Aidan Feeney | Queen's University Belfast (original) (raw)
Papers by Aidan Feeney
Cognition, 2016
Reasoning that is deliberative and reflective often requires the inhibition of intuitive response... more Reasoning that is deliberative and reflective often requires the inhibition of intuitive responses. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to assess people's ability to suppress incorrect heuristic responses in favour of deliberation. Correct responding on the CRT predicts performance on a range of tasks in which intuitive processes lead to incorrect responses, suggesting indirectly that CRT performance is related to cognitive control. Yet little is known about the cognitive processes underlying performance on the CRT. In the current research, we employed a novel mouse tracking methodology to capture the time-course of reasoning on the CRT. Analysis of mouse cursor trajectories revealed that participants were initially drawn towards the incorrect (i.e., intuitive) option even when the correct (deliberative) option was ultimately chosen. Conversely, participants were not attracted to the correct option when they ultimately chose the incorrect intuitive one. We conclude t...
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2016
Although a number of studies have examined the developmental emergence of counterfactual emotions... more Although a number of studies have examined the developmental emergence of counterfactual emotions of regret and relief, none of these has used tasks that resemble those used with adolescents and adults, which typically involve risky decision making. We examined the development of the counterfactual emotions of regret and relief in two experiments using a task in which children chose between one of two gambles that varied in risk. In regret trials they always received the best prize from that gamble but were then shown that they would have obtained a better prize had they chosen the alternative gamble, whereas in relief trials the other prize was worse. We compared two methods of measuring regret and relief based on children's reported emotion on discovering the outcome of the alternative gamble: one in which children judged whether they now felt the same, happier, or sadder on seeing the other prize and one in which children made emotion ratings on a 7-point scale after the other prize was revealed. On both of these methods, we found that 6- and 7-year-olds' and 8- and 9-year-olds' emotions varied appropriately depending on whether the alternative outcome was better or worse than the prize they had actually obtained, although the former method was more sensitive. Our findings indicate that by at least 6 or 7years children experience the same sorts of counterfactual emotions as adults in risky decision-making tasks, and they also suggest that such emotions are best measured by asking children to make comparative emotion judgments.
Journal of experimental child psychology, Jan 2, 2015
In line with the claim that regret plays a role in decision making, O'Connor, McCormack, and ... more In line with the claim that regret plays a role in decision making, O'Connor, McCormack, and Feeney (Child Development, 85 (2014) 1995-2010) found that children who reported feeling sadder on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice were more likely to make a different choice the next time around. We examined two issues of interpretation regarding this finding: whether the emotion measured was indeed regret and whether it was the experience of this emotion, rather than the ability to anticipate it, that affected decision making. To address the first issue, we varied the degree to which children aged 6 or 7 years were responsible for an outcome, assuming that responsibility is a necessary condition for regret. The second issue was addressed by examining whether children could accurately anticipate that they would feel worse on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice. Children were more likely to feel sad if they were responsible for the outcome; however, even if they...
Thinking & Reasoning, Jan 1, 2000
Canadian journal of experimental psychology = Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 2004
The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whil... more The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whilst some is logically consistent with all, it is often pragmatically interpreted as precluding all. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that with pragmatically impoverished materials, sensitivity to the pragmatic implicature associated with some is apparent earlier in development than has previously been found. Amongst 8-year-old children, we observed much greater sensitivity to the implicature in pragmatically enriched contexts. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that amongst adults, logical responses to infelicitous some statements take longer to produce than do logical responses to felicitous some statements, and that working memory capacity predicts the tendency to give logical responses to the former kind of statement. These results suggest that some adults develop the ability to inhibit a pragmatic response in favour of a logical answer. We discuss the implications of these findings for...
The Quarterly journal of experimental psychology. A, Human experimental psychology, 2003
In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford &... more In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) to the selection task data reported in Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper (2002). Although Oaksford (2002b) reports good fits to the data described in Feeney and Handley (2000), the model does not adequately capture the data described in Handley et al. (2002). Furthermore, across all six of the experiments modelled here, the ODS model does not predict participants' behaviour at the level of selection rates for individual cards. Finally, when people's probability estimates are used in the modelling exercise, the model adequately captures only 1 out of 18 conditions described in Handley et al. We discuss the implications of these results for models of the selection task and claim that they support deductive, rather than probabilistic, accounts of the task.
... For this reason, I am very grateful to the ESRC who supported this work with the award of an ... more ... For this reason, I am very grateful to the ESRC who supported this work with the award of an extended research fellowship (RES000270184), thus freeing me from all normal university duties. Jonathan Evans Plymouth, March 2007 Page 10. ...
The Suppression of Card Selections in Wason's Selection Task: Evidence that Inference Pl... more The Suppression of Card Selections in Wason's Selection Task: Evidence that Inference Plays a Role Aidan Feeney & Simon J. Handley Centre ... accounts of the indicative selection task, we will also present two inferential accounts: the first offered by Sperber, Cara and Girotto ...
