William Child | University of Oxford (original) (raw)
Papers by William Child
Wittgenstein on Meaning
The Philosophical Review, 1989
Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON ... more Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING. By COLIN MCGINN. Oxford, England, Basil Blackwell, 1984. Pp. viii, 202. The book is part of the enormous ...
Le Pore, E. , "Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson
Mind, 1987
Wittgenstein on Meaning
The Journal of Philosophy, 1988
Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms William C... more Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms William Child 'The question can be raised: Is a state that I recognize on the basis of someone's utterances really the same as the state he does not recognize this way?' (Wittgenstein 1992, 8-9) 'If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioural and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others?' (Davidson 1991, 207)
Wittgenstein and Scientism, 2017
Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language, 2019
Is it possible to give a substantive, non-circular account of meaning and rule-following: an acco... more Is it possible to give a substantive, non-circular account of meaning and rule-following: an account that explains what it is for someone to use a word with a particular meaning, or to follow a particular rule, in terms that do not employ the concept of meaning or the concept of following a rule? Naturalists and reductionists about meaning and rules think it is possible to give such an account. Anti-reductionists, by contrast, hold that facts about meaning and rules are basic and sui generis; they cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, non-semantic, non-rule-involving facts. Where does Wittgenstein stand in this debate? And is he right? I shall argue that Wittgenstein is an antireductionist about meaning and rule-following, and that anti-reductionism is the correct view to take. Section 1 shows how the issue of reductionism and anti-reductionism about meaning and rules relates to the idea of the limits of language as it figures in Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings. Section 2 presents a framework for assessing the interpretative debate between reductionist and anti-reductionist readings of Wittgenstein. Section 3 argues that we cannot settle that debate on the basis of Wittgenstein's general, methodological opposition to reductionism. Section 4 presents an important argument for anti-reductionism from Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Section 5 considers some putative evidence of reductionism about meaning in the Brown Book and offers an alternative, anti-reductionist interpretation. Section 6 explores the nature of Wittgenstein's anti-reductionism. It argues, first, that Wittgenstein accepts that semantic and normative facts supervene on non-semantic, non-normative facts and, second, that at many points his treatment of meaning and rules is not confined to the kind of pleonastic claims that are often taken to define non-reductionist, or quietist, positions.
, §293. 3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §350. 4 We shall see later how, on this app... more , §293. 3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §350. 4 We shall see later how, on this approach, an answer to question 3 falls naturally out of the answer to question 2.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 2013
It is a central feature of so-called 'new' readings of Wittgenstein that they find in the Tractat... more It is a central feature of so-called 'new' readings of Wittgenstein that they find in the Tractatus an absence of positive philosophical doctrines, a kind of quietism, and an explicitly therapeutic approach that have traditionally been associated with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Seen from the perspective of a 'new' reader, this reveals 'a novel kind of continuity' in Wittgenstein's thought (Crary 2000: 4). Seen from the perspective of a 'traditional' reader, it involves reading back into the Tractatus elements that properly belong to Wittgenstein's later work. I want to explore the justice of this complaint in connection with a recent argument of Cora Diamond's, that the Tractatus contains a private language argument: an argument to the effect that private objects in other people's minds can play no role in the language I use for talking about their sensations. 1 The argument Diamond finds in the Tractatus is not the private language argument of Philosophical Investigations. But the appearance of such an argument in Wittgenstein's early writings, she thinks, brings out important elements of continuity in his work: it challenges the orthodox idea that 'the topic of privacy' is distinctively 'a topic of Wittgenstein's later philosophy', that its appearance in the later work is 'indicative of a shift in Wittgenstein's philosophical interests to topics within the philosophy of mind, not of interest to him in the Tractatus', and that 'his treatment of the topic [is] an illustration of the fundamental shifts in his overall philosophical position' (262). And the 'Tractatus private language argument', Diamond thinks, is important not only for our understanding of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy but also for the discussion of realism and antirealism more generally, 'especially as that discussion has been shaped by Michael Dummett' (284). My paper has three parts. In part 1, I challenge Diamond's interpretation on internal grounds. To find a private language argument in the Tractatus, I argue, we would have to read Tractarian doctrines about naming and use in ways that might, indeed, be suggested by Wittgenstein's later writings but which are entirely absent from the earlier work. In part 2, I discuss the account of sensation language that Wittgenstein offered in 1929, and argue that it poses a prima facie challenge to 'new' readings of the Tractatus. Part 3 explores the relation between the Tractatus and Dummettian realism. I defend Dummett's suggestion that the Tractatus embodies a form of semantic realism against Diamond's arguments, and show the helpfulness of Dummett's framework in reflecting on the nature of Tractarian analysis.
