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Books by Alex Miller

Contemporary Metaethics (2023 Chinese Translation), 2023

As well as updated versions of the papers from the 1st (1997) edition, this much expanded 2nd edi... more As well as updated versions of the papers from the 1st (1997) edition, this much expanded 2nd edition will contain new chapters on topics such as semantic contextualism, relativism, time and tense, semantic relationism, phil. language and linguistics, externalism and internalism, 2-D semantics, the normativity of meaning, semantics v. pragmatics, conceptual role and truth conditional theories of meaning, modality and epistemic modals, minimalism and no-theory views of meaning, generics, conditionals, truthmaker semantics, assertions – grounds and consequences. Authors adding new chapters include Brian Weatherson (Michigan), Jim Pryor (NYU), Daniel Rothschild (Oxford), Jussi Haukioja (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm), Stuart Brock (Victoria University of Wellington), John Collins (East Anglia), Julian Murzi (Kent) and Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow), Andy Egan (Rutgers), Stephen Schiffer (NYU), Bernhard Nickel (Harvard), Antony Gillies (Rutgers), Kit Fine (NYU), Ian Rumfitt (Birkbeck), Michael Morris (Sussex)

Papers by Alex Miller

Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2024

This entry concerns the philosophical literature on rules and rule-following, as inspired by the ... more This entry concerns the philosophical literature on rules and rule-following, as inspired by the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and developed by Saul Kripke and Crispin Wright. It outlines the key 'skeptical argument' about meaning and rules, and explains the signiYicance of the issue for cognitive-psychological explanations of semantic creativity. It also provides a brief guide to the recent literature on rule-following and meaning.

Filosofiska Notiser, 2023

In this paper, we argue that "The Moral Problem" identified by Michael Smith in his book of that ... more In this paper, we argue that "The Moral Problem" identified by Michael Smith in his book of that name as "the central organizing problem" of metaethics needs to be refined in order to accommodate moral error theories (in the style of J.L. Mackie), and we suggest a refinement that allows it to do this. We conclude by drawing out some consequences for the formulation of internalism about moral motivation.

Acta Analytica, 2023

Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focussed on undermining or defendi... more Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focussed on undermining or defending narrow scope readings of doxastic norms. Wide scope readings are largely assumed to have been decisively refuted. This paper will oppose this trend by defending a wide scope reading of the norm of belief. We shall argue for the modest claim that if it is plausible to regard belief as constitutively normative (in the minimal sense that false belief is eo ipso defective), then a modified version of the wide scope reading of the norm of belief should be preferred to the narrow scope reading. (This is subject to certain attractive conditions relating to the holism involved in the fixation and confirmation of belief).

Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers, edited by Ali Hossein-Khani and Gary Kemp, 2022

Few major late 20 th century and contemporary analytic philosophers have been more influenced by ... more Few major late 20 th century and contemporary analytic philosophers have been more influenced by the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein than Crispin Wright. And, arguably, none have done more than Wright to place Wittgenstein's work at the forefront of contemporary concerns in the philosophies of language, mind, logic and mathematics. Wright's first book (1980) was a lengthy study of the leading philosophical themes of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Based on lectures given to graduate classes in Oxford in 1974, 1975 and 1977, and developing an interpretation begun in his 1968 Cambridge PhD thesis, Wright's 1980 study was the first major publication to give a central role to the later Wittgenstein's discussions of rules and rule-following. (As Wright notes (1991a: 413), independently and roughly over the same period, Saul Kripke was doing something similar, developing an interpretation that culminated in the publication of Kripke (1982), a competing interpretation that Wright subsequently engaged with at some length). In the Preface to his (1980), Wright remarked (p.ix) that Michael Dummett's ideas on Realism were almost as much as Wittgenstein's own ideas the subject matter of his book, and Wittgenstein looms large at key points in Wright's first volume of collected papers on Realism and Anti-Realism (1986, 2 nd edition 1993) and also in his later works on the same theme (Wright 1992, and the papers collected in Wright (2003)). The discussion of rule-following launched in Wright (1980), was followed by a series of important papers on that and related themes that were eventually collected in Wright (2001), in the Preface to which Wright speaks of his career long fascination with the thought of the later Wittgenstein on rules and objectivity, and the implications thereof for the philosophy of logic and mathematics, on the one hand, and the philosophy of everyday intentional psychology, on the other. Recent published work on these themes includes Wright (2007) and Wright (2012). Wright describes these writings of his as 'motivated, provoked, or-at their best-perhaps inspired by reading Wittgenstein' (2001: ix). They are not, however, offered 'as serious scholarly exegesis, still less as a key to unlock his [Wittgenstein's] thought' (ibid.). Following up on Wright's own suggestion that a similar disclaimer made by Kripke (1982: 5) apply to himself also, we might say that 'they should be thought of as expounding neither "Wittgenstein's" arguments nor "Wright's": rather Wittgenstein's arguments as they struck Wright, as they presented problems for him'. Limitations of space dictate that in this chapter I cannot aim at anything remotely like a comprehensive treatment. I will focus on what I take to be the most important aspects of Wright's Wittgenstein-inspired work on rulefollowing, platonism and the objectivity of meaning and the implications thereof for the Dummett-inspired debate between Realism and Anti-Realism. For the

