Robert P. George | Princeton University (original) (raw)

Books by Robert P. George

Papers by Robert P. George

Catholic University of America Press eBooks, Feb 15, 2019

Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 4, 1999

REASONS, GOODS, AND PRINCIPLES INTENTIONS IN ACTION JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND WRONGDOING PHILOSOPHY OF... more REASONS, GOODS, AND PRINCIPLES INTENTIONS IN ACTION JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND WRONGDOING PHILOSOPHY OF LAW PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC REASONS REFLECTIONS AND RESPONSES

At the deepest level, cloning should be prohibited because it turns procreation into a species of... more At the deepest level, cloning should be prohibited because it turns procreation into a species of manufacture. It treats a child-to-be as an object of production. In the words of Dr. Leon Kass, Chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics, cloning “threatens the dignity of human procreation, giving one generation unprecedented genetic control over the next. It is the first step toward a eugenic world in which children become objects of manipulation and products of will.”

International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2013

Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics

Intransigence is a vice, but there is no virtue in accepting bad compromises. The “Fairness for A... more Intransigence is a vice, but there is no virtue in accepting bad compromises. The “Fairness for All” legislation is a bad compromise — and as a result, would be a misguided response to the Supreme Court’s Bostock decision. To show this is not to question the good faith of the bill’s advocates, with whom we have been in friendly dialogue for years. It’s merely to note that despite the undoubted goodwill of the bill’s proponents (and despite its name), the bill is grievously unfair. Its protections for religious liberty are insufficient. And they come at the price of legally enshrining a misguided sexual and gender ideology — which would license officials to punish citizens who dissent from secular progressive orthodoxy. These costs are unsurprising: from the start, the compromise sought was misframed in two ways. First, there was a woeful mismatch in ambitions: The “conservative” side failed even to seek protections for many crucial interests apart from religious liberty that are imp...

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2014

In various places we have defended the position that a new human organism, that is, an individual... more In various places we have defended the position that a new human organism, that is, an individual member of the human species, comes to be at fertilization, the union of the spermatozoon and the oocyte. This individual organism, during the ordinary course of embryological development, remains the same individual and does not undergo any further substantial change, unless monozygotic twinning, or some form of chimerism occurs. Recently, in this Journal Jason Morris has challenged our position, claiming that recent findings in reproductive and stem cell biology have falsified our view. He objects to our claim that a discernible substantial change occurs at conception, giving rise to the existence of a new individual of the human species. In addition, he objects to our claim that the embryo is an individual, a unified whole that persists through various changes, and thus something other than a mere aggregate of cells. Morris raises a number of objections to these claims. However, we will show that his arguments overlook key data and confuse biological, metaphysical, and ethical questions. As a result, his attempts to rebut our arguments fail.

W. Va. L. Rev., 1987

110 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 In this, the Constitution's bicentennial year, perhaps... more 110 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 In this, the Constitution's bicentennial year, perhaps the most fitting mark of respect we can pay to the charter which has given our nation its legal and political form is to strip away some of this ivy. We should adopt as the chief object of ...

Embryos, stem cells and moral status: a response to George and Lee In an earlier essay, we argued... more Embryos, stem cells and moral status: a response to George and Lee In an earlier essay, we argued that those who grant a special moral status to human embryos cannot consistently refuse to grant a similar moral status to other entities, such as stem cells, that also have the potential to develop into adult humans (Sagan & Singer, 2007). To do so, however, would have absurd implications. In a recent issue of EMBO reports, Robert George and Patrick Lee defended their attribution of special moral status to the human embryo against our argument (George & Lee, 2009). But their defence fails.

The authors of this book, sitting as a hypothetical Supreme Court, rewrite the famous 2015 opinio... more The authors of this book, sitting as a hypothetical Supreme Court, rewrite the famous 2015 opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, which guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. In eleven incisive opinions, the authors offer the best constitutional arguments for and against the right to same-sex marriage, and debate what Obergefell should mean for the future. In addition to serving as Chief Justice of this imaginary court, the book's editor provides a critical introduction to the case. He recounts the story of the gay rights litigation that led to Obergefell, and he explains how courts respond to political mobilizations for new rights claims. The social movement for gay rights and marriage equality is a powerful example of how — through legal imagination and political struggle — arguments once dismissed as “off-the-wall” can later become established in American constitutional law.

