Spyridon Plakoudas | Rabdan Academy (original) (raw)

Books by Spyridon Plakoudas

This new book offers a comprehensive account of the PKK insurgency, one of the most complicated a... more This new book offers a comprehensive account of the PKK insurgency, one of the most complicated and longest lasting ethno-nationalist conflicts in the post-WW II era. In addition, this monograph closely examines the peace talks between the PKK and Turkey from 2013 and 2015 and the renewed war since July 2015 and is the only study that analyzes in depth Operation “Euphrates Shield” (August 2016 – March 2017), part of Turkey’s two-fold “war on terror” against ISIS and PKK / PYD).

Ο Ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος (1946-1949): Πεδίο Μάχης του Ψυχρού Πολέμου, 2017

Κατά τον 21ο αιώνα, ο ανταρτοπόλεμος συνιστά τον πιο διαδεδομένο τύπο πολέμου παγκοσμίως, προκαλώ... more Κατά τον 21ο αιώνα, ο ανταρτοπόλεμος συνιστά τον πιο διαδεδομένο τύπο πολέμου παγκοσμίως, προκαλώντας αέναες διαφωνίες ως προς την καταλληλότερη μέθοδο αντιμετώπισής του. Οπότε, ο Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος (1946-1949) χρίζει ιδιαίτερης προσοχής ένεκα της διττής μοναδικότητάς του: είναι το πρώτο πεδίο σύγκρουσης μεταξύ των δύο υπερδυνάμεων μετά τον Β΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο και επίσης μια σπάνια περίπτωση ήττας ανταρτών κατά τον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο. Εν συντομία, το βιβλίο ανά χείρας αναλύει σε βάθος, πρώτον, πώς η Ελλάδα πρωταγωνίστησε στις διεθνείς εξελίξεις παρά το μικρό μέγεθός της και, δεύτερον, πώς ένα ισχυρό αντάρτικο ηττήθηκε εντός μόλις 4 ετών. Σε αντίθεση με ομοειδή έργα, το βιβλίο αυτό ερμηνεύει τον Εμφύλιο Πόλεμο υπό το πρίσμα της Στρατηγικής – όχι της Ιστορίας ή της Πολιτικής. Ως εκ τούτου, το βιβλίο αυτό θα αποδειχθεί λίαν χρήσιμο τόσο στους λάτρεις της σύγχρονης Ελληνικής ιστορίας όσο και στους μελετητές των Διεθνών Σχέσεων και της Στρατηγικής – ιδίως στους μελετητές του ανταρτοπόλεμου.

The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was one of the few instances in the post-World War II era of a cl... more The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was one of the few instances in the post-World War II era of a clear-cut and permanent victory by right-wing government forces over an insurgent communist movement. Spyridon Plakoudas here explores the factors which ultimately caused the downfall of the communist insurgency in Greece which had, at some points, seemed undefeatable. He questions whether the guerrilla movement fell victim to the feud between Stalin and Tito or whether the significant British and, above all, American aid in fact rescued the Greek monarchist regime from collapse. Dr Plakoudas explores the strategies adopted by government forces in order to counter the communist insurgency, how external and internal actors influenced these policies and when, how and why these policies achieved success. Featuring previously unseen sources and documents, this book reveals the strategy and tactics of the monarchist regime.

Chapters in Edited Books by Spyridon Plakoudas

“Nikiforos-Toxotis: The Rise and Fall of the Greek Doctrine of Extended Deterrence (1994-2000)” in Beatrice D. Heuser, Tormod Heier and Guillaume Lasconjarias (eds.): Military Exercises, Political Messaging and Strategic Impact (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2018), pp. 245-259, 2018

This paper examines the origins, course and downfall of the Greek doctrine of extended deterrence... more This paper examines the origins, course and downfall of the Greek doctrine of extended deterrence - in other words, the fight on two fronts (Aegean and Cyprus) against Turkey. This paper examines how the Imia Crisis in 1996 dealt the death blow to this doctrine although its official end was announced a few years later.

Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471364.013

(From the Ύμνοςτου ΕΛΑΣ (hymn of the ELAS) resistance movement of World War II)
The Guerrilla Tradition in Greece

The question of strategic culture in counterinsurgency (COIN) has stimulated endless debates on the actual existence and impact of a distinct national style in conducting guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. Greece stands out as an ideal case to test the hypothesis that such a national style does actually exist, since the phenomenon of insurgency constitutes a constant and prime theme in modern Greek history. The mountainous terrain, the predominantly agricultural structure of a conservative society, the recurring phenomenon of banditry and the uninterrupted tradition of rebellion against Ottoman despotism decisively contributed to the appearance of a distinct guerrilla tradition that influenced Greek history from the end of the Ottoman rule to the onset of the Cold War.

The period between 1831 and 1912 could be regarded as the heyday of banditry in Greece. Numerous large groups of well-armed bandits pillaged and terrorised the villagers with impunity as the Athens-centric state could not fully control the mountainous countryside of Greece. Surprisingly, the very same bandits could be found hunting down other bandits or fostering rebellions in Ottoman-ruled territories in the Balkans whenever the Greek kingdom bought them off with state offices and riches. For more than a hundred years, armed irregulars (part-time bandits and part-time guerrillas) roamed across the mountainous regions of Greece.

The true nature of these irregulars in modern Greek history still remains a matter of debate. The ordinary people praised them as national heroes, while the romantic and Leftist-oriented thinkers portrayed them as apostles of socio-political revolution. In reality, until the early twentieth century, guerrillas comprised a unique social class, homogenous but fragmented, that no Greek government could afford to ignore. Specific regions (such as Crete) bred generations of tough warriors who fought with the time-tested guerrilla methods of ‘Kleftopolemos’ (bandit war in Greek) – hit-and-run tactics and night raids by small units of seasoned warriors who followed a charismatic captain.

Articles in Peer-Reviewed Journals by Spyridon Plakoudas

Cómo terminan las insurgencias: en busca de la victoria del gobierno , Volumen 17, Número 28, octubre-diciembre 2019, pp. 923-938, 2019

Actualmente, la insurgencia es el tipo de guerra más frecuente. Sin embargo, el éxito en la guerr... more Actualmente, la insurgencia es el tipo de guerra más frecuente. Sin embargo, el éxito en
la guerra irregular no puede cuantificarse y medirse con absoluta certeza. Este documento examina
cómo terminan las insurgencias y cómo un gobierno puede lograr el escenario óptimo: la victoria
militar. Una insurgencia podría terminar de tres maneras: una victoria (militar) para los insurgentes

o el gobierno, un acuerdo de paz o un estancamiento. La guerra, no obstante, evoluciona cons-
tantemente; por lo tanto, los tres escenarios anteriores pueden manifestarse durante el Transcurso

mejor de una insurgencia. En consecuencia, el Estado debe implementar una mezcla equilibrada
de reformas y represión: una política dependiente de la situación, que incluya una gobernanza justa
y apoyo externo, que garantice el bienestar y la seguridad de la población y que sea respaldada por
una narrativa adecuada.

The debt crisis in Greece since 2010 has triggered seismic changes in the political attitudes of ... more The debt crisis in Greece since 2010 has triggered seismic changes in the political attitudes of the society and, above all, the political identity and discourse of the country. The extremely unpopular austerity policies caused a severe internal polarization which quickly translated into anti-German mass hysteria, vitriolic anti-EU rhetoric and sharp anti-austerity populism. This paper will endeavour to identify the origins, course and outcome of this dramatic shift in the political attitudes and identity in Greece and analyse them with the benefit of hindsight – almost six years after the eruption of the crisis.

At the dawn of the 21st century, the Greek Civil War (1946-9) still remains a controversial episo... more At the dawn of the 21st century, the Greek Civil War (1946-9) still remains a controversial episode of modern Greek history. Academics (Greeks and non-Greeks) have not yet reached a consensus on what caused the outbreak, escalation and defeat of the communist insurgency. The great majority of the academics contend that the anti-communist camp caused the escalation of a low-intensity guerrilla war into a total war. New archival evidence, however, suggests otherwise. This article investigates this transitory phase of the Greek Civil War (January - July 1947) and uncovers that the two sides never really intended to conclude the war peacefully.

