Gerassimos Moschonas | Panteion University (original) (raw)
Books by Gerassimos Moschonas
London : Verso (370 pages and Ι-ΧI), 2002
Papers by Gerassimos Moschonas
in Andreas Schieder László Andor, Maria Maltschnig and Ania Skrzypek, Progressive Proposals for the Turbulent times, Brussels, FEPS and Karl-Renner-Institut, 2022, pp. 98-162 , 2022
The chapter sets two interrelated goals: • To understand why the Great Recession brought about m... more The chapter sets two interrelated goals:
• To understand why the Great Recession brought about minor political and policy changes, while the 1929 crisis renewed political and economic ideologies and changed the political landscape for many decades.
• To describe the programmatic response of the European social-democratic parties to the financial (2007-2009) and sovereign debt crises (from 2010 onward), and to construe their failure to differentiate themselves in a politically relevant way from their right-wing rivals.
Η Εκλογική Συμπεριφορά των Ελλήνων: Ανάμεσα στα Μνημόνια και την Πανδημία, 2022
The chapter attempts the first systematic elaboration of what has been labeled as the anti-SYRIZA... more The chapter attempts the first systematic elaboration of what has been labeled as the anti-SYRIZA current in Greece. SYRIZA benefited greatly from the de-alignment and subsequent realignment of voters that took place during the great debt crisis and remained in government from January 2015 until July 2019. Its ascendance and time in power created strong feelings of mistrust and rejection (negative partisanship) under conditions of major political polarization. The chapter analyzes the extent of the anti-SYRIZA trend amongst the population, the key moments that shaped it, as well as its ideological and demographic characteristics.
During the second SYRIZA government (September 2015-July 2019) the initial anti-SYRIZA feelings of a minority of the electorate transformed into a majority trend, with stereotypical properties to a great degree. Consequently, the bulk of anti-SYRIZA sentiment was not due to their exercise of radical left policies, but, on the contrary, to the collapse of the left narrative because of the implementation of austerity policies (a classic case of ‘left brand dilution’).
In the aforementioned period anti-SYRIZA negativism extended to an impressive 70% of the electorate, steadily exceeding 60%, whilst its hard-core was higher than 40%. The development of feelings and reflexes of animosity towards SYRIZA played a critical role in the party’s defeat in the 2019 national elections.
transform! Yearbook 2022, Merlin Press (Walter Baier, Eric Canepa, Haris Golemis eds), 2022
Kathimerini (newspaper), 2022
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE 1. LOOKING BACK: A retrospect - The period of precipitat... more THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE
1. LOOKING BACK: A retrospect
- The period of precipitation in the voting intentions
- The period of slow recovery
- The 'paradox' of the consolidation of the anti-SYRIZA current in the
first phase of the ND government
-
2. THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE ANTI-SYRIZA CURRENT
- Inefficiency/inadequate competence
- Unreliability (tacticism, loss of moral advantage and of the ability to represent the 'new')
- Deficits in the vocabulary of political representation
3. THE SYRIZA OPPOSITION AND THE KINAL/PASOK
- What SYRIZA did not do to counter the - threefold structured - negativity of the public opinion
- SYRIZA failed in opposition and as opposition
- Androulakis' positive momentum and SYRIZA's assets
in Marc Lazar and Mathieu Fulla (eds.), European Socialists and the State in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries. London: Palgrave 2020, 2020
Τhe chapter links the Greek debt crisis and the failure to establish an efficient state in Greece... more Τhe chapter links the Greek debt crisis and the failure to establish an efficient state in Greece to critical distinguishing features of PASOK’s (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) ideology and policies. It focuses on the first two governmental periods (1981–1989 and 1993–2004) of the Greek Socialists and examines PASOK’s fiscal policies as well as its policy regarding the state and the institution-building reforms it carried out. PASOK’s contribution to Greece’s fiscal collapse was decisive because it did not promote a coherent social democratic economic and state model, whether left-wing, in the Andreas Papandreou period (1981–1996), or “social-liberal”, in the more ideologically coherent period of the modernizer Costas Simitis (1996–2004). The chapter’s central thesis is that PASOK, which lacked a social democratic history and culture, was a superficial, fundamentally inconsistent social democratic party. In the history of post-WWII European social democracy it would be difficult to find a party whose own political choices and practices have undermined each other to such a high degree. PASOK was simultaneously the spearhead of social democratisation and modernisation of Greek society and the principal obstacle to them.
