Ozgur Pala | Qatar University (original) (raw)
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Papers by Ozgur Pala
This study investigates the dynamics that shaped the Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 to 2013. ... more This study investigates the dynamics that shaped the Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 to 2013. First, through a rigorous survey of the literature, it probes the Turkish-Gulf Arab relations from late 1970s until 2000s with a view to pinpointing prominent dynamics. In light of these general dynamics, the study then zeroes in on the regional and domestic motivations that facilitated a political alignment between Ankara and Doha. Second, through expert interviews, the current study substantiates the findings from the meager literature on the Turkish-Qatari relations.
Findings of this study indicate that the historical evolution of the Turkish-Gulf Arab relations is marked by political orientations of actors, security concerns and economic interests. Findings on the regional dynamics of the more specific Turkish-Qatari relations indicates that close relations between Ankara and Doha cannot be viewed separately from the overall trajectory of relations with the other Gulf Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. However, the underlying forces that the Arab Spring surfaced seems to have challenged this conclusion, as Ankara and Doha currently enjoy exceptional relations with one another while they are in increasingly worse terms with their neighbors.
The study further reveals that the present Turkish-Qatari political alignment is not attributable to one specific factor. These relations have been shaped by a confluence of numerous dynamics. First example is the convergences of foreign policy approaches and tools both actors have used, which facilitated taking similar positions on important regional issues. Another finding is that the regional developments prior to and throughout the specified period created a conducive environment for both actors to cooperate in numerous areas. In this regard, Arab Spring stands out as the most prominent arena whereby Ankara and Doha elevated their relations to the level of political alignment. The study also suggest that the domestic dynamics, as materialized in the role of leadership, as well as both actors’ interests, have been important determinants of cordial relationships. Finally, identity politics, as materialized in both actors’ vision regarding the regional political structure and who the players of this structure should be, stands out as a central force that shaped relations.
Iran’s nuclear program has instigated considerable global and regional anxiety. The Iranian gover... more Iran’s nuclear program has instigated considerable global and regional anxiety. The Iranian government contends that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only; however, certain circles in the US, Europe and the Gulf Arab monarchies, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Qatar, claim that Iran’s ultimate goal is to develop nuclear weapons, and therefore they are concerned about potential Iranian nuclear weapons. Numerous public opinion polls in the United States, Europe and some Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, have explored the public perceptions toward Iran’s nuclear program, its perceived objectives and the methods to deal with the issue. These polls expand from 2006, when the then Iranian president Ahmadinejad announced that his country successfully enriched uranium, until 2013, when Iran and the P5+1 reached a tentative framework for future negotiations to resolve the issue. Similarly, there is rich data on the perceptions of Gulf Arab government officials, which are mostly collected via interviews. In addition, several Arab Public Opinion polls conducted in Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have given public perceptions on the issue of Iranian nuclear program and potential nuclear weapons. However, no empirical research to date has analyzed the connection, if any, between demographic background of respondents and their perceptions toward the Iranian nuclear program. Lack of studies examining perceptions of general Qatari public is not an exception. Given this paucity of scholarship, the present study reports on the results of an online survey conducted with Qatar University students on the Iranian nuclear program and potential nuclear weapons.
One striking finding from the survey is that the Iranian nuclear program is not viewed as much a pressing regional issue as it is suggested in some sources. Highlighting several factors affecting perceptions such as religious affiliation and country of origin, this study concludes that a majority of respondents, both Shia and Sunni or both from the Gulf and from other parts of the Arab world, view the Iranian nuclear program as a serious security threat to Qatar. Furthermore, the results suggest that “regime survival” and “Western aggression toward Iran” seems to be two major reasons behind Iranian aspiration for nuclear program. Finally, the results suggest that solving the Iranian nuclear issue through “military means” is the least popular method, while “diplomacy and economic sanctions” are the most preferable.
As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a small stat... more As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a small state, Qatar seeks to enhance its security and sovereignty and become an indispensable regional middle power. The Arab Spring protests have created an ideal context for both actors to realize their geopolitical goals. However, adverse political developments have turned most Arab Spring countries into battlegrounds wherein old geopolitical rivalries deepened and new regional alliances were constructed. Taking Gaza, Syria and Egypt as cases in point, this paper investigates how Ankara and Doha’s evolving practical geopolitical reasoning and its domestic and international representations converged to create venues for cooperation and promotion of relations to a level of political alignment.
SSCI-AHCI Articles by Ozgur Pala
The International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs, 2020
When the Qatar crisis erupted in June 2017, Turkey quickly sided with Qatar, sending tons of food... more When the Qatar crisis erupted in June 2017, Turkey quickly sided with Qatar, sending tons of food supplies and deploying troops in the Emirate. Yet, from a purely geopolitical and economic perspective, Turkey would have been expected not to take sides given its much larger trade relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and their political clout in the region and beyond. It seems that the path dependence in bilateral relations between Turkey and Qatar pre-ordained the former’s reaction. More specifically, by the time the Gulf crisis erupted, Turkey and Qatar had already developed a special relationship, which strongly affected Turkey’s pro-Qatar stance.
Gulf crisis, GCC, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Arab Spring
As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a small stat... more As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a
small state, Qatar seeks to enhance its security and sovereignty and become an
indispensable regional middle power. The Arab Spring protests have created an ideal
context for both actors to realize their geopolitical goals. However, adverse political
developments have turned most Arab Spring countries into battlegrounds wherein old
geopolitical rivalries deepened and new regional alliances were constructed. Taking Gaza,
Syria and Egypt as cases in point, this paper investigates how Ankara and Doha’s
evolving practical geopolitical reasoning and its domestic and international
representations converged to create venues for cooperation and promotion of relations
to a level of political alignment.
