Marc Slors | Radboud University Nijmegen (original) (raw)

Books by Marc Slors

How can it possibly be the case that electrical activity in the soggy grey substance of our brain... more How can it possibly be the case that electrical activity in the soggy grey substance of our brains is responsible for our thoughts, our conscious experiences and our subjectivity? What is subjectivity, for that matter? Does it require a ‘self’, or a subject of experience? Is free will a possibility when all we think and do emerges from the physical brain? These are prototypical questions that characterize the philosophy of mind, brain and behaviour that we shall introduce in this book.

Many of the problems and theories discussed in this book fall under what is traditionally known as analytical philosophy of mind, such as the mind-body problem, mental causation, mental content and consciousness. The range of this book, however, is wider, and includes other themes that are directly connected with the bigger issue of what it is that makes us human beings or persons. These topics are ‘the self’, ‘free will’, ‘understanding other minds’, ‘embodied, embedded cognition’ and ‘emotions’.

Behoudens de in of krachtens de Auteurswet van 1912 gestelde uitzonderingen mag niets uit deze ui... more Behoudens de in of krachtens de Auteurswet van 1912 gestelde uitzonderingen mag niets uit deze uitgave worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch door fotokopieën, opnamen of enig andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever. Voor zover het maken van kopieën uit deze uitgave is toegestaan op grond van artikelen 16h t/m 16m Auteurswet 1912 jo. besluit van 27 november 2002, Stb 575, dient men de daarvoor wettelijk verschuldigde vergoeding te voldoen aan de Stichting Reprorecht te Hoofddorp (postbus 3060, 2130 KB, www.reprorecht.nl) of contact op te nemen met de uitgever voor het treffen van een rechtstreekse regeling in de zin van art. 16l, vijfde lid, Auteurswet 1912. Voor het overnemen van gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers en andere compilatiewerken (artikel 16, Auteurswet 1912) kan men zich wenden tot de Stichting PRO (Stichting Publicatie-en Reproductierechten, postbus 3060, 2130 KB Hoofddorp, www.cedar.nl/pro). No part of this book may be reproduced in any way whatsoever without the written permission of the publisher. Verzorging omslag: Bart van den Tooren Verzorging binnenwerk: Garage BNO, Kampen isbn 978 94 6105 778 5 nur 730 Voor Tycho en Rafaël

Papers by Marc Slors

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2023

The scalar notion of collective intentionality has been used to characterize the evolution of lar... more The scalar notion of collective intentionality has been used to characterize the evolution of largely uncollaborative apes to highly collaborative ones. This proposal covers human evolution up until and including the formation of hunter-gather groups. But can collective intentionality also explain the emergence of complex societies? I argue that it cannot. Instead of collective intentionality, collaboration in complex societies hinges on a set of non-strategic attitudes and standardize human interactions so that role divisions, institutions, norms and conventions can emerge as group-level phenomena. This set, summarized as 'conventionality', is a product of group-level selection rather than of collectively intending minds.

Cognitive Science, 2017

The 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci 2017) (London, UK, 26-29 July 2017)

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how.

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 2020

Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2022

In most literature on human cultural evolution and the emergence of large-scale cooperation, the ... more In most literature on human cultural evolution and the emergence of large-scale cooperation, the main function of cultural conventions is described as providing groupmarkers. This paper argues that cultural conventions serve another purpose as well that is at least as important. Large-scale cooperation is characterized by complex division of labour and by a diversity of social roles associated with cultural institutions. This requires ubiquitous 'role-interaction coordination'-as it will be labelled. It is argued that without cultural conventions this type of coordination would be cognitively intractable. Thus, apart from functioning as group markers, they are first and foremost important groupmakers.

