Self-Exclusion among Online Poker Gamblers: Effects on Expenditure in Time and Money as Compared to Matched Controls - PubMed (original) (raw)

Comparative Study

Self-Exclusion among Online Poker Gamblers: Effects on Expenditure in Time and Money as Compared to Matched Controls

Amandine Luquiens et al. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2019.

Abstract

Background: No comparative data is available to report on the effect of online self-exclusion. The aim of this study was to assess the effect of self-exclusion in online poker gambling as compared to matched controls, after the end of the self-exclusion period. Methods: We included all gamblers who were first-time self-excluders over a 7-year period (n = 4887) on a poker website, and gamblers matched for gender, age and account duration (n = 4451). We report the effects over time of self-exclusion after it ended, on money (net losses) and time spent (session duration) using an analysis of variance procedure between mixed models with and without the interaction of time and self-exclusion. Analyzes were performed on the whole sample, on the sub-groups that were the most heavily involved in terms of time or money (higher quartiles) and among short-duration self-excluders (<3 months). Results: Significant effects of self-exclusion and short-duration self-exclusion were found for money and time spent over 12 months. Among the gamblers that were the most heavily involved financially, no significant effect on the amount spent was found. Among the gamblers who were the most heavily involved in terms of time, a significant effect was found on time spent. Short-duration self-exclusions showed no significant effect on the most heavily involved gamblers. Conclusions: Self-exclusion seems efficient in the long term. However, the effect on money spent of self-exclusions and of short-duration self-exclusions should be further explored among the most heavily involved gamblers.

Keywords: comparative study; online gambling; poker; responsible gambling; self-exclusion.

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Conflict of interest statement

A.L. has received sponsorship to attend scientific meetings, speaker honoraria and consultancy fees from Lundbeck, Indivior, and ARJEL. A.B. has received sponsorship to attend scientific meetings, speaker honoraria and consultancy fees from Lundbeck, Mylan, Gilead, Jansenn Cilag and Indivior. A.D., H.P., S.G. and E.B. have no conflict of interest to report.

Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1

Evolution of money/time spent in the last 4 weeks (€/hours) at baseline and after the end of self-exclusion period (n = 4887 and n = 4451). (* = _p_-value < 0.05—ANOVA between the mixed model with and the null model without the interaction of self-exclusion X time).

Figure 2

Figure 2

Evolution of money spent (net loss) in the last 4 weeks before and after the self-exclusion period among the gamblers who were the most heavily involved in terms of money (n = 2255 and 79 respectively for the self-excluders and the control group of matched gamblers) and time (n = 2150 and 185 respectively for the self-excluders and the control group of matched gamblers) (* = _p-_value < 0.05 —ANOVA between the mixed model with and the null model without the interaction of self-exclusion X time). (* = p-value < 0.05 - ANOVA between the mixed model with and the null model without the interaction of self-exclusion X time).

Figure 3

Figure 3

Evolution of money / time spent in the last 4 weeks (€/hours) before and after a short self-exclusion (n = 1460 and 1333). (* = _p_-value < 0.05—ANOVA between the mixed model with and the null model without the interaction of self-exclusion X time).

Figure 4

Figure 4

Evolution of money spent (net loss) in the last 4 weeks before and after a short self-exclusion among the gamblers who were the most heavily involved in terms of money (n = 683 and 18 respectively for the self-excluders and the control group of matched gamblers) and in terms of time (n = 665 and 35 respectively for the self-excluders and the control group of matched gamblers). (* = _p_-value < 0.05—ANOVA between the mixed model with and the null model without the interaction of self-exclusion X time).

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