Η έννοια της στρατηγικής κουλτούρας (strategic culture) αποτελεί έναν άγνωστο ακόμη όρο της διεθν... more Η έννοια της στρατηγικής κουλτούρας (strategic culture) αποτελεί έναν άγνωστο ακόμη όρο της διεθνούς βιβλιογραφίας περί στρατηγικής στην Ελλάδα. Εν συντομία, η έννοια αυτή περιγράφει πως ένα κράτος σκέπτεται και δρα εν καιρώ πολέμου ή κρίσεων με βάση τις ιστορικές εμπειρίες, τις παραδόσεις καθώς και τα δημογραφικά χαρακτηριστικά του. Το ακόλουθο άθρο επιχειρεί να εισαγάγει την έννοια της στρατηγικής κουλτούρας στην Ελλάδα και να αναλύσει επιγραμματικά την στρατηγική κουλτούρα της χώρας όπως αυτή διαμορφώθηκε κατά τα 150 περίπου χρόνια ανεξάρτητου βίου της ούτως ώστε να εξαχθούν τα απαραίτητα συμπεράσματα για την πορεία της χώρας στο παρελθόν, παρόν και μέλλον.

«Η Στρατηγική Κουλτούρα της Ελλάδας: 1831-1974», Foreign Affairs, Τεύχος 38 (2016), σσ. 165-177

How does an established state authority respond to an insurgency? How does such an authority plan... more How does an established state authority respond to an insurgency? How does such an authority plan and carry out its struggle to counter an armed non-state actor and why? The issue of strategy in counterinsurgency (COIN) remains a rather contentious subject and several practitioners and theorists on COIN have prescribed various remedies to the same problem. This article offers a re-evaluation of the concept of strategy in COIN and outlines the practices and mentalities that counterinsurgents should adopt (and avoid) to successfully counter an insurgency.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party has been intermittently waging an insurgency against the Turkish aut... more The Kurdistan Workers’ Party has been intermittently waging an insurgency against the Turkish authorities for the past three decades with varying success. The article studies not only when and how the party staged this rural-type insurgency but also places this irregular conflict within the context of a tradition of resistance to Turkish rule among Turkey’s Kurds. In effect, this article examines the development of a consistent guerrilla tradition among Turkey’s Kurds in the first decades of the 20th century and, in addition, explores how the party deviated from this tradition and why.

Do mass killings of civilians during counter-insurgency campaigns prove effective or counter-prod... more Do mass killings of civilians during counter-insurgency campaigns prove effective or counter-productive? If they do produce the desired results for the government at the expense of the insurgents, how and why is this mission accomplished?

The Russian military intervention in Syria since September 2015 has sparked spirited debates in W... more The Russian military intervention in Syria since September 2015 has sparked spirited debates in Western policymaking and intellectual circles about the genuine motives behind the Kremlin's unexpected decision. Various monocausal explanations have been propounded, which, however, do not interpret this intervention in either an objective or systematic way. This article aspires to examine the Russian military intervention in Syria in an unbiased, innovative, and thorough way by adding the crucial geopolitical dimension. It will show that, without discounting the other incentives (e.g., support for the only Arab ally), this operation intends primarily to restore Russia's status as a world power in the twenty-first century.

«Ανταρτοπόλεμος: Το Ορφανό Παιδί της Στρατηγικής», Διακλαδική Επιθεώρηση, Τεύχος 30 (Ιούλιος-Οκτώβριος 2014), σσ. 7-18

Ο αναρτοπόλεμος αποτελεί έναν υπομελετημένο τομέα των ορθόδοξων στρατηγικών σπουδών παρ' όλο που ... more Ο αναρτοπόλεμος αποτελεί έναν υπομελετημένο τομέα των ορθόδοξων στρατηγικών σπουδών παρ' όλο που το εν λόγω υποείδος του άτακτου πολέμου είναι δίχως αμφιβολία ο πιο διαδεδομένος τύπος πολέμου στην αυγή του 21ου αιώνα. Το εν λόγω άρθρο εξετάζει την φύση του ανταρτοπολέμου, προσφέρει έναν έγκυρο και ολοκληρωμένο ορισμό της έννοιας αυτής, τονίζει τη διαφορά μεταξύ αντάρτικου και τρομοκρατίας και, τέλος, αναλύει τη στρατηγική των ανταρτών και των κυβερνήσεων.

