Brian A Chance | University of Oklahoma (original) (raw)
Papers by Brian A Chance
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2012
Kant’s response to skepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, a... more Kant’s response to skepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian skepticism and locate Kant’s response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects of this response. The first is that Kant’s response to Pyrrhonian skepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume’s skepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian skepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian skepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic.
Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity
The importance of the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories) within Kant's syst... more The importance of the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories) within Kant's system of philosophy is undeniable. 1 They provide the basis not only for our synthetic a priori cognition of nature articulated in the Analytic of Principles of the first Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science but also for the claims about the supersensible that Kant argues are proper objects of rational belief in all three Critiques, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, and the essays "On the old saying that it may be good in theory but doesn't work in practice" and "What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff".
Kantian Review
I raise three questions relevant to De Boer’s overall project in Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics. Th... more I raise three questions relevant to De Boer’s overall project in Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics. The first is whether Kant’s 1799 open letter to Fichte supports or threatens her contention that Kant had an abiding interest in developing a reformed metaphysics from 1781 onwards. The second is whether De Boer’s conception of the pure intellect and its place in Kant’s projected system of metaphysics captures the role of pure sensibility in the Analytic of Principles, rational physics and rational psychology. The third is whether one might accept the outline of this system as De Boer develops it while still holding that it is more accurate to characterize it as revolution rather than reform.
Kant and his German Contemporaries
Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics, 2019
Kant and his German Contemporaries
While there is a broad consensus that Kant models the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason on... more While there is a broad consensus that Kant models the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason on aspects of Wolff's system of philosophy, scholars have taken different views about the significance of this fact. When Erik Adickes comments on Kant's ability to "fill old bottles with new wine", for example, he means to fault Kant for presenting his arguments in a form that is singularly unhelpful for understanding their content. 1 Adickes' attitude toward the structure of the Critique echoes Schopenhauer's derision decades earlier of Kant's obsession with "systematicity" and has been echoed in the many decades since by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. 2 Others, most notably Georgio Tonelli, have argued that one cannot approach the content of the Critique without first understanding its form and that this form is borrowed largely from the conceptual and structure conventions common to the logic books of Kant's contemporaries, a tradition that bears the stamp of Wolff's influence more than that of any other thinker. 3 With respect to the Transcendental Logic, the standard reading, drawn from Tonelli and endorsed prominently by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, is that this portion of the Critique "replicates the traditional division of logic textbooks into three sections on concepts, judgments, and inferences". 4 More specifically, the first and second books of the Transcendental Analytic (the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles) are thought to provide the analogue in transcendental logic to traditional accounts of concepts formation and judgments respectively, while the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic (the Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason) is thought to provide the analogue in transcendental logic to traditional accounts of inference. 5 While it is undeniable that these parts of the Transcendental Logic contain elements that are similar to the accounts of concept formation, judgment, and inference one finds in the logic books of the Wolffian tradition, it seems to me that these similarities are largely incidental to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. One reason to think this is that the basic structure of this part of the Critique is not governed by the the single tripartite division these scholars reference but by two bipartite divisions, the analytic-dialectic division and the "two books and their various
Kantian Review, 2019
This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of... more This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius’ account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant’s arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius’ and Meier’s arguments for the immortality of the soul fail to anticipate the most important aspect of their Kantian counterparts. Developing the non-evidentialist features of Basedow’s account of belief, I distinguish it from its Pascalian and Jamesian relatives and argue that it is the clearest antecedent to Kant’s arguments for the first and second postulates. Finally, I consider the development of Kant’s account of belief after the first Critique and discuss the broader implications of my analysis.
