Donald Morrison | Rice University (original) (raw)
Papers by Donald Morrison
Aristotle Transformed, 1990
Note on Renaissance plaquette of Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodesias
According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera ... more According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera of beings. Each of them stands at the head of a tree-like division of the the items falling under it; this division is also sometimes called a "category". The metaphysical structure made up of these ten divisions is the "system of the categories". According to the traditional view, the system of the categories is very rigidly laid out. Not only is every being included in the structure, but every being has exactly one location. Each being is predicated essentially of those below it along the lines of division. Each being is related to those above it, if any, as a determination of them, and to those below it, if any, as a determinable. Because of these facts, the full analysis of the essence of any being can be gotten by stringing together the names of all the beings superior to it in the division, along with a final differentia. But this traditional view is very widely off the mark. In the first place, it is important to realize what a remarkable achievement the system of the categories as traditionally conceived would have been, if Aristotle had in fact achieved it. Plato in the late dialogues raises the specter that division leads to chaos: dismayingly many Forms are closely interwoven with dismayingly many others; some Forms are interwoven with all others. The number of different divisions which lead to any given Form is dismayingly large. Clearly, one óf the tasks the early Academy faced was to make order of this mess. The distinction in the Sophist between essential and non-essential predication was one tool invented for this purpose; the Academic distinction between the categories ti and prosti was another. For Aristotle to have developed criteria powerful enough to uniquely determine a single structure of divisions of everything there is-to have solved this problem completelywould have been extraordinary. Moreover, on the traditional view Aristotle's achievement is even more extraordinary than this. Since the work of Emst Kapp in the first half of this century it has been recognized that a major source of Aristotle's theory of categories is his research into "topics"-into classes of terms-or things-such that the members of each class share certain logical properties which are useful in constructing arguments. Armed with a theory of topics, one need only determine into which class a thing belongs in order to know what its most important properties are. Topics 1,9 introduces a theory of categories as part of the theory of topics. As Michael Frede has shown, the categories in the Topics are kinds of predicates or predications, whereas in the Categories we have to do with kinds of thing. But in the Categories Aristotle is careful to discuss the logical properties of each "category": whether it admits of contraries or not, whether it varies in degree, and so on. Somehow, the theory of kinds of thing in the Categories seems to be a development of the theory of kinds of predicate or predication in the Topics. If this is accepted, then, when it is combined with the traditional interpretation, we get the following thesis: the project of organizing beings in terms of genus and species into their ultimate divisions, and the project of groupings things according to their basic logical properties, coincide in their results. The same ultimate classes are arrived at by these two very different inquiries. If Aristotle did claim this for his theory of categories, then he claimed a very strong and remarkable result Of course, Aristotle was an extraordinary man. But one important sign that he did not take himself to have accomplished all that the traditional interpretation ascribed to him is his famous uncertainty over the number of categories. Sometimes Aristotle gives the number of categories as ten, smetimes as eight, and sometimes as six. It is unlikely that a person who was in a position to be certain that all being can be fitted into one unique division could be so unsure of how many basic divisions there are. Apart from this general misgiving, the traditional interpretation of the Categories faces obstacles in the text itself. The first of these is the well-known problem of the status of the differentiae. At Categories 3a21-28 and a33-b9, we are told that not only substances but also differentiae are said of, but not in their subjects. From this it follows, we are told, that the definitions, not only of substances, but also of their differentiae, are predicated of their subjects. Despite their similarity to substance, however, differentiae are ¡¡Q l substances; the text is clear on this. What are the implications of these remarks? First, they prove that the said of/present in distinction was not intended by Aristotle as by itself sufficient for the construction of the system of categories. Being said of a subject, being present in a subject, and their negations give one sufficient criterion to distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, and provide a help toward distinguishing substance from non-substance. But that is all. Differentiae are not substances, so they are not in the category of substance. But differentiae are beings, and many if not all of them are uncompounded, so they must be in some category or other. So many, if not all, differentiae will be in non-substance categories: perhaps chiefly quality, but others as well. Presumably items in other categories are defined in a manner similar to substance, through genus and differentia. Pale=penetrative color is a favorite Aristotelian example. But if the definitions of differentiae are predicable of whatever they are said of, and they are said of substances, then the definitions of substances are expandable in two ways: by further definitional analysis of the genus, and by further definitional analysis of the differentiae. The differentiae mentioned in the definitions of the differentiae must themselves have a place in the structure of the categories, presumably a rather different place from that of what they help to define, and they must themselves be definable. So a complete analysis of the definition of any item, substantial or not, while 12 Since substance is not divided into kinds in this text, it is unsafe to say how it would have been divided. Given the changes which Aristotle's view of substance underwent in the meantime. Metaphysics Delta 8 is not a safe guide. In Chapter 15 "having" does seem to be divided into kinds by means of differentiae. But as these differentiae include substance, defenders of the traditional interpretation will not want to count it as a discussion of the category "having".