Synthese, 2022

The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces... more The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicits the same capacity. To address this operationalization

PlosOne, 2021

In joint action literature it is often assumed that acting together is driven by pervasive and au... more In joint action literature it is often assumed that acting together is driven by pervasive and automatic process of co-representation, that is, representing the co-actor's part of the task in addition to one's own. Much of this research employs joint stimulus-response compatibility tasks varying the stimuli employed or the physical and social relations between participants. In this study we test the robustness of co-representation effects by focusing instead on variation in response modality. Specifically, we implement a mouse-tracking version of a Joint Simon Task in which participants respond by producing continuous movements with a computer mouse rather than pushing discrete buttons. We have three key findings. First, in a replication of an earlier study we show that in a classical individual Simon Task movement trajectories show greater curvature on incongruent trials, paralleling longer response times. Second, this effect largely disappears in a Go-NoGo Simon Task, in which participants respond to only one of the cues and refrain from responding to the other. Third, contrary to previous studies that use button pressing responses, we observe no overall effect in the joint variants of the task. However, we also detect a notable diversity in movement strategies adopted by the participants, with some participants showing the effect on the individual level. Our study casts doubt on the pervasiveness of co-representation, highlights the usefulness of mouse-tracking methodology and emphasizes the need for looking at individual variation in task performance.

Philosophical Psychology, 2019

According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social ins... more According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social institutions should be characterized as socially extended cognition. However, this idea invokes resistance because it seems to court metaphysical problems such as a serious variant of the problem of cognitive bloat. In this paper I argue that defenders of socially extended cognition are not overly worried by such problems, because their position is akin to a position known as ‘distributed cognition’, which does avoid these problems. Nevertheless, I will argue that the explanatory aims of socially extended cognition do not match with the distributed cognition perspective. The ensuing predicament can be avoided, however, by recognizing that the idea of socially extended cognition hinges on the conflation of two dimensions of the interconnection of the elements in a cognitive system which I will label ‘functional integration’ and ‘task-dependency’. Separating these dimensions allows us to iden...

In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition ... more In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they provide a characterization of social understanding as being essentially situated. However, embodied cognition explanations seem to be limited in scope insofar as they do not target the more sophisticated forms of emotion understanding that have traditionally been the main focus of mindreading explanations. In the second part of the article we discuss Goldie's account of emotion understanding as a possible way to complement embodied cognition approaches without re-introducing the frame problem. We offer two suggestions that might further the integration of Goldie's account of emotion understanding within the framework of embodied cognition.

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how.

ANTW, 2019

Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. I... more Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. It features two implicit ideas: First, commonsense cog- nitive concepts (CCC’s) like‘free will’,‘thoughts’,‘consciousness’,‘attention’and ‘self’, belong to a variety of disciplines and cannot be appropriated by either philosophy or cognitive neuroscience. Second, the description of biological processes in the brain and the description of behavioral processes by CCC’s are so far removed from each other that a simple reduction, or even a relation of implementation between them, is implausible. What is needed instead, is a relation of interpretation: which cognitive concepts should be used to describe specific brain processes is not fixed in advance but the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between common sense practice, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience. All articles in this special issue shed light on these two key ideas that characterize a new neurophilosophy.

Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry, 2020

In this paper, we propose a two-dimensional analysis of self-management in mental health care. Th... more In this paper, we propose a two-dimensional analysis of self-management in mental health care. The first dimension pertains to the object of self-management. Some conditions to be managed directly affect a person's agential capacities and sense of self. Such conditions are 'proximal-to-self'. Other conditions, by contrast, are more 'distal-to-self' in that they do not directly affect a person's sense of self. The second dimension represents the process of self-management. Here we will distinguish between management as 'control over' versus management as 'facilitation of' health promoting conditions or behavior. We argue for a division of labor between management-as-control and management-as-facilitation in the self-management of (mental) illness. The two-dimensional analysis of self-management that we will propose is intended as an antidote against the naïve common-sense view of self-management as 'taking conscious control over one's health conditions'. This is a one-sided and unrealistic representation of what it means to cope with (mental) illness. The proposed analysis distinguishes four types of self-management intervention, which can be combined in diverse ways. Hence, we argue, it can serve as a tool for determining realistic, person-specific and context-sensitive self-management interventions. Thus it may also help reduce (self-) stigmatization and foster a realistic understanding of empowerment.

