Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games - PubMed (original) (raw)
. 2002 May 10;296(5570):1129-32.
doi: 10.1126/science.1070582.
Affiliations
- PMID: 12004134
- DOI: 10.1126/science.1070582
Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games
Christoph Hauert et al. Science. 2002.
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation among nonrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. Reciprocal altruism fails to provide a solution if interactions are not repeated often enough or groups are too large. Punishment and reward can be very effective but require that defectors can be traced and identified. Here we present a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity. Optional participation can foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. In voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist. We show that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms, leading usually not to an equilibrium but to an unending cycle of adjustments (a Red Queen type of evolution). Thus, voluntary participation offers an escape hatch out of some social traps. Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random.
Similar articles
- Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game.
Semmann D, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M. Semmann D, et al. Nature. 2003 Sep 25;425(6956):390-3. doi: 10.1038/nature01986. Nature. 2003. PMID: 14508487 - Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with common resource dynamics.
Wakano JY. Wakano JY. J Theor Biol. 2007 Aug 21;247(4):616-22. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.04.008. Epub 2007 Apr 12. J Theor Biol. 2007. PMID: 17512952 - Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games.
Xu Z, Wang Z, Zhang L. Xu Z, et al. J Theor Biol. 2010 May 7;264(1):19-23. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.025. Epub 2010 Jan 29. J Theor Biol. 2010. PMID: 20116386 - Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment.
Archetti M, Scheuring I. Archetti M, et al. J Theor Biol. 2012 Apr 21;299:9-20. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.018. Epub 2011 Jun 24. J Theor Biol. 2012. PMID: 21723299 Review. - The evolution of cooperation and altruism--a general framework and a classification of models.
Lehmann L, Keller L. Lehmann L, et al. J Evol Biol. 2006 Sep;19(5):1365-76. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01119.x. J Evol Biol. 2006. PMID: 16910958 Review.
Cited by
- Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games.
Peña J, Rochat Y. Peña J, et al. PLoS One. 2012;7(9):e44514. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0044514. Epub 2012 Sep 10. PLoS One. 2012. PMID: 22970237 Free PMC article. - Reputation-Based Investment Helps to Optimize Group Behaviors in Spatial Lattice Networks.
Ding H, Cao L, Ren Y, Choo KK, Shi B. Ding H, et al. PLoS One. 2016 Sep 9;11(9):e0162781. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0162781. eCollection 2016. PLoS One. 2016. PMID: 27611686 Free PMC article. - Evolution as a result of resource flow in ecosystems: Ecological dynamics can drive evolution.
Salahshour M. Salahshour M. PLoS One. 2023 Oct 5;18(10):e0286922. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0286922. eCollection 2023. PLoS One. 2023. PMID: 37796863 Free PMC article. - The effect of ostracism and optional participation on the evolution of cooperation in the voluntary public goods game.
Nakamaru M, Yokoyama A. Nakamaru M, et al. PLoS One. 2014 Sep 25;9(9):e108423. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108423. eCollection 2014. PLoS One. 2014. PMID: 25255458 Free PMC article. - Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations.
Liu L, Chen X, Szolnoki A. Liu L, et al. Sci Rep. 2017 Apr 19;7:46634. doi: 10.1038/srep46634. Sci Rep. 2017. PMID: 28422168 Free PMC article.
Publication types
MeSH terms
LinkOut - more resources
Full Text Sources