According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera ... more According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera of beings. Each of them stands at the head of a tree-like division of the the items falling under it; this division is also sometimes called a "category". The metaphysical structure made up of these ten divisions is the "system of the categories". According to the traditional view, the system of the categories is very rigidly laid out. Not only is every being included in the structure, but every being has exactly one location. Each being is predicated essentially of those below it along the lines of division. Each being is related to those above it, if any, as a determination of them, and to those below it, if any, as a determinable. Because of these facts, the full analysis of the essence of any being can be gotten by stringing together the names of all the beings superior to it in the division, along with a final differentia. But this traditional view is very widely off the mark. In the first place, it is important to realize what a remarkable achievement the system of the categories as traditionally conceived would have been, if Aristotle had in fact achieved it. Plato in the late dialogues raises the specter that division leads to chaos: dismayingly many Forms are closely interwoven with dismayingly many others; some Forms are interwoven with all others. The number of different divisions which lead to any given Form is dismayingly large. Clearly, one óf the tasks the early Academy faced was to make order of this mess. The distinction in the Sophist between essential and non-essential predication was one tool invented for this purpose; the Academic distinction between the categories ti and prosti was another. For Aristotle to have developed criteria powerful enough to uniquely determine a single structure of divisions of everything there is-to have solved this problem completelywould have been extraordinary. Moreover, on the traditional view Aristotle's achievement is even more extraordinary than this. Since the work of Emst Kapp in the first half of this century it has been recognized that a major source of Aristotle's theory of categories is his research into "topics"-into classes of terms-or things-such that the members of each class share certain logical properties which are useful in constructing arguments. Armed with a theory of topics, one need only determine into which class a thing belongs in order to know what its most important properties are. Topics 1,9 introduces a theory of categories as part of the theory of topics. As Michael Frede has shown, the categories in the Topics are kinds of predicates or predications, whereas in the Categories we have to do with kinds of thing. But in the Categories Aristotle is careful to discuss the logical properties of each "category": whether it admits of contraries or not, whether it varies in degree, and so on. Somehow, the theory of kinds of thing in the Categories seems to be a development of the theory of kinds of predicate or predication in the Topics. If this is accepted, then, when it is combined with the traditional interpretation, we get the following thesis: the project of organizing beings in terms of genus and species into their ultimate divisions, and the project of groupings things according to their basic logical properties, coincide in their results. The same ultimate classes are arrived at by these two very different inquiries. If Aristotle did claim this for his theory of categories, then he claimed a very strong and remarkable result Of course, Aristotle was an extraordinary man. But one important sign that he did not take himself to have accomplished all that the traditional interpretation ascribed to him is his famous uncertainty over the number of categories. Sometimes Aristotle gives the number of categories as ten, smetimes as eight, and sometimes as six. It is unlikely that a person who was in a position to be certain that all being can be fitted into one unique division could be so unsure of how many basic divisions there are. Apart from this general misgiving, the traditional interpretation of the Categories faces obstacles in the text itself. The first of these is the well-known problem of the status of the differentiae. At Categories 3a21-28 and a33-b9, we are told that not only substances but also differentiae are said of, but not in their subjects. From this it follows, we are told, that the definitions, not only of substances, but also of their differentiae, are predicated of their subjects. Despite their similarity to substance, however, differentiae are ¡¡Q l substances; the text is clear on this. What are the implications of these remarks? First, they prove that the said of/present in distinction was not intended by Aristotle as by itself sufficient for the construction of the system of categories. Being said of a subject, being present in a subject, and their negations give one sufficient criterion to distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, and provide a help toward distinguishing substance from non-substance. But that is all. Differentiae are not substances, so they are not in the category of substance. But differentiae are beings, and many if not all of them are uncompounded, so they must be in some category or other. So many, if not all, differentiae will be in non-substance categories: perhaps chiefly quality, but others as well. Presumably items in other categories are defined in a manner similar to substance, through genus and differentia. Pale=penetrative color is a favorite Aristotelian example. But if the definitions of differentiae are predicable of whatever they are said of, and they are said of substances, then the definitions of substances are expandable in two ways: by further definitional analysis of the genus, and by further definitional analysis of the differentiae. The differentiae mentioned in the definitions of the differentiae must themselves have a place in the structure of the categories, presumably a rather different place from that of what they help to define, and they must themselves be definable. So a complete analysis of the definition of any item, substantial or not, while 12 Since substance is not divided into kinds in this text, it is unsafe to say how it would have been divided. Given the changes which Aristotle's view of substance underwent in the meantime. Metaphysics Delta 8 is not a safe guide. In Chapter 15 "having" does seem to be divided into kinds by means of differentiae. But as these differentiae include substance, defenders of the traditional interpretation will not want to count it as a discussion of the category "having".
