Taylor T Davis | Purdue University (original) (raw)
Papers by Taylor T Davis
Philosophical Psychology
Moral realists often assume that folk intuitions are predominantly realist, and argue that this p... more Moral realists often assume that folk intuitions are predominantly realist, and argue that this places the burden of proof on antirealists. More broadly, appeals to intuition in metaethics typically assume that folk judgments are generally consistent across individuals, such that they are at least predominantly something, if not realist. A substantial body of empirical work on moral objectivism has investigated these assumptions, but findings remain inconclusive, due to methodological limitations. Objectivist judgments classify individuals into broad categories of realism and antirealism, but they do not address more specific conflicts between different types of realism and antirealism, such as between nonnaturalism and divine command theory, for example, or between noncognitivism and error theory. Further, the data currently show that the folk are objectivists about some moral claims, but not others, raising questions about how much of the moral domain is judged objective, and about which types of moral claims are more objective than others. Moral Foundations Theory provides methods for addressing these questions (e.g., Graham et al., 2013), but previous studies have not employed them. Here I present a new survey that addresses these limitations. The results challenge both of the empirical assumptions identified above, with important implications for metaethical methodology.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2021
The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides ma... more The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides many local insights but is largely fragmented, lacking an overarching framework that might provide a unified overview and guide conceptual integration. As a result, it remains unclear where different local perspectives conflict, how they may reinforce one another, and where they leave gaps in our knowledge of the phenomena. Our aim is to start constructing a framework to help remedy this situation. We first identify a few key ideas for creating a theoretical roadmap for this complex territory, namely the principles of etiological functionalism and the dual inheritance theory of human evolution. We show how a "molecular" approach to emotions fits into this picture, and use it to illuminate emotions that shape intergroup relations. Finally, we weave the pieces together into the beginnings of a systematic taxonomy of the emotions involved in social interactions, both hostile and friendly. While it is but a start, we have developed the argument in a way that illustrates how the foundational principles of our proposed framework can be extended to accommodate further cases. 1 Many thanks to Michael Brownstein, Alex Madva, Uwe Peters, and an anonymous reviewer for generous and useful comments on drafts of this paper.
Ecology and Society, 2020
The emerging field of socio-hydrology is a special case of social-ecological systems research tha... more The emerging field of socio-hydrology is a special case of social-ecological systems research that focuses on coupled human-water systems, exploring how the hydrologic cycle and human cultural traits coevolve and how such coevolutions lead to phenomena of relevance to water security and sustainability. As such, most problems tackled by socio-hydrology involve some aspects of engineering design, such as large-scale water infrastructure, and self-organization in a broad context, such as cultural change at the population level and the hydrologic shift at the river basin or aquifer level. However, within the field of socio-hydrology, it has been difficult to find general theories that assist our understanding of the dynamics emerging from the interplay between design and selforganization, hindering generalization of phenomena between cases. We address this gap by developing insights on how the theoretical frameworks of robustness-fragility trade-off and cultural multilevel selection can inform our understanding in this regard. We apply the two theories to two cases in the Ganges Brahmaputra Delta in Bangladesh and the Kissimmee River Basin in Florida, illustrating how the two theories may provide general insights into causal mechanisms shaping the socio-hydrological phenomena observed in the two cases. Specifically, we use the two theories to address (1) the transference of system fragility across different domains due to design choices and (2) the multilevel social processes in the nested organizational hierarchy that lead to the formation or collapse of shared cultural traits. We show that these two theories, separately or taken together, can provide richer theoretical grounding for understanding socio-hydrological phenomena.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2016
The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adap... more The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adaptation theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for religion, and byproduct theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for other, non-religious functions. Recently, however, a new position has emerged in this debate, as an influential new theory based on cultural selection claims to integrate adaptation theories with byproduct theories, yielding a single, unified account. I argue that the proponents of this view do not say enough about how integration is actually supposed to work, from a logical point of view. Basic questions arise from the assumptions required for unifying these apparently conflicting approaches, which the authors of the account do not address. In response to these questions, I provide a model of the religious phenotype, the Goldberg Exaptation Model, which shows that adaptation and byproduct theories are consistent, and explains how they are positively related, over and above mere consistency. On this view, the religious phenotype is best understood on analogy with a Rube Goldberg device: it is assembled by selection for religion, but using parts designed by selection for other, non-religious functions.
