Eighth Circuit Rejects Missouri's Second Amendment Preservation Act (original) (raw)
Yesterday, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected Missouri's attempt to nullify federal gun laws with which the state disagrees. Chief Judge Colloton wrote a remarkably brief opinion for the panel in U.S. v. Missouri, joined by Judges Loken and Kelly.
Here is the opinion's introduction:
Missouri's Second Amendment Preservation Act classifies various federal laws regulating firearms as "infringements on the people's right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri." The Act declares that these federal laws are "invalid to this state," "shall not be recognized by this state," and "shall be specifically rejected by this state."
The United States sued the State of Missouri, the governor, and the attorney general, alleging that the Act violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States. The district court denied Missouri's motions to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim, granted the motion of the United States for summary judgment, and enjoined implementation and enforcement of the Act. On this appeal by the State, we agree that the United States has standing to sue. Because the Act purports to invalidate federal law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, we affirm the judgment.
After concluding that the federal government has standing to sue to challenge the Missouri statute, Chief Judge Colloton addressed the merits.
The Supremacy Clause states that federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land, . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. "By this declaration, the states are prohibited from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States." McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 361 (1819). The "Second Amendment Preservation Act" states that certain federal laws are "invalid to this state," Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.430, but a State cannot invalidate federal law to itself. Missouri does not seriously contest these bedrock principles of our constitutional structure. The State instead advances two arguments.
First, the State argues that the United States cannot sue to enforce the Supremacy Clause because it lacks a cause of action. While there is no implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause, there is an equitable tradition of suits to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state actors. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326-27 (2015). Based on that equitable tradition, the United States has sued in other cases to enjoin a state law's implementation and enforcement or for other appropriate relief. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 596 U.S. 832, 837 (2022); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 194 (1926); Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925). We see no reason why the United States cannot proceed similarly in this case.
Second, Missouri contends that the Act is constitutional because the State may constitutionally withdraw the authority of state officers to enforce federal law. The State argues that the reason why it withdrew its authority—i.e., because the State declared federal law invalid—is immaterial.
That Missouri may lawfully withhold its assistance from federal law enforcement, however, does not mean that the State may do so by purporting to invalidate federal law. In this context, as in others, the Constitution "is concerned with means as well as ends." Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 362 (2015). Missouri has the power to withhold state assistance, "but the means it uses to achieve its ends must be 'consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution.'" Id. (quoting McCulloch, 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421) (alteration in original). Missouri's assertion that federal laws regulating firearms are "invalid to this State" is inconsistent with both. If the State prefers as a matter of policy to discontinue assistance with the enforcement of valid federal firearms laws, then it may do so by other means that are lawful, and assume political accountability for that decision.