Engaging Kripke With Wittgenstein, edited by M. Gustafsson, O. Kuusela and J. Macha, 2022

Proper names are a confounded business. For example, suppose I wanted to call this chair Jacob. W... more Proper names are a confounded business. For example, suppose I wanted to call this chair Jacob. What did I really give the name to? The shape or the chair? … The possibility of giving names to things presupposes very complicated experiences.

Piotr StalmCambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language

Philosophy in Review (forthcoming), 2021

International Journal of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming), 2020

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2020

In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein offers a "scept... more In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein offers a "sceptical solution" to the sceptical paradox about meaning developed in chapter 2 (according to which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as "Jones means addition by '+'" can be true). Although many commentators have taken the sceptical solution to be broadly analogous to non--factualist theories in other domains, such as non--cognitivism or expressivism in metaethics, the nature of the sceptical solution has not been well--understood. The main aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the nature of the non--factualism about meaning proposed in the sceptical solution. It attempts to outline some desiderata that should be respected by interpretations of the sceptical solution and considers two objections raised against it in Barry Stroud's paper "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding and Community". It attempts to correct misconstruals of the sceptical solution that have been promulgated by Davidson and some of his followers and suggests that the sceptical solution developed by Kripke's Wittgenstein is best viewed as a form of quasi--realism about meaning. It ends by outlining what it takes to be the most pressing challenges facing the sceptical solution. 273) for especially clear illustrations of how this type of view attempts to sidestep the error theory. 2 I'm vastly oversimplifying here, especially with respect to (b), since none of the complications bear on the main points in the paper. For an account of some of the complications, see Hattiangadi (2017).

Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 2019

Dialogue, 2020

This paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's respo... more This paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's response to the sceptical paradox about rule-­-following and meaning developed by Kripke's Wittgenstein. It focusses on questions about the normativity of meaning, the social character of meaning, and the role of triangulation in Davidson's account of the determination of meaning, and invites Verheggen to compare the non-­-reductionism she finds in Davidson from that developed in Crispin Wright's judgement-­-dependent account of meaning.

Preface to Logic, Language and Mathematics: Essays on Themes From Crispin Wright (OUP forthcoming), 2019

Contemporary Metaethics (2023 Chinese Translation), 2023

As well as updated versions of the papers from the 1st (1997) edition, this much expanded 2nd edi... more As well as updated versions of the papers from the 1st (1997) edition, this much expanded 2nd edition will contain new chapters on topics such as semantic contextualism, relativism, time and tense, semantic relationism, phil. language and linguistics, externalism and internalism, 2-D semantics, the normativity of meaning, semantics v. pragmatics, conceptual role and truth conditional theories of meaning, modality and epistemic modals, minimalism and no-theory views of meaning, generics, conditionals, truthmaker semantics, assertions – grounds and consequences. Authors adding new chapters include Brian Weatherson (Michigan), Jim Pryor (NYU), Daniel Rothschild (Oxford), Jussi Haukioja (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm), Stuart Brock (Victoria University of Wellington), John Collins (East Anglia), Julian Murzi (Kent) and Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow), Andy Egan (Rutgers), Stephen Schiffer (NYU), Bernhard Nickel (Harvard), Antony Gillies (Rutgers), Kit Fine (NYU), Ian Rumfitt (Birkbeck), Michael Morris (Sussex)

Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2024

This entry concerns the philosophical literature on rules and rule-following, as inspired by the ... more This entry concerns the philosophical literature on rules and rule-following, as inspired by the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and developed by Saul Kripke and Crispin Wright. It outlines the key 'skeptical argument' about meaning and rules, and explains the signiYicance of the issue for cognitive-psychological explanations of semantic creativity. It also provides a brief guide to the recent literature on rule-following and meaning.

