The evolution of cooperation - PubMed (original) (raw)
The evolution of cooperation
R Axelrod et al. Science. 1981.
Abstract
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
Comment in
- 'Tit-for-tat' in cell biology.
Green DR. Green DR. Nat Rev Mol Cell Biol. 2011 Feb;12(2):73. doi: 10.1038/nrm3054. Nat Rev Mol Cell Biol. 2011. PMID: 21252991 No abstract available.
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