Don Garrett | New York University (original) (raw)

Papers by Don Garrett

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against... more Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against the existence of substances other than God (that is, substances of fewer-than-all attributes); and (2) an explanation of why no such substances exist. In his important 2002 article “Spinoza’s Substance Monism,” Michael Della Rocca offers on Spinoza’s behalf an alternate argument and an alternate explanation, both of which he claims better serve Spinoza’s purposes and better capture Spinoza’s intentions than those provided in chapter 2. After proposing three terminological clarifications (concerning “necessary existence” and “a priori”) and two substantive amendments to the argument of the chapter, this postscript rebuts those claims.

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by... more Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by at least three propositions of Ethics Part 1—namely, 1p16, 1p29, and 1p33—to the doctrine that every state of affairs holds with strict metaphysical necessity. In their densely argued and widely cited article “Necessitarianism Reconsidered” (1999), Edwin Curley and Gregory Walski raise objections to this interpretation and argue that Spinoza instead believes that there could have been (from all eternity) any one of many different possible complete systems of finite modes. This postscript develops and clarifies the interpretation defended in Chapter 4. It does so, first, by responding to the worries of Curley and Walski about the coherence of the view that the chapter attributes to Spinoza, and second, by rebutting their specific objections to the chapter’s interpretation of each of the three propositions of Ethics Part 1 at issue.

Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de se... more Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de sensoconceitos que tambem incluem os conceitos de AZUL, SAGACIDADE, BELO, VIRTUDE e CAUSA. Cada um deles e obtido atraves (i) da ativacao de uma sensibilidade primitiva, (ii) da consequente formacao de uma “ideia abstrata”, (iii) da adocao de um “padrao de juizo” juntamente com “regras para o julgar”; e da atribuicao de relacoes inferenciais. O desenvolvimento do conceito de PROBABILIDADE a partir do “sentimento de crenca” tambem possibilita a obtencao do conceito de VERDADE PROVAVEL, que, assim como os de BELO e VIRTUDE, funciona como um conceito normativo. A compreensao resultante da normatividade epistemica humeana produz implicacoes diretas para seu exame do ceticismo.

Spinoza's 'Theological-Political Treatise'

, and an audience at Boston University for helpful comments on an early version of this chapter. ... more , and an audience at Boston University for helpful comments on an early version of this chapter. 1 Unlike Spinoza, Hobbes distinguishes explicitly between contract (contractus) and covenant (pactum): a covenant is a contract in which at least one party is to perform his or her part at a later time.

Spinoza and German Idealism

It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philo... more It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philosophy were to be rejected, the only alternative would be Spinozism.” As the papers in the present collection illustrate, conclusions of roughly this form were reached in one way or another by Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Perhaps, then, the most general reply that might be off ered on Spinoza’s behalf would be this: “Such astute philosophers must have been right in judging disjunctively that either their own philosophy or Spinozism was correct. Th eir own philosophies are all inconsistent with one another. From these premises, you may draw your own conclusion about the truth of Spinozism.” Th e fi rst premise of this short and swift argument may, of course, be disputed. Whether the argument is sound or not, however, there is both historical and philosophical value in understanding in greater detail how Spinoza would have responded to the interpretations and criticisms of the philosophers who came after him – and of none is this more so than the German Idealists, for whom his philosophy fi gured so centrally in so many ways and through so many modes of transmission well described in these pages. In what follows, therefore, I will endeavor to off er as faithfully as I can on his behalf some of that response, not (I am sorry to say) on every important topic raised in the rich array of contributions here, but on some of the particularly central and recurring ones: God, fi nite modes, the attributes of Th ought and Extension, and the human mind. In doing so, I will seek to distinguish accurate from inaccurate interpretations and substantive from merely apparent disagreements, and I will sometimes call attention to additional resources within Spinoza’s philosophy that may not have been fully appreciated by his successors. Based on this limited treatment of central parts of his philosophy, I will also venture along the way brief and opinionated assessments of the continuing value and signifi cance of that philosophy in the light of subsequent appropriations, objections, and revisions. Th is is nevertheless just

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2009

Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori ... more Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori or a posteriori, necessary or contingent, analytic or synthetic, con-ceptual or empirical, certain or probable, self-evident or inferential, general or particular, intellectual or imaginative. In ...

Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy

Methodological feminism in philosophy-the attempt to utilize feminist insights, issues, and conce... more Methodological feminism in philosophy-the attempt to utilize feminist insights, issues, and concerns in the pursuit of philosophical knowledge and understanding-can benefit the history of philosophy-the attempt to understand philosophy's past-in at least four different ways. First, it can suggest new questions to ask and new resources to use in trying to understand the historical context in which a philosophical work was produced. Second, it can furnish a different and distinctive perspective from which to read historical philosophical texts, thereby making it more likely that their interpretation will not be merely partial or one-sided. Third, it can provide tools of criticism with which to evaluate the adequacy of the philosophical theories and arguments that an interpretation reveals. Fourth, it can show how to apply the philosophy of a past writer to philosophical issues of contemporary significance-not only gender issues specifically, but also the many philosophical issues with which gender issues intersect-in ways that can increase the value of the entire historical undertaking. One recent case in which methodological feminism has proven very productive in the history of philosophy is that of Hume's treatment of reason. In the course of his published writings, David Hume makes dozens of claims about reason. Yet it remains a controversial question what Hume's attitude toward reason is, and even what he means by the very term 'reason'. Like many other topics in Hume's philosophy, however, Hume's treatment of reason has been fruitfully informed by recent feminist writings. Genevieve Lloyd, in her 1984 book entitled The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy, was a pioneer in addressing Hume's treatment of reason from a feminist perspective. More recently, Annette Baier-who was the first writer to raise the question of Hume's claim to be a "women's philosopher"-has made his treatment of reason one central focus of her attention. I will begin by briefly describing some of the history of feminist writing on Hume, introducing three recent essays-by Baier, Lloyd, and Anne Jaap Jacobson-that bear specifically on Hume's treatment of reason. I will then highlight some interpretative claims made in these three essays that I believe to be both correct and important, and I will describe three further interpretive claims that I believe constitute understandable misinterpretations of Hume. Next, I will give my reasons for disputing these three interpretive claims and explain how my reading of Hume differs from those of Baier, Lloyd, and Jacobsen. Finally, I will argue that interpreting Hume in the way I propose actually renders his theory of reason more, rather than less, congenial to important feminist aims.

Hume Studies, 2010

Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy is an excellent book, consisting-like Hume's Treatise... more Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy is an excellent book, consisting-like Hume's Treatise itself-of three excellent parts. I will comment on one central aspect of its second part: its explanation of the source of the second thoughts that Hume famously expressed, with a frustrating lack of specificity, about his own initial discussion of personal identity in the Treatise. As is well known, Hume holds in the section "Of personal identity" (T 1.4.6) that a self, mind, or person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252) and, more specifically, a "system of different perceptions or different existences link'd together by the relation of cause and effect" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). This bundle has neither perfect simplicity (partlessness) at one time nor perfect identity (invariableness and uninterruptedness) through time; nonetheless, he argues, the imagination ascribes both features to it as the result of the associative influence of the relations of causation and resemblance holding among the perceptions themselves. He devotes several pages of the work's Appendix, published more than a year later in the subsequent volume, to reporting a "difficulty too hard for my understanding" (T Appendix 21; SBN 636) that leads him to despair regarding his previous account, "such a labyrinth that, I confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions nor how to render them consistent" (T Appendix 10; SBN 633).

Synthese, 2006

Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argue... more Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) How do perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, the functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular causal roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds.

many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couc... more many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couched in terms of reason: whether probable reasoning or causal inference is founded on reason, scepticism with regard to reason, reason and the passions, whether moral distinctions are based on reason. To understand what Hume has to say about these issues, we must understand what his account of reason and reasoning is. (HR 1)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2001

Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile... more Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile apparent contradictions in Hume's theory. Two examples occur early in Part I of Book I of the Treatise. Hume argues that all ideas are derivable from impressions (what Garrett calls "the Copy Principle"). Garrett defends Hume's rigorous attempt to found this principle empirically, taking Hume at his word when he describes it as "the first principle I establish in the science of human nature." (T 7)1 Notoriously, Hume almost immediately provides a counter-example: suppose a person had experienced all shades of blue except one, and further suppose they were presented with a table of all these shades, with a blank where the missing shade ought to be. Clearly, Hume says, such a person could supply "from his own imagination" the relevant idea, without having first experienced the corresponding impression. This presents an apparent counter-example to the Copy Principle. Another example occurs a little later. Hume claims that "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10) Distinct ideas are separable. Garrett calls this "the Separability Principle", and it is almost as important for Hume as the Copy Principle. For one thing, it shows that Hume's theory of ideas, though heavily influenced by Locke, is importantly different from the earlier theory: Locke thought there were some necessary connections between distinct ideas, connections that could not be reduced to identities or partial identities.2 More importantly, the separability of distinct ideas is the primary ground of Hume's conceivability criterion of demonstration, crucially employed in the arguments concerning the causation, necessary connection and induction. But Hume seems to present an apparent counter-example to the Separability Principle as well. When discussing distinctions of reason, Hume admits that we can distinguish between "the

Philosophical Studies, 2009

It is no wonder that the main approaches to so many central philosophical topicsfrom causation to... more It is no wonder that the main approaches to so many central philosophical topicsfrom causation to motivation, from concepts to morals-include one often dubbed ''Humeanism'' about the topic; for Hume brought both originality and penetration to almost every philosophical issue he addressed. Until the work of Donald Baxter, however, the originality and penetration of Hume's accounts of time and identity were rarely appreciated. Indeed, as Hume's Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise makes clear, a long line of distinguished commentators has systemically misunderstood them. This is partly because some key passages of Hume's text readily lend themselves to misconstrual, especially when taken out of context, and partly because much of the key argumentation occurs in the insufficiently-studied Book I Part ii of the Treatise, ''Of the ideas of space and time.'' Partly too, though, it is because some of his claims seem, when taken at face value, just too strange or contradictory to credit. Because time or duration is simply the ordering of successive objects, Hume maintains, an unchanging and uninterrupted object has no real duration or temporal complexity in itself; yet such an object can, he insists, nevertheless co-exist with each of many temporal parts of a succession that does have real duration and temporal complexity. In effect, every single object in the universe has it own time and its own temporal structure. 1 It is one of the many great merits of Baxter's book that it shows this remarkable position to be well-motivated and internally consistent. Working from his incisive analysis of Hume's views on time (in Chaps. 2 and 3), Baxter goes on to give (in Chap. 4) an interpretation of Hume's account of the origin and nature of the idea of identity. Hume was led to this account by his discovery of a

The Philosophical Review, 1979


Noûs, 1993

In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of caus... more In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of cause and effect"), Hume sets out to "explain fully" the relation of cause and effect (Hume 1978; henceforth "THN"). Twelve sections and ninety-five pages later, at the climax of THN I.iii. 14 ("Of the ...

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013

Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no id... more Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no idea can represent what is not the case and (ii) that every idea of imagination represents a truly vast amount of what is or has been the case. This essay examines the roles of confusion and causation in Spinoza’s theory of imaginative representation. In doing so, it uncovers a promising way in which he could use his distinctive conatus doctrine—that “each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (E3p6)—both to constrain the otherwise vast extent of the imaginative representation of what is and to explain how imaginative misrepresentation is possible.

The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics

The second half of Ethics, Part 5, presents Spinoza's theory of the participation of human minds ... more The second half of Ethics, Part 5, presents Spinoza's theory of the participation of human minds in the eternal. Although this theory constitutes the culmination of the Ethics, it has often proven opaque to even its most attentive and penetrating readers. Edwin Curley has written candidly, "In spite of many years of study, I still do not feel that I understand this part of the Ethics at all adequately" (1988, 84). Jonathan Bennett memorably declared this part of the Ethics to be "an unmitigated and

Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2012

Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary ter... more Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary terms to ‘true religion’; in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, his character Philo goes so far as to express ‘veneration for’ it. This paper addresses three questions. First, did Hume himself really approve of something that he called ‘true religion’? Second, what did he mean by calling it ‘true’? Third, what did he take it to be? By appeal to some of his key doctrines about causation and probability, and to some key features of the characters and content of the Dialogues, I argue, contrary to important recent interpretations by Immerwahr and Falkenstein, that Hume's ‘true religion’ is a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that he regarded as true in an epistemic sense.

