Joost van Spanje | Royal Holloway, University of London (original) (raw)

Papers by Joost van Spanje

Western democracies have witnessed gradual decline of voting according to socioeconomic backgroun... more Western democracies have witnessed gradual decline of voting according to socioeconomic background factors. However, the emergence of elderly parties suggests increasing mobilization along generational lines, which would partly reverse this pattern. While religion and class voting have decreased, such new generational divide might make age, education and income salient (again). However, to what extent is support for these parties driven by such mobilization-rather than by apolitical protest, or by politics as usual? Focusing on 50Plus in the Netherlands, the most successful current Western elderly party, we find evidence for mobilization on a new divide. Many older, less educated voters who feel poor vote for 50Plus, irrespective of their feelings of mere protest or their position on dominant policy issues. Furthermore, perceptions of 50Plus substantially vary with age and income combined. Our findings suggest that 50Plus heralds the emergence of a novel divide. To what extent this divide revitalizes socioeconomic background factors in Western politics remains to be seen.

In contemporary democracies, a political party typically needs good press to attract voters. A gl... more In contemporary democracies, a political party typically needs good press to attract voters. A glum scenario for a party would be that news media systematically stigma-tize it. To what extent does stigmatization lower its electoral support? This article examines voters' reactions to news media coverage of the Dutch party PVV. Using a media content analysis linked to a 2014 panel survey of a sample representative of the Dutch electorate, we find that, among voters who held anti-immigrant attitudes, exposure to stigmatization lowered these voters' perceived legitimacy of the PVV. This, in turn, decreased their propensity to vote for that party. This suggests that stigmatization can be a strong tool in the hands of those who intend to damage a party. News media can be biased in various ways. What are the electoral effects of media bias? This important question has hardly ever been satisfactorily addressed. This is largely because media bias effects research suffers from the well-known subjectivity problem (Groeling, 2013). This article investigates effects of media bias while minimizing problems related to subjectivity. The subjectivity problem refers to the notion that each voter will have their own perception of a news item being biased or not. Partisans may ''sin-cerely perceive news as being biased against their preferred stance, even when it is actually unbiased'' (Groeling, 2013, p. 139) because of well-known cog-nitive biases—or because of the reputation of a particular media source. In this article, we solve this problem by examining indisputable stigma-tization. We thus look for terms that voters should consider extremely negative

Kriesi et al. announced the birth of a new cleavage in contemporary Western Europe, one dividing ... more Kriesi et al. announced the birth of a new cleavage in contemporary Western Europe, one dividing the winners and losers of globalisation. Their studies in 2006 and 2008 contain analyses of party positions in six countries, based on the contents of editorial sections of newspapers. This article challenges the main conclusion of Kriesi et al. by demonstrating on the basis of two expert surveysthat party positions are mainly structured by one dimension. The structure detected by Kriesi et al. in their analysis of parties is not found, except concerning voter positions.

In various European countries established parties have responded quite differently to the recent ... more In various European countries established parties have responded quite differently to the recent rise of anti-immigration parties. In Italy and Austria these parties entered governing coalitions. In France and Belgium the established parties agreed never to collaborate in any way with anti-immigration parties. In this paper we aim to assess whether this strategy of exclusion affects the electoral support for anti-immigration parties. To answer the research questions, we link expert survey data to individual-level survey data and perform analyses across 11 parties and across 4 time points. We find that the effect of exclusion depends on the institutional context, in particular the threshold for entering parliament, and the influence of parliamentary opposition parties on policy-making. According to our estimates the former Flemish Bloc benefited from being excluded and the Northern League in Italy would have benefited if it had been excluded. The Danish Progress Party, on the other hand, would have been hurt if it had been excluded. The other parties in our analyses are hardly affected. To the extent that the exclusion of anti-immigration parties is meant to change electoral outcomes in favour of the established parties, its success is thus quite mixed.

Anti-immigration parties have experienced electoral lift-off in most Western democracies, althoug... more Anti-immigration parties have experienced electoral lift-off in most Western democracies, although the consequences of their victories for real-life policy outcomes have remained largely unexplored. A key question is: do electoral pressures from anti-immigration parties have a 'contagion' impact on other parties' immigration policy positions? In this article, I argue and empirically demonstrate that this is the case. On the basis of a comparative-empirical study of 75 parties in 11 Western European countries, I conclude that this contagion effect involves entire party systems rather than the mainstream right only. In addition, I find that opposition parties are more vulnerable to this contagion effect than parties in government. The findings of this article imply that anti-immigration parties are able to influence policy output in their political systems without entering government.

