisive step taken in the Kantian tradition of international relations. In 1991, the member states of the European Community (EC) negotiated the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to establish a single European currency and to create a new supranational institution, the European Central Bank (ECB). National governments decided to delegate their decision-making in monetary affairs to the ECB and to pool sovereignty in a key sector of domestic responsibility. The landmark agreement to place Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the first, or EC, pillar of the newly formed European Union was depicted by Commission President Jacques Delors as the ‘tiger in the tank’ of European integration. Two other pillars, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFPS) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were created as a result of agreement in the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (ICG-PU), which concluded at the same time as that of the Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union (IGC-EMU). Integration did not advance as far or as deep in negotiations on Political Union.

Choice Reviews Online, Sep 1, 1997

... Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel and his wife, Imogen Schaetzel, of the Jean Monnet Council and... more ... Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel and his wife, Imogen Schaetzel, of the Jean Monnet Council and Clifford P. Hackett provided valuable ... Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Francois Mitterrand sustained the momentum toward political union in a series of three Franco ...

Ethics & International Affairs, Mar 1, 2002

cials to have a sense of acco u n t a bi l i ty, a n d k n owl ed ge of the differen ce bet ween ... more cials to have a sense of acco u n t a bi l i ty, a n d k n owl ed ge of the differen ce bet ween ri gh t and wron g. In trad i ti onal soc i eties su ch as the Nso Fon dom of Ca m eroon , s ocial and m oral edu c a ti onal sch emes insti ll ed and emphasized accountability in leaders, but in postcolonial societies, far too many officials l ack any sense of acco u n t a bi i ty to those wh om they govern . Wi n go recom m ends a revival of the methods of moral instruction that brought good government to traditional societies. And in the volume’s concluding e s s ay, Kwasi Wi redu wri tes passion a tely about the prospects for democracy in Africa. He makes two argumen t s : Th ere are many paths to a democratic society, and consensus is the essence of democracy. Since the Western model of majority rule and party politics has proved unwork a bl e , i f n o t destructive,in the severely divided countries of Africa, he suggests that Africans develop and adopt nonpar ty systems of consensual government such as were common in traditi onal soc i eti e s . Ba s ed upon free po l i ti c a l a s s oc i a ti on , this propo s ed form of government would go a long way toward lessening ethnic ten s i ons and po l i tical alien a ti on while prom o ting the rei n tegra ti on of s t a te and civil soc i ety and narrowing the ga p bet ween word and deed . And pre su m a bly, con s en sual govern m ents wi ll be able to m a ke good on the promises of i n depen dence. It remains to be seen wh en and how Af ri c a wi ll em er ge from its tro u bl e s . The essays in this mu ch n eeded vo lume of fer en co u ra ging sign s . Th ey are inform ed , i n s i gh tf u l , and instru ctive . Ac ademics and po l i c ym a kers wi ll find thems elves ch a ll en ged to tu rn po l i tical thought into po l i tical acti on . And one can hope that, fif ty ye a rs from now, the peoples of Af rica wi ll fin d t h em s elves living within po l i tical stru ctu res that m eet their ex pect a ti ons for a just and good life . —Lester P. Lee, Jr. Northeastern University

Journal of science & technology policy management, Jul 3, 2017

Purpose The purpose of this study is to navigate the challenges irregular migratory flows generat... more Purpose The purpose of this study is to navigate the challenges irregular migratory flows generate for cities and urban systems. The migration and refugee crises that challenged Europe in 2015-2016 revealed that the developed world cities and urban areas are largely unprepared to address challenges that irregular migratory flows generate. This paper queries the smart and resilient cities’ debates, respectively, to highlight that migration-related challenges and opportunities have not been explicitly addressed in those deliberations. This creates a disconnect between what these debates promise and what cities/urban systems increasingly need to address on a daily basis. Subsequently, a way of bridging that disconnect is proposed and its policy-making implications discussed. Design/methodology/approach To suggest ways of navigating irregular migration-inflicted challenges cities/urban areas face, a nexus between the smart cities and resilient cities’ debates is established. By placing advanced sophisticated information and communication technologies (ICTs) at the heart of the analysis, a novel dynamic ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems is developed. The framework’s dynamics is defined by two hierarchically interconnected levers, i.e. that of ICTs and that of policy-design and policy-making. Drawing from qualitative analysis and process tracing, the cross-section of policy design and policy-making geared towards the most efficient and ethically sensitive use of sophisticated ICTs is queried. Subsequently, options available to cities/urban systems are discussed. Findings The ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems integrates the effectiveness of migrants and refugees’ policy design and policy-making in human-centred thinking, planning and policy-design for resilient urban systems. It places resilient approaches in the spotlight of research and policy-making, naming them the most effective methods for promoting a humanistic smart cities and resilient urban systems vision. It highlights critical junctions that urban systems’ stakeholders must consider if the promise of emerging sophisticated ICTs is to be employed effectively for the entire society, including its most vulnerable members. Research limitations/implications First, when designing ICTs’ enabled integrated resilient urban systems, the key stakeholders involved in the policy-design and policy-making process, including local, national and regional authorities, must employ a holistic view to the urban systems seen through the lens of hard and soft concerns as well as considerations expressed by the receiving and incoming populations. Second, the third-sector representatives, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors, need to be seen as peers in integrated humanistic networks, thereby contributing critical, unbiased knowledge flows to infrastructures, which promote fair and inclusive participation of migrants and refugees in local economies. Practical implications The ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems promotes a humanistic smart cities’ and resilient urban systems’ vision. It suggests how to design and implement policies apt to meet the needs of both receiving and incoming populations along value chains specific to smart and resilient cities. It promotes emerging sophisticated ICTs as the subtle, yet key, enabler of data ecosystems and customized services capable of responding to critical societal needs of the receiving and the incoming populations. In addition, the framework suggests options, alternatives and strategies for urban systems’ stakeholders, including the authorities, businesses, NGOs, inhabitants and ICTs’ providers and vendors. Originality/value The value added of this paper is three-fold. At the conceptual level, by bringing together the smart cities and resilient cities debates, and incorporating sophisticated ICTs in the analysis, it makes a case for their usefulness for cities/urban areas in light of challenges these cities/urban areas confront each day. At the empirical level, this analysis maps the key challenges that cities and their stakeholders face in context of migratory flows and highlights their dual nature. At the policy-making level, this study makes a case for a sound set of policies and actions that boost effective use of ICTs beyond the smart technology hype.

An eVolume to Celebrate 30 Years of Bosch Fellowship (1984-2014) Colette Mazzucelli and Ronald J.... more An eVolume to Celebrate 30 Years of Bosch Fellowship (1984-2014) Colette Mazzucelli and Ronald J. Bee, editors

The First Choice: Germany in a Eurasian Europe: “Functional Geography” Germany continues to inve... more The First Choice: Germany in a Eurasian Europe: “Functional Geography”

Germany continues to invest considerable assets to strengthen connectivity in favor of “functional geography,” as underlined by Parag Khanna in Connectography Mapping the Future of Global Civilization.

Anthem Press Blog, 2020

The impact of COVID-19 is already influencing the ways in which we experience and map the interac... more The impact of COVID-19 is already influencing the ways in which we experience and map the interactions of people as agents of transformation inside and across borders. The pandemic increasingly raises questions as to an evolution of thinking within diverse philosophical traditions ranging from classical realism to liberalism to social constructivism, instead of simply an entrenched competition among distinct theories. This change is likely to become the norm in learning, particularly as a transition occurs away from the Western core towards a “deep pluralism” in which postcolonial, feminist, and critical theories figure more prominently.