Spyridon Plakoudas: "The Syrian Kurds and the Democratic Union Party: The Outsider in the Syrian War", Meditteranean Quarterly, 2017

By June 2016 the Kurds of Syria (just 12 percent of the country’s total population) controlled al... more By June 2016 the Kurds of Syria (just 12 percent of the country’s total population) controlled almost all of the 822-kilometer Turkish-Syrian border and advanced against Manbij and Raqqa—the Islamic State’s resupply center and capital, respectively. How did the Syrian Kurds grow from pariahs to kingmakers in northern Syria? This essay surveys the strategy of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the most powerful organization among the Syrian Kurds, from 2011 until the first half of 2016 and shows how the PYD’s realpolitk secured the party’s survival and, eventually, success in the midst of a vicious sectarian civil war.

Lectures by Spyridon Plakoudas

What is strategy? How can strategy be best defined? How can we distinguish between strategy and o... more What is strategy? How can strategy be best defined? How can we distinguish between strategy and operational art or tactics? Who devises and executes a strategy? What are the types and forms of strategy?

Papers for Think Tanks by Spyridon Plakoudas

What are the causes of terrorism nowadays? Religious fundamentalism? Political repression? Romant... more What are the causes of terrorism nowadays? Religious fundamentalism? Political repression? Romantic ideologies? Or simple paranoia? This article examines the literature on the causes of terrorism and demonstrates that the roots of this violent phenomenon are the following: ego, protest and ideas.

Κατά τον 21 ο αιώνα, οι απειλές για την εθνική ασφάλεια των κρατών έχουν αλλάξει άρδην μορφή και ... more Κατά τον 21 ο αιώνα, οι απειλές για την εθνική ασφάλεια των κρατών έχουν αλλάξει άρδην μορφή και χαρακτήρα και εκπορεύονται πλέον από τρεις κύριες πηγές: τα κράτη, τους μη κρατικούς δρώντες και το (άναρχα και πολυπολικό) διεθνές σύστημα. Οι μη κρατικοί δρώντες έχουν αυξήσει δραματικά την ισχύ και επιρροή τους στο διεθνές σύστημα την επαύριο της λήξης του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Ως εκ τούτου, οι ένοπλες ομάδες (τρομοκράτες, αντάρτες και οργανωμένο έγκλημα) αμφισβητούν το κρατικό μονοπώλιο στην βία δυναμικώς χάρη σε ορισμένους παράγοντες: α) την πρόσβαση σε υπερσύγχρονα όπλα (μέσω της μαύρης αγοράς) και σε ανθρώπινους και υλικούς πόρους (χάρη στους νέους πολλαπλασιαστές ισχύος κατά την εποχή της παγκοσμιοποίησης και της πληροφορίας), β) την χρήση των νέων τεχνολογιών (πρωτίστως το διαδίκτυο και τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης), γ) τη συνεργασία μεταξύ ομοδεϊατών ανά την υφήλιο (π.χ. οι τζιχαντιστές ή οι μαφίες) και δ) τον περιορισμό της κρατικής κυριαρχίας (π.χ. η εκχώρηση των αρμοδιοτήτων της εθνικής ασφάλειας σε υπερεθνικούς οργανισμούς όπως η ΕΕ). Οι απειλές εκ των ενόπλων ομάδων, όμως, ενίοτε υπερβαίνουν τα όρια ενός κράτους όπως αποδεικνύει η έκταση του διεθνούς οργανωμένου εγκλήματος (π.χ. η Ρωσική Μαφία) και της διεθνούς τρομοκρατίας (π.χ. το Ισλαμικό Κράτος). Την εποχή της παγκοσμιοποίησης αναφύονται απειλές εκτός της επικράτειας ενός κράτους που όμως επηρεάζουν το ίδιο και τα υπόλοιπα ποικιλοτρόπως. Η κλιματική αλλαγή, η (παράνομη) μετανάστευση, η (πολιτική / θρησκευτική) ριζοσπαστικοποίηση, τα όπλα μαζικής καταστροφής και οι οικονομικές κρίσεις – καθώς και τα παράγωγά τους (π.χ. η επιστιστική ασφάλεια ή η χρήση όπλων μαζικής καταστροφής από τρομοκράτες) – αποτελούν απότοκα της μη γραμμικής διαδικασίας της παγκοσμιοποίησης. Ως εκ τούτου, δεν επιδέχονται επιτυχούς αντιμετώπισης παρά μόνον σε υπερεθνικό επίπεδο. Ακόμη, όμως, και οι «παραδοσιακές» απειλές εκ μέρους των κρατών μεταλάσσονται. Σε μια εποχή όπου η «διπλωματία των κανονιοφόρων» και ο πόλεμος υποχωρεί δραματικά, τα κράτη υιοθετούν νέες έμμεσες μεθόδους για να επιβάλουν την θέλησή τους. Ο κυβερνοπόλεμος και οι κυρώσεις (οικονομικές και μη) αποτελούν ισχυρά εργαλεία στο οπλοστάσιο ενός κράτους την εποχή της παγκοσμιοποίησης και της πληροφορίας. O υβριδικός πόλεμος, όμως, αντιπροσωπεύει μια ακόμα ισχυρότερη απειλή. Ως όρος εμφανίστηκε σχετικά πρόσφατα (βλ. Πόλεμος Χεζμπολλάχ-Ισραήλ το 2006) και ορίζεται ως μια σύμμειξη του μη συμβατικού και συμβατικού modus operandi (εμπεριέχοντας τον κυβερνοπόλεμο επίσης). Ο υβριδικός πόλεμος δεν υιοθετείται αποκλειστικά από μη κρατικούς δρώντες (π.χ. Χεζμπολλάχ