Kantian Review, 2011
Hume's account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical ... more Hume's account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical philosophy is to be successful. But from Kant's time to the present, Hume's denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects, a denial that relies heavily on his account of causation, has also been regarded as a forerunner to Kant's critique of metaphysics. After identifying reasons for rejecting Wayne Waxman's recent account of Kant's debt to Hume, I present my own, more modest account of this debt, an account that seeks to unite the two very different pictures of Kant's relationship to Hume sketched above.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2012
664025, which differs in the standard ways (formatting, pagination, small grammatical corrections... more 664025, which differs in the standard ways (formatting, pagination, small grammatical corrections, etc.) from the draft. SKEPTICISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC † Brian A. Chance Kant's response to skepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. Instead, the dominant view since Kant's own time has been that this response is fairly straightforward. Skeptics deny various claims to cognition that Kant affirms. Some of these claims concern the existence of the external world, others the existence of objectively necessary causal relations, and others still the more general possibility of synthetic a priori cognition. And since Kant's response to these denials-whether in the Refutation of Idealism, the Second Analogy, or the Transcendental Analytic more generally-is to show that each is unjustified, his response to skepticism is typically thought to be entirely negative. Moreover, since all of these denials have, at different times, been attributed to Hume, it is often supposed that Kant's response to skepticism reduces without remainder to his response to Hume. Aspects of this view have recently been challenged by Michael Forster and Paul Guyer. 1 On their view, Hume is not the sole focus of Kant's anti-skeptical arguments, and external world skepticism was never a central target of the Critique. Rather, the Critique is an attempt to provide critical responses to two distinct skeptical threats, only one of which can be attributed to Hume. The first is a skeptical denial of a priori principles of cognition that Kant attempts to † Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason use the standard A/B format to refer to the pages of the first (A) and second (B) editions. Citations from Kant's other works use the volume number and pagination of the Kant's gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy of the Sciences. 29 vols. (Berlin, 1900-). I have used the translations of Kant's works listed in the bibliography, in some cases with slight modifications. All other translations are my own.
Bioethics
This essay develops a Kantian approach to the permissibility of biomedical physical, cognitive, a... more This essay develops a Kantian approach to the permissibility of biomedical physical, cognitive, and moral enhancement. Kant holds that human beings have an imperfect duty to promote their physical, cognitive, and moral perfection. While an agent's individual circumstances may limit the means she may permissibly use to enhance herself, whether biomedically or otherwise, I argue (1) that biomedical means of enhancing oneself are, generally speaking, both permissible and meritorious from a Kantian perspective. Despite often being equally permissible, I also argue (2) that enhancing oneself by more traditional means is, generally speaking, more meritorious (and involves the display of more virtue) than enhancing oneself by biomedical means. Nevertheless, since Kant does not fault agents for acting less meritoriously (or for displaying less virtue) than they otherwise could, I also argue (3) that those who opt for permissible biomedical enhancement over more traditional forms are not blameworthy for doing so. I also consider and reject several objections to these claims, including that biomedical enhancements (1) are too passive to count as actions by the agent who enhances herself, (2) involve a failure of the agent to treat her humanity as an end in itself or to show proper respect for her dignity, (3) might be undertaken on the basis of motives that undermine their permissibility, (4) are likely to exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities in ways that do the same, and (5) in their moral form are incompatible with Kant's conception of duty and human freedom.
Kant Yearbook, 2015
This paper attempts to shed light on three related issues that bear directly on our understanding... more This paper attempts to shed light on three related issues that bear directly on our understanding of Locke and Kant. The first is whether Kant believes Locke merely anticipates his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or also believes Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition. The second is what we as readers of Kant and Locke should think about Kant’s view whatever it turns out to be, and the third is the nature of Kant’s justification for the comparison he draws between his philosophy and Locke’s. I argue (1) that Kant believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition, (2) that the best justification for Kant’s claim draws on Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowledge, (3) that the arguments against this claim developed by Carson, Allison, and Newman fail to undermine it, and (4) that Kant’s own justification for his claim is quite different from what many comm...
The Review of Metaphysics, 2007
Kantian Review, 2019
This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant's account of belief draws on the views of... more This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant's account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius's account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant's distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant's arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius's and Meier's arguments for the immortality of the soul fail to anticipate the most important aspect of their Kantian counterparts. Developing the non-evidentialist features of Basedow's account of belief, I distinguish it from its Pascalian and Jamesian relatives and argue that it is the clearest antecedent to Kant's arguments for the first and second postulates. Finally, I consider the development of Kant's account of belief after the first Critique in light of the foregoing, and discuss the broader implications of my analysis.
In this chapter we explore the importance of the Pantheism Controversy for the evolution of Kant’... more In this chapter we explore the importance of the Pantheism Controversy for the evolution of Kant’s so-called “Moral Argument” for the Highest Good and its postulates. After an initial discussion of the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason, we move on to the relationship between faith and reason in the Pantheism Controversy, Kant’s response to the Controversy in his 1786 “Orientation” Essay, Thomas Wizenmann’s criticisms of that essay, and finally to the Critique of Practical Reason. We argue that while Kant used the Pantheism Controversy to reset his account of the Highest Good, its treatment in the Orientation Essay was susceptible to the objections raised by Thomas Wizenmann, and thus in need of the further advances found in the Critique of Practical Reason.
