Epistemic injustice in psychiatry - PubMed (original) (raw)

Editorial

Epistemic injustice in psychiatry

Paul Crichton et al. BJPsych Bull. 2017 Apr.

Abstract

It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice (a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject) than healthy people. This editorial claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory factors are outlined, global and specific. Some suggestions are made to counteract the effects of these factors, for instance, we suggest that physicians should participate in groups where the subjective experience of patients is explored, and learn to become more aware of their own unconscious prejudices towards psychiatric patients.

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Conflict of interest statement

Declaration of interest None.

References

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