Jonathan Dancy | University of Reading (original) (raw)
Papers by Jonathan Dancy
... 163 Keith Lehrer 168 Alvin Plantinga 173 John Pollock 178 Ernest Sosa 185 Barry ... Georg Wil... more ... 163 Keith Lehrer 168 Alvin Plantinga 173 John Pollock 178 Ernest Sosa 185 Barry ... Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) Kenneth R. Westphal 405 Heidegger, Martin (1889–1976 ... Guignon 412 Hintikka, Jaakko (1929–) Risto Hilpinen 413 historical knowledge Jack W. Meiland ...
Mind, Jan 1, 1983
This paper is about the non-existence of moral principles. Its conclusion is a thorough particula... more This paper is about the non-existence of moral principles. Its conclusion is a thorough particularism, according to which our ethical decisions are made case bycase, without the comforting support or awkward demands of moral principles. Defence of this position occurs at the ...
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Jan 1, 2005
Many people seem willing to call themselves feminists with little idea of what they are committin... more Many people seem willing to call themselves feminists with little idea of what they are committing themselves to. The same, in my experience, is true of particularism in the theory of moral reasons. There is a common suggestion that to be a particularist is, at the outset, only to ...
Mind, Jan 1, 1981
1. Resultance We know a priori that if an action has a moral property, it has it in view of some ... more 1. Resultance We know a priori that if an action has a moral property, it has it in view of some other properties which it has. I want to investigate this truism and explore its relationship with two other truisms, but I shall not be offering an analysis of it. Taken baldly as I have first ...
A companion to ethics, Jan 1, 1991
PART IV■ HOW OUGHT I TO LIVE? our power either to do or not to do. We cannot choose what motives ... more PART IV■ HOW OUGHT I TO LIVE? our power either to do or not to do. We cannot choose what motives we will act from; our motives are not up to us. We can choose what we will do but not why we will do it. So we cannot be required to act from a particular motive. Kant does ...
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Jan 1, 1995
1 W. Frankena, 'Obligation and Motivation', in AI Melden ed. Essays in ... more 1 W. Frankena, 'Obligation and Motivation', in AI Melden ed. Essays in Moral Philo-sophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), at pp. 43-5. 2 D. Brink Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1989), ch. 3. 3 See M. ...
The Philosophical Quarterly, Jan 1, 1995
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 181 October igg$ ISSNoojiSog4 The Philosophical Quarter... more The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 181 October igg$ ISSNoojiSog4 The Philosophical Quarterly ARGUMENTS FROM ILLUSION By Jonathan Dangy We all know about the argument from illusion. In this paper I suggest, with several examples, that the argument from ...
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Jan 1, 2000
In Principia Ethica (1903) GE Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest ... more In Principia Ethica (1903) GE Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote 'This use of "right", as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word' (p. 18). By the ...
… of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Jan 1, 1986
In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the meri... more In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the merits of the former. In fact, I argue that the weak conception is not a form of moral realism at all. I take moral realism to be a view about the nature of moral properties; the realist holds that ...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jan 1, 2001
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Jan 1, 1995
University of Reading. CentAUR: Central Archive at the University of Reading. Accessibility navig... more University of Reading. CentAUR: Central Archive at the University of Reading. Accessibility navigation. Enticing reasons. Dancy, J. (2004) Enticing reasons. In: Wallace, RJ, Pettit, P., Scheffler, S. and Smith, M. (eds.) Reason and ...
A companion to ethics, Jan 1, 1991
Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 except for editor's introduction (copyright ©J... more Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 except for editor's introduction (copyright ©Jonathan Dancy 2000) and chapter 2 (copyright ©Joseph Raz 2000) First published 2000 ISBN 0-631-22041-0 (Pbk) Blackwell Publishers 108 Cowley Road Oxford 0X4 1JF, UK ...
Metaphilosophy, Jan 1, 1999
... 163 Keith Lehrer 168 Alvin Plantinga 173 John Pollock 178 Ernest Sosa 185 Barry ... Georg Wil... more ... 163 Keith Lehrer 168 Alvin Plantinga 173 John Pollock 178 Ernest Sosa 185 Barry ... Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) Kenneth R. Westphal 405 Heidegger, Martin (1889–1976 ... Guignon 412 Hintikka, Jaakko (1929–) Risto Hilpinen 413 historical knowledge Jack W. Meiland ...
