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Conference Presentations by Jeremy Smith
In this paper I plan to confront certain issues that arise in Husserl's analysis of the perceptio... more In this paper I plan to confront certain issues that arise in Husserl's analysis of the perception of objects in the world. My argument will support what might be called a "realist" interpretation of that analysis. But it seems to me that Husserl's thought, in grappling with the real issues that give rise to labels such as "realism" and "idealism," pushes beyond that dichotomy and those labels themselves. I begin with a discussion of the phenomenological epokhe, which can sound "idealistic" in isolating a world of "pure experience" and exploring the way consciousness "constitutes" the world. But a close
Husserl Circle Conference, 2014
For Husserl, the concept of imagination refers to phantasy as an original form of intentionality ... more For Husserl, the concept of imagination refers to phantasy as an original form of intentionality that grasps absent objects as if they were present. He suggests that aesthetic experience has to do with taking pleasure in appearances for their own sakes. How does imagination then relate to aesthetic experience? A phantasy itself may be utterly banal. What gives a phantasy aesthetic value? Husserl’s analyses of perception, judgment, and eidetic awareness imply the notion of presence. I hold that aesthetic experience lies not merely in taking pleasure in appearance, and not essentially in imagining objects as if they were present, but rather in the imagining of presence itself. The aim of this paper is to define this distinction by arguing that presence is the non-eidetic upon which all eidos relies, the non-objective within which all intentionality lives, and the original foundation of all experience of being and value.
A central task in Husserl's philosophy is to explicate the nature of truthfulness by showing exac... more A central task in Husserl's philosophy is to explicate the nature of truthfulness by showing exactly how conceptual and propositional understanding relates to perception.
Papers by Jeremy Smith
In \u27Voir l\u27invisible\u27 Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection to the realm ... more In \u27Voir l\u27invisible\u27 Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection to the realm of aesthetics. Henry claims that autoaffection, as nonobjective experience, is essential not only to self-experience, but also to the experience of objects and their qualities. On the basis of an examination of Henry\u27s aesthetic theory in the light of Husserl\u27s analysis of our experience of visible objects, I conclude that revisions are required in both Husserl\u27s and Henry\u27s approaches: Husserl\u27s noema must be considered to be a lived-through experience, and nonobjective lived-through experience must be recognized as primordial evidence; Henry\u27s claim that intentionality makes unreal all that it objectifies must be replaced by a recognition of the interdependence between autoaffection and heteroaffection
International Philosophical Quarterly, 1996
Reponse a la deconstruction derridienne de la phenomenologie de la conscience du temps developpee... more Reponse a la deconstruction derridienne de la phenomenologie de la conscience du temps developpee par Husserl. S'appuyant sur la reference a Hegel introduite dans l'analyse de Derrida, l'A. montre que la notion de difference joue un role dans la constitution de l'identite a soi et de la presence a soi de la conscience
aspect of the Other would be a complete misunderstanding. ‘Ipseity’ is the word for the very oppo... more aspect of the Other would be a complete misunderstanding. ‘Ipseity’ is the word for the very opposite of what is abstract. Ipseity is precisely that by virtue of which an individual is individual, actual, and concrete. But even if love which targets ipseity cannot be love for some abstract feature, it is not easy to grasp what that love for ipseity would concretely mean. One example would be the rare case of the saint. A way to define saintliness would be the ability tofeature, it is not easy to grasp what that love for ipseity would concretely mean. One example would be the rare case of the saint. A way to define saintliness would be the ability to see and affirm in anyone and everyone the splendor of individual ipseity, to sense and never lose an absolute and profound reverence in the face of the dignity of each individual. In more
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
In Voir l’invisible Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection (which is both inspired ... more In Voir l’invisible Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection (which is both inspired by, and critical of, Husserl) to the realm of aesthetics. Henry claims that autoaffection, as non‐objective experience, is essential not only to self‐experience, but also to the experience of objects and their qualities. Intentionality tempts us to experience objects merely from the ‘outside’, but aesthetic experience returns us to the inner life of objects as a lived experience. On the basis of an examination of Henry’s aesthetic theory in the light of Husserl’s analysis of our experience of visible objects, I conclude that revisions are required in both Husserl’s and Henry’s approaches: Husserl’s noema must be considered to be a lived‐through experience, and non‐objective lived‐through experience must be recognized as primordial evidence; Henry’s claim that intentionality makes unreal all that it objectifies must be replaced by a recognition of the interdependence between autoaffection...