DiaNEOsis Research and Policy Institute June 2020 https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/moschonas-arthro-krisi-v5-1.pdf, 2020
In Andersson, Jenny, and Olivier Godechot (eds.). 2018. ”Destabilizing Orders – Understanding the Consequences of Neoliberalism.” Proceedings from the MaxPo Fifth-Anniversary Conference. Paris, January 11–12, 2018. MaxPo Discussion Paper 18/1 (May 2018).
in William Outhwaite and Stephen Turner (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Political Sociology, London: SAGE Publications, pp. 516-547 , 2018
The chapter presents the programmatic story of the European workers’ movement during the period o... more The chapter presents the programmatic story of the European workers’ movement during the period of the Second International (1889-1914) and the parallel—and strongly competitive— ideological paths of the Western European Social Democratic and Communist political families in the inter-war years.
The purpose of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, it proposes a synthesis of the programmatic characteristics of Second-International parties (1889-1914) based on the study of the programs of the most important parties of the period. Borrowing from Lars Lih, we use the term Erfurtian (from the 1891 Erfurt programme of the SPD) to describe this initial and common ideological-programmatic matrix of the European Left. Secondly, the chapter examines the evolution of the two party-families’ identities in the inter-war years precisely in the light of their common ideological-programmatic Erfurtian past.
Our interest in studying social democracy and communism together derives from the simple historical fact that they shared the same origins in the Erfurtian social democracy (from 1889 to 1914). We take full account of this fundamental fact and try to trace its repercussions in later periods. It is argued that the formation of both the Social Democratic and the Communist identities exhibits the same dynamic pattern of evolution: a great initial ideological-programmatic wave is followed, sooner or later, by a second, smaller one. The function of the former is institutive and foundational; that of the latter is corrective and balancing. Thus, the two major formative periods of social democracy are the classic Erfurtian one of 1889-1914 followed by that of the 1930s. The formative waves of Western communism date from 1919-1921 (the period of foundation) and the time after 1934 which we would, by convention, name as the period of the ‘Popular Fronts’. It is argued also that this pattern of foundation and partial refoundation was crucial for the post-World War II consolidation and development of both the Social Democratic and the Communist identities, influencing the ideology and programmes of the European Left for an extended period.
in Yannis Metaxas (ed.), Political Science Vol VI: Comparative Politics. Athens, Center for European Constitutional Law and Sideris Publications, 2016, pp. 175 – 201 (in Greek).
http://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ekthesi\_moschona\_single\_Pages.pdf, Athens, Dianeosis Foundation of Research and Analysis, February 2016, 37 pages (in Greek).
in Ernst Stetter, Karl Duffek and Ania Skrzypek (eds.), For A Connecting Progressive Agenda, Poland, FEPS [Foundation for European Progressive Studies] and Renner Institute, "Next Left" book series, 2015, pp. 410-430.
in David Bailey, Jean-Michel De Waele, Fabien Escalona and Mathieu Vieira (eds.), European Social Democracy During the Global Economic Crisis: Renovation or Resignation?, 2014
in The Rise of Populism and Extremist Parties in Europe, The Spinelli Group, 2013: 20-27.
Dissent, pp. 33-37, fall, 2013
in Daniel Cohen and Alain Bergounioux (eds), Le socialisme à l’épreuve du capitalisme. Paris: Fayard, 2012, pp. 233-54.
in Cronin J, Ross G. and Shoch J. (eds.), What’s Left of the Left, Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times. Durham, N. C: Duke University Press, 2011, pp. 50-85.
