Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization - PubMed (original) (raw)

Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization

Sergey Gavrilets et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2017.

Abstract

Human behavior is strongly affected by culturally transmitted norms and values. Certain norms are internalized (i.e., acting according to a norm becomes an end in itself rather than merely a tool in achieving certain goals or avoiding social sanctions). Humans' capacity to internalize norms likely evolved in our ancestors to simplify solving certain challenges-including social ones. Here we study theoretically the evolutionary origins of the capacity to internalize norms. In our models, individuals can choose to participate in collective actions as well as punish free riders. In making their decisions, individuals attempt to maximize a utility function in which normative values are initially irrelevant but play an increasingly important role if the ability to internalize norms emerges. Using agent-based simulations, we show that norm internalization evolves under a wide range of conditions so that cooperation becomes "instinctive." Norm internalization evolves much more easily and has much larger effects on behavior if groups promote peer punishment of free riders. Promoting only participation in collective actions is not effective. Typically, intermediate levels of norm internalization are most frequent but there are also cases with relatively small frequencies of "oversocialized" individuals willing to make extreme sacrifices for their groups no matter material costs, as well as "undersocialized" individuals completely immune to social norms. Evolving the ability to internalize norms was likely a crucial step on the path to large-scale human cooperation.

Keywords: conflict; cooperation; evolution; modeling; values.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Figures

Fig. 1.

Fig. 1.

Examples of evolutionary dynamics. Us-vs.-nature game with n=16,b= 4,vx= 0,vy= 0.5,X0= 8,δ= 0.50,K= 4. (A) Frequencies of individuals using different combinations of strategies (x,y). (Inset) The average fitness. (B) The dynamics of the distribution of the internalization trait η. The intensity of the black color is proportional to the number of individuals with the corresponding trait values present at a given time. The red line shows the mean value of η. See Methods and SI Appendix for exact definitions of parameters.

Fig. 2.

Fig. 2.

Examples of evolutionary dynamics: us-vs.-them game with n=8,b= 1,vx= 0,vy= 0.5,δ= 0.50,K= 2. (A) Frequencies of individuals using different combinations of strategies (x,y). (Inset) The average fitness. (B) The dynamics of the distribution of the internalization trait η. The intensity of the black color is proportional to the number of individuals with the corresponding trait values present at a given time. The red line shows the mean value of η. See Methods and the SI Appendix for exact definitions of parameters.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 3.

Summary graphs for us-vs.-nature games: efforts x, punishment y, internalization η, fitness w, and SD σ in internalization trait η for different normative values of production vx and punishment vy, and group size n. Other parameters: X0=n/2,δ= 0.5,b= 4,K= 3. Shown are averages based on 10 runs for each parameter combination.

Fig. 4.

Fig. 4.

Summary graphs for us-vs.-them games: efforts x, punishment y, internalization η, fitness w, and SD σ in internalization trait η for different normative values of production vx and punishment vy, and group size n. Other parameters: δ= 0.5,b= 1,K= 3. Shown are averages based on 10 runs for each parameter combination.

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