Abstract will be provided by author.
Cognition, 2016
Reasoning that is deliberative and reflective often requires the inhibition of intuitive response... more Reasoning that is deliberative and reflective often requires the inhibition of intuitive responses. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to assess people's ability to suppress incorrect heuristic responses in favour of deliberation. Correct responding on the CRT predicts performance on a range of tasks in which intuitive processes lead to incorrect responses, suggesting indirectly that CRT performance is related to cognitive control. Yet little is known about the cognitive processes underlying performance on the CRT. In the current research, we employed a novel mouse tracking methodology to capture the time-course of reasoning on the CRT. Analysis of mouse cursor trajectories revealed that participants were initially drawn towards the incorrect (i.e., intuitive) option even when the correct (deliberative) option was ultimately chosen. Conversely, participants were not attracted to the correct option when they ultimately chose the incorrect intuitive one. We conclude t...
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2016
Although a number of studies have examined the developmental emergence of counterfactual emotions... more Although a number of studies have examined the developmental emergence of counterfactual emotions of regret and relief, none of these has used tasks that resemble those used with adolescents and adults, which typically involve risky decision making. We examined the development of the counterfactual emotions of regret and relief in two experiments using a task in which children chose between one of two gambles that varied in risk. In regret trials they always received the best prize from that gamble but were then shown that they would have obtained a better prize had they chosen the alternative gamble, whereas in relief trials the other prize was worse. We compared two methods of measuring regret and relief based on children's reported emotion on discovering the outcome of the alternative gamble: one in which children judged whether they now felt the same, happier, or sadder on seeing the other prize and one in which children made emotion ratings on a 7-point scale after the other prize was revealed. On both of these methods, we found that 6- and 7-year-olds' and 8- and 9-year-olds' emotions varied appropriately depending on whether the alternative outcome was better or worse than the prize they had actually obtained, although the former method was more sensitive. Our findings indicate that by at least 6 or 7years children experience the same sorts of counterfactual emotions as adults in risky decision-making tasks, and they also suggest that such emotions are best measured by asking children to make comparative emotion judgments.
Journal of experimental child psychology, Jan 2, 2015
In line with the claim that regret plays a role in decision making, O'Connor, McCormack, and ... more In line with the claim that regret plays a role in decision making, O'Connor, McCormack, and Feeney (Child Development, 85 (2014) 1995-2010) found that children who reported feeling sadder on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice were more likely to make a different choice the next time around. We examined two issues of interpretation regarding this finding: whether the emotion measured was indeed regret and whether it was the experience of this emotion, rather than the ability to anticipate it, that affected decision making. To address the first issue, we varied the degree to which children aged 6 or 7 years were responsible for an outcome, assuming that responsibility is a necessary condition for regret. The second issue was addressed by examining whether children could accurately anticipate that they would feel worse on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice. Children were more likely to feel sad if they were responsible for the outcome; however, even if they...
Thinking & Reasoning, Jan 1, 2000
Canadian journal of experimental psychology = Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 2004
The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whil... more The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whilst some is logically consistent with all, it is often pragmatically interpreted as precluding all. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that with pragmatically impoverished materials, sensitivity to the pragmatic implicature associated with some is apparent earlier in development than has previously been found. Amongst 8-year-old children, we observed much greater sensitivity to the implicature in pragmatically enriched contexts. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that amongst adults, logical responses to infelicitous some statements take longer to produce than do logical responses to felicitous some statements, and that working memory capacity predicts the tendency to give logical responses to the former kind of statement. These results suggest that some adults develop the ability to inhibit a pragmatic response in favour of a logical answer. We discuss the implications of these findings for...
The Quarterly journal of experimental psychology. A, Human experimental psychology, 2003
In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford &... more In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) to the selection task data reported in Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper (2002). Although Oaksford (2002b) reports good fits to the data described in Feeney and Handley (2000), the model does not adequately capture the data described in Handley et al. (2002). Furthermore, across all six of the experiments modelled here, the ODS model does not predict participants' behaviour at the level of selection rates for individual cards. Finally, when people's probability estimates are used in the modelling exercise, the model adequately captures only 1 out of 18 conditions described in Handley et al. We discuss the implications of these results for models of the selection task and claim that they support deductive, rather than probabilistic, accounts of the task.
... For this reason, I am very grateful to the ESRC who supported this work with the award of an ... more ... For this reason, I am very grateful to the ESRC who supported this work with the award of an extended research fellowship (RES000270184), thus freeing me from all normal university duties. Jonathan Evans Plymouth, March 2007 Page 10. ...
The Suppression of Card Selections in Wason's Selection Task: Evidence that Inference Pl... more The Suppression of Card Selections in Wason's Selection Task: Evidence that Inference Plays a Role Aidan Feeney & Simon J. Handley Centre ... accounts of the indicative selection task, we will also present two inferential accounts: the first offered by Sperber, Cara and Girotto ...
Abstract will be provided by author.