In Cronin J, Ross G. and Shoch J. (eds.), What’s Left of the Left, Democrats and Social Democrats... more In Cronin J, Ross G. and Shoch J. (eds.), What’s Left of the Left, Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times. Durham, N. C: Duke University Press, 2011, pp. 50-85
Renewal, vol. 17, no 2 (Summer 2009): 11-20
Parties have historically developed, among other things, in the wake of major institutional chang... more Parties have historically developed, among other things, in the wake of major institutional changes such as the parliamentarisation of formerly authoritarian states or the advent of universal suffrage. So, today, the unprecedented character of the European Union has a significant impact on party phenomena and party conflict. How does the European framework, particularly its institutional aspects, influence the role and dynamics of political parties (and partisan families)? What are its consequences for the programmatic development and, more generally, the physiognomy and tradition, of social democracy?
London : Verso (370 pages and Ι-ΧI), 2002
in Andreas Schieder László Andor, Maria Maltschnig and Ania Skrzypek, Progressive Proposals for the Turbulent times, Brussels, FEPS and Karl-Renner-Institut, 2022, pp. 98-162 , 2022
The chapter sets two interrelated goals: • To understand why the Great Recession brought about m... more The chapter sets two interrelated goals:
• To understand why the Great Recession brought about minor political and policy changes, while the 1929 crisis renewed political and economic ideologies and changed the political landscape for many decades.
• To describe the programmatic response of the European social-democratic parties to the financial (2007-2009) and sovereign debt crises (from 2010 onward), and to construe their failure to differentiate themselves in a politically relevant way from their right-wing rivals.
Η Εκλογική Συμπεριφορά των Ελλήνων: Ανάμεσα στα Μνημόνια και την Πανδημία, 2022
The chapter attempts the first systematic elaboration of what has been labeled as the anti-SYRIZA... more The chapter attempts the first systematic elaboration of what has been labeled as the anti-SYRIZA current in Greece. SYRIZA benefited greatly from the de-alignment and subsequent realignment of voters that took place during the great debt crisis and remained in government from January 2015 until July 2019. Its ascendance and time in power created strong feelings of mistrust and rejection (negative partisanship) under conditions of major political polarization. The chapter analyzes the extent of the anti-SYRIZA trend amongst the population, the key moments that shaped it, as well as its ideological and demographic characteristics.
During the second SYRIZA government (September 2015-July 2019) the initial anti-SYRIZA feelings of a minority of the electorate transformed into a majority trend, with stereotypical properties to a great degree. Consequently, the bulk of anti-SYRIZA sentiment was not due to their exercise of radical left policies, but, on the contrary, to the collapse of the left narrative because of the implementation of austerity policies (a classic case of ‘left brand dilution’).
In the aforementioned period anti-SYRIZA negativism extended to an impressive 70% of the electorate, steadily exceeding 60%, whilst its hard-core was higher than 40%. The development of feelings and reflexes of animosity towards SYRIZA played a critical role in the party’s defeat in the 2019 national elections.