Frontiers in Psychology, 2020

Cognition is claimed to be extended by a wide array of items, ranging from notebooks to social in... more Cognition is claimed to be extended by a wide array of items, ranging from notebooks to social institutions. Although the connection between individuals and these items is usually referred to as ‘coupling’, the difference between notebooks and social institutions is so vast that the meaning of ‘coupling’ is bound to be different in each of these cases. In this paper I argue that the radical difference between ‘artefact-extended cognition’ and ‘socially extended cognition’ is not sufficiently highlighted in the literature. I argue that there are two different senses of ‘cognitive extension’ at play, that I shall label, respectively, ‘implementation extension’ and ‘impact extension.’ Whereas implementation extension is a causal-functional notion, impact-extension hinges on social normativity that is connected with organization and action coordination. I will argue that the two kinds of cognitive extension are different enough to warrant separate labels. Because the most salient form of social extension of cognition involves the reciprocal co-constitution of cognitive capacities, I will propose to set it apart from other types of extended cognition by using the label ‘symbiotic cognition.’

Mind & Language, 2019

In this paper I sketch the contours of an explanation for the perceived normativity of cultural c... more In this paper I sketch the contours of an explanation for the perceived normativity of cultural conventions—social etiquette, dress codes, architectural styles, styling of public space—that hinges neither on David Lewis’ nor on Margaret Gilbert’s classic theories of convention. I argue that cultural conventions facilitate and enable a specific kind of action coordination—'role-interaction coordination’—that is prevalent in the (often massive) division of labour that characterizes human societies. I argue further that playing one’s roles in society and coordinating them with those of others is form of multitasking. Such multitasking is made possible on a large scale, I argue, because we can offload cognition aimed at role-interaction coordination onto a social and material infrastructure of cultural conventions. Research on multitasking shows that such offloading is possible only if this infrastructure is stable. Our natural tendency to prefer multitasking in instances where one task requires low cognitive control can thus explain both our preference for and expectation of familiar cultural conventions—i.e. their perceived normativity. This explanation fits well with existing literature on culture shock. It also allows for an evolutionary explanation of psychological findings about our natural susceptibility to rules and rituals.

American Journal of Bioethics, 2019

Frontiers in Psychology, section Cognitive Science, 2019

Research initiated by Benjamin Libet suggests that short-term conscious intentions are not the on... more Research initiated by Benjamin Libet suggests that short-term conscious intentions are not the onsets of bodily actions. However, other research, particularly on longer term intentions, seems to show that at least some conscious intentions are effective. This leads to the idea that volition is a complex interplay between conscious and unconscious processes. The nature and structure of this interplay is mostly uncharted territory. In this paper, I will highlight two currently neglected distinctions that will help to chart the territory. The first distinction is between intentions we become conscious of (passive) and consciously formed intentions (active). The second is Fred Dretske’s distinction between structuring and triggering causes. I will introduce both distinctions by discussing how they tie in with and strengthen recent criticism of free selection paradigms and support the idea that consciously self-initiated action issues from processes of conscious deliberation and/or information integration. I will argue that consciously self-initiated action typically involves consciously formed intentions that are the structuring causes of our actions. This notion of conscious intentional action allows us to identify at least four stages in which unconscious processes co-determine our actions—without undermining their self-initiated character.

How can it possibly be the case that electrical activity in the soggy grey substance of our brain... more How can it possibly be the case that electrical activity in the soggy grey substance of our brains is responsible for our thoughts, our conscious experiences and our subjectivity? What is subjectivity, for that matter? Does it require a ‘self’, or a subject of experience? Is free will a possibility when all we think and do emerges from the physical brain? These are prototypical questions that characterize the philosophy of mind, brain and behaviour that we shall introduce in this book.

Many of the problems and theories discussed in this book fall under what is traditionally known as analytical philosophy of mind, such as the mind-body problem, mental causation, mental content and consciousness. The range of this book, however, is wider, and includes other themes that are directly connected with the bigger issue of what it is that makes us human beings or persons. These topics are ‘the self’, ‘free will’, ‘understanding other minds’, ‘embodied, embedded cognition’ and ‘emotions’.