Since the 1960s, anti-immigration parties have emerged in many established European democracies. ... more Since the 1960s, anti-immigration parties have emerged in many established European democracies. Some of them -for example, the German Republikaner and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium -have been treated as pariahs by other parties. Others -for example, the Lega Nord in Italy and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid -have not. Why is this? In this paper I argue that other parties are likely to ostracize an anti-immigration party if they do not need to cooperate with it anyway. They are even more likely to do so if they can convincingly make the case that its ideologies are outside agreed standards of acceptability. Through logistic regression analyses based on data concerning 31 Western European antiimmigration parties, I demonstrate that a party's size and ideological profile are major factors accounting for its treatment as a pariah. The findings offer important insights about the applicability of the commonly used strategy of ostracism, which has previously been shown to affect coalition building in established democracies.

Recent studies have shown that the most important factor explaining opinions on European Union is... more Recent studies have shown that the most important factor explaining opinions on European Union issues is attitudes towards immigrants. Two arguments are given to explain this effect. We contend that these arguments are both built on the idea that people with anti-immigrant attitudes frame other Europeans as an out-group. We then test the validity of these arguments by measuring how respondents in a voter survey frame the issue of Turkish membership. We find that framing the issue in terms of outgroups indeed mediates the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support for Turkish membership. This finding offers new insights into why levels of public support vary over different EU issues, because opposition is likely to increase when an issue is more easily framed in terms of out-groups.

Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral 'cost of governi... more Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral 'cost of governing'. This cost varies across coalition partners, and is higher for anti-politicalestablishment parties. This is because, if such a party participates in a coalition, it loses the purity of its message by being seen to cooperate with the political establishment. In order to demonstrate that anti-political-establishment parties suffer an additional cost of governing, this article builds on the work by Van der Brug et al. and refines the standard cost of governing theory by 'bringing the party back in'. The results of the analyses, based on 594 observations concerning 51 parties in seven Western European countries, cast doubt on the conventional concept of a cost of governing that pertains to all parties equally. The findings call for a major revision of the standard cost of governing literature, while adding a significant contribution to the debate on strategies against parties that may constitute a danger to democracy.

Some scholars have found that mass immigration fuels the success of anti-immigration parties, whe... more Some scholars have found that mass immigration fuels the success of anti-immigration parties, whereas others have found that it does not. In this paper, we propose a reason for these contradictory results. We advance a set of hypotheses that revolves around a commonly ignored factor, crime. To test these hypotheses, we examine a setting where an anti-immigration party, the LPF, participated in simultaneous elections in all Dutch municipalities, which form a single constituency. According to our results, the impact of immigration rates on the individual vote for the LPF only manifests itself among those voters who are very 'tough on crime'. In addition, we demonstrate that high local crime rates make an anti-immigration vote more likely, but only among voters who are very 'tough on immigration'. This suggests that immigration and crime rates do not make all citizens more likely to cast an anti-immigration vote, but only those who perceive a link between the two issues. Thus, if one wishes to reduce anti-immigration leaders' electoral support, countering their criminalization of immigrants may be a more fruitful strategy than trying to stop immigrationif at all possible.

The literature meant here are studies that revolve around the research question of why a new clas... more The literature meant here are studies that revolve around the research question of why a new class of party has emerged in Western democracies.

The 2008-2009 worldwide economic crisis serves as a backdrop to this study of the dynamics of cit... more The 2008-2009 worldwide economic crisis serves as a backdrop to this study of the dynamics of citizens' economic expectations. Economic expectations are identified as crucial for a range of political attitudes. This study is the first to consider how information affects evaluations in times of a severe crisis, as prior research of information effects on economic evaluations took place in more stable economic times. It links citizens' news exposure and the content of economic news coverage with changes in prospective economic assessments. Drawing on a three-wave panel study and on a media content analysis between the panel waves, we thus provide a dynamic assessment of media influences on changes in economic evaluations. The results demonstrate that media exposure strongly affected expectations regarding the future development of the national economic situation, while being largely unrelated to personal economic expectations. We furthermore show that media dependency increases the magnitude of the media effect. We discuss the disconnect between personal and national economic evaluations with regard to mass-mediated economic information.