transform! Yearbook 2022, Merlin Press (Walter Baier, Eric Canepa, Haris Golemis eds), 2022
Kathimerini (newspaper), 2022
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE 1. LOOKING BACK: A retrospect - The period of precipitat... more THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE
1. LOOKING BACK: A retrospect
- The period of precipitation in the voting intentions
- The period of slow recovery
- The 'paradox' of the consolidation of the anti-SYRIZA current in the
first phase of the ND government
-
2. THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE ANTI-SYRIZA CURRENT
- Inefficiency/inadequate competence
- Unreliability (tacticism, loss of moral advantage and of the ability to represent the 'new')
- Deficits in the vocabulary of political representation
3. THE SYRIZA OPPOSITION AND THE KINAL/PASOK
- What SYRIZA did not do to counter the - threefold structured - negativity of the public opinion
- SYRIZA failed in opposition and as opposition
- Androulakis' positive momentum and SYRIZA's assets
in Marc Lazar and Mathieu Fulla (eds.), European Socialists and the State in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries. London: Palgrave 2020, 2020
Τhe chapter links the Greek debt crisis and the failure to establish an efficient state in Greece... more Τhe chapter links the Greek debt crisis and the failure to establish an efficient state in Greece to critical distinguishing features of PASOK’s (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) ideology and policies. It focuses on the first two governmental periods (1981–1989 and 1993–2004) of the Greek Socialists and examines PASOK’s fiscal policies as well as its policy regarding the state and the institution-building reforms it carried out. PASOK’s contribution to Greece’s fiscal collapse was decisive because it did not promote a coherent social democratic economic and state model, whether left-wing, in the Andreas Papandreou period (1981–1996), or “social-liberal”, in the more ideologically coherent period of the modernizer Costas Simitis (1996–2004). The chapter’s central thesis is that PASOK, which lacked a social democratic history and culture, was a superficial, fundamentally inconsistent social democratic party. In the history of post-WWII European social democracy it would be difficult to find a party whose own political choices and practices have undermined each other to such a high degree. PASOK was simultaneously the spearhead of social democratisation and modernisation of Greek society and the principal obstacle to them.
DiaNEOsis Research and Policy Institute June 2020 https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/moschonas-arthro-krisi-v5-1.pdf, 2020
In Andersson, Jenny, and Olivier Godechot (eds.). 2018. ”Destabilizing Orders – Understanding the Consequences of Neoliberalism.” Proceedings from the MaxPo Fifth-Anniversary Conference. Paris, January 11–12, 2018. MaxPo Discussion Paper 18/1 (May 2018).
in William Outhwaite and Stephen Turner (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Political Sociology, London: SAGE Publications, pp. 516-547 , 2018
The chapter presents the programmatic story of the European workers’ movement during the period o... more The chapter presents the programmatic story of the European workers’ movement during the period of the Second International (1889-1914) and the parallel—and strongly competitive— ideological paths of the Western European Social Democratic and Communist political families in the inter-war years.
The purpose of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, it proposes a synthesis of the programmatic characteristics of Second-International parties (1889-1914) based on the study of the programs of the most important parties of the period. Borrowing from Lars Lih, we use the term Erfurtian (from the 1891 Erfurt programme of the SPD) to describe this initial and common ideological-programmatic matrix of the European Left. Secondly, the chapter examines the evolution of the two party-families’ identities in the inter-war years precisely in the light of their common ideological-programmatic Erfurtian past.
Our interest in studying social democracy and communism together derives from the simple historical fact that they shared the same origins in the Erfurtian social democracy (from 1889 to 1914). We take full account of this fundamental fact and try to trace its repercussions in later periods. It is argued that the formation of both the Social Democratic and the Communist identities exhibits the same dynamic pattern of evolution: a great initial ideological-programmatic wave is followed, sooner or later, by a second, smaller one. The function of the former is institutive and foundational; that of the latter is corrective and balancing. Thus, the two major formative periods of social democracy are the classic Erfurtian one of 1889-1914 followed by that of the 1930s. The formative waves of Western communism date from 1919-1921 (the period of foundation) and the time after 1934 which we would, by convention, name as the period of the ‘Popular Fronts’. It is argued also that this pattern of foundation and partial refoundation was crucial for the post-World War II consolidation and development of both the Social Democratic and the Communist identities, influencing the ideology and programmes of the European Left for an extended period.
in Yannis Metaxas (ed.), Political Science Vol VI: Comparative Politics. Athens, Center for European Constitutional Law and Sideris Publications, 2016, pp. 175 – 201 (in Greek).
http://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ekthesi\_moschona\_single\_Pages.pdf, Athens, Dianeosis Foundation of Research and Analysis, February 2016, 37 pages (in Greek).
in Ernst Stetter, Karl Duffek and Ania Skrzypek (eds.), For A Connecting Progressive Agenda, Poland, FEPS [Foundation for European Progressive Studies] and Renner Institute, "Next Left" book series, 2015, pp. 410-430.
in David Bailey, Jean-Michel De Waele, Fabien Escalona and Mathieu Vieira (eds.), European Social Democracy During the Global Economic Crisis: Renovation or Resignation?, 2014
in The Rise of Populism and Extremist Parties in Europe, The Spinelli Group, 2013: 20-27.