Behoudens de in of krachtens de Auteurswet van 1912 gestelde uitzonderingen mag niets uit deze ui... more Behoudens de in of krachtens de Auteurswet van 1912 gestelde uitzonderingen mag niets uit deze uitgave worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch door fotokopieën, opnamen of enig andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever. Voor zover het maken van kopieën uit deze uitgave is toegestaan op grond van artikelen 16h t/m 16m Auteurswet 1912 jo. besluit van 27 november 2002, Stb 575, dient men de daarvoor wettelijk verschuldigde vergoeding te voldoen aan de Stichting Reprorecht te Hoofddorp (postbus 3060, 2130 KB, www.reprorecht.nl) of contact op te nemen met de uitgever voor het treffen van een rechtstreekse regeling in de zin van art. 16l, vijfde lid, Auteurswet 1912. Voor het overnemen van gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers en andere compilatiewerken (artikel 16, Auteurswet 1912) kan men zich wenden tot de Stichting PRO (Stichting Publicatie-en Reproductierechten, postbus 3060, 2130 KB Hoofddorp, www.cedar.nl/pro). No part of this book may be reproduced in any way whatsoever without the written permission of the publisher. Verzorging omslag: Bart van den Tooren Verzorging binnenwerk: Garage BNO, Kampen isbn 978 94 6105 778 5 nur 730 Voor Tycho en Rafaël

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2023

The scalar notion of collective intentionality has been used to characterize the evolution of lar... more The scalar notion of collective intentionality has been used to characterize the evolution of largely uncollaborative apes to highly collaborative ones. This proposal covers human evolution up until and including the formation of hunter-gather groups. But can collective intentionality also explain the emergence of complex societies? I argue that it cannot. Instead of collective intentionality, collaboration in complex societies hinges on a set of non-strategic attitudes and standardize human interactions so that role divisions, institutions, norms and conventions can emerge as group-level phenomena. This set, summarized as 'conventionality', is a product of group-level selection rather than of collectively intending minds.

Cognitive Science, 2017

The 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci 2017) (London, UK, 26-29 July 2017)

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how.

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 2020

Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2022

In most literature on human cultural evolution and the emergence of large-scale cooperation, the ... more In most literature on human cultural evolution and the emergence of large-scale cooperation, the main function of cultural conventions is described as providing groupmarkers. This paper argues that cultural conventions serve another purpose as well that is at least as important. Large-scale cooperation is characterized by complex division of labour and by a diversity of social roles associated with cultural institutions. This requires ubiquitous 'role-interaction coordination'-as it will be labelled. It is argued that without cultural conventions this type of coordination would be cognitively intractable. Thus, apart from functioning as group markers, they are first and foremost important groupmakers.

Synthese, 2022

The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces... more The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicits the same capacity. To address this operationalization

PlosOne, 2021

In joint action literature it is often assumed that acting together is driven by pervasive and au... more In joint action literature it is often assumed that acting together is driven by pervasive and automatic process of co-representation, that is, representing the co-actor's part of the task in addition to one's own. Much of this research employs joint stimulus-response compatibility tasks varying the stimuli employed or the physical and social relations between participants. In this study we test the robustness of co-representation effects by focusing instead on variation in response modality. Specifically, we implement a mouse-tracking version of a Joint Simon Task in which participants respond by producing continuous movements with a computer mouse rather than pushing discrete buttons. We have three key findings. First, in a replication of an earlier study we show that in a classical individual Simon Task movement trajectories show greater curvature on incongruent trials, paralleling longer response times. Second, this effect largely disappears in a Go-NoGo Simon Task, in which participants respond to only one of the cues and refrain from responding to the other. Third, contrary to previous studies that use button pressing responses, we observe no overall effect in the joint variants of the task. However, we also detect a notable diversity in movement strategies adopted by the participants, with some participants showing the effect on the individual level. Our study casts doubt on the pervasiveness of co-representation, highlights the usefulness of mouse-tracking methodology and emphasizes the need for looking at individual variation in task performance.

Philosophical Psychology, 2019

According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social ins... more According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social institutions should be characterized as socially extended cognition. However, this idea invokes resistance because it seems to court metaphysical problems such as a serious variant of the problem of cognitive bloat. In this paper I argue that defenders of socially extended cognition are not overly worried by such problems, because their position is akin to a position known as ‘distributed cognition’, which does avoid these problems. Nevertheless, I will argue that the explanatory aims of socially extended cognition do not match with the distributed cognition perspective. The ensuing predicament can be avoided, however, by recognizing that the idea of socially extended cognition hinges on the conflation of two dimensions of the interconnection of the elements in a cognitive system which I will label ‘functional integration’ and ‘task-dependency’. Separating these dimensions allows us to iden...