In Defense of Natural Law, 1999

The American Founding : Its Intellectual and Moral Framework

By the phrase "our humanity," I refer more precisely to the nature of humans as rational beings. ... more By the phrase "our humanity," I refer more precisely to the nature of humans as rational beings. The nature of human beings is a rational nature. So in virtue of our human nature, we human beings possess a profound and inherent dignity. The same would be true, however, of beings other than humans whose nature is a rational nature, if indeed there are such beings. In the case of humans, even individuals who have not yet acquired the immediately exercisable capacities for conceptual thought and other rational acts, and even those who have temporarily or permanently lost them, and, indeed, even those who do not possess them, never possessed them, and (short of a miracle) never will possess them, possess a rational nature.

Body–Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics, 2007

The Good Society, 2003

My dear Laski, Your remark about the "oughts" and system of values in political science leaves me... more My dear Laski, Your remark about the "oughts" and system of values in political science leaves me rather cold. If as I think, the values are simply generalizations emotionally expressed, the generalizations are matters for the same science as other observations of fact. If as I sometimes suspect, you believe in some transcendental sanction, I don't. Of course, different people, and especially different races, differ in their values-but those differences are matters of fact and I have no respect for them except my general respect for what exists. Man is an idealizing animal-and expresses his ideals (values) in the conventions of his time. I have very little respect for the conventions in themselves, but respect and generally try to observe those of my own environment as the transitory expression of an eternal fact.. . S o the eighty-eight year old Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to Harold Laski on September 15, 1929, just weeks before the stock market crashed plunging the world into depression. What are we to make of Holmes's statements? "Values," he says, are merely "generalizations emotionally expressed". 2 As such, they are "matters for the same science as other observations of fact. ' 3 They have no "transcendental sanction." 4 Of course, different people, and, especially, different peoples (what Holmes calls "races"), "differ in their values." 5 These differences are mere "matters of fact," and deserve no particular

Catholic University of America Press eBooks, Feb 15, 2019

Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 4, 1999

REASONS, GOODS, AND PRINCIPLES INTENTIONS IN ACTION JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND WRONGDOING PHILOSOPHY OF... more REASONS, GOODS, AND PRINCIPLES INTENTIONS IN ACTION JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND WRONGDOING PHILOSOPHY OF LAW PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC REASONS REFLECTIONS AND RESPONSES

At the deepest level, cloning should be prohibited because it turns procreation into a species of... more At the deepest level, cloning should be prohibited because it turns procreation into a species of manufacture. It treats a child-to-be as an object of production. In the words of Dr. Leon Kass, Chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics, cloning “threatens the dignity of human procreation, giving one generation unprecedented genetic control over the next. It is the first step toward a eugenic world in which children become objects of manipulation and products of will.”

International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2013

Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics

Intransigence is a vice, but there is no virtue in accepting bad compromises. The “Fairness for A... more Intransigence is a vice, but there is no virtue in accepting bad compromises. The “Fairness for All” legislation is a bad compromise — and as a result, would be a misguided response to the Supreme Court’s Bostock decision. To show this is not to question the good faith of the bill’s advocates, with whom we have been in friendly dialogue for years. It’s merely to note that despite the undoubted goodwill of the bill’s proponents (and despite its name), the bill is grievously unfair. Its protections for religious liberty are insufficient. And they come at the price of legally enshrining a misguided sexual and gender ideology — which would license officials to punish citizens who dissent from secular progressive orthodoxy. These costs are unsurprising: from the start, the compromise sought was misframed in two ways. First, there was a woeful mismatch in ambitions: The “conservative” side failed even to seek protections for many crucial interests apart from religious liberty that are imp...

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2014

In various places we have defended the position that a new human organism, that is, an individual... more In various places we have defended the position that a new human organism, that is, an individual member of the human species, comes to be at fertilization, the union of the spermatozoon and the oocyte. This individual organism, during the ordinary course of embryological development, remains the same individual and does not undergo any further substantial change, unless monozygotic twinning, or some form of chimerism occurs. Recently, in this Journal Jason Morris has challenged our position, claiming that recent findings in reproductive and stem cell biology have falsified our view. He objects to our claim that a discernible substantial change occurs at conception, giving rise to the existence of a new individual of the human species. In addition, he objects to our claim that the embryo is an individual, a unified whole that persists through various changes, and thus something other than a mere aggregate of cells. Morris raises a number of objections to these claims. However, we will show that his arguments overlook key data and confuse biological, metaphysical, and ethical questions. As a result, his attempts to rebut our arguments fail.