Les études philosophiques, 2004
Cette etude examine la conception de la royaute et de la tyrannie chez le Socrate de Xenophon, et... more Cette etude examine la conception de la royaute et de la tyrannie chez le Socrate de Xenophon, et la compare a celles qui sont defendues par Aristote, le Socrate de Platon, et d’autres. Le Socrate de Xenophon soutient que le consentement des gouvernes et le regne de la loi sont les caracteristiques qui distinguent un roi d’un tyran, alors qu’Aristote soutient que la difference tient plutot a la nature des interets qui sont poursuivis, selon qu’il s’agit des interets des sujets, dans le cas de la royaute, ou du dirigeant, dans le cas de la tyrannie. On se penche egalement sur la nature de l’art de gouverner selon le Socrate de Platon, sur le role de la sagesse, et l’on examine enfin si ces differents auteurs reconnaissent ou non la possibilite, sur le plan conceptuel, d’un bon tyran.
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Politics
The Cambridge companion to Socrates / edited by Donald R. Morrison. p. cm.-(Cambridge companions ... more The Cambridge companion to Socrates / edited by Donald R. Morrison. p. cm.-(Cambridge companions to philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index.
Examination of various possible solutions to the question, in Aristotle, what category do differ... more Examination of various possible solutions to the question, in Aristotle, what category do differentia belong to? And in particular, the differentia of substance?
Examination of various possible solutions to the question, In Aristotle, what category do diffe... more Examination of various possible solutions to the question, In Aristotle, what category do differentia belong to; in particular the differentia of substance?
This paper examines Aristotle's concept of the happiness of the city (eudaimonia of the polis) an... more This paper examines Aristotle's concept of the happiness of the city (eudaimonia of the polis) and its relation to the common good.
The Classical Quarterly, 1987
Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought, 2001
The fundamental concepts of Socratic political theory are statesmanship or the art of politics, a... more The fundamental concepts of Socratic political theory are statesmanship or the art of politics, and the good of the city. Important scholars have denied that, on Socrates' view, statesmanship as such is possible. But Socratic intellectualism does not commit him to the view that the methods of politics, such as legislation and punishment, are useless. The Socratic tradition in political theory is rich and varied. Among the dimensions of variation are: the relationship between statesmanship and other arts of rule; what are the limits of reasonable human ambition; and the relationship between the well-being of the city and the well-being of its parts. At the core of Socratic moral and political theory is a commitment to choose what is truly good. Varieties of Socratic value theory arise from the different ways in which this commitment is interpreted, and the range of realms to which it is applied.
in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its princ... more in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles. The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification. So we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature. Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by distinguishing them.'
What does Aristotle think of ‘politics as a vocation’? For whom does Aristotle believe that a lif... more What does Aristotle think of ‘politics as a vocation’? For whom does Aristotle believe that a life devoted to politics is choiceworthy? In Nicomachean Ethics I, 2, Aristotle argues that the goal of politics is the ultimate and natural goal for
all human beings. This chapter is often interpreted weakly, as if Aristotle’s point were only that human beings are suited to lead lives of general sociability. But what his argument
implies is stronger. If the human good, the ultimate end of human action, is the public good, then when each citizen asks, ‘What is the ultimate goal of my actions?’ the correct answer should be, ‘the good of my polis’.