In recent decades, ordinary European Union (EU) citizens have been able to express their opinion ... more In recent decades, ordinary European Union (EU) citizens have been able to express their opinion on the course of the European project on several occasions. Judging from electoral outcomes, there is quite some Euroscepticism among them. What motivations underlie the Eurosceptic vote? Using an extended and comprehensive multidimensional measure of EU attitudes, we investigate which specific attitudes and issue positions were conducive to Eurosceptic voting in the 2009 European Parliament elections. Based on a voter survey in 21 countries, we conclude that concerns about the EU's 'democratic deficit', low perceived utility of the EU for the country, negative affection towards the EU, opposition to EU integration, and an absence of EU identity enhance anti-EU voting. In addition, these effects depend on the dispersion of party positions concerning EU matters, so that the more the parties diverge on EU matters, the stronger the effect becomes of each of the five EU dimensions mentioned on party choice. We conclude by setting these findings in perspective and discussing their implications for the future of the European project.

First, this study tests for media effects on support for EU enlargement in a natural setting, whi... more First, this study tests for media effects on support for EU enlargement in a natural setting, while including actual media content in the analysis. Second, the moderation by anti-immigrant attitudes of media effects is tested, as it is argued that perceptions of 'others' influences how new information on enlargement is received. The study draws on a two-wave panel survey and a media content analysis in 21 countries. The results suggest there is a media effect, although not from individual exposure but from the information environment. In addition, individuals with stronger antiimmigrant attitudes are more strongly affected by a negative information environment.

News about the European Union (EU) looks different in different countries at different points in ... more News about the European Union (EU) looks different in different countries at different points in time. This study investigates explanations for cross-national and over-time variation in news media coverage of EU affairs drawing on large-scale media content analyses of newspapers and television news in the EU-15 (1999), EU-25 (2004) and EU-27 (2009) in relation to European Parliament (EP) elections. The analyses focus in particular on explanatory factors pertaining to media characteristics and the political elites. Results show that national elites play an important role for the coverage of EU matters during EP election campaigns.The more strongly national parties are divided about the EU in combination with overall more negative positions towards the EU, the more visible the news. Also, increases in EU news visibility from one election to the next and the Europeanness of the news are determined by a country's elite positions. The findings are discussed in light of the EU's alleged communication deficit.

A key predictor of support for Turkey's EU membership is citizens' attitudes toward immigrants. H... more A key predictor of support for Turkey's EU membership is citizens' attitudes toward immigrants. How anti-immigrant attitudes relate to support is not obvious and has remained unclear thus far. We argue that the presence of immigrants in a country reduces support for Turkey's membership. Second, the stronger this presence, the stronger the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support. Third, the more salient immigration issues in a country, the stronger the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support. Using cross sectional survey data (N ¼ 26,344) from 20 EU member states, we find support for these claims. Our findings provide a prime example of how politicians and media can influence citizens' thinking about specific issues, and, in doing so, can influence public opinion.

European Union (EU) enlargement evokes strong opposition among its citizens. Meanwhile, EU citize... more European Union (EU) enlargement evokes strong opposition among its citizens. Meanwhile, EU citizens' opinions are likely to become increasingly important in determining the future of the European project. Countries aspiring to EU membership must therefore take public opinion in the EU into consideration. What determines public support for EU entry? A factor that has been ignored in the relevant literature is perceived threat posed by a candidate country's religion. On the basis of data derived from a voter survey fielded in the Netherlands (N ¼ 1394), we show that perceived religious threat is not very relevant for public support for EU access of Croatia or Switzerland. It is, by contrast, a major predictor of opposition to Turkish entrance to the EU. In the Turkish case, religious threat overshadows all other factors suggested in the literature except for immigration threat. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for Turkey's EU accession bid, and that of other Muslim countries.

Western democracies have witnessed gradual decline of voting according to socioeconomic backgroun... more Western democracies have witnessed gradual decline of voting according to socioeconomic background factors. However, the emergence of elderly parties suggests increasing mobilization along generational lines, which would partly reverse this pattern. While religion and class voting have decreased, such new generational divide might make age, education and income salient (again). However, to what extent is support for these parties driven by such mobilization-rather than by apolitical protest, or by politics as usual? Focusing on 50Plus in the Netherlands, the most successful current Western elderly party, we find evidence for mobilization on a new divide. Many older, less educated voters who feel poor vote for 50Plus, irrespective of their feelings of mere protest or their position on dominant policy issues. Furthermore, perceptions of 50Plus substantially vary with age and income combined. Our findings suggest that 50Plus heralds the emergence of a novel divide. To what extent this divide revitalizes socioeconomic background factors in Western politics remains to be seen.