This study investigates the dynamics that shaped the Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 to 2013. ... more This study investigates the dynamics that shaped the Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 to 2013. First, through a rigorous survey of the literature, it probes the Turkish-Gulf Arab relations from late 1970s until 2000s with a view to pinpointing prominent dynamics. In light of these general dynamics, the study then zeroes in on the regional and domestic motivations that facilitated a political alignment between Ankara and Doha. Second, through expert interviews, the current study substantiates the findings from the meager literature on the Turkish-Qatari relations.
Findings of this study indicate that the historical evolution of the Turkish-Gulf Arab relations is marked by political orientations of actors, security concerns and economic interests. Findings on the regional dynamics of the more specific Turkish-Qatari relations indicates that close relations between Ankara and Doha cannot be viewed separately from the overall trajectory of relations with the other Gulf Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. However, the underlying forces that the Arab Spring surfaced seems to have challenged this conclusion, as Ankara and Doha currently enjoy exceptional relations with one another while they are in increasingly worse terms with their neighbors.
The study further reveals that the present Turkish-Qatari political alignment is not attributable to one specific factor. These relations have been shaped by a confluence of numerous dynamics. First example is the convergences of foreign policy approaches and tools both actors have used, which facilitated taking similar positions on important regional issues. Another finding is that the regional developments prior to and throughout the specified period created a conducive environment for both actors to cooperate in numerous areas. In this regard, Arab Spring stands out as the most prominent arena whereby Ankara and Doha elevated their relations to the level of political alignment. The study also suggest that the domestic dynamics, as materialized in the role of leadership, as well as both actors’ interests, have been important determinants of cordial relationships. Finally, identity politics, as materialized in both actors’ vision regarding the regional political structure and who the players of this structure should be, stands out as a central force that shaped relations.
Iran’s nuclear program has instigated considerable global and regional anxiety. The Iranian gover... more Iran’s nuclear program has instigated considerable global and regional anxiety. The Iranian government contends that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only; however, certain circles in the US, Europe and the Gulf Arab monarchies, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Qatar, claim that Iran’s ultimate goal is to develop nuclear weapons, and therefore they are concerned about potential Iranian nuclear weapons. Numerous public opinion polls in the United States, Europe and some Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, have explored the public perceptions toward Iran’s nuclear program, its perceived objectives and the methods to deal with the issue. These polls expand from 2006, when the then Iranian president Ahmadinejad announced that his country successfully enriched uranium, until 2013, when Iran and the P5+1 reached a tentative framework for future negotiations to resolve the issue. Similarly, there is rich data on the perceptions of Gulf Arab government officials, which are mostly collected via interviews. In addition, several Arab Public Opinion polls conducted in Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have given public perceptions on the issue of Iranian nuclear program and potential nuclear weapons. However, no empirical research to date has analyzed the connection, if any, between demographic background of respondents and their perceptions toward the Iranian nuclear program. Lack of studies examining perceptions of general Qatari public is not an exception. Given this paucity of scholarship, the present study reports on the results of an online survey conducted with Qatar University students on the Iranian nuclear program and potential nuclear weapons.
One striking finding from the survey is that the Iranian nuclear program is not viewed as much a pressing regional issue as it is suggested in some sources. Highlighting several factors affecting perceptions such as religious affiliation and country of origin, this study concludes that a majority of respondents, both Shia and Sunni or both from the Gulf and from other parts of the Arab world, view the Iranian nuclear program as a serious security threat to Qatar. Furthermore, the results suggest that “regime survival” and “Western aggression toward Iran” seems to be two major reasons behind Iranian aspiration for nuclear program. Finally, the results suggest that solving the Iranian nuclear issue through “military means” is the least popular method, while “diplomacy and economic sanctions” are the most preferable.
As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a small stat... more As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a small state, Qatar seeks to enhance its security and sovereignty and become an indispensable regional middle power. The Arab Spring protests have created an ideal context for both actors to realize their geopolitical goals. However, adverse political developments have turned most Arab Spring countries into battlegrounds wherein old geopolitical rivalries deepened and new regional alliances were constructed. Taking Gaza, Syria and Egypt as cases in point, this paper investigates how Ankara and Doha’s evolving practical geopolitical reasoning and its domestic and international representations converged to create venues for cooperation and promotion of relations to a level of political alignment.
The International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs, 2020
When the Qatar crisis erupted in June 2017, Turkey quickly sided with Qatar, sending tons of food... more When the Qatar crisis erupted in June 2017, Turkey quickly sided with Qatar, sending tons of food supplies and deploying troops in the Emirate. Yet, from a purely geopolitical and economic perspective, Turkey would have been expected not to take sides given its much larger trade relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and their political clout in the region and beyond. It seems that the path dependence in bilateral relations between Turkey and Qatar pre-ordained the former’s reaction. More specifically, by the time the Gulf crisis erupted, Turkey and Qatar had already developed a special relationship, which strongly affected Turkey’s pro-Qatar stance.
Gulf crisis, GCC, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Arab Spring
As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a small stat... more As a regional power, Turkey aspires to become an influential international actor. As a
small state, Qatar seeks to enhance its security and sovereignty and become an
indispensable regional middle power. The Arab Spring protests have created an ideal
context for both actors to realize their geopolitical goals. However, adverse political
developments have turned most Arab Spring countries into battlegrounds wherein old
geopolitical rivalries deepened and new regional alliances were constructed. Taking Gaza,
Syria and Egypt as cases in point, this paper investigates how Ankara and Doha’s
evolving practical geopolitical reasoning and its domestic and international
representations converged to create venues for cooperation and promotion of relations
to a level of political alignment.