Filosofiska Notiser, 2023

In this paper, we argue that "The Moral Problem" identified by Michael Smith in his book of that ... more In this paper, we argue that "The Moral Problem" identified by Michael Smith in his book of that name as "the central organizing problem" of metaethics needs to be refined in order to accommodate moral error theories (in the style of J.L. Mackie), and we suggest a refinement that allows it to do this. We conclude by drawing out some consequences for the formulation of internalism about moral motivation.

Acta Analytica, 2023

Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focussed on undermining or defendi... more Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focussed on undermining or defending narrow scope readings of doxastic norms. Wide scope readings are largely assumed to have been decisively refuted. This paper will oppose this trend by defending a wide scope reading of the norm of belief. We shall argue for the modest claim that if it is plausible to regard belief as constitutively normative (in the minimal sense that false belief is eo ipso defective), then a modified version of the wide scope reading of the norm of belief should be preferred to the narrow scope reading. (This is subject to certain attractive conditions relating to the holism involved in the fixation and confirmation of belief).

Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers, edited by Ali Hossein-Khani and Gary Kemp, 2022

Few major late 20 th century and contemporary analytic philosophers have been more influenced by ... more Few major late 20 th century and contemporary analytic philosophers have been more influenced by the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein than Crispin Wright. And, arguably, none have done more than Wright to place Wittgenstein's work at the forefront of contemporary concerns in the philosophies of language, mind, logic and mathematics. Wright's first book (1980) was a lengthy study of the leading philosophical themes of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Based on lectures given to graduate classes in Oxford in 1974, 1975 and 1977, and developing an interpretation begun in his 1968 Cambridge PhD thesis, Wright's 1980 study was the first major publication to give a central role to the later Wittgenstein's discussions of rules and rule-following. (As Wright notes (1991a: 413), independently and roughly over the same period, Saul Kripke was doing something similar, developing an interpretation that culminated in the publication of Kripke (1982), a competing interpretation that Wright subsequently engaged with at some length). In the Preface to his (1980), Wright remarked (p.ix) that Michael Dummett's ideas on Realism were almost as much as Wittgenstein's own ideas the subject matter of his book, and Wittgenstein looms large at key points in Wright's first volume of collected papers on Realism and Anti-Realism (1986, 2 nd edition 1993) and also in his later works on the same theme (Wright 1992, and the papers collected in Wright (2003)). The discussion of rule-following launched in Wright (1980), was followed by a series of important papers on that and related themes that were eventually collected in Wright (2001), in the Preface to which Wright speaks of his career long fascination with the thought of the later Wittgenstein on rules and objectivity, and the implications thereof for the philosophy of logic and mathematics, on the one hand, and the philosophy of everyday intentional psychology, on the other. Recent published work on these themes includes Wright (2007) and Wright (2012). Wright describes these writings of his as 'motivated, provoked, or-at their best-perhaps inspired by reading Wittgenstein' (2001: ix). They are not, however, offered 'as serious scholarly exegesis, still less as a key to unlock his [Wittgenstein's] thought' (ibid.). Following up on Wright's own suggestion that a similar disclaimer made by Kripke (1982: 5) apply to himself also, we might say that 'they should be thought of as expounding neither "Wittgenstein's" arguments nor "Wright's": rather Wittgenstein's arguments as they struck Wright, as they presented problems for him'. Limitations of space dictate that in this chapter I cannot aim at anything remotely like a comprehensive treatment. I will focus on what I take to be the most important aspects of Wright's Wittgenstein-inspired work on rulefollowing, platonism and the objectivity of meaning and the implications thereof for the Dummett-inspired debate between Realism and Anti-Realism. For the

Engaging Kripke With Wittgenstein, edited by M. Gustafsson, O. Kuusela and J. Macha, 2022

Proper names are a confounded business. For example, suppose I wanted to call this chair Jacob. W... more Proper names are a confounded business. For example, suppose I wanted to call this chair Jacob. What did I really give the name to? The shape or the chair? … The possibility of giving names to things presupposes very complicated experiences.

Piotr StalmCambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language

Philosophy in Review (forthcoming), 2021

International Journal of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming), 2020

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2020

In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein offers a "scept... more In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein offers a "sceptical solution" to the sceptical paradox about meaning developed in chapter 2 (according to which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as "Jones means addition by '+'" can be true). Although many commentators have taken the sceptical solution to be broadly analogous to non--factualist theories in other domains, such as non--cognitivism or expressivism in metaethics, the nature of the sceptical solution has not been well--understood. The main aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the nature of the non--factualism about meaning proposed in the sceptical solution. It attempts to outline some desiderata that should be respected by interpretations of the sceptical solution and considers two objections raised against it in Barry Stroud's paper "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding and Community". It attempts to correct misconstruals of the sceptical solution that have been promulgated by Davidson and some of his followers and suggests that the sceptical solution developed by Kripke's Wittgenstein is best viewed as a form of quasi--realism about meaning. It ends by outlining what it takes to be the most pressing challenges facing the sceptical solution. 273) for especially clear illustrations of how this type of view attempts to sidestep the error theory. 2 I'm vastly oversimplifying here, especially with respect to (b), since none of the complications bear on the main points in the paper. For an account of some of the complications, see Hattiangadi (2017).

Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 2019

Dialogue, 2020

This paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's respo... more This paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's response to the sceptical paradox about rule-­-following and meaning developed by Kripke's Wittgenstein. It focusses on questions about the normativity of meaning, the social character of meaning, and the role of triangulation in Davidson's account of the determination of meaning, and invites Verheggen to compare the non-­-reductionism she finds in Davidson from that developed in Crispin Wright's judgement-­-dependent account of meaning.

Preface to Logic, Language and Mathematics: Essays on Themes From Crispin Wright (OUP forthcoming), 2019

Australasian Philosophical Review, 2019

The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language

Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein, edited by Benjamin De Mesel and Oskari Kuusela, 2019

In the 1970s and 1980s, Simon Blackburn published a number of much-­‐discussed works in which he ... more In the 1970s and 1980s, Simon Blackburn published a number of much-­‐discussed works in which he argued that the supervenience of the moral on the natural generates a serious problem for moral realism, a problem which his own brand of moral projectivism can avoid (Blackburn 1970, 1984, 1985). As we'll see below, Blackburn construed moral supervenience in terms of what is known as weak supervenience. Partly in response to Blackburn, a number of philosophers have argued that weak supervenience is too weak to capture the intuitive sense in which the moral supervenes on the natural. Instead, it is argued, we should opt for strong supervenience, and, further, that strong supervenience completely disables Blackburn's argument against moral realism. This idea – that strong supervenience undermines Blackburn's argument – is very common in recent metaethics, and the purpose of the present paper is to develop a challenge to this near-­‐orthodoxy

This paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in respo... more This paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in responding to the sceptical argument about meaning developed in chapter 2 of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It takes as its stalking-horse the response to Kripke's Wittgenstein developed in a recent series of important works by Hannah Ginsborg. The paper concludes that Ginsborg's attempted solution fails for a number of reasons: it depends on an inadequate response to Kripke's Wittgenstein's " finitude " objection to reductive dispositionalism, it erroneously rejects the idea that a speaker's understanding of an expressions guides her use, it threatens to collapse into either full-blown non-reductionism or reductive dispositionalism, and there is no motive for accepting it over forms of non-reductionism such as those developed by Barry Stroud and John McDowell.

Scottish Socialist Voice , 2025

Scottish Socialist Voice, 2024

Scottish Socialist Voice, 2024

Capital and Class, 2023

This erudite yet highly readable study covers the period from January 1881 to Marx's death on Mar... more This erudite yet highly readable study covers the period from January 1881 to Marx's death on March 14 th 1883. As Musto notes, previous biographers have 'devoted … few pages to his activity after the winding up of the International Working Men's Association, in 1872' (p.5). This tendency to neglect his final years includes authors of classic biographies sympathetic to Marx, such as Franz Mehring (1918), Boris Nicolaevsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen (1936), and David McLellan (1973), and also more recent and less sympathetic biographies by the likes of Gareth Stedman-Jones (2016). Musto's aim is thus to fill a gap in the literature, making use of the new materials that have become available since the resumed publication in 1998 of the Marx-Engels-Gesamtaugabe (MEGA 2). Musto notes that the demise of Marxism-Leninism makes it possible 'to read a Marx very unlike the dogmatic, economistic, and Eurocentric theorist who was paraded around for so long' (p.4), and he argues that a study of Marx's last writings can contribute to the emergence of such readings. Far from dimming, Marx's relentlessly probing and questioning intellect burns all the more brightly as his health-ruined by decades of poverty and overwork-starts to give out. It is a great virtue of Musto's book that the story of Marx's theoretical work in his last years is intertwined with a vivid and intimate account of his struggle against bodily frailty and impending death. There are four modestly proportioned but substantive chapters. Chapter 1, 'New Research Horizons', provides an atmospheric portait of Marx in his study in Maitland Park Road in North London, toiling 'at a modest desk no larger than three feet by two' with his 'painstakingly rigorous and intransigiently critical [method]' (p.11). Musto isn't exaggerating when he writes that 'The whole world was contained in his room as he sat there at his desk' (p.48): having taught himself Russian, a considerable section of his library consists of texts in the Cyrillic alphabet, such as Maksim Kovalevsky's 1879 Communal Landownership: The Causes, Course and Consequences of its Decline, a study of which allows Marx to reflect on landownership in countries under foreign rule and how possession rights were regulated in Latin America by the Spanish, in India by the British, and in Algeria by the French. Anthroplogy, ancient societies, organic chemistry, physics, physiology, geology, and differential calculus are only some of the subjects studied, as well as Australia, the United States, and the British colonial occupation of Ireland, all in addition to his ongoing work in political economy and socialist politics. Chapter 2, 'Controversy Over the Development of Capitalism in Russia', displays just how far Marx was from being a dogmatist who attempted to shoehorn historical events into a pre-ordained a priori schema. In 1881 Marx received a letter from Vera Zasulich, a Russian activist (who had flown to Geneva, having attempted to assassinate the chief of police in St. Petersburg), asking whether Marx believed it possible that the rural commune (obshchina) was capable of developing in a socialist direction without first perishing and being usurped by capitalism. Based on the schema feudalism-capitalism-socialism, many 'Marxists' of the day would answer

