D. Tulodziecki | Purdue University (original) (raw)
Papers by D. Tulodziecki
My talk will be guided by the idea that there are some familiar scientific practices that are epi... more My talk will be guided by the idea that there are some familiar scientific practices that are epistemically significant. I will argue that we can test for the success of these practices empirically by examining cases in the history of science. Specifically, I will reconstruct one particular episode in the history of medicine – John Snow's reasoning concerning the infectiousness of cholera – and offer this case as a concrete example of the sort of empirical research that needs to be done in order to discover what kinds of methodological practices and rules are actually of epistemic interest. Analysing this case, I will explain how it (and other cases like it) can help us resolve specific cases of underdetermination. After exploring some possible anti-realist responses to this argument, I will conclude that, while the anti-realist is (more or less legitimately) able to construct underdetermination scenarios on a case-by-case basis, he will likely have to abandon the strategy of us...
Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 2014
The standard underdetermination argument relies on the assumption that empirical evidence is the ... more The standard underdetermination argument relies on the assumption that empirical evidence is the only epistemic constraint on theory-choice. One prominent response to this has been the invocation of theoretical virtues, properties of our scientific theories that scientific realists take to be epistemic in nature and that are such that, if they are had by our theories, make it more likely for those theories to be true. It thus becomes a main goal for scientific realists to establish a link between the theoretical virtues and truth. However, despite the fact that the virtues are frequently invoked in response to underdetermination arguments, how to do so has not been addressed in any detail. In this chapter, I will spell out the most promising approach in making this link: an account according to which the question of whether the virtues are epistemic is answered empirically, through an examination of cases of epistemically successful (and unsuccessful) theories. I will illustrate how this approach works concretely by discussing a case-study from mid-nineteenth century Britain concerning the debate about the transmissibility of puerperal fever. After showing how some specific virtues are put to work in this case, I will explain what is required in order to make a more general argument for the epistemic potential of the theoretical virtues. I then argue that putting the virtue-question on empirical grounds is enough to undermine the anti-realist position on underdetermination – regardless of whether, in fact, the virtues turn out to be epistemically potent or not.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2011
ABSTRACT
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2011
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2007
Philosophy of Science, 2013
The case of Semmelweis has been well known since Hempel. More recently, it has been revived by Pe... more The case of Semmelweis has been well known since Hempel. More recently, it has been revived by Peter Lipton, Donald Gillies, Alexander Bird, Alex Broadbent, and Raphael Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree that Semmelweis was an excellent reasoner. This widespread agreement has also given rise to a puzzle: why Semmelweis’s views were rejected for so long. I aim to dissolve both this puzzle and the standard view of Semmelweis by showing that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Semmelweis was not the excellent reasoner he has been assumed to be.
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2012
Philosophy of Science, 2017
It has recently been suggested that realist responses to historical cases featured in pessimistic... more It has recently been suggested that realist responses to historical cases featured in pessimistic meta-inductions are not as successful as previously thought. In response, selective realists have updated the basic divide et impera strategy specifically to take such cases into account and to argue that more modern realist accounts are immune to the historical challenge. Using a case study—that of the nineteenth-century zymotic theory of disease—I argue that these updated proposals fail and that even the most sophisticated recent realist accounts remain vulnerable to the challenge from history.
Metascience, 2008
In Making Prehistory, Derek Turner tries to bring to the fore an area of science that, he believe... more In Making Prehistory, Derek Turner tries to bring to the fore an area of science that, he believes, has been largely neglected in philosophy of science and, in particular, in the debate about scientific realism: prehistory. Turner's intended audience is twofold. On the one hand, he addresses philosophers of science, whom he hopes to convince that the debate about scientific realism has been skewed. According to Turner, this is due to the fact that writers on the subject have paid disproportionate attention to the microphysical at the expense of historical science, ''even though one cannot see, or smell, or bump into a living dinosaur any more than one can an X-ray photon'' (p. 2). On the other hand, he addresses scientists working on prehistory, trying to show how philosophical debates can have an impact on their field (p. 2). In a nutshell, Turner tries to argue two main claims. The first, which is the central concern of Chapters 1 to 5, is that scientific realism about the past is less warranted than scientific realism about the microphysical world. The second, which occupies Chapters 6 to 8, is directly related to the title of the book, Making Prehistory, and ''hints at the sort of social constructivist views that many scientists find kooky, or worse'' (p. 4). This claim involves what Turner calls the natural historical attitude, a view that espouses ''agnosticism with respect to the metaphysics of the past: Maybe we have made prehistory, and maybe we haven't'' (p. 5). Turner begins by pointing out that there is an important difference Ôbetween the past and the tiny' (cf. Chapter 1). He explains this difference by appealing to an epistemic asymmetry that
It has recently been suggested (for example, Lyons 2006) that realist responses to historical cas... more It has recently been suggested (for example, Lyons 2006) that realist responses to historical cases featured in pessimistic meta-inductions are not as successful as previously thought. In response, selective realists have updated the basic divide et impera strategy specifically to take such cases into account and to argue that more modern realist accounts are immune to the historical challenge (cf. Vickers 2013). Using a case-study – that of the 19th century zymotic theory of disease – I argue that these updated proposals fail and that even the most sophisticated recent realist accounts remain vulnerable to the challenge from history.
