Jules Salomone-Sehr | University of Oxford (original) (raw)
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Papers by Jules Salomone-Sehr
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared ... more What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities’ joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who de...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared ... more What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities’ joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who determines the content of a plan and attributes the different parts of that plan to a collection of agents. The second does away with the planner and involves a roughly Darwinian selection of patterns of activity. Both families of mechanisms enable us to act together even in the absence of shared intentions.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows th... more Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normativ...
Picture yourself at a Parisian café, gazing at people walking down the street. At first, they see... more Picture yourself at a Parisian café, gazing at people walking down the street. At first, they seem to be typical Parisians going about their own business. Until you realize, as you spot cameras, that they are all actors on a movie set. You thought you were in the midst of many individual actions, but it is now clear that each actor is playing their part in a different kind of activity: a shared activity. Our capacity for shared agency is fundamental to our social lives. We make movies, sit in Parliament, and fight pandemics together. In my thesis, I first offer a novel theory of what is required for collections of activities to count as shared. I then develop an account of cooperativeness, i.e. the disposition to think and act as a good partner in shared activity. What makes it the case that the actors in the Parisian street are engaged in more than mere parallel individual actions? From the café, it was—at first—impossible to distinguish the actors from real flâneurs. Such examples...
Ethics, 2022
This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shar... more This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to φ are neither necessary nor sufficient for φ to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, in turn, lead to my positive proposal. People cooperate, I argue, just in case their activities are coordinated in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, 2022
Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reason... more Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reasoning imprints our actions with the distinctive mark of rational full-blooded agency. This entry enquires into what practical reasoning consists in. First, we lay out four basic criteria—mentality, evaluation, practicality, attributability—that adequate accounts of practical reasoning ought to satisfy in order to capture essential features of the phenomenon. Specifically, practical deliberation is a by and large conscious mental process answerable to a range of evaluative standards. Moreover, this process is aimed at settling what to do. Lastly, reasoning does not merely occur to the practical reasoner but is instead something that they do.
We then turn to John Broome’s influential account of reasoning which satisfies the aforementioned criteria. On his view, practical reasoning is the rule-guided activity by which we bring our mental attitudes (especially our intentions) to satisfy requirements of practical rationality. We then focus on three challenges to Broome’s account that have been the topic of recent debate. First, we discuss the role that autobiographical considerations of the sort ‘I’d like to φ’, or ‘I intend to φ’ might play in practical reasoning. Broome, perhaps, is wrong in giving them very little place. Second, we discuss Jonathan Dancy’s proposal that practical reasoning does not conclude in the formation of intentions but in action. Third, we consider whether assessments of rationality can come in degrees and why we should care about satisfying rational requirements in the first place.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared ... more What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities’ joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who de...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared ... more What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities’ joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who determines the content of a plan and attributes the different parts of that plan to a collection of agents. The second does away with the planner and involves a roughly Darwinian selection of patterns of activity. Both families of mechanisms enable us to act together even in the absence of shared intentions.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows th... more Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normativ...
Picture yourself at a Parisian café, gazing at people walking down the street. At first, they see... more Picture yourself at a Parisian café, gazing at people walking down the street. At first, they seem to be typical Parisians going about their own business. Until you realize, as you spot cameras, that they are all actors on a movie set. You thought you were in the midst of many individual actions, but it is now clear that each actor is playing their part in a different kind of activity: a shared activity. Our capacity for shared agency is fundamental to our social lives. We make movies, sit in Parliament, and fight pandemics together. In my thesis, I first offer a novel theory of what is required for collections of activities to count as shared. I then develop an account of cooperativeness, i.e. the disposition to think and act as a good partner in shared activity. What makes it the case that the actors in the Parisian street are engaged in more than mere parallel individual actions? From the café, it was—at first—impossible to distinguish the actors from real flâneurs. Such examples...
Ethics, 2022
This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shar... more This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to φ are neither necessary nor sufficient for φ to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, in turn, lead to my positive proposal. People cooperate, I argue, just in case their activities are coordinated in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, 2022
Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reason... more Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reasoning imprints our actions with the distinctive mark of rational full-blooded agency. This entry enquires into what practical reasoning consists in. First, we lay out four basic criteria—mentality, evaluation, practicality, attributability—that adequate accounts of practical reasoning ought to satisfy in order to capture essential features of the phenomenon. Specifically, practical deliberation is a by and large conscious mental process answerable to a range of evaluative standards. Moreover, this process is aimed at settling what to do. Lastly, reasoning does not merely occur to the practical reasoner but is instead something that they do.
We then turn to John Broome’s influential account of reasoning which satisfies the aforementioned criteria. On his view, practical reasoning is the rule-guided activity by which we bring our mental attitudes (especially our intentions) to satisfy requirements of practical rationality. We then focus on three challenges to Broome’s account that have been the topic of recent debate. First, we discuss the role that autobiographical considerations of the sort ‘I’d like to φ’, or ‘I intend to φ’ might play in practical reasoning. Broome, perhaps, is wrong in giving them very little place. Second, we discuss Jonathan Dancy’s proposal that practical reasoning does not conclude in the formation of intentions but in action. Third, we consider whether assessments of rationality can come in degrees and why we should care about satisfying rational requirements in the first place.