Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra | University of Oxford (original) (raw)

Papers by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2022

Jamin Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking is one of the most important books on truthmaking, full of i... more Jamin Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking is one of the most important books on truthmaking, full of important ideas from beginning to end. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Asay's attack on the explanation-first truthmaking. Explanation-first truthmaking is the explanatory project of explaining why truths are true. This is in contrast with ontology-first truthmaking, the project defended by Asay, and which is the project of answering the fundamental ontological question “What is there?”. Asay thinks explanation-first truthmaking should be abandoned because (a) it is problematic and (b) it offers no benefits over those of ontology-first truthmaking. In this brief paper I argue that he has not established the problematicity of explanation-first truthmaking, and that explanation-first truthmaking offers benefits over ontology-first truthmaking.

Quaderns De Filosofia, Mar 4, 2014

Resum: El nominalisme té almenys dues varietats. Una consisteix en el rebuig dels objectes abstra... more Resum: El nominalisme té almenys dues varietats. Una consisteix en el rebuig dels objectes abstractes; l'altra, en el rebuig dels universals. Les dues varietats del nominalisme són independents entre si i cadascuna pot defensar-se consistentment sense l'altra, per bé que comparteixen algunes motivacions i arguments. Aquest article exposa les teories nominalistes de les dues varietats.

Philosophical Studies, 2020

1. Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full... more 1. Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full answer to this question in this paper. But I shall give a partial answer to it. In particular, Rosen (2006) has distinguished a certain conception of metaphysical necessity, which he calls the Non-Standard conception, which, together with the assumption that all natures or essences are Kantian, is supposed to entail that many laws of ontology are metaphysically contingent (Rosen 2006: 20, 27).1 Now, the argument Rosen gives supports the conclusion that all categorical laws of ontology are contingent. I shall argue that the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian are incompatible with each other and that, if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology, and I shall identify such a law. Thus my contribution to the question of the title of the paper will be that not all categorical ontological laws can be contingent if the Non-Standard conception is true. In Section 2 I shall explain what I mean by the categorical laws of ontology, and I shall explain the Non-Standard conception of metaphysical necessity and the Kantian character of natures. In Section 3 I shall argue for the incompatibility of the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian, and in Section 4 I shall argue that if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology. Section 5 is a brief conclusion. 2. By the laws of ontology, or ontological laws, I will understand synthetic a priori claims about basic matters of ontology that are standardly regarded as metaphysically necessary. Such laws entail the existence of a distinctive sort of object-perhaps conditionally on the existence of things of a more basic sort. This is, indeed, Rosen's conception of an ontological law (2006: 20).2 Examples of putative categorical ontological laws (as opposed to conditional ones) are the following claims: There are 1 Rosen does not make clear whether he endorses either the Non-Standard conception or the thesis that all natures are Kantian. 2 Rosen says that the epistemological status of such claims is uncertain but that they are 'palpably more apriori than aposteriori' (2006: 20). I do not know what to make of this. But it does not matter. All the ontological laws considered in this paper (most of which will be Rosen's own examples) will be "palpably" a priori ontological laws. But surely what is palpably a priori is palpably more a priori than a posteriori-whatever that means. So my examples will satisfy Rosen's characterization of the epistemological status of ontological laws.

Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 2018

In the 1750s Optimism, the Leibnizian doctrine that the actual world is the best possible world, ... more In the 1750s Optimism, the Leibnizian doctrine that the actual world is the best possible world, popularised by Pope in 1733 in his Essay on Man, was a hot topic. In 1759 Kant wrote and published a brief essay defending Optimism, Attempt at some Reflections on Optimism. Kant’s aim in this essay is to establish that there is one and only one best possible world. In particular, he argues against the claim that, for every possible world, there is a possible world better than it and against the claim that there are two or more equally good possible worlds that are better than all the rest. Although it is not clear why, Kant was later dissatisfied with his essay. In this article I shall reconstruct, discuss, and evaluate Kant’s arguments. My evaluation will be negative, and so I think Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with his essay.

Philosophy, 2018

Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing... more Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument's premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question van Inwagen wanted to answer.

Analytic Philosophy , 2018

The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply funda... more The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the Laser should replace the Razor. Here we argue that the Laser cannot replace the Razor.

Philosophical Studies, 2017

What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams i... more What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams in 1979, for the possibility of indiscernibles based on the possibility of almost indiscernibles. The argument is that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible, but since almost indiscernible are possible, indiscernibles are possible. The argument seems to be an improvement over the mere appeal to intuitions, like that suggested by Max Black, that situations in which there are indiscernibles are possible, for the argument purports to give us a reason that indiscernibles are possible. In this paper I shall assess the argument by examining whether there is support for the conditional premise that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible. I shall argue that there are reasons to think that either the premise lacks support or almost indiscernibles are dispensable. If the premise lacks support, the argument does not establish the possibility of almost indiscernibles; if almost indiscernibles are dispensable, the argument is not needed to establish the possibility of indiscernibles.

Inquiry, 2017

Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has tra... more Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals.

Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1 (3), September 2015, pp. 517-534.

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguin... more The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.

Published in Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed), Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, 2018

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, o... more Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6).

Analysis, Apr 2015

This is a reply to Byeong-Uk Yi who argued that my Resemblance Nominalism fails to account for se... more This is a reply to Byeong-Uk Yi who argued that my Resemblance Nominalism fails to account for sentences featuring abstract nouns like (1) Carmine resembles vermillion more than it resembles French blue and (2) Scarlet is a colour. I accept his criticism of what I said in my book on Resemblance Nominalism about (1), but then I go on to show how (1) can be accounted for. I reject his criticism of what I said in my book about (2). I also show how Resemblance Nominalism can account for other sentences featuring abstract nouns.