Philosophy of Science, 2013
Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree ... more Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree that Semmelweis was an excellent reasoner. This widespread agreement has also given rise to a puzzle: why Semmelweis's views were rejected for so long. I aim to dissolve both this puzzle and the standard view of Semmelweis by showing that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Semmelweis was not the excellent reasoner he has been assumed to be.
Synthese, 2013
In this paper, I argue (i) that there are certain methodological practices that are epistemically... more In this paper, I argue (i) that there are certain methodological practices that are epistemically significant, and (ii) that we can test for the success of these practices empirically by examining case-studies in the history of science. Analysing a particular episode from the history of medicine, I explain how this can help us resolve specific cases of underdetermination. I conclude that, while the anti-realist is (more or less legitimately) able to construct underdetermination scenarios on a case-by-case basis, he will have to abandon the strategy of using algorithms to do so, thus losing the much needed guarantee that there will always be rival cases of the required kind.
One typical realist response to the argument from underdetermination of theories by evidence is a... more One typical realist response to the argument from underdetermination of theories by evidence is an appeal to epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence to argue that, while scientific theories might be empirically equivalent, they are not epistemically equivalent. In this article, I spell out a new and reformulated version of the underdetermination argument that takes such criteria into account. I explain the notion of epistemic equivalence which this new argument appeals to, and argue that epistemic equivalence can be achieved in several, significantly different, ways. On the basis of this 'multiple realisability' of epistemic equivalence, I then proceed to explain and examine some of the main consequences of this reformulated underdetermination argument for both realists and anti-realists.
One premise of the underdetermination argument is that entailment of evidence is the only epistem... more One premise of the underdetermination argument is that entailment of evidence is the only epistemic constraint on theory-choice. I argue that methodological rules can be epistemically significant, both with respect to observables and unobservables. Using an example from the history of medicine-Koch's 1882 discovery of tuberculosis bacteria-I argue that even anti-realists ought to accept that these rules can break the tie between theories that are allegedly underdetermined. I then distinguish two types of underdetermination and argue that anti-realists, in order to maintain the underdetermination argument, need to do more than show that theories are empirically equivalent: they need to show that a certain kind of underdetermination obtains.
In the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or 'exciting cause' of cholera. Despite ... more In the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or 'exciting cause' of cholera. Despite much confusion surrounding the disease, the so-called miasma theory emerged as the prevalent account about cholera's cause. Going against this mainstream view, the British physician John Snow inferred several things about cholera's origin and pathology that no one else inferred. Without observing the vibrio cholerae, however,-data unavailable to Snow and his colleagues-, there was no way of settling the question of what exactly was causing cholera and how, or if, it was passed on. The question then arises as to how Snow arrived at conclusions so systematically different from those of his opponents. In this paper, I want to look at Snow's reasoning in some detail, and show that there were certain principles, explanatory power in particular, that were epistemologically important to Snow in their own right. I will show that Snow himself takes explanatory power to be an epistemic property, and makes explicit links between explanatory power and confirmation. Systematically juxtaposing Snow's claims and his opponents', I will show that Snow was right to tout the explanatory power of his theory, and that his conclusions about the epistemic superiority of his theory over that of the miasmatists' were justified.