Aristotle Transformed, 1990
Note on Renaissance plaquette of Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodesias
According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera ... more According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera of beings. Each of them stands at the head of a tree-like division of the the items falling under it; this division is also sometimes called a "category". The metaphysical structure made up of these ten divisions is the "system of the categories". According to the traditional view, the system of the categories is very rigidly laid out. Not only is every being included in the structure, but every being has exactly one location. Each being is predicated essentially of those below it along the lines of division. Each being is related to those above it, if any, as a determination of them, and to those below it, if any, as a determinable. Because of these facts, the full analysis of the essence of any being can be gotten by stringing together the names of all the beings superior to it in the division, along with a final differentia. But this traditional view is very widely off the mark. In the first place, it is important to realize what a remarkable achievement the system of the categories as traditionally conceived would have been, if Aristotle had in fact achieved it. Plato in the late dialogues raises the specter that division leads to chaos: dismayingly many Forms are closely interwoven with dismayingly many others; some Forms are interwoven with all others. The number of different divisions which lead to any given Form is dismayingly large. Clearly, one óf the tasks the early Academy faced was to make order of this mess. The distinction in the Sophist between essential and non-essential predication was one tool invented for this purpose; the Academic distinction between the categories ti and prosti was another. For Aristotle to have developed criteria powerful enough to uniquely determine a single structure of divisions of everything there is-to have solved this problem completelywould have been extraordinary. Moreover, on the traditional view Aristotle's achievement is even more extraordinary than this. Since the work of Emst Kapp in the first half of this century it has been recognized that a major source of Aristotle's theory of categories is his research into "topics"-into classes of terms-or things-such that the members of each class share certain logical properties which are useful in constructing arguments. Armed with a theory of topics, one need only determine into which class a thing belongs in order to know what its most important properties are. Topics 1,9 introduces a theory of categories as part of the theory of topics. As Michael Frede has shown, the categories in the Topics are kinds of predicates or predications, whereas in the Categories we have to do with kinds of thing. But in the Categories Aristotle is careful to discuss the logical properties of each "category": whether it admits of contraries or not, whether it varies in degree, and so on. Somehow, the theory of kinds of thing in the Categories seems to be a development of the theory of kinds of predicate or predication in the Topics. If this is accepted, then, when it is combined with the traditional interpretation, we get the following thesis: the project of organizing beings in terms of genus and species into their ultimate divisions, and the project of groupings things according to their basic logical properties, coincide in their results. The same ultimate classes are arrived at by these two very different inquiries. If Aristotle did claim this for his theory of categories, then he claimed a very strong and remarkable result Of course, Aristotle was an extraordinary man. But one important sign that he did not take himself to have accomplished all that the traditional interpretation ascribed to him is his famous uncertainty over the number of categories. Sometimes Aristotle gives the number of categories as ten, smetimes as eight, and sometimes as six. It is unlikely that a person who was in a position to be certain that all being can be fitted into one unique division could be so unsure of how many basic divisions there are. Apart from this general misgiving, the traditional interpretation of the Categories faces obstacles in the text itself. The first of these is the well-known problem of the status of the differentiae. At Categories 3a21-28 and a33-b9, we are told that not only substances but also differentiae are said of, but not in their subjects. From this it follows, we are told, that the definitions, not only of substances, but also of their differentiae, are predicated of their subjects. Despite their similarity to substance, however, differentiae are ¡¡Q l substances; the text is clear on this. What are the implications of these remarks? First, they prove that the said of/present in distinction was not intended by Aristotle as by itself sufficient for the construction of the system of categories. Being said of a subject, being present in a subject, and their negations give one sufficient criterion to distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, and provide a help toward distinguishing substance from non-substance. But that is all. Differentiae are not substances, so they are not in the category of substance. But differentiae are beings, and many if not all of them are uncompounded, so they must be in some category or other. So many, if not all, differentiae will be in non-substance categories: perhaps chiefly quality, but others as well. Presumably items in other categories are defined in a manner similar to substance, through genus and differentia. Pale=penetrative color is a favorite Aristotelian example. But if the definitions of differentiae are predicable of whatever they are said of, and they are said of substances, then the definitions of substances are expandable in two ways: by further definitional analysis of the genus, and by further definitional analysis of the differentiae. The differentiae mentioned in the definitions of the differentiae must themselves have a place in the structure of the categories, presumably a rather different place from that of what they help to define, and they must themselves be definable. So a complete analysis of the definition of any item, substantial or not, while 12 Since substance is not divided into kinds in this text, it is unsafe to say how it would have been divided. Given the changes which Aristotle's view of substance underwent in the meantime. Metaphysics Delta 8 is not a safe guide. In Chapter 15 "having" does seem to be divided into kinds by means of differentiae. But as these differentiae include substance, defenders of the traditional interpretation will not want to count it as a discussion of the category "having".