In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition ... more In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they provide a characterization of social understanding as being essentially situated. However, embodied cognition explanations seem to be limited in scope insofar as they do not target the more sophisticated forms of emotion understanding that have traditionally been the main focus of mindreading explanations. In the second part of the article we discuss Goldie's account of emotion understanding as a possible way to complement embodied cognition approaches without re-introducing the frame problem. We offer two suggestions that might further the integration of Goldie's account of emotion understanding within the framework of embodied cognition.

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how.

ANTW, 2019

Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. I... more Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. It features two implicit ideas: First, commonsense cog- nitive concepts (CCC’s) like‘free will’,‘thoughts’,‘consciousness’,‘attention’and ‘self’, belong to a variety of disciplines and cannot be appropriated by either philosophy or cognitive neuroscience. Second, the description of biological processes in the brain and the description of behavioral processes by CCC’s are so far removed from each other that a simple reduction, or even a relation of implementation between them, is implausible. What is needed instead, is a relation of interpretation: which cognitive concepts should be used to describe specific brain processes is not fixed in advance but the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between common sense practice, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience. All articles in this special issue shed light on these two key ideas that characterize a new neurophilosophy.

Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry, 2020

In this paper, we propose a two-dimensional analysis of self-management in mental health care. Th... more In this paper, we propose a two-dimensional analysis of self-management in mental health care. The first dimension pertains to the object of self-management. Some conditions to be managed directly affect a person's agential capacities and sense of self. Such conditions are 'proximal-to-self'. Other conditions, by contrast, are more 'distal-to-self' in that they do not directly affect a person's sense of self. The second dimension represents the process of self-management. Here we will distinguish between management as 'control over' versus management as 'facilitation of' health promoting conditions or behavior. We argue for a division of labor between management-as-control and management-as-facilitation in the self-management of (mental) illness. The two-dimensional analysis of self-management that we will propose is intended as an antidote against the naïve common-sense view of self-management as 'taking conscious control over one's health conditions'. This is a one-sided and unrealistic representation of what it means to cope with (mental) illness. The proposed analysis distinguishes four types of self-management intervention, which can be combined in diverse ways. Hence, we argue, it can serve as a tool for determining realistic, person-specific and context-sensitive self-management interventions. Thus it may also help reduce (self-) stigmatization and foster a realistic understanding of empowerment.

Frontiers in Psychology, 2020

Cognition is claimed to be extended by a wide array of items, ranging from notebooks to social in... more Cognition is claimed to be extended by a wide array of items, ranging from notebooks to social institutions. Although the connection between individuals and these items is usually referred to as ‘coupling’, the difference between notebooks and social institutions is so vast that the meaning of ‘coupling’ is bound to be different in each of these cases. In this paper I argue that the radical difference between ‘artefact-extended cognition’ and ‘socially extended cognition’ is not sufficiently highlighted in the literature. I argue that there are two different senses of ‘cognitive extension’ at play, that I shall label, respectively, ‘implementation extension’ and ‘impact extension.’ Whereas implementation extension is a causal-functional notion, impact-extension hinges on social normativity that is connected with organization and action coordination. I will argue that the two kinds of cognitive extension are different enough to warrant separate labels. Because the most salient form of social extension of cognition involves the reciprocal co-constitution of cognitive capacities, I will propose to set it apart from other types of extended cognition by using the label ‘symbiotic cognition.’

Mind & Language, 2019

In this paper I sketch the contours of an explanation for the perceived normativity of cultural c... more In this paper I sketch the contours of an explanation for the perceived normativity of cultural conventions—social etiquette, dress codes, architectural styles, styling of public space—that hinges neither on David Lewis’ nor on Margaret Gilbert’s classic theories of convention. I argue that cultural conventions facilitate and enable a specific kind of action coordination—'role-interaction coordination’—that is prevalent in the (often massive) division of labour that characterizes human societies. I argue further that playing one’s roles in society and coordinating them with those of others is form of multitasking. Such multitasking is made possible on a large scale, I argue, because we can offload cognition aimed at role-interaction coordination onto a social and material infrastructure of cultural conventions. Research on multitasking shows that such offloading is possible only if this infrastructure is stable. Our natural tendency to prefer multitasking in instances where one task requires low cognitive control can thus explain both our preference for and expectation of familiar cultural conventions—i.e. their perceived normativity. This explanation fits well with existing literature on culture shock. It also allows for an evolutionary explanation of psychological findings about our natural susceptibility to rules and rituals.