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2015
In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selec... more In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selection to explain the relationship between religious belief and altruism, or costly, prosocial behavior. Both theories agree that group selection plays an important role in cultural evolution, affecting psychological traits that individuals acquire through social learning. They disagree, however, about whether group selection has also played a role in genetic evolution, affecting traits that are inherited genetically. Recently, Jonathan Haidt has defended the most fully developed account based on genetic group selection, and I argue here that problems with this account reveal good reasons to doubt that genetic group selection has played any important role in human evolution at all. Thus, considering the role of group selection in religious evolution is important not just because of what it reveals about religious psychology and religious evolution, but also because of what it reveals about...
Philosophical Psychology, 2014
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experime... more Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will-the "natural" compatibilism debate-is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions.
Philosophical Psychology, 2014
In our paper, "The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism" (this is... more In our paper, "The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism" (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris's concerns.
Nature Sustainability
An emerging literature on the evolution of culture can offer new explanations for how norms encou... more An emerging literature on the evolution of culture can offer new explanations for how norms encourage or obstruct sustainable practices. In particular, dual-inheritance theory describes how interactions between genetic and cultural evolution give rise, in part, to prosociality. Based on this theory, we identify the concept of normative motivation — internalized desires to follow and enforce norms. We discuss the utility of this concept in progressing two major research agendas across the social and behavioural sciences: the impact of motivation on cognition and normative behaviour, and the influence of norms on the policy process. Key contributions from considering norms from this evolutionary perspective include: (1) an improved model of the motivations that lead individuals to follow norms, (2) clarification of how and when incentives successfully generate motivations favouring sustainability and (3) new ideas for leveraging the influence of norms in public policy beyond financial incentives and education campaigns.Theories of cultural evolution can help explain how norms that are externally enforced are internalized to become intrinsic motivations to behave sustainably. This knowledge is useful for developing interventions for behavioural change.
Sustainability Science
Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a d... more Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor, it arguably pushes scientific investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Philosophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science with respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion, we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
We endorse Stanford's project, which calls attention to features of human psychology that exh... more We endorse Stanford's project, which calls attention to features of human psychology that exhibit a “puzzling combination of objective and subjective elements,” and that are central to cooperation. However, we disagree with his delineation of the explanatory target. What he calls “externalization or objectification” conflates two separate properties, neither of which can serve as the mark of the moral.
Social Philosophy and Policy
Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch a cognitive evolutionary approach for developing expla... more Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch a cognitive evolutionary approach for developing explanations of social change that is anchored on the psychological mechanisms underlying normative cognition and the transmission of social norms. We throw the relevant features of this approach into relief by comparing it with the self-fulfilling social expectations account developed by Bicchieri and colleagues. After describing both accounts, we argue that the two approaches are largely compatible, but that the cognitive evolutionary approach is wellsuited to encompass much of the social expectations view, whose focus on a narrow range of norms comes at the expense of the breadth the cognitive evolutionary approach can provide.
The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adap... more The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adaptation theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for religion, and byproduct theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for other, non-religious functions. Recently, however, a new position has emerged in this debate, as an influential new theory based on cultural selection claims to integrate adaptation theories with byproduct theories, yielding a single, unified account. I argue that the proponents of this view do not say enough about how integration is actually supposed to work, from a logical point of view. Basic questions arise from the assumptions required for unifying these apparently conflicting approaches, which the authors of the account do not address. In response to these questions, I provide a model of the religious phenotype, the Goldberg Exaptation Model, which shows that adaptation and byproduct theories are consistent, and explains how they are positively related, over and above mere consistency. On this view, the religious phenotype is best understood on analogy with a Rube Goldberg device: it is assembled by selection for religion, but using parts designed by selection for other, non-religious functions.
