Jørgen Jensehaugen | Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (original) (raw)
Articles by Jørgen Jensehaugen
According to health statistics, Jordan has largely avoided the COVID-19 pandemic. As of early Jun... more According to health statistics, Jordan has largely avoided the COVID-19 pandemic. As of early June 2020, there have only been 9 deaths in a population of 10 million. Jordan implemented a strict closure before the outbreak gained momentum. The country’s swift lockdown was due to it being well-equipped to coerce the population, while being structurally ill-equipped to deal with a large outbreak. Jordan has a weak health-care system, a struggling economy and densely populated poor urban areas where the virus would have been hard to contain. Jordan is a success story from a public health perspective, but the societal and economic costs have been high.
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2019
When the US embassy in Teheran was stormed in 1979, and the embassy personnel taken hostage, the ... more When the US embassy in Teheran was stormed in 1979, and the
embassy personnel taken hostage, the PLO saw an opportunity to
engage with the United States. Since the early 1970s the PLO had
tried to open a political channel with the USA. While several backchannels had been attempted none resulted in direct political
talks between the US and the PLO. The US was bound by a secret
agreement with Israel, as part of Sinai II, having promised not to
negotiate with the PLO. When the US hostages were taken in 1979,
the PLO attempted to use their contacts in the new Iranian regime
to negotiate on behalf of the US. While this channel did not result
in a major breakthrough in the hostage negotiations, it is a case
which illustrates a paradox in US Middle East policy: The US was
unwilling to negotiate with the Palestinians when it was their
conflict that was at stake, but once US lives were in the balance,
the US administration was more than willing to open a direct
channel to the PLO. Arafat, for his part, was equally willing to
step up, hoping to make political gains further down the line.
Middle East Journal, 2019
For the United States and the Palestinians, 1977 was a diplomatic opportunity due to the election... more For the United States and the Palestinians, 1977 was a diplomatic opportunity due to the election of President Jimmy Carter and changes within the Palestine Liberation Organization. While Carter aimed for a comprehensive peace to solve the entire Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel balked. Instead of blocking the process entirely, however, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin proposed Palestinian "self-rule." While it enabled a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace process, the self-rule proposal was an obfuscation intended to continue Palestinian political exclusion and prevent Palestinian statehood.
Babylon - nordisk tidsskrift for midtøstenstudier, 2018
Amerikansk motvilje mot å flytte sin Israel-ambassade til Jerusalem gir inntrykk av en stabil ame... more Amerikansk motvilje mot å flytte sin Israel-ambassade til Jerusalem gir inntrykk av en stabil amerikansk Jerusalem-politikk hvor usa står i opposisjon mot Israel. Ser man på amerikansk Jerusalem-politikk i et syttiårsperspektiv, blir det imidlertid klart at Israel gradvis har vunnet mot amerikansk ettergivenhet.
Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor represent... more Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor representing the minority population within the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine to establishing the State of Israel, which would be recognised almost instantaneously by the world's two Superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a result, however, was never a given. What processes allowed a non-state actor, the Zionist movement, to secure international acceptance for the creation of a Jewish state in highly ambiguous circumstances? This analysis explores the dual-track adopted by the Zionist movement, whereby it worked to create facts on the ground within Palestine whilst securing support for its state-building project at the international level. By establishing state-like institutions in Palestine whilst building international support, the Jewish Agency was able to secure for itself a unique place from which to declare statehood.