This research paper examines thoroughly and critically all the causes and facilitators of the Ara... more This research paper examines thoroughly and critically all the causes and facilitators of the Arab Spring - from twitter and facebook to the relative deprivation of the numerous youth in the Arab World. In addition, this research paper for the first time outlines the necessary and sufficient conditions under which regime change was effectuated and, thus, explains the resilience of certain regimes and the vulnerability of others.

This article examines how and why the Syrian Kurds, an outsider in the Syrian War, have thus far ... more This article examines how and why the Syrian Kurds, an outsider in the Syrian War, have thus far succeeded in acquiring power and territory through a pragmatist strategy from 2011 until now.

Ο Ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος (1946-1949): Πεδίο Μάχης του Ψυχρού Πολέμου, 2017

Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471364.013

(From the Ύμνοςτου ΕΛΑΣ (hymn of the ELAS) resistance movement of World War II)
The Guerrilla Tradition in Greece

Cómo terminan las insurgencias: en busca de la victoria del gobierno , Volumen 17, Número 28, octubre-diciembre 2019, pp. 923-938, 2019

o el gobierno, un acuerdo de paz o un estancamiento. La guerra, no obstante, evoluciona cons-
tantemente; por lo tanto, los tres escenarios anteriores pueden manifestarse durante el Transcurso

«Η Στρατηγική Κουλτούρα της Ελλάδας: 1831-1974», Foreign Affairs, Τεύχος 38 (2016), σσ. 165-177

Spyridon Plakoudas: "The Syrian Kurds and the Democratic Union Party: The Outsider in the Syrian War", Meditteranean Quarterly, 2017

The Syrian Civil War, currently in its sixth year, has monopolised the attention of the world's m... more The Syrian Civil War, currently in its sixth year, has monopolised the attention of the world's mass media. However, another war (no less vicious than the sectarian conflict in Syria) rages in the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. A Saudi-led coalition of peripheral Sunni powers battles against the Shia Houthis and their Iranian backers in yet another manifestation of the Sunni-Shia divide in the Middle East and the rift between Southern and Northern Yemen.