In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selec... more In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selection to explain the relationship between religious belief and altruism, or costly, prosocial behavior. Both theories agree that group selection plays an impor- tant role in cultural evolution, affecting psychological traits that individuals acquire through social learning. They disagree, however, about whether group selection has also played a role in genetic evolution, affecting traits that are inherited genetically. Recently, Jonathan Haidt has defended the most fully developed account based on genetic group selection, and I argue here that problems with this account reveal good reasons to doubt that genetic group selection has played any important role in human evolution at all. Thus, considering the role of group selection in religious evolution is important not just because of what it reveals about religious psychology and reli- gious evolution, but also because of what it reveals about the role of group selection in human evolution more generally.
Philosophical Psychology 28(6): 776-801., 2015
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experime... more Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants’ being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the ‘natural’ compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions.
Philosophical Psychology 28(6): 808-814., 2015
In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” (this is... more In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris’s concerns.
In his target article, Smaldino proposes an extension of the theory of cultural evolution that em... more In his target article, Smaldino proposes an extension of the theory of cultural evolution that embraces emergent group-level traits. We argue, instead, that group-level traits reduce to the traits of individuals, particularly when it comes to the question of how group-level traits are inherited or transmitted. This metaphysical fact is an essential assumption of the cultural evolutionary models on which Smaldino's theory relies.
Journal of Memory and Language, 2002
Four experiments investigated whether memory conjunction errors could be reduced when memories we... more Four experiments investigated whether memory conjunction errors could be reduced when memories were inspected in a source-monitoring task as opposed to the standard recognition tests that have traditionally been used in this literature. A conjunction stimulus is composed of pieces that have been experienced previously but in different contexts. We found that source monitoring did not generally reduce conjunction errors, but rather increased them in some cases. The data are consistent with theoretical accounts that characterize conjunction materials as evoking high degrees of familiarity. We also present an alternative account in which partial recollective details of context can act as familiarity in order to account for the above-chance source monitoring when pieces of conjunctions were studied in the same con- text.
Talks by Taylor T Davis
Philosophical Psychology
Moral realists often assume that folk intuitions are predominantly realist, and argue that this p... more Moral realists often assume that folk intuitions are predominantly realist, and argue that this places the burden of proof on antirealists. More broadly, appeals to intuition in metaethics typically assume that folk judgments are generally consistent across individuals, such that they are at least predominantly something, if not realist. A substantial body of empirical work on moral objectivism has investigated these assumptions, but findings remain inconclusive, due to methodological limitations. Objectivist judgments classify individuals into broad categories of realism and antirealism, but they do not address more specific conflicts between different types of realism and antirealism, such as between nonnaturalism and divine command theory, for example, or between noncognitivism and error theory. Further, the data currently show that the folk are objectivists about some moral claims, but not others, raising questions about how much of the moral domain is judged objective, and about which types of moral claims are more objective than others. Moral Foundations Theory provides methods for addressing these questions (e.g., Graham et al., 2013), but previous studies have not employed them. Here I present a new survey that addresses these limitations. The results challenge both of the empirical assumptions identified above, with important implications for metaethical methodology.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2021
The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides ma... more The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides many local insights but is largely fragmented, lacking an overarching framework that might provide a unified overview and guide conceptual integration. As a result, it remains unclear where different local perspectives conflict, how they may reinforce one another, and where they leave gaps in our knowledge of the phenomena. Our aim is to start constructing a framework to help remedy this situation. We first identify a few key ideas for creating a theoretical roadmap for this complex territory, namely the principles of etiological functionalism and the dual inheritance theory of human evolution. We show how a "molecular" approach to emotions fits into this picture, and use it to illuminate emotions that shape intergroup relations. Finally, we weave the pieces together into the beginnings of a systematic taxonomy of the emotions involved in social interactions, both hostile and friendly. While it is but a start, we have developed the argument in a way that illustrates how the foundational principles of our proposed framework can be extended to accommodate further cases. 1 Many thanks to Michael Brownstein, Alex Madva, Uwe Peters, and an anonymous reviewer for generous and useful comments on drafts of this paper.