Wittgenstein on The First Person
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2011
Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Lud... more Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings. This article explores two interrelated issues. First, what is the function and significance of the first-person pronoun? Second, what is the relation between the first-person point of view — the point of view that each of us has on ourselves, our experiences, and our mental states — and the second- or third-person point of view — the point of view we adopt towards others, their experiences, and their mental states? When ‘I’ is used ‘as object’, Wittgenstein says, ‘the possibility of an error has been provided for’; when ‘I’ is used ‘as subject’, ‘no error is possible’. Wittgenstein has identified a genuine feature of certain self-ascriptions: immunity to error through misidentification. One of Wittgenstein's aims in Philosophical Investigations is to offer an account of the ‘language-game’ of ascribing sensations and attitudes to oneself and others th...
Wittgenstein in the 1930s
Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, 2019
What is the relation between meaning and use? Wittgenstein says that 'the meaning of a word is it... more What is the relation between meaning and use? Wittgenstein says that 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (PI §43). 1 He makes a parallel claim about the sense of a proposition: 'the use of a proposition-that is its sense' (BT 80). But what sort of illumination are we supposed to derive from those ideas? Consider a particular expression: the word 'red', for instance. Part of Wittgenstein's point is that the word 'red' means what it does because we use it in the way we do. But the significance of that point depends on how we understand the notion of use. We can distinguish between a reductionist and an anti-reductionist view. The anti-reductionist thinks of the use of a word in a wholly quietist or pleonastic way. On this view, all we can say about how use determines meaning is this: the word 'red' means red because we use it to mean red; the words 'add 2 each time' mean add two each time because they 'are used by us to mean that two is to be added each time' (Stroud 2012, p. 27); and so on. As Barry Stroud puts it, a description of the use of an expression that 'suffices to fix its meaning' must itself 'employ the idea of meaning' (2012, p. 27). That is the view that Stroud both endorses and attributes to Wittgenstein. 2 For the reductionist, by contrast, the point of the idea that meaning is use is to explain linguistic meaning in more basic terms. She agrees that we use the word 'red' to mean red. But she thinks we can spell out what is involved in using the word 'red' to mean red in a way that does not employ semantic concepts: in terms, for instance, of people's dispositions to produce and respond to sounds or symbols containing 'red' in specified observable circumstances. That is a view that many readers have ascribed to Wittgenstein. According to Michael Dummett, for instance, when Wittgenstein describes the use of language, what is described is the complex of activities with which the utterances of sentences are interwoven; and. .. the description does not invoke psychological or semantic concepts, but is couched entirely in terms of what is open to outward view (Dummett 1978, p. 446). Paul Horwich agrees: Wittgenstein's 'examples of the meaning-constituting uses of words', he writes, 'are never couched in semantic or intentional terms' (Horwich 2012, p. 112). My own view is that Wittgenstein is an anti-reductionist about meaning and intentional content. And I think Wittgenstein is right; facts about meaning and content cannot be constructed from or reduced to facts about use characterized in wholly non-semantic, non-intentional terms. But Wittgenstein does not adopt the most flat-footed, uncompromisingly anti-reductionist position on these matters. For, though he insists that meaning cannot be explained or accounted for in other terms, he does think that there are interesting and non-pleonastic things to say about what it takes for an expression to be used with a particular meaning, including things about the relation between a word's meaning what it does and facts about its use, characterized in non-semantic terms. That strand in his thinking emerges in many passages. I will give two examples. Wittgenstein writes: Let us consider very simple rules. Let the expression be a figure, say this one: |-| and one follows the rule by drawing a straight sequence of such figures (perhaps as an ornament).
Anomalism, Rationality, and Psychophysical Relations
RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de u... more RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de una palabra? Esta cuestion es abordada a la luz de algunos ejemplos poco discutidos. Wittgenstein rechaza una explicacion del fenomeno de que un significado se presente ante una mente en terminos de un doble componente de (a) habilidades mas (b) experiencias conscientes que carecen de contenido intencional intrinseco. Pero no dice sin mas que se trata de un fenomeno basico de la conciencia que no requiere explicacion. Mas bien, hace varias observaciones positivas acerca de lo que sucede cuando el significado se presenta ante una mente, observaciones que buscan iluminar el fenomeno.
Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears
Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When ... more Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When the Whistling had to Stop 3. Wittgenstein's Builders and Aristotle's Craftsmen 4. Pear's Wittgenstein: Rule-Following, Platonism, and Naturalism 5. Logical Rules, Necessity, and Convention 6. Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension 7. The Reality of Consciousness Index
3.3. Autonomy and Self-Knowledge
Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive
Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonom... more Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonomie relevent de la controverse entre les conceptions causaliste et non causaliste de l'explication de l'action. Dans cette controverse, certains (p. ex. Wittgenstein) soutiennent que le fait que la connaissance que nous avons de nos raisons est immediate et absolue prouve que ces raisons ne peuvent pas etre les causes des croyances et des actions qu'elles nous servent a expliquer. En effet, la connaissance des causes est une connaissance empirique, laquelle ne saurait etre acquise a la maniere dont nous connaissons nos raisons. Ce chapitre s'oppose a cette facon de voir. Est d'abord avance un modele de la connaissance de soi (derive du meme Wittgenstein) d'apres lequel le fait de s'auto-attribuer une croyance implique la conversion d'un jugement exprimant cette croyance en un jugement qui l'auto-attribue explicitement. Ensuite, ce modele est remodele de facon a lui permettre d'expliquer comment il se fait que nous soyons capables, de maniere fiable et sans effort particulier, de nous auto-attribuer les raisons de nos croyances et de nos actions. Ce modele s'avere propre a rendre compte du caractere immediat de la connaissance de nos raisons tout en restant parfaitement compatible avec l'opinion selon laquelle ces raisons sont des causes.
Wittgensteinian themes: essays in honour of David Pears
For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He i... more For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He is author of many papers and three books on Wittgenstein's philosophy; Wittgenstein ( 1971 ) and The False Prison: A Study in the ...
Explaining attitudes: a practical approach to the mind
Page 1. CdMBRIDGG STUDieSIN PHILOSOPHY XPl/HMMG dTTITUDS A PMCTIGIL r^PPRO^CH TOTHMIND LYNNS R... more Page 1. CdMBRIDGG STUDieSIN PHILOSOPHY XPl/HMMG dTTITUDS A PMCTIGIL r^PPRO^CH TOTHMIND LYNNS RUDDER MKlER Page 2. Page 3. Explaining Attitudes offers a timely and important challenge to the dominant ...
Wittgenstein on Meaning
The Philosophical Review, 1989
Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON ... more Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING. By COLIN MCGINN. Oxford, England, Basil Blackwell, 1984. Pp. viii, 202. The book is part of the enormous ...
Le Pore, E. , "Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson
Mind, 1987
Wittgenstein on Meaning
The Journal of Philosophy, 1988
Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms William C... more Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms William Child 'The question can be raised: Is a state that I recognize on the basis of someone's utterances really the same as the state he does not recognize this way?' (Wittgenstein 1992, 8-9) 'If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioural and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others?' (Davidson 1991, 207)
Wittgenstein and Scientism, 2017
Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language, 2019
Is it possible to give a substantive, non-circular account of meaning and rule-following: an acco... more Is it possible to give a substantive, non-circular account of meaning and rule-following: an account that explains what it is for someone to use a word with a particular meaning, or to follow a particular rule, in terms that do not employ the concept of meaning or the concept of following a rule? Naturalists and reductionists about meaning and rules think it is possible to give such an account. Anti-reductionists, by contrast, hold that facts about meaning and rules are basic and sui generis; they cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, non-semantic, non-rule-involving facts. Where does Wittgenstein stand in this debate? And is he right? I shall argue that Wittgenstein is an antireductionist about meaning and rule-following, and that anti-reductionism is the correct view to take. Section 1 shows how the issue of reductionism and anti-reductionism about meaning and rules relates to the idea of the limits of language as it figures in Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings. Section 2 presents a framework for assessing the interpretative debate between reductionist and anti-reductionist readings of Wittgenstein. Section 3 argues that we cannot settle that debate on the basis of Wittgenstein's general, methodological opposition to reductionism. Section 4 presents an important argument for anti-reductionism from Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Section 5 considers some putative evidence of reductionism about meaning in the Brown Book and offers an alternative, anti-reductionist interpretation. Section 6 explores the nature of Wittgenstein's anti-reductionism. It argues, first, that Wittgenstein accepts that semantic and normative facts supervene on non-semantic, non-normative facts and, second, that at many points his treatment of meaning and rules is not confined to the kind of pleonastic claims that are often taken to define non-reductionist, or quietist, positions.