Scottish Socialist Voice 2022

Green Left, 2021

Albert Camus was one of the most prominent and influential French philosophical writers of the 20... more Albert Camus was one of the most prominent and influential French philosophical writers of the 20th century, exploring the great themes of existentialist philosophy in enduring masterpieces such as The Stranger and The Plague.

Scottish Socialist Voice, 2020

New Zealand operates a "mixed member proportional"(MMP) form of proportional representation, more... more New Zealand operates a "mixed member proportional"(MMP) form of proportional representation, more or less designed to prevent single political parties from obtaining absolute majorities in parliament in the general elections held every 3 years. Although the (then-governing) centre-right National Party obtained 44% of the popular vote in the 2017 general election it was unable to form a government on the basis of its 56 parliamentary seats, and much to the surprise (and relief) of the left a coalition government was formed between Labour (46 seats) and the maverick populist party New Zealand First (9 seats), in the context of a confidence-and-supply agreement between Labour and the Green Party (8 seats).

Scottish Socialist Voice 2019

Links: International Journal of Socialist Renewal, 2018

Scottish Socialist Voice 2018

Green Left Weekly 2017

2017, 159 pages REVIEW BY ALEX MILLER In this well--written and powerful book, Nicky Hager and Jo... more 2017, 159 pages REVIEW BY ALEX MILLER In this well--written and powerful book, Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson present a barrage of evidence that "New Zealanders and their United States allies were involved in war crimes" in Afghanistan in 2010. The evidence is gleaned from interviews with over 3 dozen people, including the victims of the alleged war crimes, serving and former members of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), serving and former members of the Afghan army and intelligence services, as well as civilian officials, NGO workers, and medical staff. Most of those from the NZDF and Afghan forces participated directly in the events described in the book, and for obvious reasons are not identified by name.

This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationsh... more This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationship between facts and values, bringing together a wide spectrum of contributors committed to testing the validity of this dichotomy, exploring alternatives, and assessing their implications. The assumption that facts and values inhabit distinct, unbridgeable conceptual and experiential domains has long dominated scientific and philosophical discourse, but this separation has been seriously called into question from a number of corners. The original essays here collected offer a diversity of responses to fact-value dichotomy, including contributions from Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam who are rightly credited with revitalizing philosophical interest in this alleged opposition. Both they, and many of our contributors, are in agreement that the relationship between epistemic developments and evaluative attitudes cannot be framed as a conflict between descriptive and normative understanding. Each chapter demonstrates how and why contrapositions between science and ethics, between facts and values, and between objective and subjective are false dichotomies. Values cannot simply be separated from reason. Facts and Values will therefore prove essential reading for analytic and continental philosophers alike, for theorists of ethics and meta-ethics, and for philosophers of economics, sociology and law. Reviews "The concept of normativity spans a series of interrelated dichotomies that lie at the heart of philosophical inquiry: fact and value, is and ought, the objective and the subjective, causes and reasons, the natural world and human sensibilities. Much philosophical effort has been devoted to accentuating the gaps between the concepts juxtaposed by each of these pairs, and the fallacies involved in their conflation. This volume, however, seeks to bridge these gaps. The papers collected here—all written expressly for this volume—set out to show that normative discourse must be sensitive to the facts, and that reasoning about facts is inherently value