In both his published works and lecture notes Kant distinguishes between Transcendental and Natur... more In both his published works and lecture notes Kant distinguishes between Transcendental and Natural Theology, associating the former with Deism and the latter with Theism. The purpose of this paper is to explore these distinctions, particularly as they are shaped by Kant’s engagement with Baumgarten’s Philosophical Theology.
Kant and his German Contemporaries (eds.) C. Dyck and F. Wunderlich. Cambridge UP (forthcoming)
It is often claimed that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is modeled on the Wolffian div... more It is often claimed that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is modeled on the Wolffian division of logic textbooks into sections on concepts, judgments, and inferences. While it is undeniable that the Transcendental Logic contains elements that are similar to the content of these sections, I believe these similarities are largely incidental to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In this essay, I offer an alternative and, I believe, more plausible account of Wolff’s influence on the structure of the Transcendental Logic, one that puts the focus on his empirical psychology rather than his logic. In particular, I argue that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is deeply indebted to a conception of purity that Wolff introduces in his empirical psychology and that this conception sheds more light on the overall structure of the Transcendental Logic than the accepted view. In section one, I outline two conceptions of purity found in Kant and trace them to similar views in Wolff. In section two, I turn to Kant’s views about logic as they are expressed in the Critique and argue that it is best to interpret Kant’s taxonomy of logic on its own terms rather than reading it through its terminological similarities to aspects of the Wolffian tradition. In section three, I argue that the second of the two conceptions of purity identified in section one is central to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In doing so, I argue against the widespread view that this section of the Critique is modeled solely on what Kant calls pure general logic as opposed to both pure and applied general logic. I then conclude by briefly reviewing my account and considering some of its broader implications for our understanding of Kant.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2012
Kant’s response to skepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, a... more Kant’s response to skepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian skepticism and locate Kant’s response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects of this response. The first is that Kant’s response to Pyrrhonian skepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume’s skepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian skepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian skepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic.
Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity
The importance of the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories) within Kant's syst... more The importance of the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories) within Kant's system of philosophy is undeniable. 1 They provide the basis not only for our synthetic a priori cognition of nature articulated in the Analytic of Principles of the first Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science but also for the claims about the supersensible that Kant argues are proper objects of rational belief in all three Critiques, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, and the essays "On the old saying that it may be good in theory but doesn't work in practice" and "What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff".
Kantian Review
I raise three questions relevant to De Boer’s overall project in Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics. Th... more I raise three questions relevant to De Boer’s overall project in Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics. The first is whether Kant’s 1799 open letter to Fichte supports or threatens her contention that Kant had an abiding interest in developing a reformed metaphysics from 1781 onwards. The second is whether De Boer’s conception of the pure intellect and its place in Kant’s projected system of metaphysics captures the role of pure sensibility in the Analytic of Principles, rational physics and rational psychology. The third is whether one might accept the outline of this system as De Boer develops it while still holding that it is more accurate to characterize it as revolution rather than reform.
