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Visiting Fellow, Ayn Rand Institute
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Francis Bacon's method of induction is often understood as a form of eliminative induction. The i... more Francis Bacon's method of induction is often understood as a form of eliminative induction. The idea, on this interpretation, is to list the possible formal causes of a phenomenon and, by reference to a copious and reliable natural history, to falsify all of them but one. Whatever remains must be the formal cause. Bacon's crucial instances are often seen as the crowning example of this method. In this article, I argue that this interpretation of crucial instances is mistaken, and it has caused us to lose sight of why Bacon assigns crucial instances a special role in his quest for epistemic certainty about formal causes. If crucial instances are interpreted eliminatively, then they are subject to the two problems related to underdetermination raised by Duhem: (1) that it is impossible to be certain one has specified all of the possible alternatives and (2) that an experiment falsifies a whole theory, not just a single hypothesis in isolation. I show that Bacon anticipates and aims to dodge both of these problems by conceiving of crucial instances as working, in the ideal case, through direct affirmations that are supported by links to more foundational knowledge.
Journal of Early Modern Studies
Th e recent surge of interest in Bacon's own attempts at natural history has revealed a complex i... more Th e recent surge of interest in Bacon's own attempts at natural history has revealed a complex interplay with his speculative ideas in natural philosophy. Th is research has given rise to the concern that his natural histories are theory-laden in a way that Bacon ought to fi nd unacceptable, given his prescription in the Parasceve for a reliable body of factual instances that can be used as a storehouse for induction. Th is paper aims to resolve this tension by elaborating a moderate foundationalist account of Bacon's method and by appealing to a distinction he makes, in a letter to Father Fulgentio, between pure and impure natural histories. I argue that the discussions of causes and axioms in the published histories render them impure, since that material properly belongs to Part Four of the Instauratio, but that this interplay with Part Four is necessary for the sake of the continued refi nement of Part Th ree (the natural historical part). Bacon ultimately aims for a storehouse of instances, to be attained at the culmination of this process of refi nement, and at that point the history should be published in its pure form.
Francis Bacon's method of induction is often understood as a form of eliminative induction. The i... more Francis Bacon's method of induction is often understood as a form of eliminative induction. The idea, on this interpretation, is to list the possible formal causes of a phenomenon and, by reference to a copious and reliable natural history, to falsify all of them but one. Whatever remains must be the formal cause. Bacon's crucial instances are often seen as the crowning example of this method. In this article, I argue that this interpretation of crucial instances is mistaken, and it has caused us to lose sight of why Bacon assigns crucial instances a special role in his quest for epistemic certainty about formal causes. If crucial instances are interpreted eliminatively, then they are subject to the two problems related to underdetermination raised by Duhem: (1) that it is impossible to be certain one has specified all of the possible alternatives and (2) that an experiment falsifies a whole theory, not just a single hypothesis in isolation. I show that Bacon anticipates and aims to dodge both of these problems by conceiving of crucial instances as working, in the ideal case, through direct affirmations that are supported by links to more foundational knowledge.
Journal of Early Modern Studies
Th e recent surge of interest in Bacon's own attempts at natural history has revealed a complex i... more Th e recent surge of interest in Bacon's own attempts at natural history has revealed a complex interplay with his speculative ideas in natural philosophy. Th is research has given rise to the concern that his natural histories are theory-laden in a way that Bacon ought to fi nd unacceptable, given his prescription in the Parasceve for a reliable body of factual instances that can be used as a storehouse for induction. Th is paper aims to resolve this tension by elaborating a moderate foundationalist account of Bacon's method and by appealing to a distinction he makes, in a letter to Father Fulgentio, between pure and impure natural histories. I argue that the discussions of causes and axioms in the published histories render them impure, since that material properly belongs to Part Four of the Instauratio, but that this interplay with Part Four is necessary for the sake of the continued refi nement of Part Th ree (the natural historical part). Bacon ultimately aims for a storehouse of instances, to be attained at the culmination of this process of refi nement, and at that point the history should be published in its pure form.