Dissent, pp. 33-37, fall, 2013
in Daniel Cohen and Alain Bergounioux (eds), Le socialisme à l’épreuve du capitalisme. Paris: Fayard, 2012, pp. 233-54.
in Cronin J, Ross G. and Shoch J. (eds.), What’s Left of the Left, Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times. Durham, N. C: Duke University Press, 2011, pp. 50-85.
In Cronin J, Ross G. and Shoch J. (eds.), What’s Left of the Left, Democrats and Social Democrats... more In Cronin J, Ross G. and Shoch J. (eds.), What’s Left of the Left, Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times. Durham, N. C: Duke University Press, 2011, pp. 50-85
Renewal, vol. 17, no 2 (Summer 2009): 11-20
Parties have historically developed, among other things, in the wake of major institutional chang... more Parties have historically developed, among other things, in the wake of major institutional changes such as the parliamentarisation of formerly authoritarian states or the advent of universal suffrage. So, today, the unprecedented character of the European Union has a significant impact on party phenomena and party conflict. How does the European framework, particularly its institutional aspects, influence the role and dynamics of political parties (and partisan families)? What are its consequences for the programmatic development and, more generally, the physiognomy and tradition, of social democracy?
in J. Callaghan, N. Fishman, B. Jackson and M. Mcivor (eds), In Search of Social democracy, Responses to Crisis and Modernisation. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2009, pp. 168-193
In the framework of the nation-state the limited number of power centres and political actors, as... more In the framework of the nation-state the limited number of power centres and political actors, as well as the less constraining influence of 'external' factors, made it easier to formulate and implement a reformist strategy. Moreover, once the strategy had been formulated (the greatest difficulty consisting in the formulation), the practical mechanisms of its realisation – a more or less centralised state, a powerful party, probably a popular leader and, obviously, a social coalition of support (trade unions and the left-wing electorate) – afforded reasonable prospects for successful implementation (if the socialists were in a majority), or for exercising real influence (through 'external pressure', if the socialists were in opposition). 2 Within the social-democratic movement, the problem of collective action and cooperation was less acute, the emergence of a strategic leadership easier, and the capacity for programmatic innovation greater. Reformism in the national era was coherent. It was rather at ease in its sphere of action, a sphere that was homogeneous politically and (invariably) culturally. By contrast, the European 'transnational' terrain, while not chaotic, is structured very differently. The centres of authority and the (institutoional and political) actors are very numerous; their ideological repertoires are heteroclite; and the logics of actions often diverge. The multiplicity of power centres and the superimposition of decision-making levels short-circuit the unity of the decision-making process and reduce the governmental efficacy (problem-solving capacity) of the regime. To be adopted, a policy requires (depending on the sector and institution) either vast majorities or unanimity, which leads the member States or the national parties either to construct grand coalitions or to abandon their policies. In this highly complex and fissured institutional setup , the capacity of political parties for institutional and policy harmonization – and, as a result, their capacity for efficient government – is greatly
Revue Socialiste, no 39 (third trimester of 2010): 37-45.
Revue Socialiste. No 34 (Second trimester, 2009): 131-139
http://www.telos-eu.com/fr/europe/syriza-et-lue-apres-la-premiere-longue-bataille-bi.html
Sigxrona Themata, no 130-131, July-December 2015, pp. 26-28 (in Greek)
Chronos, No 16, August 2014: http://www.chronosmag.eu/index.php/s-1121.html (in Greek)
Sigxrona Themata, no 110, (September 2010):15-18 (in Greek).