Kant and his German Contemporaries
Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics, 2019
Kant and his German Contemporaries
While there is a broad consensus that Kant models the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason on... more While there is a broad consensus that Kant models the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason on aspects of Wolff's system of philosophy, scholars have taken different views about the significance of this fact. When Erik Adickes comments on Kant's ability to "fill old bottles with new wine", for example, he means to fault Kant for presenting his arguments in a form that is singularly unhelpful for understanding their content. 1 Adickes' attitude toward the structure of the Critique echoes Schopenhauer's derision decades earlier of Kant's obsession with "systematicity" and has been echoed in the many decades since by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. 2 Others, most notably Georgio Tonelli, have argued that one cannot approach the content of the Critique without first understanding its form and that this form is borrowed largely from the conceptual and structure conventions common to the logic books of Kant's contemporaries, a tradition that bears the stamp of Wolff's influence more than that of any other thinker. 3 With respect to the Transcendental Logic, the standard reading, drawn from Tonelli and endorsed prominently by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, is that this portion of the Critique "replicates the traditional division of logic textbooks into three sections on concepts, judgments, and inferences". 4 More specifically, the first and second books of the Transcendental Analytic (the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles) are thought to provide the analogue in transcendental logic to traditional accounts of concepts formation and judgments respectively, while the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic (the Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason) is thought to provide the analogue in transcendental logic to traditional accounts of inference. 5 While it is undeniable that these parts of the Transcendental Logic contain elements that are similar to the accounts of concept formation, judgment, and inference one finds in the logic books of the Wolffian tradition, it seems to me that these similarities are largely incidental to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. One reason to think this is that the basic structure of this part of the Critique is not governed by the the single tripartite division these scholars reference but by two bipartite divisions, the analytic-dialectic division and the "two books and their various
Kantian Review, 2019
This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of... more This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius’ account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant’s arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius’ and Meier’s arguments for the immortality of the soul fail to anticipate the most important aspect of their Kantian counterparts. Developing the non-evidentialist features of Basedow’s account of belief, I distinguish it from its Pascalian and Jamesian relatives and argue that it is the clearest antecedent to Kant’s arguments for the first and second postulates. Finally, I consider the development of Kant’s account of belief after the first Critique and discuss the broader implications of my analysis.
Kantian Review, 2011
Hume's account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical ... more Hume's account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical philosophy is to be successful. But from Kant's time to the present, Hume's denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects, a denial that relies heavily on his account of causation, has also been regarded as a forerunner to Kant's critique of metaphysics. After identifying reasons for rejecting Wayne Waxman's recent account of Kant's debt to Hume, I present my own, more modest account of this debt, an account that seeks to unite the two very different pictures of Kant's relationship to Hume sketched above.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2012
664025, which differs in the standard ways (formatting, pagination, small grammatical corrections... more 664025, which differs in the standard ways (formatting, pagination, small grammatical corrections, etc.) from the draft. SKEPTICISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC † Brian A. Chance Kant's response to skepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. Instead, the dominant view since Kant's own time has been that this response is fairly straightforward. Skeptics deny various claims to cognition that Kant affirms. Some of these claims concern the existence of the external world, others the existence of objectively necessary causal relations, and others still the more general possibility of synthetic a priori cognition. And since Kant's response to these denials-whether in the Refutation of Idealism, the Second Analogy, or the Transcendental Analytic more generally-is to show that each is unjustified, his response to skepticism is typically thought to be entirely negative. Moreover, since all of these denials have, at different times, been attributed to Hume, it is often supposed that Kant's response to skepticism reduces without remainder to his response to Hume. Aspects of this view have recently been challenged by Michael Forster and Paul Guyer. 1 On their view, Hume is not the sole focus of Kant's anti-skeptical arguments, and external world skepticism was never a central target of the Critique. Rather, the Critique is an attempt to provide critical responses to two distinct skeptical threats, only one of which can be attributed to Hume. The first is a skeptical denial of a priori principles of cognition that Kant attempts to † Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason use the standard A/B format to refer to the pages of the first (A) and second (B) editions. Citations from Kant's other works use the volume number and pagination of the Kant's gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy of the Sciences. 29 vols. (Berlin, 1900-). I have used the translations of Kant's works listed in the bibliography, in some cases with slight modifications. All other translations are my own.
Bioethics
This essay develops a Kantian approach to the permissibility of biomedical physical, cognitive, a... more This essay develops a Kantian approach to the permissibility of biomedical physical, cognitive, and moral enhancement. Kant holds that human beings have an imperfect duty to promote their physical, cognitive, and moral perfection. While an agent's individual circumstances may limit the means she may permissibly use to enhance herself, whether biomedically or otherwise, I argue (1) that biomedical means of enhancing oneself are, generally speaking, both permissible and meritorious from a Kantian perspective. Despite often being equally permissible, I also argue (2) that enhancing oneself by more traditional means is, generally speaking, more meritorious (and involves the display of more virtue) than enhancing oneself by biomedical means. Nevertheless, since Kant does not fault agents for acting less meritoriously (or for displaying less virtue) than they otherwise could, I also argue (3) that those who opt for permissible biomedical enhancement over more traditional forms are not blameworthy for doing so. I also consider and reject several objections to these claims, including that biomedical enhancements (1) are too passive to count as actions by the agent who enhances herself, (2) involve a failure of the agent to treat her humanity as an end in itself or to show proper respect for her dignity, (3) might be undertaken on the basis of motives that undermine their permissibility, (4) are likely to exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities in ways that do the same, and (5) in their moral form are incompatible with Kant's conception of duty and human freedom.
