Bent Flyvbjerg | University of Oxford (original) (raw)

Books by Bent Flyvbjerg

Penguin Random House. Named a Best Book of the Year by The Economist, The Financial Times, Forbes, Inc. Magazine, CEO Magazine, Morningstar, Business Leader, Redefining Energy, and more., 2023

“This book is important, timely, instructive, and entertaining. What more could you ask for?” —Da... more “This book is important, timely, instructive, and entertaining. What more could you ask for?” —Daniel Kahneman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics and author of Thinking, Fast and Slow

“A wise, vivid, and unforgettable combination of inspiring storytelling with decades of practical research and experience . . . Everyone who deals with large projects is already desperate to read this book. The rest of us will take great pleasure in learning from it anyway.” —Tim Harford, author of The Data Detective

“Having researched the properties of planning errors, I am confident that nobody has studied the topic more broadly and deeply than Bent Flyvbjerg. His focus ranges from the Olympic Games to the renovation of your doghouse.” —Nassim Nicholas Taleb, distinguished professor of risk engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, and author of the Incerto series

“This book distills the best scientific advice on planning big projects. And it is arguably the bargain of the century. For a few dollars you can tap into thousands of dollars of insights in executive-education classrooms—and if you happen to be a CEO or head of state, the savings will quickly run into the billions.” —Philip Tetlock, co-author of Superforecasting

“If we’re to make it through these next few decades, we’re going to have to build a lot of stuff—and we’re going to have to do it cheaply and fast. Here’s a very useful handbook!” —Bill McKibben, author of The Flag, the Cross, and the Station Wagon

“Flyvbjerg’s study of big construction projects worldwide has led him to formulate the iron law of megaprojects: over budget, over time, under benefits, over and over again. His deep understanding of why big projects fail—and occasionally succeed—makes this book a truly fascinating read. There’s a practical payoff, too: a toolbox with eleven smart heuristics for better project leadership that every planner who wants to succeed should know.” —Gerd Gigerenzer, author of Gut Feelings

Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. ... more Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multibillion-dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be essential reading in its field for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians, journalists and interested citizens.

The ambition for this inaugural edition of The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management is to be... more The ambition for this inaugural edition of The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management is to become the ultimate source for state-of-the-art scholarship in the emerging field of megaproject management. The book offers a rigorous, research-oriented, up-to-date academic view of the discipline based on high-quality data and strong theory. Until lately, the literature in this new field was scattered over a large number of publications and disciplines making it difficult to obtain an overview of the history, key issues, and core readings. Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings, Vols. I-II (2014) assembled the key historical texts in the field. Now the Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management has been designed to provide the most important contemporary readings. Taken together, the two books are intended to map out the best of what is worth reading in the megaproject management literature, past and present.

Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the gr... more Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the growing body of research on megaproject planning and management along with an original introduction by the editor, Bent Flyvbjerg. The leading and most cited authority in the field, Flyvbjerg has used crowdsourcing and 25 years of experience to cherry-pick from several hundred articles and books the writings that define the field. This volume will be an indispensable source for those wishing to speak with authority about how megaprojects are prepared, delivered, and fought over. The target audience is students, academics, practitioners, and media pundits alike, as well as communities affected by megaprojects.

Back cover text: Real Social Science presents a new, hands-on approach to social inquiry. The the... more Back cover text: Real Social Science presents a new, hands-on approach to social inquiry. The theoretical and methodological ideas behind the book, inspired by Aristotelian phronesis, represent an original perspective within the social sciences, and this volume gives readers for the first time a set of studies exemplifying what applied phronesis looks like in practice. The reflexive analysis of values and power gives new meaning to the impact of research on policy and practice. Real Social Science is a major step forward in a novel and thriving field of research. This book will benefit scholars, researchers, and students who want to make a difference in practice, not just in the academy. Its message will make it essential reading for students and academics across the social sciences.

Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects ... more Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects and suggest recommendations for a more effective, efficient and democratic approach. Authors from different scientific disciplines address various aspects of the decision-making process, such as management characteristics and cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation and competition and institutions. The subject matter is highly diverse, but certain questions remain at the forefront. For example, how do we deal with protracted preparation processes, how do we tackle risks and uncertainties, and how can we best divide the risks and responsibilities among the private and public players throughout the different phases of the project? - Presenting a state-of-the-art overview, based on experiences and visions of authors from Europe and North America, this unique book will be of interest to practitioners of large-scale project management, politicians, public officials and private organisations involved in mega-project decision-making. It will also appeal to researchers, consultants and students dealing with substantial engineering projects, complex systems, project management and transport infrastructure.