Mind, Jan 1, 1983
This paper is about the non-existence of moral principles. Its conclusion is a thorough particula... more This paper is about the non-existence of moral principles. Its conclusion is a thorough particularism, according to which our ethical decisions are made case bycase, without the comforting support or awkward demands of moral principles. Defence of this position occurs at the ...
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Jan 1, 2005
Many people seem willing to call themselves feminists with little idea of what they are committin... more Many people seem willing to call themselves feminists with little idea of what they are committing themselves to. The same, in my experience, is true of particularism in the theory of moral reasons. There is a common suggestion that to be a particularist is, at the outset, only to ...
Mind, Jan 1, 1981
1. Resultance We know a priori that if an action has a moral property, it has it in view of some ... more 1. Resultance We know a priori that if an action has a moral property, it has it in view of some other properties which it has. I want to investigate this truism and explore its relationship with two other truisms, but I shall not be offering an analysis of it. Taken baldly as I have first ...
A companion to ethics, Jan 1, 1991
PART IV■ HOW OUGHT I TO LIVE? our power either to do or not to do. We cannot choose what motives ... more PART IV■ HOW OUGHT I TO LIVE? our power either to do or not to do. We cannot choose what motives we will act from; our motives are not up to us. We can choose what we will do but not why we will do it. So we cannot be required to act from a particular motive. Kant does ...
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Jan 1, 1995
1 W. Frankena, 'Obligation and Motivation', in AI Melden ed. Essays in ... more 1 W. Frankena, 'Obligation and Motivation', in AI Melden ed. Essays in Moral Philo-sophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), at pp. 43-5. 2 D. Brink Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1989), ch. 3. 3 See M. ...
The Philosophical Quarterly, Jan 1, 1995
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 181 October igg$ ISSNoojiSog4 The Philosophical Quarter... more The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 181 October igg$ ISSNoojiSog4 The Philosophical Quarterly ARGUMENTS FROM ILLUSION By Jonathan Dangy We all know about the argument from illusion. In this paper I suggest, with several examples, that the argument from ...
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Jan 1, 2000
In Principia Ethica (1903) GE Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest ... more In Principia Ethica (1903) GE Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote 'This use of "right", as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word' (p. 18). By the ...
… of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Jan 1, 1986
In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the meri... more In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the merits of the former. In fact, I argue that the weak conception is not a form of moral realism at all. I take moral realism to be a view about the nature of moral properties; the realist holds that ...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jan 1, 2001
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Jan 1, 1995
University of Reading. CentAUR: Central Archive at the University of Reading. Accessibility navig... more University of Reading. CentAUR: Central Archive at the University of Reading. Accessibility navigation. Enticing reasons. Dancy, J. (2004) Enticing reasons. In: Wallace, RJ, Pettit, P., Scheffler, S. and Smith, M. (eds.) Reason and ...
A companion to ethics, Jan 1, 1991
Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 except for editor's introduction (copyright ©J... more Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 except for editor's introduction (copyright ©Jonathan Dancy 2000) and chapter 2 (copyright ©Joseph Raz 2000) First published 2000 ISBN 0-631-22041-0 (Pbk) Blackwell Publishers 108 Cowley Road Oxford 0X4 1JF, UK ...
Metaphilosophy, Jan 1, 1999
The Philosophy of Action: An Anthology is an authoritative collection of key work by top scholars... more The Philosophy of Action: An Anthology is an authoritative collection of key work by top scholars, arranged thematically and accompanied by expert introductions written by the editors. This unique collection brings together a selection of the most influential essays from the 1960s to the present day.
An invaluable collection that brings together a selection of the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of action.
No other broad-ranging and detailed coverage of this kind currently exists in the field
Each themed section opens with a synoptic introduction and includes a comprehensive further reading list to guide students
Includes sections on action and agency, willing and trying, intention and intentional action, acting for a reason, the explanation of action, and free agency and responsibility
Written and organised in a style that allows it to be used as a primary teaching resource in its own right