, §293. 3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §350. 4 We shall see later how, on this app... more , §293. 3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §350. 4 We shall see later how, on this approach, an answer to question 3 falls naturally out of the answer to question 2.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 2013
It is a central feature of so-called 'new' readings of Wittgenstein that they find in the Tractat... more It is a central feature of so-called 'new' readings of Wittgenstein that they find in the Tractatus an absence of positive philosophical doctrines, a kind of quietism, and an explicitly therapeutic approach that have traditionally been associated with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Seen from the perspective of a 'new' reader, this reveals 'a novel kind of continuity' in Wittgenstein's thought (Crary 2000: 4). Seen from the perspective of a 'traditional' reader, it involves reading back into the Tractatus elements that properly belong to Wittgenstein's later work. I want to explore the justice of this complaint in connection with a recent argument of Cora Diamond's, that the Tractatus contains a private language argument: an argument to the effect that private objects in other people's minds can play no role in the language I use for talking about their sensations. 1 The argument Diamond finds in the Tractatus is not the private language argument of Philosophical Investigations. But the appearance of such an argument in Wittgenstein's early writings, she thinks, brings out important elements of continuity in his work: it challenges the orthodox idea that 'the topic of privacy' is distinctively 'a topic of Wittgenstein's later philosophy', that its appearance in the later work is 'indicative of a shift in Wittgenstein's philosophical interests to topics within the philosophy of mind, not of interest to him in the Tractatus', and that 'his treatment of the topic [is] an illustration of the fundamental shifts in his overall philosophical position' (262). And the 'Tractatus private language argument', Diamond thinks, is important not only for our understanding of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy but also for the discussion of realism and antirealism more generally, 'especially as that discussion has been shaped by Michael Dummett' (284). My paper has three parts. In part 1, I challenge Diamond's interpretation on internal grounds. To find a private language argument in the Tractatus, I argue, we would have to read Tractarian doctrines about naming and use in ways that might, indeed, be suggested by Wittgenstein's later writings but which are entirely absent from the earlier work. In part 2, I discuss the account of sensation language that Wittgenstein offered in 1929, and argue that it poses a prima facie challenge to 'new' readings of the Tractatus. Part 3 explores the relation between the Tractatus and Dummettian realism. I defend Dummett's suggestion that the Tractatus embodies a form of semantic realism against Diamond's arguments, and show the helpfulness of Dummett's framework in reflecting on the nature of Tractarian analysis.
Wittgenstein on The First Person
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2011
Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Lud... more Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings. This article explores two interrelated issues. First, what is the function and significance of the first-person pronoun? Second, what is the relation between the first-person point of view — the point of view that each of us has on ourselves, our experiences, and our mental states — and the second- or third-person point of view — the point of view we adopt towards others, their experiences, and their mental states? When ‘I’ is used ‘as object’, Wittgenstein says, ‘the possibility of an error has been provided for’; when ‘I’ is used ‘as subject’, ‘no error is possible’. Wittgenstein has identified a genuine feature of certain self-ascriptions: immunity to error through misidentification. One of Wittgenstein's aims in Philosophical Investigations is to offer an account of the ‘language-game’ of ascribing sensations and attitudes to oneself and others th...