Without doubt, the Syrian Civil War represents the most violent war in the world. At present, the... more Without doubt, the Syrian Civil War represents the most violent war in the world. At present, the Syrian War has degenerated into a sanguinary stalemate. How can the stalemate be overcome? Through a military victory or a peace settlement? Does the prospect of a peace settlement in Syria seem a chimera or a viable option? This article intends to answer this question.

Revista Cientifica General Jose Maria Cordova, 2019

Insurgency is currently the most prevalent type of war. However, success in irregular warfare can... more Insurgency is currently the most prevalent type of war. However, success in irregular warfare cannot be quantified and measured with absolute certainty. This paper will examine how insurgencies end and how a government can achieve the optimum scenario, military victory. An insurgency could end in three possible ways: a (military) victory for the insurgents or the regime, a peace deal, or a stalemate. However, war constantly evolves; therefore, the above three scenarios can manifest at any time during the course of an insurgency. Therefore, the state should use a balanced mix of reforms and repression. A state must implement a situation-dependent policy that includes good governance and outside support, that ensures the welfare and security of the population, buttressed by an adequate narrative.

Defense & Security Analysis

Amerykańska strategia wojskowa w Syrii podlegała w tym równaniu dwóm zmiennym niezależnym: prezyd... more Amerykańska strategia wojskowa w Syrii podlegała w tym równaniu dwóm zmiennym niezależnym: prezydentom Trumpowi i Erdoğanowi. Ten drugi był niezmiennie zdeterminowany, by zlikwidować Rojavę i w miarę możliwości rozszerzyć granice Turcji zgodnie z "Paktem Narodowym", a ten pierwszy, wierny doktrynie "America First", opowiadał się za wycofaniem z "niekończących się wojen" na Bliskim Wschodzie.The US military strategy in Syria was subjected to two independent variables in this equation: presidents Trump and Erdoğan. The latter was stead- fastly committed to dismantling Rojava and, if possible, expanding the borders of Turkey according to the "National Pact." And the former, loyal to the "America Firs"” doctrine, favored disengagement from the "endless wars" in the Middle East

Middle East Policy

One of the domains of US foreign policy stuck on autopilot relates to Syria and, most importantly... more One of the domains of US foreign policy stuck on autopilot relates to Syria and, most importantly, Rojava (or AANES by its official name). The Biden administration inherited a quandary from its predecessor with no easy solution. On the one hand, the hostility of other actors in the region—especially Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria—render a continued US presence in northeastern Syria untenable in the long term. On the other hand, Washington cannot abandon its partners in the fight against ISIS as they did before—at least not before securing a deal beneficial to all sides. So what will President Joe Biden do with regards to Rojava? Will he adopt the policy enacted during Barack Obama's second term? Or will he implement a new policy to address the new challenges? This article examines the challenges for US foreign policy with regards to Rojava and, on the basis of the developments thus far, analyzes whether the Biden administration's approach will replicate Obama‐era policy.