Kant Yearbook, 2015
This paper attempts to shed light on three related issues that bear directly on our understanding... more This paper attempts to shed light on three related issues that bear directly on our understanding of Locke and Kant. The first is whether Kant believes Locke merely anticipates his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or also believes Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition. The second is what we as readers of Kant and Locke should think about Kant’s view whatever it turns out to be, and the third is the nature of Kant’s justification for the comparison he draws between his philosophy and Locke’s. I argue (1) that Kant believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition, (2) that the best justification for Kant’s claim draws on Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowledge, (3) that the arguments against this claim developed by Carson, Allison, and Newman fail to undermine it, and (4) that Kant’s own justification for his claim is quite different from what many comm...
The Review of Metaphysics, 2007
Kantian Review, 2019
This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant's account of belief draws on the views of... more This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant's account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius's account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant's distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant's arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius's and Meier's arguments for the immortality of the soul fail to anticipate the most important aspect of their Kantian counterparts. Developing the non-evidentialist features of Basedow's account of belief, I distinguish it from its Pascalian and Jamesian relatives and argue that it is the clearest antecedent to Kant's arguments for the first and second postulates. Finally, I consider the development of Kant's account of belief after the first Critique in light of the foregoing, and discuss the broader implications of my analysis.
In this chapter we explore the importance of the Pantheism Controversy for the evolution of Kant’... more In this chapter we explore the importance of the Pantheism Controversy for the evolution of Kant’s so-called “Moral Argument” for the Highest Good and its postulates. After an initial discussion of the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason, we move on to the relationship between faith and reason in the Pantheism Controversy, Kant’s response to the Controversy in his 1786 “Orientation” Essay, Thomas Wizenmann’s criticisms of that essay, and finally to the Critique of Practical Reason. We argue that while Kant used the Pantheism Controversy to reset his account of the Highest Good, its treatment in the Orientation Essay was susceptible to the objections raised by Thomas Wizenmann, and thus in need of the further advances found in the Critique of Practical Reason.
In both his published works and lecture notes Kant distinguishes between Transcendental and Natur... more In both his published works and lecture notes Kant distinguishes between Transcendental and Natural Theology, associating the former with Deism and the latter with Theism. The purpose of this paper is to explore these distinctions, particularly as they are shaped by Kant’s engagement with Baumgarten’s Philosophical Theology.
Kant and his German Contemporaries (eds.) C. Dyck and F. Wunderlich. Cambridge UP (forthcoming)
It is often claimed that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is modeled on the Wolffian div... more It is often claimed that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is modeled on the Wolffian division of logic textbooks into sections on concepts, judgments, and inferences. While it is undeniable that the Transcendental Logic contains elements that are similar to the content of these sections, I believe these similarities are largely incidental to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In this essay, I offer an alternative and, I believe, more plausible account of Wolff’s influence on the structure of the Transcendental Logic, one that puts the focus on his empirical psychology rather than his logic. In particular, I argue that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is deeply indebted to a conception of purity that Wolff introduces in his empirical psychology and that this conception sheds more light on the overall structure of the Transcendental Logic than the accepted view. In section one, I outline two conceptions of purity found in Kant and trace them to similar views in Wolff. In section two, I turn to Kant’s views about logic as they are expressed in the Critique and argue that it is best to interpret Kant’s taxonomy of logic on its own terms rather than reading it through its terminological similarities to aspects of the Wolffian tradition. In section three, I argue that the second of the two conceptions of purity identified in section one is central to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In doing so, I argue against the widespread view that this section of the Critique is modeled solely on what Kant calls pure general logic as opposed to both pure and applied general logic. I then conclude by briefly reviewing my account and considering some of its broader implications for our understanding of Kant.
This is a draft translation of chapter 1 of Otto Liebmann’s Kant und die Epigonen. The final vers... more This is a draft translation of chapter 1 of Otto Liebmann’s Kant und die Epigonen. The final version, which includes many useful editorial comments, was published in Sebastian Luft (ed.) The Neo-Kantian Reader: An Anthology of Key Texts from Classical Neo-Kantianism (Routledge Press, 2015)