During 1948–9, Israeli leaders placed considerable importance on the country's efforts to secure ... more During 1948–9, Israeli leaders placed considerable importance on the country's efforts to secure membership in the United Nations (UN). Israel's foreign relations at the time, however, were complicated not only by the country's lack of UN membership. Israel was also at war with its Arab neighbours, and the newly created state was thus without clear borders and faced with several unresolved political problems with clear international ramifications: the future status of Jerusalem and the growing Palestinian refugee problem. Despite this, and despite the international pressure these unresolved issues triggered, Israel succeeded in securing UN membership in May 1949, which entailed a de facto international recognition of the new state. How might a political achievement of such magnitude be explained? Looking in greater detail at how Israel argued for its admission to the UN, and how it successfully countered the arguments voiced internationally against its application for membership, this article shows how Israel was able to achieve its goal of UN membership without making any concessions on its positions on territory, Jerusalem, or the question of the Palestinian refugees. In essence, it was able to do this by holding the Arab–Israeli peace process hostage to its UN admission.
The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli... more The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks differed radically from the other armistice negotiations. Here, two parallel tracks were followed. At Rhodes, the two countries negotiated openly under UN auspices, while in Jerusalem and at King Abdullah's palace in Transjordan, representatives of the two countries held secret bilateral talks. Israel masterfully used the context of these talks to maximise its gains, using military operations to create ‘facts on the ground’, combined with direct coercion in the shape of blackmail, while taking full advantage of international power structures and abusing the trust that King Abdullah had placed in personal relations. The UN Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was aware of the secret back channel, where the clearest cases of coercion took place. Physically and mentally exhausted by the protracted negotiations, he allowed the secret talks to progress despite his dislike of the outcome. The British government, at the time the protector of Transjordan, was unable to assist its client for fear of falling out with the USA, while the US government, in many ways the protector of Israel, maintained an equally ‘hands off’ stance because the talks concerned only an armistice, not a peace treaty. Already at this early stage in their relations, the power asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states was the main reason the parties could not arrive at a peaceful, sustainable solution. This article reinvestigates this diplomacy by using a combination of US, Israeli, British and UN archives, as well as the almost untouched Ralph Bunche diary.
After the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a se... more After the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a series of negotiations between Israel and its Arab adversaries, culminating in three disengagement agreements. As successful as these were, by late 1975 Kissinger’s step-by-step approach had stagnated. New approaches seemed essential to push the peace process forward. Throughout 1975, a Brookings Institution study group wrote a report on how the United States could better approach Arab–Israeli peacemaking. It recommended a comprehensive approach, aimed at solving all outstanding questions, by including all the parties within the same framework. The recommendations advocated including the Soviet Union in the peace process and that the Palestinians should represent themselves. The report was highly influential on President Jimmy Carter’s subsequent approach towards the Arab–Israeli conflict—and many of the report’s authors staffed his Administration. Carter’s perceived adaptation of the report aggrieved the Israelis, whilst for others the Brookings report served as a normative benchmark for the Carter presidency.
Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier
Siden palestinernes president Mahmoud Abbas forlot 2010-forhandlingene, har Israels statsminister... more Siden palestinernes president Mahmoud Abbas forlot 2010-forhandlingene, har Israels statsminister gjentatte ganger invitert ham tilbake til forhandlingsbordet, så lenge alle betingelser legges til side. Men «ingen betingelser» er slett ikke et nøytralt utgangspunkt for forhandlinger; det er en velutprøvd israelsk forhandlingsstrategi.
Den palestinske nasjonale identiteten ble skapt i Palestina, men det var flukten fra Palestina so... more Den palestinske nasjonale identiteten ble skapt i Palestina,
men det var flukten fra Palestina som dannet den samlende
erfaringen som ble basisen for den altomfattende palestinske
nasjonalismen. Eksilet skapte ikke nasjonalismen, men styrket
den ved å definere og demokratisere den.
Krigen i 1948 var palestinernes al-Nakba og står som den viktigste hendelsen i palestinsk histori... more Krigen i 1948 var palestinernes al-Nakba og står som den viktigste hendelsen
i palestinsk historie. På tross av krigens sentrale posisjon tar den
overraskende liten plass i palestinske historiebøker. Det er ikke hvordan
Palestina ble ødelagt som står i fokus, men heller hva som ble ødelagt.