Wittgenstein in the 1930s
Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, 2019
What is the relation between meaning and use? Wittgenstein says that 'the meaning of a word is it... more What is the relation between meaning and use? Wittgenstein says that 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (PI §43). 1 He makes a parallel claim about the sense of a proposition: 'the use of a proposition-that is its sense' (BT 80). But what sort of illumination are we supposed to derive from those ideas? Consider a particular expression: the word 'red', for instance. Part of Wittgenstein's point is that the word 'red' means what it does because we use it in the way we do. But the significance of that point depends on how we understand the notion of use. We can distinguish between a reductionist and an anti-reductionist view. The anti-reductionist thinks of the use of a word in a wholly quietist or pleonastic way. On this view, all we can say about how use determines meaning is this: the word 'red' means red because we use it to mean red; the words 'add 2 each time' mean add two each time because they 'are used by us to mean that two is to be added each time' (Stroud 2012, p. 27); and so on. As Barry Stroud puts it, a description of the use of an expression that 'suffices to fix its meaning' must itself 'employ the idea of meaning' (2012, p. 27). That is the view that Stroud both endorses and attributes to Wittgenstein. 2 For the reductionist, by contrast, the point of the idea that meaning is use is to explain linguistic meaning in more basic terms. She agrees that we use the word 'red' to mean red. But she thinks we can spell out what is involved in using the word 'red' to mean red in a way that does not employ semantic concepts: in terms, for instance, of people's dispositions to produce and respond to sounds or symbols containing 'red' in specified observable circumstances. That is a view that many readers have ascribed to Wittgenstein. According to Michael Dummett, for instance, when Wittgenstein describes the use of language, what is described is the complex of activities with which the utterances of sentences are interwoven; and. .. the description does not invoke psychological or semantic concepts, but is couched entirely in terms of what is open to outward view (Dummett 1978, p. 446). Paul Horwich agrees: Wittgenstein's 'examples of the meaning-constituting uses of words', he writes, 'are never couched in semantic or intentional terms' (Horwich 2012, p. 112). My own view is that Wittgenstein is an anti-reductionist about meaning and intentional content. And I think Wittgenstein is right; facts about meaning and content cannot be constructed from or reduced to facts about use characterized in wholly non-semantic, non-intentional terms. But Wittgenstein does not adopt the most flat-footed, uncompromisingly anti-reductionist position on these matters. For, though he insists that meaning cannot be explained or accounted for in other terms, he does think that there are interesting and non-pleonastic things to say about what it takes for an expression to be used with a particular meaning, including things about the relation between a word's meaning what it does and facts about its use, characterized in non-semantic terms. That strand in his thinking emerges in many passages. I will give two examples. Wittgenstein writes: Let us consider very simple rules. Let the expression be a figure, say this one: |-| and one follows the rule by drawing a straight sequence of such figures (perhaps as an ornament).
Anomalism, Rationality, and Psychophysical Relations
RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de u... more RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de una palabra? Esta cuestion es abordada a la luz de algunos ejemplos poco discutidos. Wittgenstein rechaza una explicacion del fenomeno de que un significado se presente ante una mente en terminos de un doble componente de (a) habilidades mas (b) experiencias conscientes que carecen de contenido intencional intrinseco. Pero no dice sin mas que se trata de un fenomeno basico de la conciencia que no requiere explicacion. Mas bien, hace varias observaciones positivas acerca de lo que sucede cuando el significado se presenta ante una mente, observaciones que buscan iluminar el fenomeno.
Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears
Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When ... more Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When the Whistling had to Stop 3. Wittgenstein's Builders and Aristotle's Craftsmen 4. Pear's Wittgenstein: Rule-Following, Platonism, and Naturalism 5. Logical Rules, Necessity, and Convention 6. Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension 7. The Reality of Consciousness Index
3.3. Autonomy and Self-Knowledge
Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive
Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonom... more Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonomie relevent de la controverse entre les conceptions causaliste et non causaliste de l'explication de l'action. Dans cette controverse, certains (p. ex. Wittgenstein) soutiennent que le fait que la connaissance que nous avons de nos raisons est immediate et absolue prouve que ces raisons ne peuvent pas etre les causes des croyances et des actions qu'elles nous servent a expliquer. En effet, la connaissance des causes est une connaissance empirique, laquelle ne saurait etre acquise a la maniere dont nous connaissons nos raisons. Ce chapitre s'oppose a cette facon de voir. Est d'abord avance un modele de la connaissance de soi (derive du meme Wittgenstein) d'apres lequel le fait de s'auto-attribuer une croyance implique la conversion d'un jugement exprimant cette croyance en un jugement qui l'auto-attribue explicitement. Ensuite, ce modele est remodele de facon a lui permettre d'expliquer comment il se fait que nous soyons capables, de maniere fiable et sans effort particulier, de nous auto-attribuer les raisons de nos croyances et de nos actions. Ce modele s'avere propre a rendre compte du caractere immediat de la connaissance de nos raisons tout en restant parfaitement compatible avec l'opinion selon laquelle ces raisons sont des causes.
Wittgensteinian themes: essays in honour of David Pears
For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He i... more For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He is author of many papers and three books on Wittgenstein's philosophy; Wittgenstein ( 1971 ) and The False Prison: A Study in the ...
Explaining attitudes: a practical approach to the mind
Page 1. CdMBRIDGG STUDieSIN PHILOSOPHY XPl/HMMG dTTITUDS A PMCTIGIL r^PPRO^CH TOTHMIND LYNNS R... more Page 1. CdMBRIDGG STUDieSIN PHILOSOPHY XPl/HMMG dTTITUDS A PMCTIGIL r^PPRO^CH TOTHMIND LYNNS RUDDER MKlER Page 2. Page 3. Explaining Attitudes offers a timely and important challenge to the dominant ...