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Papers by Richard Samuels

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Clarke and Beck import certain assumptions about the nature of numbers. Although these are widesp... more Clarke and Beck import certain assumptions about the nature of numbers. Although these are widespread within research on number cognition, they are highly contentious among philosophers of mathematics. In this commentary, we isolate and critically evaluate one core assumption: the identity thesis.

Institute of Philosophy, 2004

Oxford University Press eBooks, May 1, 2009

American Journal of Psychology, 1998

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Jul 1, 2018

There are multiple formal characterizations of the natural numbers available. Despite being inter... more There are multiple formal characterizations of the natural numbers available. Despite being inter-derivable, they plausibly codify different possible applications of the naturals – doing basic arithmetic, counting, and ordering – as well as different philosophical conceptions of those numbers: structuralist, cardinal, and ordinal. Some influential philosophers of mathematics have argued for a non-egalitarian attitude according to which one of those characterizations is ‘more basic’ or ‘more fundamental’ than the others. This paper addresses two related issues. First, we review some of these non-egalitarian arguments, lay out a laundry list of different, legitimate, notions of relative priority, and suggest that these arguments plausibly employ different such notions. Secondly, we argue that given a metaphysical-cum-epistemological gloss suggested by Frege's foundationalist epistemology, the ordinals are plausibly more basic than the cardinals. This is just one orientation to relative priority one could take, however. Ultimately, we subscribe to an egalitarian attitude towards these formal characterizations: they are, in some sense, equally ‘legitimate’.

Routledge eBooks, Oct 8, 2019

Elsevier eBooks, 2017

This paper explores the implications of Bayesian research in cognitive science for debates over t... more This paper explores the implications of Bayesian research in cognitive science for debates over the extent of human rationality. Work in the heuristics and biases tradition has led many philosophers to pessimistic conclusions about human rationality.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 14, 2005

This chapter examines the scope and limits of the tractability argument. It argues for two claims... more This chapter examines the scope and limits of the tractability argument. It argues for two claims. First, that when explored with appropriate care and attention, it becomes clear that the argument provides no good reason to prefer massive modularity to the more traditional rationalist alternative. Second, while it is denied that tractability considerations support massive modularity per se, this does not mean that they show nothing whatsoever. Careful analysis of tractability considerations suggests a range of characteristics that any plausible version of psychological rationalism is likely to possess. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 outlines and clarifies the general form of the tractability argument. Section 2 explains how massive modularity is supposed to resolve intractability worries. Sections 3 to 7 highlight the deficiencies of the main extant arguments for claiming that nonmodular mechanisms are intractable. Section 8 concludes by sketching some of the general characteristics that a plausible rationalist alternative to massive modularity — one capable of subserving tractable cognitive processes — is likely to possess.

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Apr 12, 2012

Philosophies, Feb 18, 2022

We intend to look at whether folk understanding of mathematical claims more closely approximate f... more We intend to look at whether folk understanding of mathematical claims more closely approximate folk understanding of factual claims, fictional claims, metaphorical claims, or something else.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 1, 2008

Mind & Language, Dec 1, 1998

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science

Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 5, 2004

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2002

This book addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rati... more This book addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rationality. While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unified cognitive map, this book offers novel, even paradoxical, views of the relationship. The book considers what constitutes human rationality, behavior, and intelligence, while covering diverse areas of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Clarke and Beck import certain assumptions about the nature of numbers. Although these are widesp... more Clarke and Beck import certain assumptions about the nature of numbers. Although these are widespread within research on number cognition, they are highly contentious among philosophers of mathematics. In this commentary, we isolate and critically evaluate one core assumption: the identity thesis.

Institute of Philosophy, 2004

Oxford University Press eBooks, May 1, 2009

American Journal of Psychology, 1998

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Jul 1, 2018

There are multiple formal characterizations of the natural numbers available. Despite being inter... more There are multiple formal characterizations of the natural numbers available. Despite being inter-derivable, they plausibly codify different possible applications of the naturals – doing basic arithmetic, counting, and ordering – as well as different philosophical conceptions of those numbers: structuralist, cardinal, and ordinal. Some influential philosophers of mathematics have argued for a non-egalitarian attitude according to which one of those characterizations is ‘more basic’ or ‘more fundamental’ than the others. This paper addresses two related issues. First, we review some of these non-egalitarian arguments, lay out a laundry list of different, legitimate, notions of relative priority, and suggest that these arguments plausibly employ different such notions. Secondly, we argue that given a metaphysical-cum-epistemological gloss suggested by Frege's foundationalist epistemology, the ordinals are plausibly more basic than the cardinals. This is just one orientation to relative priority one could take, however. Ultimately, we subscribe to an egalitarian attitude towards these formal characterizations: they are, in some sense, equally ‘legitimate’.

Routledge eBooks, Oct 8, 2019

Elsevier eBooks, 2017

This paper explores the implications of Bayesian research in cognitive science for debates over t... more This paper explores the implications of Bayesian research in cognitive science for debates over the extent of human rationality. Work in the heuristics and biases tradition has led many philosophers to pessimistic conclusions about human rationality.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 14, 2005

This chapter examines the scope and limits of the tractability argument. It argues for two claims... more This chapter examines the scope and limits of the tractability argument. It argues for two claims. First, that when explored with appropriate care and attention, it becomes clear that the argument provides no good reason to prefer massive modularity to the more traditional rationalist alternative. Second, while it is denied that tractability considerations support massive modularity per se, this does not mean that they show nothing whatsoever. Careful analysis of tractability considerations suggests a range of characteristics that any plausible version of psychological rationalism is likely to possess. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 outlines and clarifies the general form of the tractability argument. Section 2 explains how massive modularity is supposed to resolve intractability worries. Sections 3 to 7 highlight the deficiencies of the main extant arguments for claiming that nonmodular mechanisms are intractable. Section 8 concludes by sketching some of the general characteristics that a plausible rationalist alternative to massive modularity — one capable of subserving tractable cognitive processes — is likely to possess.

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Apr 12, 2012

Philosophies, Feb 18, 2022

We intend to look at whether folk understanding of mathematical claims more closely approximate f... more We intend to look at whether folk understanding of mathematical claims more closely approximate folk understanding of factual claims, fictional claims, metaphorical claims, or something else.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 1, 2008

Mind & Language, Dec 1, 1998

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science

Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 5, 2004

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2002

This book addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rati... more This book addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rationality. While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unified cognitive map, this book offers novel, even paradoxical, views of the relationship. The book considers what constitutes human rationality, behavior, and intelligence, while covering diverse areas of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science.