Ecology and Society, 2020
The emerging field of socio-hydrology is a special case of social-ecological systems research tha... more The emerging field of socio-hydrology is a special case of social-ecological systems research that focuses on coupled human-water systems, exploring how the hydrologic cycle and human cultural traits coevolve and how such coevolutions lead to phenomena of relevance to water security and sustainability. As such, most problems tackled by socio-hydrology involve some aspects of engineering design, such as large-scale water infrastructure, and self-organization in a broad context, such as cultural change at the population level and the hydrologic shift at the river basin or aquifer level. However, within the field of socio-hydrology, it has been difficult to find general theories that assist our understanding of the dynamics emerging from the interplay between design and selforganization, hindering generalization of phenomena between cases. We address this gap by developing insights on how the theoretical frameworks of robustness-fragility trade-off and cultural multilevel selection can inform our understanding in this regard. We apply the two theories to two cases in the Ganges Brahmaputra Delta in Bangladesh and the Kissimmee River Basin in Florida, illustrating how the two theories may provide general insights into causal mechanisms shaping the socio-hydrological phenomena observed in the two cases. Specifically, we use the two theories to address (1) the transference of system fragility across different domains due to design choices and (2) the multilevel social processes in the nested organizational hierarchy that lead to the formation or collapse of shared cultural traits. We show that these two theories, separately or taken together, can provide richer theoretical grounding for understanding socio-hydrological phenomena.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2016
The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adap... more The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adaptation theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for religion, and byproduct theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for other, non-religious functions. Recently, however, a new position has emerged in this debate, as an influential new theory based on cultural selection claims to integrate adaptation theories with byproduct theories, yielding a single, unified account. I argue that the proponents of this view do not say enough about how integration is actually supposed to work, from a logical point of view. Basic questions arise from the assumptions required for unifying these apparently conflicting approaches, which the authors of the account do not address. In response to these questions, I provide a model of the religious phenotype, the Goldberg Exaptation Model, which shows that adaptation and byproduct theories are consistent, and explains how they are positively related, over and above mere consistency. On this view, the religious phenotype is best understood on analogy with a Rube Goldberg device: it is assembled by selection for religion, but using parts designed by selection for other, non-religious functions.
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2015
In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selec... more In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selection to explain the relationship between religious belief and altruism, or costly, prosocial behavior. Both theories agree that group selection plays an important role in cultural evolution, affecting psychological traits that individuals acquire through social learning. They disagree, however, about whether group selection has also played a role in genetic evolution, affecting traits that are inherited genetically. Recently, Jonathan Haidt has defended the most fully developed account based on genetic group selection, and I argue here that problems with this account reveal good reasons to doubt that genetic group selection has played any important role in human evolution at all. Thus, considering the role of group selection in religious evolution is important not just because of what it reveals about religious psychology and religious evolution, but also because of what it reveals about...
Philosophical Psychology, 2014
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experime... more Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will-the "natural" compatibilism debate-is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions.
Philosophical Psychology, 2014
In our paper, "The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism" (this is... more In our paper, "The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism" (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris's concerns.
Nature Sustainability
An emerging literature on the evolution of culture can offer new explanations for how norms encou... more An emerging literature on the evolution of culture can offer new explanations for how norms encourage or obstruct sustainable practices. In particular, dual-inheritance theory describes how interactions between genetic and cultural evolution give rise, in part, to prosociality. Based on this theory, we identify the concept of normative motivation — internalized desires to follow and enforce norms. We discuss the utility of this concept in progressing two major research agendas across the social and behavioural sciences: the impact of motivation on cognition and normative behaviour, and the influence of norms on the policy process. Key contributions from considering norms from this evolutionary perspective include: (1) an improved model of the motivations that lead individuals to follow norms, (2) clarification of how and when incentives successfully generate motivations favouring sustainability and (3) new ideas for leveraging the influence of norms in public policy beyond financial incentives and education campaigns.Theories of cultural evolution can help explain how norms that are externally enforced are internalized to become intrinsic motivations to behave sustainably. This knowledge is useful for developing interventions for behavioural change.