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon ... more Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory, experience and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

Back cover text: Making Social Science Matter presents an exciting new approach to social science... more Back cover text: Making Social Science Matter presents an exciting new approach to social science, including theoretical argument, methodological guidelines, and examples of practical application. Why has social science failed in attempts to emulate natural science and produce normal theory? Bent Flyvbjerg argues that the strength of social science is in its rich, reflexive analysis of values and power, essential to the social and economic development of any society. Richly informed, powerfully argued, and clearly written, this book provides essential reading for all those in the social and behavioral sciences.

Back cover text: If the new fin de siècle marks a recurrence of the real, Bent Flyvbjerg’s Ration... more Back cover text: If the new fin de siècle marks a recurrence of the real, Bent Flyvbjerg’s Rationality and Power epitomizes that development and sets new standards for social and political inquiry. The Danish town of Aalborg is to Flyvbjerg what Florence was to Machiavelli: a laboratory for understanding the real workings of power, and for grasping what they mean to our more general concerns of social and political organization. Politics, administration, and planning are examined in ways that allow a rare, in-depth understanding. The reader witnesses, firsthand, the classic and endless drama which defines what modernity and democracy are and can be.

Papers by Bent Flyvbjerg

SBS Working Papers, 2024

The present paper is an update and extension of the "The Oxford Olympics Study 2016" (Flyvbjerg e... more The present paper is an update and extension of the "The Oxford Olympics Study 2016" (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016). We document that the Games remain costly and continue to have large cost overruns, to a degree that threatens their viability. The IOC is aware of the problem and has initiated reform. We assess the reforms and find: (a) Olympic costs are statistically significantly increasing; prior analyses did not show this trend; it is a step in the wrong direction. (b) Cost overruns were decreasing until 2008, but have increased since then; again a step in the wrong direction. (c) At present, the cost of Paris 2024 is USD 8.7 billion (2022 level) and cost overrun is 115% in real terms; this is not the less expensive Games that were promised. (d) Cost overruns are the norm for the Games, past, present, and future; they are the only project type that never delivered on budget, ever. We assess a new IOC policy of reducing cost by reusing existing venues instead of building new ones. We find that reuse did not have the desired effect for Tokyo 2020 and also looks ineffective for Paris 2024. Finally, we recommend that the Games look to other types of megaproject for better data, better forecasting, and how to generate the positive learning curves that are necessary for bringing costs and overrun down. Only if this happens are Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane 2032 likely to live up to the IOC’s intentions of a more affordable Games that more cities will want to host.

Nature NPJ Climate Action, 2024

Digitalization is a core component of the green transition. Today's focus is on quantifying and p... more Digitalization is a core component of the green transition. Today's focus is on quantifying and predicting the climate effects of digitalization through various life-cycle assessments and baseline scenario methodologies. Here we argue that this is a mistake. Most attempts at prediction are based on three implicit assumptions: (a) the digital carbon footprint can be quantified, (b) business-asusual with episodic change leading to a new era of stability, and (c) investments in digitalization will be delivered within the cost, timeframe, and benefits described in their business cases. We problematize each assumption within the context of digitalization and argue that the digital carbon footprint is inherently unpredictable. We build on uncertainty literature to show that even if you cannot predict, you can still mitigate. On that basis, we propose to rethink practice on the digital carbon footprint from prediction to mitigation.

Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 2021

Most cost-benefit analyses assume that the estimates of costs and benefits are more or less accur... more Most cost-benefit analyses assume that the estimates of costs and benefits are more or less accurate and unbiased. But what if, in reality, estimates are highly inaccurate and biased? Then the assumption that cost-benefit analysis is a rational way to improve resource allocation would be a fallacy. Based on the largest dataset of its kind, we test the assumption that cost and benefit estimates of public investments are accurate and unbiased. We find this is not the case with overwhelming statistical significance. We document the extent of cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and forecasting bias in public investments. We further assess whether such inaccuracies seriously distort effective resource allocation, which is found to be the case. We explain our findings in behavioral terms and explore their policy implications. Finally, we conclude that cost-benefit analysis of public investments stands in need of reform and we outline four steps to such reform.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012

Implementing large-scale information and communication technology (IT) projects carries large ris... more Implementing large-scale information and communication technology (IT) projects carries large risks and easily might disrupt operations, waste taxpayers’ money, and create negative publicity. Because of the high risks it is important that government leaders manage the attendant risks. We analysed the based on a sample of 1,355 public-sector IT projects. The sample included large-scale projects, on average the actual expenditure was $130 million and the average duration was 35 months. Our findings showed that the typical project had no cost overruns and took on average 24% longer than initially expected. However, comparing the risk distribution with the normative model of a thin tailed distribution, projects’ actual costs should fall within -30% and +25% of the budget in nearly 99 out of 100 projects. The data showed, however, that a staggering 18% of all projects are outliers with cost overruns >25%. Tests showed that the risk of outliers is even higher for standard software (24%...

