Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon - PubMed (original) (raw)

Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon

M I Meltzer et al. Emerg Infect Dis. 2001 Nov-Dec.

Abstract

We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.

PubMed Disclaimer

References

    1. N Engl J Med. 1969 Nov 27;281(22):1220-4 - PubMed
    1. J Infect Dis. 1972 Feb;125(2):161-9 - PubMed
    1. Nature. 1979 Aug 2;280(5721):361-7 - PubMed
    1. Nature. 1979 Aug 9;280(5722):455-61 - PubMed
    1. J Hyg (Lond). 1986 Jun;96(3):459-66 - PubMed

MeSH terms

Substances

LinkOut - more resources