"Locke and Leibniz on substance", edited by T. Stoneham and P. Lodge, Routledge. , 2015

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of sub... more In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates. The aim of this paper is to clarify Leibniz’s notion of substance in the Discourse with a view to explaining how that definition successfully distinguishes between substances and accidents.

Analysis (2015) 75 (1): 3-8. First published online December 1, 2014 doi:10.1093/analys/anu121

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. In sec... more In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. In section 2 we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In section 3 we shall argue that, even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and they invalidate the logic that Mlne uses in his proof. In section 4 we shall argue that Milne’s proof requires, contrarily to what he thinks, an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In section 5 we shall point out that there are two important disimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2013

The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of Socrates is white ultimately involves only... more The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of Socrates is white ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of Socrates resembles Plato , and Socrates and Aristotle those of Socrates resembles Aristotle . But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle and Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle have the same truthmakers, namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. I shall argue that the resemblance nominalist can say that those conjunctions have the same truthmakers but these truthmakers make them true in different ways. I shall also use this view to account for the truthmakers of propositions like Socrates is white , and respond to previous objections by Cian Dorr and Jessica Wilson. I Resemblance nominalism is a theory according to which there are no universals and no tropes. What theories of universals and tropes explain by invoking universals and tropes, resemblance nominalism explains by invoking resembling particulars and sets, but sets, although abstract, are particular nevertheless. (Thus resemblance nominalism is nominalism in the traditional sense of the word, in that it rejects universals, not in the modern sense of the word, according to which nominalism entails the rejection of abstract objects.)

The Puzzle of Existence - Why is there something rather than nothing (edited by Tyron Goldschmidt), 2013

The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establi... more The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument.
In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and Stoneham 2005). I shall defend the subtraction argument* from Alexander Paseau’s (2006) objection that because a crucial premise of the subtraction argument* may have no plausibility independent from Metaphysical Nihilism, the subtraction argument* is not suasive. Although Paseau focuses on the subtraction argument*, I shall point out that Efird and Stoneham could reply to Paseau’s objection in the same way. Thus there are (at least) two suasive versions of the subtraction argument that establish Metaphysical Nihilism. But are those two arguments equally good? I shall argue that the subtraction argument* is preferable to Efird and Stoneham’s argument.

Critica, Apr 2013

This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exc... more This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections.

The Leibniz Review, Dec 2012

Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but ... more Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this seems to be a mistake and the real addressee is thought to be Ludovico Casati, nephew of Paolo Casati, the Jesuit mathematician. The letter, reproduced in the Berlin’s Academy edition of Leibniz’s works, was first published by Gerhardt in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1892 (Gerhardt 1892: 53–54). It also appears in Robinet’s Iter Italicum (Robinet 1988: 134–35). But neither Gerhardt nor Robinet provide a philosophical discussion of the letter, and I am not aware of any other philosophical discussion of it. Furthermore, as far as I know, the letter has never been translated into any language. Thus I shall here provide a transcription (from A 2 2 288–89) and a translation of the letter into English, and a philosophical discussion of its treatment of the Identity of Indiscernibles.

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 2011

Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2022

Quaderns De Filosofia, Mar 4, 2014

Philosophical Studies, 2020

Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 2018

Philosophy, 2018

Analytic Philosophy , 2018

Philosophical Studies, 2017

Inquiry, 2017

Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1 (3), September 2015, pp. 517-534.

Published in Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed), Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, 2018

Analysis, Apr 2015

"Locke and Leibniz on substance", edited by T. Stoneham and P. Lodge, Routledge. , 2015

Analysis (2015) 75 (1): 3-8. First published online December 1, 2014 doi:10.1093/analys/anu121

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2013

The Puzzle of Existence - Why is there something rather than nothing (edited by Tyron Goldschmidt), 2013

Critica, Apr 2013

The Leibniz Review, Dec 2012

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 2011

Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century,... more Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism about properties and provides tools to understand how they developed in the history of Western Philosophy. All essays are new and are written by experts on the topic, and they advance the discussion about nominalism to a new level.

Original work on a key idea in the history of philosophy Written with clarity and pr... more Original work on a key idea in the history of philosophy
Written with clarity and precision

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra presents an original study of the place and role of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's philosophy. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles rules out numerically distinct but perfectly similar things; Leibniz derived it from more basic principles and used it to establish important philosophical theses. Rodriguez-Pereyra aims to establish what Leibniz meant by the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, what his arguments for and from it were, and to assess those arguments and Leibniz's claims about the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. He argues that Leibniz had a very strong version of the principle, according to which no possibilia (whether or not they belong to the same possible world) are intrinsically perfectly similar, where this excludes things that differ in magnitude alone. The book discusses Leibniz's arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles in the Meditation on the Principle of the Individual, the Discourse on Metaphysics, Notationes Generales, Primary Truths, the letter to Casati of 1689, the correspondence with Clarke, as well as the use of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's arguments against the Cartesian conception of the material world, atoms, absolute space and time, the Lockean conception of the mind as a tabula rasa, and freedom of indifference. Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that the Identity of Indiscernibles was a central but inessential principle of Leibniz's philosophy.

Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only p... more Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the dormant alternative theory of resemblance nominalism, showing first that it can withstand the attacks of such eminent opponents as Goodman and Armstrong, and then that there are reasons to prefer it to its rival theories. The clarity and rigour of his arguments will challenge metaphysicians to rethink their views on properties.

A collection of essays in metaphysics to honour D. H Mellor