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

ABSTRACT Ai vertici di Levi Strauss, quella di riorganizzare i sistemi IT era sembrata una buona ... more ABSTRACT Ai vertici di Levi Strauss, quella di riorganizzare i sistemi IT era sembrata una buona idea. L’azienda aveva fatto parecchia strada dalla sua fondazione nel XIX secolo ad opera di un commerciante tedesco di tessuti: nel 2003 era una grande azienda globale attiva in oltre 110 Paesi. La sua rete IT era invece antiquata, una commistione balcanica di sistemi informatici nazionali incompatibili tra loro. Si decise dunque di passare a un unico sistema SAP e a questo fine venne assunto un team di consulenti di Deloitte. I rischi apparivano contenuti: il budget previsto ammontava a meno di 5 milioni di dollari. Ma ben presto si scatenò l’inferno. Un cliente importante come Walmart pose la condizione che il sistema si interfacciasse con quello che gestiva la sua supply chain interna, creando ulteriori difficoltà. L’insufficienza delle procedure di reporting finanziario e di controllo interno quasi costrinse Levi Strauss a rivedere i risultati trimestrali e annuali. Nel corso della migrazione non fu possibile evadere gli ordini e i tre centri di distribuzione negli Stati Uniti rimasero chiusi per una settimana. Nel secondo trimestre del 2008 l’azienda inserì in bilancio una posta negativa di 192,5 milioni di dollari per compensare il progetto mal riuscito e il CIO, David Bergen, fu costretto a dimettersi.

Penguin Random House. Named a Best Book of the Year by The Economist, The Financial Times, Forbes, Inc. Magazine, CEO Magazine, Morningstar, Business Leader, Redefining Energy, and more., 2023

SBS Working Papers, 2024

Nature NPJ Climate Action, 2024

Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 2021

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011

The phronetic approach to social science as developed in Making Social Science Matter (Flyvbjerg ... more The phronetic approach to social science as developed in Making Social Science Matter (Flyvbjerg 2001), Making Political Science Matter (Schram and Caterino 2006) and Real Social Science (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012) argues for the application of practical wisdom in social science research that emerges from the development of applied expert knowledge. The collection of case studies in Real Social Science revealed a remarkable set of ‘tension points’ across different research projects that are crucial in bringing impact and change that flows from the research itself. From mega-projects to airport expansion, these tension points show extraordinary yet persistent contradictions (e.g. skewed cost-benefit analysis for megaprojects or ‘sustainable aviation’ in the UK) in policy making and practice that are elucidated through the phronetic approach. Conceived as ‘fault lines’, tension points can be ‘broken’ through sustained research that identifies them, problematizes them, and dev...

New Political Science, 2013

The British Journal of Sociology, 2013

Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 2010

Lock-in, the escalating commitment of decision makers to an ineffective course of action, has the... more Lock-in, the escalating commitment of decision makers to an ineffective course of action, has the potential to explain the large cost overruns in large-scale transportation infrastructure projects. Lock-in can occur both at the decision-making level (before the decision to build) and at the project level (after the decision to build) and can influence the extent of overruns in two ways. The first involves the ‘methodology’ of calculating cost overruns according to the ‘formal decision to build’. Due to lock-in, however, the ‘real decision to build’ is made much earlier in the decision-making process and the costs estimated at that stage are often much lower than those that are estimated at a later stage in the decision-making process, thus increasing cost overruns. The second way that lock-in can affect cost overruns is through ‘practice’. Although decisions about the project (design and implementation) need to be made, lock-in can lead to inefficient decisions that involve higher c...

Harvard Business Review, 2023

A study of some 16,000 major projects-from large buildings to bridges, dams, power stations, rock... more A study of some 16,000 major projects-from large buildings to bridges, dams, power stations, rockets, railroads, information technology systems, and even the Olympic Games-reveals a massive project-management problem. Only 8.5% of those projects were delivered on time and on budget, while a mere 0.5% were completed on time and on budget and produced the expected benefits. In other words, 99.5% of large projects failed to deliver as promised. Master architect Frank Gehry consistently defies those odds, producing projects of staggering beauty while meeting time and budget targets. This article reveals four lessons, gleaned from Gehry and his colleagues, for successfully managing big projects.