Historiografien er eksistensiell – Palestina fantes og vi eksisterer som et
folk.
Book Reviews by Jørgen Jensehaugen
Journal of Peace Research, 2017
Elie Podeh opens the book by showing that Abba Eban's famous dictum that the Palestinians never m... more Elie Podeh opens the book by showing that Abba Eban's famous dictum that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity is apocryphal. The quote nonetheless provides an excellent starting-point for analysing Arab-Israeli peacemaking, because the Palestinians are not alone in having a knack for missing opportunities. Rather, it is a symptom that describes all the parties involved. Podeh takes the reader through an impressive twenty-eight short case studies of opportunities for peace, most of which were missed. The cases stretch as far back as 1919, the Faysal-Weizmann Agreement, and as contemporary as the 2008 Abu Mazen-Olmert Talks. In each of the case studies, Podeh presents a factual account, before he analyses the extent to which the case constitutes a 'missed opportunity'. Gauging whether the chance was suᕤiciently large to be labelled 'missed' is no easy task, but Podeh develops a rather convincing three-tiered scheme. First, did the necessary conditions for a possible breakthrough exist? Second, was the opportunity plausible? And third, did the opportunity create a useful legacy? To assess the first of these criteria Podeh uses four variables: the degree of legitimacy held by the political leadership; the willingness to take bold steps; the level of trust between the parties; and third-party involvement. This strict structure allows Podeh to provide us with many insights in very few pages, which again explains how he can deliver such a large range of case studies. While one might disagree with certain of the individual conclusions, there is no doubt that the sum of the work is impressive and a very useful starting point for learning about the conflict.
Review of Yaqub, Salim (2016) Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and US-Middle East Relations... more Review of Yaqub, Salim (2016) Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and US-Middle East Relations in the 1970s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
According to health statistics, Jordan has largely avoided the COVID-19 pandemic. As of early Jun... more According to health statistics, Jordan has largely avoided the COVID-19 pandemic. As of early June 2020, there have only been 9 deaths in a population of 10 million. Jordan implemented a strict closure before the outbreak gained momentum. The country’s swift lockdown was due to it being well-equipped to coerce the population, while being structurally ill-equipped to deal with a large outbreak. Jordan has a weak health-care system, a struggling economy and densely populated poor urban areas where the virus would have been hard to contain. Jordan is a success story from a public health perspective, but the societal and economic costs have been high.
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2019
When the US embassy in Teheran was stormed in 1979, and the embassy personnel taken hostage, the ... more When the US embassy in Teheran was stormed in 1979, and the
embassy personnel taken hostage, the PLO saw an opportunity to
engage with the United States. Since the early 1970s the PLO had
tried to open a political channel with the USA. While several backchannels had been attempted none resulted in direct political
talks between the US and the PLO. The US was bound by a secret
agreement with Israel, as part of Sinai II, having promised not to
negotiate with the PLO. When the US hostages were taken in 1979,
the PLO attempted to use their contacts in the new Iranian regime
to negotiate on behalf of the US. While this channel did not result
in a major breakthrough in the hostage negotiations, it is a case
which illustrates a paradox in US Middle East policy: The US was
unwilling to negotiate with the Palestinians when it was their
conflict that was at stake, but once US lives were in the balance,
the US administration was more than willing to open a direct
channel to the PLO. Arafat, for his part, was equally willing to
step up, hoping to make political gains further down the line.
Middle East Journal, 2019
For the United States and the Palestinians, 1977 was a diplomatic opportunity due to the election... more For the United States and the Palestinians, 1977 was a diplomatic opportunity due to the election of President Jimmy Carter and changes within the Palestine Liberation Organization. While Carter aimed for a comprehensive peace to solve the entire Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel balked. Instead of blocking the process entirely, however, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin proposed Palestinian "self-rule." While it enabled a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace process, the self-rule proposal was an obfuscation intended to continue Palestinian political exclusion and prevent Palestinian statehood.