According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera ... more According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera of beings. Each of them stands at the head of a tree-like division of the the items falling under it; this division is also sometimes called a "category". The metaphysical structure made up of these ten divisions is the "system of the categories". According to the traditional view, the system of the categories is very rigidly laid out. Not only is every being included in the structure, but every being has exactly one location. Each being is predicated essentially of those below it along the lines of division. Each being is related to those above it, if any, as a determination of them, and to those below it, if any, as a determinable. Because of these facts, the full analysis of the essence of any being can be gotten by stringing together the names of all the beings superior to it in the division, along with a final differentia. But this traditional view is very widely off the mark. In the first place, it is important to realize what a remarkable achievement the system of the categories as traditionally conceived would have been, if Aristotle had in fact achieved it. Plato in the late dialogues raises the specter that division leads to chaos: dismayingly many Forms are closely interwoven with dismayingly many others; some Forms are interwoven with all others. The number of different divisions which lead to any given Form is dismayingly large. Clearly, one óf the tasks the early Academy faced was to make order of this mess. The distinction in the Sophist between essential and non-essential predication was one tool invented for this purpose; the Academic distinction between the categories ti and prosti was another. For Aristotle to have developed criteria powerful enough to uniquely determine a single structure of divisions of everything there is-to have solved this problem completelywould have been extraordinary. Moreover, on the traditional view Aristotle's achievement is even more extraordinary than this. Since the work of Emst Kapp in the first half of this century it has been recognized that a major source of Aristotle's theory of categories is his research into "topics"-into classes of terms-or things-such that the members of each class share certain logical properties which are useful in constructing arguments. Armed with a theory of topics, one need only determine into which class a thing belongs in order to know what its most important properties are. Topics 1,9 introduces a theory of categories as part of the theory of topics. As Michael Frede has shown, the categories in the Topics are kinds of predicates or predications, whereas in the Categories we have to do with kinds of thing. But in the Categories Aristotle is careful to discuss the logical properties of each "category": whether it admits of contraries or not, whether it varies in degree, and so on. Somehow, the theory of kinds of thing in the Categories seems to be a development of the theory of kinds of predicate or predication in the Topics. If this is accepted, then, when it is combined with the traditional interpretation, we get the following thesis: the project of organizing beings in terms of genus and species into their ultimate divisions, and the project of groupings things according to their basic logical properties, coincide in their results. The same ultimate classes are arrived at by these two very different inquiries. If Aristotle did claim this for his theory of categories, then he claimed a very strong and remarkable result Of course, Aristotle was an extraordinary man. But one important sign that he did not take himself to have accomplished all that the traditional interpretation ascribed to him is his famous uncertainty over the number of categories. Sometimes Aristotle gives the number of categories as ten, smetimes as eight, and sometimes as six. It is unlikely that a person who was in a position to be certain that all being can be fitted into one unique division could be so unsure of how many basic divisions there are. Apart from this general misgiving, the traditional interpretation of the Categories faces obstacles in the text itself. The first of these is the well-known problem of the status of the differentiae. At Categories 3a21-28 and a33-b9, we are told that not only substances but also differentiae are said of, but not in their subjects. From this it follows, we are told, that the definitions, not only of substances, but also of their differentiae, are predicated of their subjects. Despite their similarity to substance, however, differentiae are ¡¡Q l substances; the text is clear on this. What are the implications of these remarks? First, they prove that the said of/present in distinction was not intended by Aristotle as by itself sufficient for the construction of the system of categories. Being said of a subject, being present in a subject, and their negations give one sufficient criterion to distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, and provide a help toward