Necessity and Nature in Spinoza's Philosophy

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against... more Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against the existence of substances other than God (that is, substances of fewer-than-all attributes); and (2) an explanation of why no such substances exist. In his important 2002 article “Spinoza’s Substance Monism,” Michael Della Rocca offers on Spinoza’s behalf an alternate argument and an alternate explanation, both of which he claims better serve Spinoza’s purposes and better capture Spinoza’s intentions than those provided in chapter 2. After proposing three terminological clarifications (concerning “necessary existence” and “a priori”) and two substantive amendments to the argument of the chapter, this postscript rebuts those claims.

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by... more Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by at least three propositions of Ethics Part 1—namely, 1p16, 1p29, and 1p33—to the doctrine that every state of affairs holds with strict metaphysical necessity. In their densely argued and widely cited article “Necessitarianism Reconsidered” (1999), Edwin Curley and Gregory Walski raise objections to this interpretation and argue that Spinoza instead believes that there could have been (from all eternity) any one of many different possible complete systems of finite modes. This postscript develops and clarifies the interpretation defended in Chapter 4. It does so, first, by responding to the worries of Curley and Walski about the coherence of the view that the chapter attributes to Spinoza, and second, by rebutting their specific objections to the chapter’s interpretation of each of the three propositions of Ethics Part 1 at issue.

Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de se... more Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de sensoconceitos que tambem incluem os conceitos de AZUL, SAGACIDADE, BELO, VIRTUDE e CAUSA. Cada um deles e obtido atraves (i) da ativacao de uma sensibilidade primitiva, (ii) da consequente formacao de uma “ideia abstrata”, (iii) da adocao de um “padrao de juizo” juntamente com “regras para o julgar”; e da atribuicao de relacoes inferenciais. O desenvolvimento do conceito de PROBABILIDADE a partir do “sentimento de crenca” tambem possibilita a obtencao do conceito de VERDADE PROVAVEL, que, assim como os de BELO e VIRTUDE, funciona como um conceito normativo. A compreensao resultante da normatividade epistemica humeana produz implicacoes diretas para seu exame do ceticismo.

Spinoza's 'Theological-Political Treatise'

, and an audience at Boston University for helpful comments on an early version of this chapter. ... more , and an audience at Boston University for helpful comments on an early version of this chapter. 1 Unlike Spinoza, Hobbes distinguishes explicitly between contract (contractus) and covenant (pactum): a covenant is a contract in which at least one party is to perform his or her part at a later time.

Spinoza and German Idealism

It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philo... more It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philosophy were to be rejected, the only alternative would be Spinozism.” As the papers in the present collection illustrate, conclusions of roughly this form were reached in one way or another by Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Perhaps, then, the most general reply that might be off ered on Spinoza’s behalf would be this: “Such astute philosophers must have been right in judging disjunctively that either their own philosophy or Spinozism was correct. Th eir own philosophies are all inconsistent with one another. From these premises, you may draw your own conclusion about the truth of Spinozism.” Th e fi rst premise of this short and swift argument may, of course, be disputed. Whether the argument is sound or not, however, there is both historical and philosophical value in understanding in greater detail how Spinoza would have responded to the interpretations and criticisms of the philosophers who came after him – and of none is this more so than the German Idealists, for whom his philosophy fi gured so centrally in so many ways and through so many modes of transmission well described in these pages. In what follows, therefore, I will endeavor to off er as faithfully as I can on his behalf some of that response, not (I am sorry to say) on every important topic raised in the rich array of contributions here, but on some of the particularly central and recurring ones: God, fi nite modes, the attributes of Th ought and Extension, and the human mind. In doing so, I will seek to distinguish accurate from inaccurate interpretations and substantive from merely apparent disagreements, and I will sometimes call attention to additional resources within Spinoza’s philosophy that may not have been fully appreciated by his successors. Based on this limited treatment of central parts of his philosophy, I will also venture along the way brief and opinionated assessments of the continuing value and signifi cance of that philosophy in the light of subsequent appropriations, objections, and revisions. Th is is nevertheless just

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2009

Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori ... more Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori or a posteriori, necessary or contingent, analytic or synthetic, con-ceptual or empirical, certain or probable, self-evident or inferential, general or particular, intellectual or imaginative. In ...

Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy

Methodological feminism in philosophy-the attempt to utilize feminist insights, issues, and conce... more Methodological feminism in philosophy-the attempt to utilize feminist insights, issues, and concerns in the pursuit of philosophical knowledge and understanding-can benefit the history of philosophy-the attempt to understand philosophy's past-in at least four different ways. First, it can suggest new questions to ask and new resources to use in trying to understand the historical context in which a philosophical work was produced. Second, it can furnish a different and distinctive perspective from which to read historical philosophical texts, thereby making it more likely that their interpretation will not be merely partial or one-sided. Third, it can provide tools of criticism with which to evaluate the adequacy of the philosophical theories and arguments that an interpretation reveals. Fourth, it can show how to apply the philosophy of a past writer to philosophical issues of contemporary significance-not only gender issues specifically, but also the many philosophical issues with which gender issues intersect-in ways that can increase the value of the entire historical undertaking. One recent case in which methodological feminism has proven very productive in the history of philosophy is that of Hume's treatment of reason. In the course of his published writings, David Hume makes dozens of claims about reason. Yet it remains a controversial question what Hume's attitude toward reason is, and even what he means by the very term 'reason'. Like many other topics in Hume's philosophy, however, Hume's treatment of reason has been fruitfully informed by recent feminist writings. Genevieve Lloyd, in her 1984 book entitled The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy, was a pioneer in addressing Hume's treatment of reason from a feminist perspective. More recently, Annette Baier-who was the first writer to raise the question of Hume's claim to be a "women's philosopher"-has made his treatment of reason one central focus of her attention. I will begin by briefly describing some of the history of feminist writing on Hume, introducing three recent essays-by Baier, Lloyd, and Anne Jaap Jacobson-that bear specifically on Hume's treatment of reason. I will then highlight some interpretative claims made in these three essays that I believe to be both correct and important, and I will describe three further interpretive claims that I believe constitute understandable misinterpretations of Hume. Next, I will give my reasons for disputing these three interpretive claims and explain how my reading of Hume differs from those of Baier, Lloyd, and Jacobsen. Finally, I will argue that interpreting Hume in the way I propose actually renders his theory of reason more, rather than less, congenial to important feminist aims.

Hume Studies, 2010

Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy is an excellent book, consisting-like Hume's Treatise... more Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy is an excellent book, consisting-like Hume's Treatise itself-of three excellent parts. I will comment on one central aspect of its second part: its explanation of the source of the second thoughts that Hume famously expressed, with a frustrating lack of specificity, about his own initial discussion of personal identity in the Treatise. As is well known, Hume holds in the section "Of personal identity" (T 1.4.6) that a self, mind, or person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252) and, more specifically, a "system of different perceptions or different existences link'd together by the relation of cause and effect" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). This bundle has neither perfect simplicity (partlessness) at one time nor perfect identity (invariableness and uninterruptedness) through time; nonetheless, he argues, the imagination ascribes both features to it as the result of the associative influence of the relations of causation and resemblance holding among the perceptions themselves. He devotes several pages of the work's Appendix, published more than a year later in the subsequent volume, to reporting a "difficulty too hard for my understanding" (T Appendix 21; SBN 636) that leads him to despair regarding his previous account, "such a labyrinth that, I confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions nor how to render them consistent" (T Appendix 10; SBN 633).

Synthese, 2006

Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argue... more Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) How do perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, the functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular causal roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds.

many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couc... more many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couched in terms of reason: whether probable reasoning or causal inference is founded on reason, scepticism with regard to reason, reason and the passions, whether moral distinctions are based on reason. To understand what Hume has to say about these issues, we must understand what his account of reason and reasoning is. (HR 1)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2001

Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile... more Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile apparent contradictions in Hume's theory. Two examples occur early in Part I of Book I of the Treatise. Hume argues that all ideas are derivable from impressions (what Garrett calls "the Copy Principle"). Garrett defends Hume's rigorous attempt to found this principle empirically, taking Hume at his word when he describes it as "the first principle I establish in the science of human nature." (T 7)1 Notoriously, Hume almost immediately provides a counter-example: suppose a person had experienced all shades of blue except one, and further suppose they were presented with a table of all these shades, with a blank where the missing shade ought to be. Clearly, Hume says, such a person could supply "from his own imagination" the relevant idea, without having first experienced the corresponding impression. This presents an apparent counter-example to the Copy Principle. Another example occurs a little later. Hume claims that "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10) Distinct ideas are separable. Garrett calls this "the Separability Principle", and it is almost as important for Hume as the Copy Principle. For one thing, it shows that Hume's theory of ideas, though heavily influenced by Locke, is importantly different from the earlier theory: Locke thought there were some necessary connections between distinct ideas, connections that could not be reduced to identities or partial identities.2 More importantly, the separability of distinct ideas is the primary ground of Hume's conceivability criterion of demonstration, crucially employed in the arguments concerning the causation, necessary connection and induction. But Hume seems to present an apparent counter-example to the Separability Principle as well. When discussing distinctions of reason, Hume admits that we can distinguish between "the

Philosophical Studies, 2009

It is no wonder that the main approaches to so many central philosophical topicsfrom causation to... more It is no wonder that the main approaches to so many central philosophical topicsfrom causation to motivation, from concepts to morals-include one often dubbed ''Humeanism'' about the topic; for Hume brought both originality and penetration to almost every philosophical issue he addressed. Until the work of Donald Baxter, however, the originality and penetration of Hume's accounts of time and identity were rarely appreciated. Indeed, as Hume's Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise makes clear, a long line of distinguished commentators has systemically misunderstood them. This is partly because some key passages of Hume's text readily lend themselves to misconstrual, especially when taken out of context, and partly because much of the key argumentation occurs in the insufficiently-studied Book I Part ii of the Treatise, ''Of the ideas of space and time.'' Partly too, though, it is because some of his claims seem, when taken at face value, just too strange or contradictory to credit. Because time or duration is simply the ordering of successive objects, Hume maintains, an unchanging and uninterrupted object has no real duration or temporal complexity in itself; yet such an object can, he insists, nevertheless co-exist with each of many temporal parts of a succession that does have real duration and temporal complexity. In effect, every single object in the universe has it own time and its own temporal structure. 1 It is one of the many great merits of Baxter's book that it shows this remarkable position to be well-motivated and internally consistent. Working from his incisive analysis of Hume's views on time (in Chaps. 2 and 3), Baxter goes on to give (in Chap. 4) an interpretation of Hume's account of the origin and nature of the idea of identity. Hume was led to this account by his discovery of a

The Philosophical Review, 1979


Noûs, 1993

In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of caus... more In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of cause and effect"), Hume sets out to "explain fully" the relation of cause and effect (Hume 1978; henceforth "THN"). Twelve sections and ninety-five pages later, at the climax of THN I.iii. 14 ("Of the ...

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013

Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no id... more Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no idea can represent what is not the case and (ii) that every idea of imagination represents a truly vast amount of what is or has been the case. This essay examines the roles of confusion and causation in Spinoza’s theory of imaginative representation. In doing so, it uncovers a promising way in which he could use his distinctive conatus doctrine—that “each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (E3p6)—both to constrain the otherwise vast extent of the imaginative representation of what is and to explain how imaginative misrepresentation is possible.

The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics

The second half of Ethics, Part 5, presents Spinoza's theory of the participation of human minds ... more The second half of Ethics, Part 5, presents Spinoza's theory of the participation of human minds in the eternal. Although this theory constitutes the culmination of the Ethics, it has often proven opaque to even its most attentive and penetrating readers. Edwin Curley has written candidly, "In spite of many years of study, I still do not feel that I understand this part of the Ethics at all adequately" (1988, 84). Jonathan Bennett memorably declared this part of the Ethics to be "an unmitigated and

Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2012

Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary ter... more Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary terms to ‘true religion’; in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, his character Philo goes so far as to express ‘veneration for’ it. This paper addresses three questions. First, did Hume himself really approve of something that he called ‘true religion’? Second, what did he mean by calling it ‘true’? Third, what did he take it to be? By appeal to some of his key doctrines about causation and probability, and to some key features of the characters and content of the Dialogues, I argue, contrary to important recent interpretations by Immerwahr and Falkenstein, that Hume's ‘true religion’ is a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that he regarded as true in an epistemic sense.

Necessity and Nature in Spinoza's Philosophy