Infrastructure Economics and Policy: International Perspectives , 2022

Most cost-benefit analyses assume that the estimates of costs and benefits are more or less accur... more Most cost-benefit analyses assume that the estimates of costs and benefits are more or less accurate and unbiased. But what if, in reality, estimates of costs and benefits are highly inaccurate and biased? Then the assumption that cost-benefit analysis is a rational way to improve resource allocation would be a fallacy. Using the largest dataset of its kind, we test the assumption that cost and benefit estimates of infrastructure capital investments are accurate and unbiased. We find this is not the case with overwhelming statistical significance. We document the extent of cost overruns, demand shortfalls, and forecasting bias in infrastructure investments. We further assess whether such forecasting inaccuracies seriously distort effective resource allocation, which is found to be the case. We explain our findings in behavioral terms and explore their implications for infrastructure economics and policy. Finally, we conclude that cost-benefit analysis stands in need of reform, and we outline four steps to such reform.

Jonathan E. Hillman, ed., Is Asia Reconnecting? Essays on Asia's Infrastructure Contest (New York: Rowman and Littlefield with Center for Strategic & International Studies), Chapter 7, pp. 7-9., 2017

Low-quality infrastructure investments pose significant risk to the Chinese economy. Unless China... more Low-quality infrastructure investments pose significant risk to the Chinese economy. Unless China shifts to fewer and higher-quality infrastructure investments, the country is headed for an infrastructure-led national financial and economic crisis, which is likely to spread to the international economy.

With Albert O. Hirschman, project management scholarship has what it lacks the most: an eminent i... more With Albert O. Hirschman, project management scholarship has what it lacks the most: an eminent intellectual and social scientist who has thought long and hard about project management, and especially the management of large transformative projects. Cass Sunstein, co-author of Nudge and a key contributor to behavioral economics, distinguishes Hirschman as an early behavioral economist and says that his main contribution to project management, the book Development Projects Observed, "can plausibly be counted as a work in behavioral economics." This chapter tests Sunstein's claim by assessing Hirschman's work in major project management. The chapter asks what we can learn from Hirschman, as scholars, policy makers, and project leaders. The focus is on Hirschman's principle of the Hiding Hand, first described in Development Projects Observed, because this is rightly considered his largest idea on project management and one of his main contributions to economics and social science.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infras... more This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infrastructure projects. First, the paper identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure developments pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is massive cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large infrastructure projects with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance-structures, the latter being more important.

Et ud af seks store it-projekter går helt galt. Det er et af resultaterne fra en af de største in... more Et ud af seks store it-projekter går helt galt. Det er et af resultaterne fra en af de største internationale undersøgelser på området foretaget af forskere fra Oxford Universitet med danske Bent Flyvbjerg i spidsen. Med budget-overskridelser på de værste projekter på i gennemsnit 200% er it-projekter mere tilbøjelige til at køre af sporet end tilsvarende store byggeprojekter. Hvorfor er it-projekter så sårbare? Hvad gør man galt? Denne artikel bringes i samarbejde med Bent Flyvbjerg og ser nærmere på undersøgelsens resultater og konklusioner. Slutteligt giver artiklen en række anbefalinger til, hvordan man kan styre sit it-projekt sikkert i havn. Anbefalinger, som Taktika har udarbejdet i samarbejde med Økonomistyrelsen.

One out of ten IT projects go wrong. That is one of the results from one of the largest international studies in IT that exists, carried out by researchers at Oxford University, led by Bent Flyvbjerg. With cost overruns on the worst projects at 200% on average, IT projects are more likely to go off track than large construction projects. Why are IT projects so vulnerable? What is done wrong?

The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management, Apr 2017

Megaprojects are large, they are constantly growing ever larger, and more and more are being buil... more Megaprojects are large, they are constantly growing ever larger, and more and more are being built in what has been called the biggest investment boom in history. This chapter serves as an introduction to megaprojects, and to The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management. First, megaprojects are defined and the size of the global megaprojects business is estimated. Second, drivers of the megaproject boom are identified, including monumentalism and the technological sublime. Third, ten things you must know about megaprojects are detailed, from their tendency to suffer from uniqueness bias to their overexposure to black-swan events. Fourth, the "iron law of megaprojects" is identified as a main challenge to megaproject management: "Over budget, over time, under benefits, over and over again." Finally, the main structure of the Handbook is set out as covering the what, the why, and the how of megaproject management, in terms of the challenges, causes, and cures that students of megaprojects must decipher to better understand and better manage megaprojects.