distinguishing substance from non-substance. But that is all. Differentiae are not substances, so they are not in the category of substance. But differentiae are beings, and many if not all of them are uncompounded, so they must be in some category or other. So many, if not all, differentiae will be in non-substance categories: perhaps chiefly quality, but others as well. Presumably items in other categories are defined in a manner similar to substance, through genus and differentia. Pale=penetrative color is a favorite Aristotelian example. But if the definitions of differentiae are predicable of whatever they are said of, and they are said of substances, then the definitions of substances are expandable in two ways: by further definitional analysis of the genus, and by further definitional analysis of the differentiae. The differentiae mentioned in the definitions of the differentiae must themselves have a place in the structure of the categories, presumably a rather different place from that of what they help to define, and they must themselves be definable. So a complete analysis of the definition of any item, substantial or not, while 12 Since substance is not divided into kinds in this text, it is unsafe to say how it would have been divided. Given the changes which Aristotle's view of substance underwent in the meantime. Metaphysics Delta 8 is not a safe guide. In Chapter 15 "having" does seem to be divided into kinds by means of differentiae. But as these differentiae include substance, defenders of the traditional interpretation will not want to count it as a discussion of the category "having".
Les études philosophiques, 2004
Cette etude examine la conception de la royaute et de la tyrannie chez le Socrate de Xenophon, et... more Cette etude examine la conception de la royaute et de la tyrannie chez le Socrate de Xenophon, et la compare a celles qui sont defendues par Aristote, le Socrate de Platon, et d’autres. Le Socrate de Xenophon soutient que le consentement des gouvernes et le regne de la loi sont les caracteristiques qui distinguent un roi d’un tyran, alors qu’Aristote soutient que la difference tient plutot a la nature des interets qui sont poursuivis, selon qu’il s’agit des interets des sujets, dans le cas de la royaute, ou du dirigeant, dans le cas de la tyrannie. On se penche egalement sur la nature de l’art de gouverner selon le Socrate de Platon, sur le role de la sagesse, et l’on examine enfin si ces differents auteurs reconnaissent ou non la possibilite, sur le plan conceptuel, d’un bon tyran.
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Politics
The Cambridge companion to Socrates / edited by Donald R. Morrison. p. cm.-(Cambridge companions ... more The Cambridge companion to Socrates / edited by Donald R. Morrison. p. cm.-(Cambridge companions to philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index.
Examination of various possible solutions to the question, in Aristotle, what category do differ... more Examination of various possible solutions to the question, in Aristotle, what category do differentia belong to? And in particular, the differentia of substance?
Examination of various possible solutions to the question, In Aristotle, what category do diffe... more Examination of various possible solutions to the question, In Aristotle, what category do differentia belong to; in particular the differentia of substance?
This paper examines Aristotle's concept of the happiness of the city (eudaimonia of the polis) an... more This paper examines Aristotle's concept of the happiness of the city (eudaimonia of the polis) and its relation to the common good.
The Classical Quarterly, 1987
Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought, 2001
The fundamental concepts of Socratic political theory are statesmanship or the art of politics, a... more The fundamental concepts of Socratic political theory are statesmanship or the art of politics, and the good of the city. Important scholars have denied that, on Socrates' view, statesmanship as such is possible. But Socratic intellectualism does not commit him to the view that the methods of politics, such as legislation and punishment, are useless. The Socratic tradition in political theory is rich and varied. Among the dimensions of variation are: the relationship between statesmanship and other arts of rule; what are the limits of reasonable human ambition; and the relationship between the well-being of the city and the well-being of its parts. At the core of Socratic moral and political theory is a commitment to choose what is truly good. Varieties of Socratic value theory arise from the different ways in which this commitment is interpreted, and the range of realms to which it is applied.
in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its princ... more in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles. The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification. So we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature. Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by distinguishing them.'