Babylon - nordisk tidsskrift for midtøstenstudier, 2018
Amerikansk motvilje mot å flytte sin Israel-ambassade til Jerusalem gir inntrykk av en stabil ame... more Amerikansk motvilje mot å flytte sin Israel-ambassade til Jerusalem gir inntrykk av en stabil amerikansk Jerusalem-politikk hvor usa står i opposisjon mot Israel. Ser man på amerikansk Jerusalem-politikk i et syttiårsperspektiv, blir det imidlertid klart at Israel gradvis har vunnet mot amerikansk ettergivenhet.
Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor represent... more Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor representing the minority population within the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine to establishing the State of Israel, which would be recognised almost instantaneously by the world's two Superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a result, however, was never a given. What processes allowed a non-state actor, the Zionist movement, to secure international acceptance for the creation of a Jewish state in highly ambiguous circumstances? This analysis explores the dual-track adopted by the Zionist movement, whereby it worked to create facts on the ground within Palestine whilst securing support for its state-building project at the international level. By establishing state-like institutions in Palestine whilst building international support, the Jewish Agency was able to secure for itself a unique place from which to declare statehood.
During 1948–9, Israeli leaders placed considerable importance on the country's efforts to secure ... more During 1948–9, Israeli leaders placed considerable importance on the country's efforts to secure membership in the United Nations (UN). Israel's foreign relations at the time, however, were complicated not only by the country's lack of UN membership. Israel was also at war with its Arab neighbours, and the newly created state was thus without clear borders and faced with several unresolved political problems with clear international ramifications: the future status of Jerusalem and the growing Palestinian refugee problem. Despite this, and despite the international pressure these unresolved issues triggered, Israel succeeded in securing UN membership in May 1949, which entailed a de facto international recognition of the new state. How might a political achievement of such magnitude be explained? Looking in greater detail at how Israel argued for its admission to the UN, and how it successfully countered the arguments voiced internationally against its application for membership, this article shows how Israel was able to achieve its goal of UN membership without making any concessions on its positions on territory, Jerusalem, or the question of the Palestinian refugees. In essence, it was able to do this by holding the Arab–Israeli peace process hostage to its UN admission.
The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli... more The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks differed radically from the other armistice negotiations. Here, two parallel tracks were followed. At Rhodes, the two countries negotiated openly under UN auspices, while in Jerusalem and at King Abdullah's palace in Transjordan, representatives of the two countries held secret bilateral talks. Israel masterfully used the context of these talks to maximise its gains, using military operations to create ‘facts on the ground’, combined with direct coercion in the shape of blackmail, while taking full advantage of international power structures and abusing the trust that King Abdullah had placed in personal relations. The UN Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was aware of the secret back channel, where the clearest cases of coercion took place. Physically and mentally exhausted by the protracted negotiations, he allowed the secret talks to progress despite his dislike of the outcome. The British government, at the time the protector of Transjordan, was unable to assist its client for fear of falling out with the USA, while the US government, in many ways the protector of Israel, maintained an equally ‘hands off’ stance because the talks concerned only an armistice, not a peace treaty. Already at this early stage in their relations, the power asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states was the main reason the parties could not arrive at a peaceful, sustainable solution. This article reinvestigates this diplomacy by using a combination of US, Israeli, British and UN archives, as well as the almost untouched Ralph Bunche diary.
After the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a se... more After the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a series of negotiations between Israel and its Arab adversaries, culminating in three disengagement agreements. As successful as these were, by late 1975 Kissinger’s step-by-step approach had stagnated. New approaches seemed essential to push the peace process forward. Throughout 1975, a Brookings Institution study group wrote a report on how the United States could better approach Arab–Israeli peacemaking. It recommended a comprehensive approach, aimed at solving all outstanding questions, by including all the parties within the same framework. The recommendations advocated including the Soviet Union in the peace process and that the Palestinians should represent themselves. The report was highly influential on President Jimmy Carter’s subsequent approach towards the Arab–Israeli conflict—and many of the report’s authors staffed his Administration. Carter’s perceived adaptation of the report aggrieved the Israelis, whilst for others the Brookings report served as a normative benchmark for the Carter presidency.
Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier
Siden palestinernes president Mahmoud Abbas forlot 2010-forhandlingene, har Israels statsminister... more Siden palestinernes president Mahmoud Abbas forlot 2010-forhandlingene, har Israels statsminister gjentatte ganger invitert ham tilbake til forhandlingsbordet, så lenge alle betingelser legges til side. Men «ingen betingelser» er slett ikke et nøytralt utgangspunkt for forhandlinger; det er en velutprøvd israelsk forhandlingsstrategi.
Den palestinske nasjonale identiteten ble skapt i Palestina, men det var flukten fra Palestina so... more Den palestinske nasjonale identiteten ble skapt i Palestina,
men det var flukten fra Palestina som dannet den samlende
erfaringen som ble basisen for den altomfattende palestinske
nasjonalismen. Eksilet skapte ikke nasjonalismen, men styrket
den ved å definere og demokratisere den.
Krigen i 1948 var palestinernes al-Nakba og står som den viktigste hendelsen i palestinsk histori... more Krigen i 1948 var palestinernes al-Nakba og står som den viktigste hendelsen
i palestinsk historie. På tross av krigens sentrale posisjon tar den
overraskende liten plass i palestinske historiebøker. Det er ikke hvordan
Palestina ble ødelagt som står i fokus, men heller hva som ble ødelagt.
Historiografien er eksistensiell – Palestina fantes og vi eksisterer som et
folk.
Journal of Peace Research, 2017
Elie Podeh opens the book by showing that Abba Eban's famous dictum that the Palestinians never m... more Elie Podeh opens the book by showing that Abba Eban's famous dictum that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity is apocryphal. The quote nonetheless provides an excellent starting-point for analysing Arab-Israeli peacemaking, because the Palestinians are not alone in having a knack for missing opportunities. Rather, it is a symptom that describes all the parties involved. Podeh takes the reader through an impressive twenty-eight short case studies of opportunities for peace, most of which were missed. The cases stretch as far back as 1919, the Faysal-Weizmann Agreement, and as contemporary as the 2008 Abu Mazen-Olmert Talks. In each of the case studies, Podeh presents a factual account, before he analyses the extent to which the case constitutes a 'missed opportunity'. Gauging whether the chance was suᕤiciently large to be labelled 'missed' is no easy task, but Podeh develops a rather convincing three-tiered scheme. First, did the necessary conditions for a possible breakthrough exist? Second, was the opportunity plausible? And third, did the opportunity create a useful legacy? To assess the first of these criteria Podeh uses four variables: the degree of legitimacy held by the political leadership; the willingness to take bold steps; the level of trust between the parties; and third-party involvement. This strict structure allows Podeh to provide us with many insights in very few pages, which again explains how he can deliver such a large range of case studies. While one might disagree with certain of the individual conclusions, there is no doubt that the sum of the work is impressive and a very useful starting point for learning about the conflict.
Review of Yaqub, Salim (2016) Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and US-Middle East Relations... more Review of Yaqub, Salim (2016) Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and US-Middle East Relations in the 1970s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Journal of Peace Research
Journal of Peace Research
Mahmoud Darwish, palestinernes nasjonalpoet, skrev om savn, krig, flukt og eksil. Hans livshistor... more Mahmoud Darwish, palestinernes nasjonalpoet, skrev om savn, krig, flukt og eksil. Hans livshistorie rommet den palestinske kampen, og poesien manifesterer lengselen og lidelsen som banker i alle eksilhjerter: “an incurable malady called hope”.