The case of John Snow has long been important to epidemiologists and public health officials. How... more The case of John Snow has long been important to epidemiologists and public health officials. However, despite the fact that there have been many discussions about the various aspects of Snow's case, there has been virtually no discussion about what guided Snow's reasoning in his coming to believe his various conclusions about cholera. Here, I want to take up this question in some detail and show that there are a number of specific principles of reasoning that played a crucial role for Snow. Moreover, these principles were epistemologically important to Snow, a fact about which Snow is explicit in many places. An analysis of Snow's case suggests that, because of the epistemic role such principles of reasoning can play, health care practitioners ought to understand their practices to be theoretically informed in these ways, and not just data driven. bs_bs_banner
My talk will be guided by the idea that there are some familiar scientific practices that are epi... more My talk will be guided by the idea that there are some familiar scientific practices that are epistemically significant. I will argue that we can test for the success of these practices empirically by examining cases in the history of science. Specifically, I will reconstruct one particular episode in the history of medicine – John Snow's reasoning concerning the infectiousness of cholera – and offer this case as a concrete example of the sort of empirical research that needs to be done in order to discover what kinds of methodological practices and rules are actually of epistemic interest. Analysing this case, I will explain how it (and other cases like it) can help us resolve specific cases of underdetermination. After exploring some possible anti-realist responses to this argument, I will conclude that, while the anti-realist is (more or less legitimately) able to construct underdetermination scenarios on a case-by-case basis, he will likely have to abandon the strategy of us...
Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 2014
The standard underdetermination argument relies on the assumption that empirical evidence is the ... more The standard underdetermination argument relies on the assumption that empirical evidence is the only epistemic constraint on theory-choice. One prominent response to this has been the invocation of theoretical virtues, properties of our scientific theories that scientific realists take to be epistemic in nature and that are such that, if they are had by our theories, make it more likely for those theories to be true. It thus becomes a main goal for scientific realists to establish a link between the theoretical virtues and truth. However, despite the fact that the virtues are frequently invoked in response to underdetermination arguments, how to do so has not been addressed in any detail. In this chapter, I will spell out the most promising approach in making this link: an account according to which the question of whether the virtues are epistemic is answered empirically, through an examination of cases of epistemically successful (and unsuccessful) theories. I will illustrate how this approach works concretely by discussing a case-study from mid-nineteenth century Britain concerning the debate about the transmissibility of puerperal fever. After showing how some specific virtues are put to work in this case, I will explain what is required in order to make a more general argument for the epistemic potential of the theoretical virtues. I then argue that putting the virtue-question on empirical grounds is enough to undermine the anti-realist position on underdetermination – regardless of whether, in fact, the virtues turn out to be epistemically potent or not.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2011
ABSTRACT
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2011
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2007
Philosophy of Science, 2013
The case of Semmelweis has been well known since Hempel. More recently, it has been revived by Pe... more The case of Semmelweis has been well known since Hempel. More recently, it has been revived by Peter Lipton, Donald Gillies, Alexander Bird, Alex Broadbent, and Raphael Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree that Semmelweis was an excellent reasoner. This widespread agreement has also given rise to a puzzle: why Semmelweis’s views were rejected for so long. I aim to dissolve both this puzzle and the standard view of Semmelweis by showing that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Semmelweis was not the excellent reasoner he has been assumed to be.
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2012
Philosophy of Science, 2017
It has recently been suggested that realist responses to historical cases featured in pessimistic... more It has recently been suggested that realist responses to historical cases featured in pessimistic meta-inductions are not as successful as previously thought. In response, selective realists have updated the basic divide et impera strategy specifically to take such cases into account and to argue that more modern realist accounts are immune to the historical challenge. Using a case study—that of the nineteenth-century zymotic theory of disease—I argue that these updated proposals fail and that even the most sophisticated recent realist accounts remain vulnerable to the challenge from history.
Metascience, 2008
In Making Prehistory, Derek Turner tries to bring to the fore an area of science that, he believe... more In Making Prehistory, Derek Turner tries to bring to the fore an area of science that, he believes, has been largely neglected in philosophy of science and, in particular, in the debate about scientific realism: prehistory. Turner's intended audience is twofold. On the one hand, he addresses philosophers of science, whom he hopes to convince that the debate about scientific realism has been skewed. According to Turner, this is due to the fact that writers on the subject have paid disproportionate attention to the microphysical at the expense of historical science, ''even though one cannot see, or smell, or bump into a living dinosaur any more than one can an X-ray photon'' (p. 2). On the other hand, he addresses scientists working on prehistory, trying to show how philosophical debates can have an impact on their field (p. 2). In a nutshell, Turner tries to argue two main claims. The first, which is the central concern of Chapters 1 to 5, is that scientific realism about the past is less warranted than scientific realism about the microphysical world. The second, which occupies Chapters 6 to 8, is directly related to the title of the book, Making Prehistory, and ''hints at the sort of social constructivist views that many scientists find kooky, or worse'' (p. 4). This claim involves what Turner calls the natural historical attitude, a view that espouses ''agnosticism with respect to the metaphysics of the past: Maybe we have made prehistory, and maybe we haven't'' (p. 5). Turner begins by pointing out that there is an important difference Ôbetween the past and the tiny' (cf. Chapter 1). He explains this difference by appealing to an epistemic asymmetry that
It has recently been suggested (for example, Lyons 2006) that realist responses to historical cas... more It has recently been suggested (for example, Lyons 2006) that realist responses to historical cases featured in pessimistic meta-inductions are not as successful as previously thought. In response, selective realists have updated the basic divide et impera strategy specifically to take such cases into account and to argue that more modern realist accounts are immune to the historical challenge (cf. Vickers 2013). Using a case-study – that of the 19th century zymotic theory of disease – I argue that these updated proposals fail and that even the most sophisticated recent realist accounts remain vulnerable to the challenge from history.