W. Va. L. Rev., 1987

110 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 In this, the Constitution's bicentennial year, perhaps... more 110 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 In this, the Constitution's bicentennial year, perhaps the most fitting mark of respect we can pay to the charter which has given our nation its legal and political form is to strip away some of this ivy. We should adopt as the chief object of ...

Embryos, stem cells and moral status: a response to George and Lee In an earlier essay, we argued... more Embryos, stem cells and moral status: a response to George and Lee In an earlier essay, we argued that those who grant a special moral status to human embryos cannot consistently refuse to grant a similar moral status to other entities, such as stem cells, that also have the potential to develop into adult humans (Sagan & Singer, 2007). To do so, however, would have absurd implications. In a recent issue of EMBO reports, Robert George and Patrick Lee defended their attribution of special moral status to the human embryo against our argument (George & Lee, 2009). But their defence fails.

The authors of this book, sitting as a hypothetical Supreme Court, rewrite the famous 2015 opinio... more The authors of this book, sitting as a hypothetical Supreme Court, rewrite the famous 2015 opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, which guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. In eleven incisive opinions, the authors offer the best constitutional arguments for and against the right to same-sex marriage, and debate what Obergefell should mean for the future. In addition to serving as Chief Justice of this imaginary court, the book's editor provides a critical introduction to the case. He recounts the story of the gay rights litigation that led to Obergefell, and he explains how courts respond to political mobilizations for new rights claims. The social movement for gay rights and marriage equality is a powerful example of how — through legal imagination and political struggle — arguments once dismissed as “off-the-wall” can later become established in American constitutional law.

In Defense of Natural Law, 1999

The American Founding : Its Intellectual and Moral Framework

By the phrase "our humanity," I refer more precisely to the nature of humans as rational beings. ... more By the phrase "our humanity," I refer more precisely to the nature of humans as rational beings. The nature of human beings is a rational nature. So in virtue of our human nature, we human beings possess a profound and inherent dignity. The same would be true, however, of beings other than humans whose nature is a rational nature, if indeed there are such beings. In the case of humans, even individuals who have not yet acquired the immediately exercisable capacities for conceptual thought and other rational acts, and even those who have temporarily or permanently lost them, and, indeed, even those who do not possess them, never possessed them, and (short of a miracle) never will possess them, possess a rational nature.

Body–Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics, 2007

The Good Society, 2003

My dear Laski, Your remark about the "oughts" and system of values in political science leaves me... more My dear Laski, Your remark about the "oughts" and system of values in political science leaves me rather cold. If as I think, the values are simply generalizations emotionally expressed, the generalizations are matters for the same science as other observations of fact. If as I sometimes suspect, you believe in some transcendental sanction, I don't. Of course, different people, and especially different races, differ in their values-but those differences are matters of fact and I have no respect for them except my general respect for what exists. Man is an idealizing animal-and expresses his ideals (values) in the conventions of his time. I have very little respect for the conventions in themselves, but respect and generally try to observe those of my own environment as the transitory expression of an eternal fact.. . S o the eighty-eight year old Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to Harold Laski on September 15, 1929, just weeks before the stock market crashed plunging the world into depression. What are we to make of Holmes's statements? "Values," he says, are merely "generalizations emotionally expressed". 2 As such, they are "matters for the same science as other observations of fact. ' 3 They have no "transcendental sanction." 4 Of course, different people, and, especially, different peoples (what Holmes calls "races"), "differ in their values." 5 These differences are mere "matters of fact," and deserve no particular

The University of Chicago Law Review, 1988

A noteworthy feature of contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world and beyond is a rea... more A noteworthy feature of contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world and beyond is a reawakening of interest in practical reason. The willingness to take reasons for action seriously in descriptive and prescriptive jurisprudence, as well as in political philosophy and ethics, has been a mark of many notable philosophical achievements over the past three decades. In jurisprudence, the works of H. L. A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and Ronald Dworkin certainly come to mind. In political philosophy, one immediately thinks of the competing theories of justice developed by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. In ethics, a long list of contributions would only begin with those of Alan Donagan, Alan Gewirth, Philippa Foot, David Wiggins, and John McDowell. The revival of interest in practical reason has brought in its wake renewed philosophical attention to theories of natural law. Long relegated to merely historical interest (at least outside of Roman Catholic intellectual circles), natural law theory is once again a competitor in contemporary philosophical debates about law, politics, and morals. What this means, for one thing, is that the writings of St.