What does Aristotle think of ‘politics as a vocation’? For whom does Aristotle believe that a lif... more What does Aristotle think of ‘politics as a vocation’? For whom does Aristotle believe that a life devoted to politics is choiceworthy? In Nicomachean Ethics I, 2, Aristotle argues that the goal of politics is the ultimate and natural goal for
all human beings. This chapter is often interpreted weakly, as if Aristotle’s point were only that human beings are suited to lead lives of general sociability. But what his argument
implies is stronger. If the human good, the ultimate end of human action, is the public good, then when each citizen asks, ‘What is the ultimate goal of my actions?’ the correct answer should be, ‘the good of my polis’.
An event sponsored by the International Society for Socratic Studies June, 25-26, and July, 2-3,... more An event sponsored by the International Society for Socratic Studies
June, 25-26, and July, 2-3, 2020
Zoom platform, 18.00 CET
Despite the appearances given by certain texts, the moral psychology of Socrates need not imply selfishness. On the contrary, a close look at passages in Plato and Xenophon (see Plato, Meno 77-78, Protagoras 358, Gorgias 466-468, Euthydemus 278, Lysis 219; Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.9.4-5) suggests that the egoist’s welfare depends upon the welfare of others (i.e. family or friends). Since the welfare of the egoist’s family and friends is part of the egoist’s own eudaimonia, the egoist has a direct and intrinsic motive to promote the welfare of these others.
The workshop will explore the role that other peoples’ welfare plays in Socratic ethics. Special attention will be paid to test-cases in which the principle that moral action is always good for the agent seems to have no validity. I.e., under which circumstances is the self-sacrifice for the sake of others (such as the soldier’s self-sacrifice on the battlefield) good for the agent (as in Alcibiades I 115a-116d)? We will discuss contradictions or tensions of this sort, and relate them to more general views on eudaimonia held within Socratic literature. Comparison between different Socratic authors will be used as a means to identify the distinctive features of Socratic eudaimonia if compared to other Greek theories of happiness, such as the Aristotelian theory of philautia (NE IX, 1166a-1166b; 1168a-1169b).
Monday 11 July (all times Central; remote speakers in orange font) 8:00-9:00 COFFEE Philosophy Lo... more Monday 11 July (all times Central; remote speakers in orange font) 8:00-9:00 COFFEE Philosophy Lounge, HUMA 216 9.00-9.30 WELCOME 9.30-10.00 LIVIO ROSSETTI Socrate e l'arte di scrivere testi che non si configurino come trattati HUMA 117 HUMA 118 10.15-10.45 SANTIAGO CHAME On the Megarians of Metaphysics IX 3 DINO DE SANCTIS Socrate e le Sirene 10.45-11.15 MICHELE CORRADI Eubulide tra scena comica e dibattito filosofico nell'Atene del IV secolo RYO TASHIRO The meaning of θεία µοῖρα in the Platonic Theages 11.30-12.00 JEREMY HENRY The wisdom of Plato's Socrates EVAN RODRIGUEZ Three modes of protreptic 12.00-12.30 DUSTIN GISH A philosophic friendship BERNHARD KAISER The Socratic elenchus and the σκοπός of Plato's Gorgias 12.30-2.30 LUNCH on your own 1:30-2:15 TOUR of Rice Campus (optional) 2.30-3.00 ALESSANDRO STAVRU How Socratic Is "Socratic midwifery"? Contextualizing Tht. 149a-151d 3.00-3.30 FRANCESCA PENTASSUGLIO A Wirkungsgeschichte of Socratic erôs: Hermias, Proclus and Olympiodorus compared 3.30-3.45 BREAK 12.00-12.30 FLORIAN MARION Le tournant mégarique en philosophie contemporaine 12.30-2.30 LUNCH on your own 2.30-4.00 KEYNOTE AGNES CALLARD Socratic Love 4.00-4.15 BREAK 4.15-4.45 CAROLINA ARAÚJO Aristippus on the virtue of women 4.45-5.15 ANDRÉ LUIZ BRAGA DA SILVA The "Ideas as thoughts" hypothesis: Antisthenes in Plato's Parmenides? 5.15-5.45 ALEX LEE and CHRISTOPHER MOORE Crito of Alopece and the earliest authors of Socratic writings 7.30-9.30 BANQUET Sixty Vines Restaurant,