Party Politics XX(X), 2021
Histoire@Politique, www.histoire-politique.fr, Revue électronique du Centre d’histoire de Science Po [Center for History at Sciences Po, Paris], 31 October 2017.
Revue internationale de politique comparée, 2015/3 (Vol. 22), pp. 445-449.
Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 13, Part 3, July 2007, pp. 546-548.
La Croix (newspaper), 2022
Newspaper Kathimerini, 5 January, 2020
Newspaper To Vima, 28 July 2019
Newspaper To Vima, 30 December 2017. http://www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/?aid=929083
Newspaper To Vima , 26 November 2017, http://www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/?aid=919036
Newspaper To Vima 5 May 2017
Η προκαταρκτική συμφωνία για τη δεύτερη αξιολόγηση διασφαλίζει την παραμονή της χώρας σε τροχιά λ... more Η προκαταρκτική συμφωνία για τη δεύτερη αξιολόγηση διασφαλίζει την παραμονή της χώρας σε τροχιά λιτότητας τουλάχιστον μέχρι το 2020. Ετσι, χάρη στα μνημόνια, ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ εισήλθε σε έναν άλλο κόσμο ιδεών. Οι επιπτώσεις δεν περιορίζονται στο εκκωφαντικά προφανές, την απόσταση ανάμεσα στην παλαιά ρητορική και στις ασκούμενες πολιτικές. Οι επιπτώσεις αγγίζουν πρωτίστως την ίδια την ταυτότητα του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, τις προγραμματικές επεξεργασίες, τη βαθύτερη ψυχή του κόμματος. Μια όψη της ταυτότητας αυτής θα εξετάσουμε σε αυτό το κείμενο: τον αριστερό λαϊκισμό. Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ κατηγορείται από τους πολιτικούς του αντιπάλους για λαϊκισμό. Ταυτόχρονα, η απο-δαιμονοποίηση του λαϊκισμού είναι μια διεθνής, αν και μειοψηφική, επιστημονική τάση που απελευθερώνει τον όρο «λαϊκισμός» από τις συνδηλώσεις της δημαγωγίας, της συνωμοσιολογίας, της πολιτικής «καθυστέρησης» και του ανορθολογισμού, καθώς αποδίδει, ειδικά στα αριστερά λαϊκιστικά εγχειρήματα, την ικανότητα προώθησης δημοκρατικών πολιτικών και κοινωνικών μετασχηματισμών που η κλασική Αριστερά δεν είναι πλέον σε θέση να επιτύχει. Από τη σκοπιά του πολιτικού-ιδεολογικού ανταγωνισμού, η μερική υιοθέτηση από τους Podemos στην Ισπανία και από τον Melenchon στη Γαλλία μιας τέτοιας οπτικής «εκσυγχρονίζει» τον λαϊκισμό, τον απενοχοποιεί και τον εντάσσει σε ένα πλαίσιο πολύ ευρύτερο του κλασικού λατινοαμερικανικού μοντέλου, έστω και αν αυτό το τελευταίο έχει προσφέρει τα αρχικά θεμελιακά υλικά για τη διαμόρφωση του σύγχρονου ευρωπαϊκού αριστερού λαϊκισμού. Είναι λοιπόν ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ ένα λαϊκιστικό κόμμα; Με τι τρόπο, και σε ποιον βαθμό;
Newspaper To Vima, 25 March 2017, http://www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/?aid=869760
Newspaper To Vima 6 March 2016
Gerassimos Moschonas spoke to Rethinking Greece* about Εuropean Democracy, the Left's prospects i... more Gerassimos Moschonas spoke to Rethinking Greece* about Εuropean Democracy, the Left's prospects in Europe, Greek state building and political modernity as well as Syriza's capacity to promote progressive reforms in Greece.
February 2015. http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1834-gerassimos-moschonas-syriza-s-tremendous-path-to-power
International Conference, Socialism, Socialists and the State in Western Europe. History Centre, Science Po, Paris, 7-9 December 2016, France