Middle East Quarterly, Sep 1, 2021

On October 9, 2019, the Turkish army and its proxy Syrian National Army (SNA) invaded the autonom... more On October 9, 2019, the Turkish army and its proxy Syrian National Army (SNA) invaded the autonomous Kurdish region in northeastern Syria. Accompanied by a White House clarification that US forces in the area would not resist the Turkish incursion and would be shortly withdrawn from Syria, kindled immediate accusations of Washington's betrayal of its loyal Kurdish ally. In reality, this move by the Trump administration was a corollary of the incoherent and contradictory policy vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war in general, and the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in particular, bequeathed by the Obama administration to its successor. This culminated in a narrow counterterrorism strategy that relied heavily on the Kurds for fighting the Islamist terror organization while giving little thought to the implications of this strategy for Kurdish relations with the Assad regime and Turkey. As a result, Operation Peace Spring threw the most stable and peaceful corner of Syria into disarray and set in train a "scramble for the Syrian Kurdistan" that seems to have closed the lid on Kurdish hopes for autonomous, if not independent existence. Note: Copyright: Middle East Forum.9 października 2019 r. armia turecka i jej proxy Syryjska Armia Narodowa (SNA) dokonały inwazji na autonomiczny region kurdyjski w północno-wschodniej Syrii. Towarzyszące temu wyjaśnienie Białego Domu, że siły amerykańskie w tym rejonie nie stawią oporu tureckiemu wtargnięciu i zostaną wkrótce wycofane z Syrii, rozpaliło natychmiastowe oskarżenia o zdradę Waszyngtonu wobec lojalnego kurdyjskiego sojusznika. W rzeczywistości to posunięcie administracji Trumpa było następstwem niespójnej i sprzecznej polityki wobec syryjskiej wojny domowej w ogóle, a walki z samozwańczym Państwem Islamskim (ISIS) w szczególności, przekazanej przez administrację Obamy jej następcy. Kulminacją tego procesu była wąska strategia antyterrorystyczna, która w dużym stopniu opierała się na Kurdach w walce z islamistyczną organizacją terrorystyczną, przy czym nie zastanawiano się nad konsekwencjami tej strategii dla relacji Kurdów z reżimem Asada i Turcją. W rezultacie operacja "Pokojowa Wiosna" doprowadziła do chaosu w najbardziej stabilnym i spokojnym zakątku Syrii i zapoczątkowała "walkę o syryjski Kurdystan", która, jak się wydaje, zamknęła kurdyjskie nadzieje na autonomiczną, jeśli nie niezależną egzystencję. Uwaga: Copyright: Middle East Forum

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkey, 2018

This chapter argues that two critical developments in 2003 can explain the rise of the PKK from i... more This chapter argues that two critical developments in 2003 can explain the rise of the PKK from its own ashes like a phoenix in 2004: the Iraq War and the AKP Phenomenon in Turkey. However, the new wave of violence differed critically from the vicious war in the 1990s. The chapter argues that both parties were pre-occupied with the consolidation of their influence inside the country vis-a-vis other contenders (the Kemalists for the AKP/the Hizmet and AKP for the PKK) and, therefore, a limited war unfolded which was repeatedly interrupted by ceasefires and (open and covert) peace talks. In 2012, the Syrian Civil War acted as a catalyst and the low-intensity conflict escalated into an all-out one.

THE PKK INSURGENCYUntil quite recently, the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey received little attentio... more THE PKK INSURGENCYUntil quite recently, the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey received little attention in Western academia in comparison to other concurrent insurgencies of far less intensity (such as that of the IRA in Northern Ireland). The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) insurgency, which began in 1984, has continued on and off for almost three decades and has resulted in over 45,000 fatalities on both sides.1While the PKK uprising has often been characterized as terrorism by the Turkish state, its external allies, 2 and a large portion of the academic community, 3 counterinsurgency (COIN) experts have referred to it as a ruraltype insurgency. This outbreak of separatist violence did not take place in a vacuum. Rather, like many of the Kurdish guerrilla movements that emerged following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the insurgency too originated in the mountainous region of Southeastern Turkey (or Turkish Kurdistan). The warlike, semi-nomadic Kurdish tribes in ...

THE RUSSIAN BEAR ROARSOn September 30, 2015, the world's news media circulated a startling de... more THE RUSSIAN BEAR ROARSOn September 30, 2015, the world's news media circulated a startling development: Russian warplanes flew to Syria after an official invitation by the beleaguered government of Bashar al-Assad and waged a fierce wave of aerial bombardment against the regime's opponents. According to Putin, Russia stepped into the war to stem the tide of jihadi terror in Syria and beyond.1 However, the target lists of the Russian air force told a different story: From the outset, the Russian warplanes primarily targeted the Free Syrian Army and other armed Islamist organizations that threatened the regime's nerve centers (i.e., the Latakia-Damascus highway and the Alawite enclave) rather than the Islamic State.2 Only in November 2015 did the Russian warplanes shifttheir military focus to the Islamic State and, in particular, its oil industry (tankers and refineries).3 The main factions of the anti-Assad camp (most notably, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and NATO) were surprise...

Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 2019

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkey, 2018

Praise for Insurgency and counter-Insurgency In turkey "The Kurdish armed forces aligned with the... more Praise for Insurgency and counter-Insurgency In turkey "The Kurdish armed forces aligned with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) of Syria have received an unprecedented attention in the past few years, owing to their fighting prowess, effectiveness against the Islamic State, and progressive ideals. While much has been written on this hitherto unknown group, the insurgency from which the PYD gets its inspiration, the PKK in Turkey, is what this book aspires to examine. The PKK, formed by a small group of college students in the 1970s, has survived, grown, and evolved into one of the most powerful non-state actors in the Middle East. In this fresh and much needed look at the PKK, Spyridon Plakoudas offers an insightful analysis of one of the most complicated armed insurgencies in the world. This is a valuable resource for anyone interested in the complex nature of the Kurdish conflict in the Middle East.

Journal of Strategic Studies, 2018

Mediterranean Quarterly, 2017

By June 2016, the Kurds of Syria (just 12 percent of the country's total population) controll... more By June 2016, the Kurds of Syria (just 12 percent of the country's total population) controlled almost all of the 822-kilometer Turkish-Syrian border and advanced against Manbij and Raqqa — the Islamic State's resupply center and capital, respectively. How did the Syrian Kurds grow from pariahs to kingmakers in northern Syria? This essay surveys the strategy of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the most powerful organization among the Syrian Kurds, from 2011 until the first half of 2016, and shows how the PYD's realpolitik secured the party's survival and, eventually, success in the midst of a vicious sectarian civil war.

Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 2016

Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2016

Abstract Since control over the population constitutes the most crucial determinant for victory i... more Abstract Since control over the population constitutes the most crucial determinant for victory in irregular warfare, how should a state authority isolate the insurgents (the “fish” in Maoist terms) from the population (the “sea” in which the “fish” thrive)? Should a state authority simply drain the “sea” by diverting its “water” elsewhere? Does the forcible transfer of the local people who support an insurgency truly work? This article studies how the royalist regime of Greece forcibly transferred thousands of villagers (over 10% of the total population) to counter the communist insurgency during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and shows whether and how these deportations could be crowned with success.

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2014

Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

Summary With a thousand names, one nature, Akritas [frontier guard] or Armatolos [gendarme]/Antar... more Summary With a thousand names, one nature, Akritas [frontier guard] or Armatolos [gendarme]/Antartis [guerrillero], Kleftis [brigand], Palikari [hero], I'm always the people itself. (From the Ύμνοςτου ΕΛΑΣ (hymn of the ELAS) resistance movement of World War II) The Guerrilla Tradition in Greece The question of strategic culture in counterinsurgency (COIN) has stimulated endless debates on the actual existence and impact of a distinct national style in conducting guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. Greece stands out as an ideal case to test the hypothesis that such a national style does actually exist, since the phenomenon of insurgency constitutes a constant and prime theme in modern Greek history. The mountainous terrain, the predominantly agricultural structure of a conservative society, the recurring phenomenon of banditry and the uninterrupted tradition of rebellion against Ottoman despotism decisively contributed to the appearance of a distinct guerrilla tradition that influenced Greek history from the end of the Ottoman rule to the onset of the Cold War. The period between 1831 and 1912 could be regarded as the heyday of banditry in Greece. Numerous large groups of well-armed bandits pillaged and terrorised the villagers with impunity as the Athens-centric state could not fully control the mountainous countryside of Greece. Surprisingly, the very same bandits could be found hunting down other bandits or fostering rebellions in Ottoman-ruled territories in the Balkans whenever the Greek kingdom bought them off with state offices and riches. For more than a hundred years, armed irregulars (part-time bandits and part-time guerrillas) roamed across the mountainous regions of Greece. The true nature of these irregulars in modern Greek history still remains a matter of debate. The ordinary people praised them as national heroes, while the romantic and Leftist-oriented thinkers portrayed them as apostles of socio-political revolution. In reality, until the early twentieth century, guerrillas comprised a unique social class, homogenous but fragmented, that no Greek government could afford to ignore. Specific regions (such as Crete) bred generations of tough warriors who fought with the time-tested guerrilla methods of ‘Kleftopolemos’ (bandit war in Greek) – hit-and-run tactics and night raids by small units of seasoned warriors who followed a charismatic captain.