Nok en gang advares Israel om at tostatsløsning snart kan vaere død og at man naermer seg en "ens... more Nok en gang advares Israel om at tostatsløsning snart kan vaere død og at man naermer seg en "enstatsrealitet". Det er høyst uklart når dette snart er, og nok en gang kan Israel ignorere advarselen.
Få land har investert så mye tid og penger i tostatsløsningen som Norge. Likevel har Norge avståt... more Få land har investert så mye tid og penger i tostatsløsningen som Norge. Likevel har Norge avstått fra å støtte palestinernes ønske om å heise flagget utenfor FN.
Historien om disse to stedene forteller oss mye om hvorfor det er så vanskelig å få i stand en to... more Historien om disse to stedene forteller oss mye om hvorfor det er så vanskelig å få i stand en tostatsløsning.
Når palestinerne i løpet av november går til FN med sine krav, bør Norge anerkjenne Palestina som... more Når palestinerne i løpet av november går til FN med sine krav, bør Norge anerkjenne Palestina som stat.
Israel fornekter og redefinerer landskapet i Palestina, med mer og mindre subtile midler.
Rome, IAI, January 2019, 4 p. (IAI Commentaries ; 19|03), 2019
While there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is a significant regional actor, it is highly questiona... more While there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is a significant regional actor, it is highly questionable whether this translates into it being an important player in the Israeli–Palestinian arena. While the fault of the diplomatic failings listed in this paper clearly does not lie with Saudi Arabia as such, what is interesting is the insistence of the United States that Saudi Arabia can act as a peace peddler despite evidence to the contrary.
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2012
The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli... more The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks differed radically from the other armistice negotiations. Here, two parallel tracks were followed. At Rhodes, the two countries negotiated openly under UN auspices, while in Jerusalem and at King Abdullah's palace in Transjordan, representatives of the two countries held secret bilateral talks. Israel masterfully used the context of these talks to maximise its gains, using military operations to create ‘facts on the ground’, combined with direct coercion in the shape of blackmail, while taking full advantage of international power structures and abusing the trust that King Abdullah had placed in personal relations. The UN Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was aware of the secret back channel, where the clearest cases of coercion took place. Physically and mentally exhausted by the protracted negotiations, he allowed the secret talks to progress despite his dislike of the outcome. The British government, at the time the protector of Transjordan, was unable to assist its client for fear of falling out with the USA, while the US government, in many ways the protector of Israel, maintained an equally ‘hands off’ stance because the talks concerned only an armistice, not a peace treaty. Already at this early stage in their relations, the power asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states was the main reason the parties could not arrive at a peaceful, sustainable solution. This article reinvestigates this diplomacy by using a combination of US, Israeli, British and UN archives, as well as the almost untouched Ralph Bunche diary.
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 2012
The history of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East is marked by numerous stark failures and a few e... more The history of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East is marked by numerous stark failures and a few ephemeral successes. Jimmy Carter’s short-lived Middle East diplomatic strategy constitutes an exception in vision and approach. In this extensive and long-overdue analysis of Carter’s Middle East policy, Jørgen Jensehaugen sheds light on this important and unprecedented chapter in U.S. regional diplomacy. Against all odds, including the rise of Menachem Begin’s right-wing government in Israel, Carter broke new ground by demanding the involvement of the Palestinians in Arab-Israeli diplomatic negotiations. This book assesses the president’s ‘comprehensive peace’ doctrine, which aimed to encompass all parties of the conflict, and reveals the reasons why his vision ultimately failed.
Largely based on analysis of newly-declassified diplomatic files and American, British, Palestinian and Israeli archival sources, this book is the first comprehensive examination of Jimmy Carter’s engagement with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At a time when U.S. involvement in the region threatens to exacerbate tensions further, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter provides important new insights into the historical roots of the ongoing unrest. The book will be of value to Middle East and International Relations scholars, and those researching U.S diplomacy and the Carter Administration.