American Journal of Bioethics, 2019

Frontiers in Psychology, section Cognitive Science, 2019

Research initiated by Benjamin Libet suggests that short-term conscious intentions are not the on... more Research initiated by Benjamin Libet suggests that short-term conscious intentions are not the onsets of bodily actions. However, other research, particularly on longer term intentions, seems to show that at least some conscious intentions are effective. This leads to the idea that volition is a complex interplay between conscious and unconscious processes. The nature and structure of this interplay is mostly uncharted territory. In this paper, I will highlight two currently neglected distinctions that will help to chart the territory. The first distinction is between intentions we become conscious of (passive) and consciously formed intentions (active). The second is Fred Dretske’s distinction between structuring and triggering causes. I will introduce both distinctions by discussing how they tie in with and strengthen recent criticism of free selection paradigms and support the idea that consciously self-initiated action issues from processes of conscious deliberation and/or information integration. I will argue that consciously self-initiated action typically involves consciously formed intentions that are the structuring causes of our actions. This notion of conscious intentional action allows us to identify at least four stages in which unconscious processes co-determine our actions—without undermining their self-initiated character.

Philosophical Psychology, 2019

According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social ins... more According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social institutions should be characterized as socially extended cognition. However, this idea invokes resistance because it seems to court metaphysical problems such as a serious variant of the problem of cognitive bloat. In this paper I argue that defenders of socially extended cognition are not overly worried by such problems, because their position is akin to a position known as ‘distributed cognition’, which does avoid these problems. Nevertheless, I will argue that the explanatory aims of socially extended cognition do not match with the distributed cognition perspective. The ensuing predicament can be avoided, however, by recognizing that the idea of socially extended cognition hinges on the conflation of two dimensions of the interconnection of the elements in a cognitive system which I will label ‘functional integration’ and ‘task-dependency’. Separating these dimensions allows us to identify an overlooked alternative for extended and distributed cognition—symbiotic cognition—that fits cognition in social institutions better than both and that avoids the predicament.

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2018

In this article we analyze the methodological commitments of a radical embodied cognition (REC) a... more In this article we analyze the methodological commitments of a radical embodied cognition (REC) approach to social interaction and social cognition, specifically with respect to the explanatory framework it adopts. According to many representatives of REC, such as enactivists and the proponents of dynamical and ecological psychology, sociality is to be explained by (1) focusing on the social unit rather than the individuals that comprise it and (2) establishing the regularities that hold on this level rather than modeling the sub-personal mechanisms that could be said to underlie social phenomena. We point out that, despite explicit commitment , such a view implies an implicit rejection of the mechanistic explanation framework widely adopted in traditional cognitive science (TCS), which, in our view, hinders comparability between REC and these approaches. We further argue that such a position is unnecessary and that enactive mechanistic explanation of sociality is both possible and desirable. We examine three distinct objections from REC against mechanistic explanation, which we dub the decomposability, causality and extended cognition worries. In each case we show that these complaints can be alleviated by either appreciation of the full scope of the mechanistic account or adjustments on both mechanistic and REC sides of the debate.

Brain and Cognition, 2017

To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of resea... more To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For example , when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the concept in court. Furthermore, lying and other cognitive concepts are used unsystematically and have an indirect and divergent mapping onto brain activity. Therefore, scientific findings cannot inform our practical concerns in a straightforward way. How then can neuroscience ultimately help determine if a defendant is legally responsible, or help someone understand their addiction better? Since the above-mentioned problems provide serious obstacles to move from science to common-sense, we call this the 'translation problem'. Here, we describe three promising approaches for neuroscience to face this translation problem. First, neuroscience could propose new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, beyond the traditional folk-psychological array, which might inform and alter our phenomenology. Second, neuroscience can modify our current array of common-sense concepts by refining and validating scientific concepts. Third, neuroscience can change our views on the application criteria of concepts such as responsibility and consciousness. We believe that these strategies to deal with the translation problem should guide the practice of neuroscientific research to be able to contribute to our day-today life more effectively.