Taken together, the works of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault highlight an essential tension i... more Taken together, the works of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault highlight an essential tension in modernity. This is the tension between the normative and the real, between what should be done and what is actually done. Understanding this tension is crucial to understanding modern democracy, what it is and what it could be. It has been argued that an effective way of making democracy stronger is to strengthen civil society. This article contains a comparative analysis of the central ideas of Habermas and Foucault as they pertain to the question of democracy and civil society. More specifically, the discourse ethics of Habermas is contrasted with the power analytics and ethics of Foucault evaluating their usefulness for those interested in understanding, and bringing about, democratic social change.

We live in an unprecedented era for humankind. Recently, for the first time ever, have the action... more We live in an unprecedented era for humankind. Recently, for the first time ever, have the actions of people become a threat on a global scale to their life. This is not only through nuclear disasters that may or may not happen but through changes in the global ecology that are happening. Earlier, on a human time scale the continuance or life on the planet was considered a constant rather than a question mark. No wonder, then, it has been said we live in a post-era: post-rational, post enlightenment, post-modern, post-foundationalist, post-structuralist. If any one phenomenon distinguishes the start or a new era and a post-condition, it is this: humans' newly achieved ability to effectively destroy their own sustenance. The world has become post-immortal; not in the sense that human life on the planet is necessarily mortal on the scale of human history, but rather that there is no longer any assurance of its immortality. We live in a world-aI-risk, where life has become contingent upon our own actions. In this unique situation the need has never been greater to skillfully pose, answer, and act upon simple value-rational questions like the following: (a) Where are we going? (b) Who gains, who loses? (c) Is this development desirable? (d) What should be done?

The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management; Listed on SSRN's Top-Ten download list for Financial Economics, FEN, Economics Research, Corporate Finance, Macroeconomics, Apr 2017

In this paper we characterise the propensity of big capital investments to systematically deliver... more In this paper we characterise the propensity of big capital investments to systematically deliver poor outcomes as “fragility,” a notion suggested by Nassim Taleb. A thing or system that is easily harmed by randomness is fragile. We argue that, contrary to their appearance, big capital investments break easily — i.e. deliver negative net present value — due to various sources of uncertainty that impact them during their long gestation, implementation, and operation periods. We do not refute the existence of economies of scale and scope. Instead we argue that big capital investments have a disproportionate (non-linear) exposure to uncertainties that deliver poor or negative returns above and beyond their economies of scale and scope. We further argue that to succeed, leaders of capital projects need to carefully consider where scaling pays off and where it does not. To automatically assume that "bigger is better," which is common in megaproject management, is a recipe for failure.

A main problem in the decision-making of major infrastructure projects is the high level of misin... more A main problem in the decision-making of major infrastructure projects is the high level of misinformation about costs decision-makers face in deciding whether to build the project. Reduced public funds and misallocation thereof were the main reasons for the revival of private financing in infrastructure planning. A first systematic study into the relation between project ownership and cost performance of transport infrastructure projects showed that the problem may not be the difference between private and public projects but a certain type of public ownership, i.e. state-owned enterprises. This study concluded that it is not ownership in itself that matters in project performance. Ownership does not reveal which parties are responsible for construction, operation, or maintenance. Consequently, we cannot draw any conclusions on whether private parties’ involvement results in better project performance. Based on a case study of the HSL-South, a high-speed railway line in the Netherlands, we found that the contracting strategy and the amount of private financing are better determinants for project performance.

Saïd Business School Working Paper, 2022

Heuristics are fast and frugal rules of thumb, used to simplify complex decisions. First, the pap... more Heuristics are fast and frugal rules of thumb, used to simplify complex decisions. First, the paper identifies two schools of thought in heuristics scholarship, one of positive and one of negative heuristics. Second, the paper explains why heuristics work, based on Occam's razor. Third, it outlines five steps for teasing out project leaders' tacit heuristics, illustrating each step with real-life examples. The five steps emphasize the role of Aristotelian phronesis in developing effective heuristics. Fourth, the paper gives examples of project leaders who have deliberated about their heuristics and made them explicit. Finally, the author presents his own heuristics to illustrate in detail how heuristics can work in practice to improve project leadership. Readers are encouraged to develop and improve their own heuristics, and guidance is given for how to do this.