Philosophy of Science, 2013
Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree ... more Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree that Semmelweis was an excellent reasoner. This widespread agreement has also given rise to a puzzle: why Semmelweis's views were rejected for so long. I aim to dissolve both this puzzle and the standard view of Semmelweis by showing that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Semmelweis was not the excellent reasoner he has been assumed to be.
Synthese, 2013
In this paper, I argue (i) that there are certain methodological practices that are epistemically... more In this paper, I argue (i) that there are certain methodological practices that are epistemically significant, and (ii) that we can test for the success of these practices empirically by examining case-studies in the history of science. Analysing a particular episode from the history of medicine, I explain how this can help us resolve specific cases of underdetermination. I conclude that, while the anti-realist is (more or less legitimately) able to construct underdetermination scenarios on a case-by-case basis, he will have to abandon the strategy of using algorithms to do so, thus losing the much needed guarantee that there will always be rival cases of the required kind.
One typical realist response to the argument from underdetermination of theories by evidence is a... more One typical realist response to the argument from underdetermination of theories by evidence is an appeal to epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence to argue that, while scientific theories might be empirically equivalent, they are not epistemically equivalent. In this article, I spell out a new and reformulated version of the underdetermination argument that takes such criteria into account. I explain the notion of epistemic equivalence which this new argument appeals to, and argue that epistemic equivalence can be achieved in several, significantly different, ways. On the basis of this 'multiple realisability' of epistemic equivalence, I then proceed to explain and examine some of the main consequences of this reformulated underdetermination argument for both realists and anti-realists.
One premise of the underdetermination argument is that entailment of evidence is the only epistem... more One premise of the underdetermination argument is that entailment of evidence is the only epistemic constraint on theory-choice. I argue that methodological rules can be epistemically significant, both with respect to observables and unobservables. Using an example from the history of medicine-Koch's 1882 discovery of tuberculosis bacteria-I argue that even anti-realists ought to accept that these rules can break the tie between theories that are allegedly underdetermined. I then distinguish two types of underdetermination and argue that anti-realists, in order to maintain the underdetermination argument, need to do more than show that theories are empirically equivalent: they need to show that a certain kind of underdetermination obtains.
In the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or 'exciting cause' of cholera. Despite ... more In the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or 'exciting cause' of cholera. Despite much confusion surrounding the disease, the so-called miasma theory emerged as the prevalent account about cholera's cause. Going against this mainstream view, the British physician John Snow inferred several things about cholera's origin and pathology that no one else inferred. Without observing the vibrio cholerae, however,-data unavailable to Snow and his colleagues-, there was no way of settling the question of what exactly was causing cholera and how, or if, it was passed on. The question then arises as to how Snow arrived at conclusions so systematically different from those of his opponents. In this paper, I want to look at Snow's reasoning in some detail, and show that there were certain principles, explanatory power in particular, that were epistemologically important to Snow in their own right. I will show that Snow himself takes explanatory power to be an epistemic property, and makes explicit links between explanatory power and confirmation. Systematically juxtaposing Snow's claims and his opponents', I will show that Snow was right to tout the explanatory power of his theory, and that his conclusions about the epistemic superiority of his theory over that of the miasmatists' were justified.
The case of John Snow has long been important to epidemiologists and public health officials. How... more The case of John Snow has long been important to epidemiologists and public health officials. However, despite the fact that there have been many discussions about the various aspects of Snow's case, there has been virtually no discussion about what guided Snow's reasoning in his coming to believe his various conclusions about cholera. Here, I want to take up this question in some detail and show that there are a number of specific principles of reasoning that played a crucial role for Snow. Moreover, these principles were epistemologically important to Snow, a fact about which Snow is explicit in many places. An analysis of Snow's case suggests that, because of the epistemic role such principles of reasoning can play, health care practitioners ought to understand their practices to be theoretically informed in these ways, and not just data driven. bs_bs_banner