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2011
Religion, is engaged in a very specific task. Sharma poses the question of the contribution that ... more Religion, is engaged in a very specific task. Sharma poses the question of the contribution that primal religions can make to Western philoso-phy of religion. Sharma begins with two givens: the philosophy of reli-gion as it exists in the Western academic world, especially as defined by John Hick, and “primal religion ” as it is described in a number of well-known works, such as those of John Mbiti and Geoffrey Parrinder in the case of African religion. On this basis, Sharma attempts to discover the contributions primal religion can make to the philosophy of reli-gion. His work is very much an effort to map out an issue and make a first attempt at an answer—and thus does not include a thorough survey either of source material on primal religion or of the range of Western approaches to the philosophy of religion. His aim is not to have the last word on the question, but rather to frame it and begin to answer it, working with the material that most immediately and
In this paper I plan to confront certain issues that arise in Husserl's analysis of the perceptio... more In this paper I plan to confront certain issues that arise in Husserl's analysis of the perception of objects in the world. My argument will support what might be called a "realist" interpretation of that analysis. But it seems to me that Husserl's thought, in grappling with the real issues that give rise to labels such as "realism" and "idealism," pushes beyond that dichotomy and those labels themselves. I begin with a discussion of the phenomenological epokhe, which can sound "idealistic" in isolating a world of "pure experience" and exploring the way consciousness "constitutes" the world. But a close
Husserl Circle Conference, 2014
For Husserl, the concept of imagination refers to phantasy as an original form of intentionality ... more For Husserl, the concept of imagination refers to phantasy as an original form of intentionality that grasps absent objects as if they were present. He suggests that aesthetic experience has to do with taking pleasure in appearances for their own sakes. How does imagination then relate to aesthetic experience? A phantasy itself may be utterly banal. What gives a phantasy aesthetic value? Husserl’s analyses of perception, judgment, and eidetic awareness imply the notion of presence. I hold that aesthetic experience lies not merely in taking pleasure in appearance, and not essentially in imagining objects as if they were present, but rather in the imagining of presence itself. The aim of this paper is to define this distinction by arguing that presence is the non-eidetic upon which all eidos relies, the non-objective within which all intentionality lives, and the original foundation of all experience of being and value.
A central task in Husserl's philosophy is to explicate the nature of truthfulness by showing exac... more A central task in Husserl's philosophy is to explicate the nature of truthfulness by showing exactly how conceptual and propositional understanding relates to perception.
In \u27Voir l\u27invisible\u27 Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection to the realm ... more In \u27Voir l\u27invisible\u27 Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection to the realm of aesthetics. Henry claims that autoaffection, as nonobjective experience, is essential not only to self-experience, but also to the experience of objects and their qualities. On the basis of an examination of Henry\u27s aesthetic theory in the light of Husserl\u27s analysis of our experience of visible objects, I conclude that revisions are required in both Husserl\u27s and Henry\u27s approaches: Husserl\u27s noema must be considered to be a lived-through experience, and nonobjective lived-through experience must be recognized as primordial evidence; Henry\u27s claim that intentionality makes unreal all that it objectifies must be replaced by a recognition of the interdependence between autoaffection and heteroaffection
International Philosophical Quarterly, 1996
Reponse a la deconstruction derridienne de la phenomenologie de la conscience du temps developpee... more Reponse a la deconstruction derridienne de la phenomenologie de la conscience du temps developpee par Husserl. S'appuyant sur la reference a Hegel introduite dans l'analyse de Derrida, l'A. montre que la notion de difference joue un role dans la constitution de l'identite a soi et de la presence a soi de la conscience
aspect of the Other would be a complete misunderstanding. ‘Ipseity’ is the word for the very oppo... more aspect of the Other would be a complete misunderstanding. ‘Ipseity’ is the word for the very opposite of what is abstract. Ipseity is precisely that by virtue of which an individual is individual, actual, and concrete. But even if love which targets ipseity cannot be love for some abstract feature, it is not easy to grasp what that love for ipseity would concretely mean. One example would be the rare case of the saint. A way to define saintliness would be the ability tofeature, it is not easy to grasp what that love for ipseity would concretely mean. One example would be the rare case of the saint. A way to define saintliness would be the ability to see and affirm in anyone and everyone the splendor of individual ipseity, to sense and never lose an absolute and profound reverence in the face of the dignity of each individual. In more
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
In Voir l’invisible Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection (which is both inspired ... more In Voir l’invisible Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection (which is both inspired by, and critical of, Husserl) to the realm of aesthetics. Henry claims that autoaffection, as non‐objective experience, is essential not only to self‐experience, but also to the experience of objects and their qualities. Intentionality tempts us to experience objects merely from the ‘outside’, but aesthetic experience returns us to the inner life of objects as a lived experience. On the basis of an examination of Henry’s aesthetic theory in the light of Husserl’s analysis of our experience of visible objects, I conclude that revisions are required in both Husserl’s and Henry’s approaches: Husserl’s noema must be considered to be a lived‐through experience, and non‐objective lived‐through experience must be recognized as primordial evidence; Henry’s claim that intentionality makes unreal all that it objectifies must be replaced by a recognition of the interdependence between autoaffection...
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2011
Religion, is engaged in a very specific task. Sharma poses the question of the contribution that ... more Religion, is engaged in a very specific task. Sharma poses the question of the contribution that primal religions can make to Western philoso-phy of religion. Sharma begins with two givens: the philosophy of reli-gion as it exists in the Western academic world, especially as defined by John Hick, and “primal religion ” as it is described in a number of well-known works, such as those of John Mbiti and Geoffrey Parrinder in the case of African religion. On this basis, Sharma attempts to discover the contributions primal religion can make to the philosophy of reli-gion. His work is very much an effort to map out an issue and make a first attempt at an answer—and thus does not include a thorough survey either of source material on primal religion or of the range of Western approaches to the philosophy of religion. His aim is not to have the last word on the question, but rather to frame it and begin to answer it, working with the material that most immediately and