Sustainability Science
Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a d... more Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor, it arguably pushes scientific investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Philosophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science with respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion, we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
We endorse Stanford's project, which calls attention to features of human psychology that exh... more We endorse Stanford's project, which calls attention to features of human psychology that exhibit a “puzzling combination of objective and subjective elements,” and that are central to cooperation. However, we disagree with his delineation of the explanatory target. What he calls “externalization or objectification” conflates two separate properties, neither of which can serve as the mark of the moral.
Social Philosophy and Policy
Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch a cognitive evolutionary approach for developing expla... more Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch a cognitive evolutionary approach for developing explanations of social change that is anchored on the psychological mechanisms underlying normative cognition and the transmission of social norms. We throw the relevant features of this approach into relief by comparing it with the self-fulfilling social expectations account developed by Bicchieri and colleagues. After describing both accounts, we argue that the two approaches are largely compatible, but that the cognitive evolutionary approach is wellsuited to encompass much of the social expectations view, whose focus on a narrow range of norms comes at the expense of the breadth the cognitive evolutionary approach can provide.
The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adap... more The literature on the evolution of religion has been divided by a fundamental debate between adaptation theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for religion, and byproduct theories, which explain religious traits as products of selection for other, non-religious functions. Recently, however, a new position has emerged in this debate, as an influential new theory based on cultural selection claims to integrate adaptation theories with byproduct theories, yielding a single, unified account. I argue that the proponents of this view do not say enough about how integration is actually supposed to work, from a logical point of view. Basic questions arise from the assumptions required for unifying these apparently conflicting approaches, which the authors of the account do not address. In response to these questions, I provide a model of the religious phenotype, the Goldberg Exaptation Model, which shows that adaptation and byproduct theories are consistent, and explains how they are positively related, over and above mere consistency. On this view, the religious phenotype is best understood on analogy with a Rube Goldberg device: it is assembled by selection for religion, but using parts designed by selection for other, non-religious functions.
In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selec... more In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selection to explain the relationship between religious belief and altruism, or costly, prosocial behavior. Both theories agree that group selection plays an impor- tant role in cultural evolution, affecting psychological traits that individuals acquire through social learning. They disagree, however, about whether group selection has also played a role in genetic evolution, affecting traits that are inherited genetically. Recently, Jonathan Haidt has defended the most fully developed account based on genetic group selection, and I argue here that problems with this account reveal good reasons to doubt that genetic group selection has played any important role in human evolution at all. Thus, considering the role of group selection in religious evolution is important not just because of what it reveals about religious psychology and reli- gious evolution, but also because of what it reveals about the role of group selection in human evolution more generally.
Philosophical Psychology 28(6): 776-801., 2015
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experime... more Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants’ being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the ‘natural’ compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions.
Philosophical Psychology 28(6): 808-814., 2015
In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” (this is... more In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris’s concerns.
In his target article, Smaldino proposes an extension of the theory of cultural evolution that em... more In his target article, Smaldino proposes an extension of the theory of cultural evolution that embraces emergent group-level traits. We argue, instead, that group-level traits reduce to the traits of individuals, particularly when it comes to the question of how group-level traits are inherited or transmitted. This metaphysical fact is an essential assumption of the cultural evolutionary models on which Smaldino's theory relies.
Journal of Memory and Language, 2002
Four experiments investigated whether memory conjunction errors could be reduced when memories we... more Four experiments investigated whether memory conjunction errors could be reduced when memories were inspected in a source-monitoring task as opposed to the standard recognition tests that have traditionally been used in this literature. A conjunction stimulus is composed of pieces that have been experienced previously but in different contexts. We found that source monitoring did not generally reduce conjunction errors, but rather increased them in some cases. The data are consistent with theoretical accounts that characterize conjunction materials as evoking high degrees of familiarity. We also present an alternative account in which partial recollective details of context can act as familiarity in order to account for the above-chance source monitoring when pieces of conjunctions were studied in the same con- text.