In contemporary democracies, a political party typically needs good press to attract voters. A gl... more In contemporary democracies, a political party typically needs good press to attract voters. A glum scenario for a party would be that news media systematically stigma-tize it. To what extent does stigmatization lower its electoral support? This article examines voters' reactions to news media coverage of the Dutch party PVV. Using a media content analysis linked to a 2014 panel survey of a sample representative of the Dutch electorate, we find that, among voters who held anti-immigrant attitudes, exposure to stigmatization lowered these voters' perceived legitimacy of the PVV. This, in turn, decreased their propensity to vote for that party. This suggests that stigmatization can be a strong tool in the hands of those who intend to damage a party. News media can be biased in various ways. What are the electoral effects of media bias? This important question has hardly ever been satisfactorily addressed. This is largely because media bias effects research suffers from the well-known subjectivity problem (Groeling, 2013). This article investigates effects of media bias while minimizing problems related to subjectivity. The subjectivity problem refers to the notion that each voter will have their own perception of a news item being biased or not. Partisans may ''sin-cerely perceive news as being biased against their preferred stance, even when it is actually unbiased'' (Groeling, 2013, p. 139) because of well-known cog-nitive biases—or because of the reputation of a particular media source. In this article, we solve this problem by examining indisputable stigma-tization. We thus look for terms that voters should consider extremely negative

Kriesi et al. announced the birth of a new cleavage in contemporary Western Europe, one dividing ... more Kriesi et al. announced the birth of a new cleavage in contemporary Western Europe, one dividing the winners and losers of globalisation. Their studies in 2006 and 2008 contain analyses of party positions in six countries, based on the contents of editorial sections of newspapers. This article challenges the main conclusion of Kriesi et al. by demonstrating on the basis of two expert surveysthat party positions are mainly structured by one dimension. The structure detected by Kriesi et al. in their analysis of parties is not found, except concerning voter positions.

In various European countries established parties have responded quite differently to the recent ... more In various European countries established parties have responded quite differently to the recent rise of anti-immigration parties. In Italy and Austria these parties entered governing coalitions. In France and Belgium the established parties agreed never to collaborate in any way with anti-immigration parties. In this paper we aim to assess whether this strategy of exclusion affects the electoral support for anti-immigration parties. To answer the research questions, we link expert survey data to individual-level survey data and perform analyses across 11 parties and across 4 time points. We find that the effect of exclusion depends on the institutional context, in particular the threshold for entering parliament, and the influence of parliamentary opposition parties on policy-making. According to our estimates the former Flemish Bloc benefited from being excluded and the Northern League in Italy would have benefited if it had been excluded. The Danish Progress Party, on the other hand, would have been hurt if it had been excluded. The other parties in our analyses are hardly affected. To the extent that the exclusion of anti-immigration parties is meant to change electoral outcomes in favour of the established parties, its success is thus quite mixed.

Anti-immigration parties have experienced electoral lift-off in most Western democracies, althoug... more Anti-immigration parties have experienced electoral lift-off in most Western democracies, although the consequences of their victories for real-life policy outcomes have remained largely unexplored. A key question is: do electoral pressures from anti-immigration parties have a 'contagion' impact on other parties' immigration policy positions? In this article, I argue and empirically demonstrate that this is the case. On the basis of a comparative-empirical study of 75 parties in 11 Western European countries, I conclude that this contagion effect involves entire party systems rather than the mainstream right only. In addition, I find that opposition parties are more vulnerable to this contagion effect than parties in government. The findings of this article imply that anti-immigration parties are able to influence policy output in their political systems without entering government.

Since the 1960s, anti-immigration parties have emerged in many established European democracies. ... more Since the 1960s, anti-immigration parties have emerged in many established European democracies. Some of them -for example, the German Republikaner and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium -have been treated as pariahs by other parties. Others -for example, the Lega Nord in Italy and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid -have not. Why is this? In this paper I argue that other parties are likely to ostracize an anti-immigration party if they do not need to cooperate with it anyway. They are even more likely to do so if they can convincingly make the case that its ideologies are outside agreed standards of acceptability. Through logistic regression analyses based on data concerning 31 Western European antiimmigration parties, I demonstrate that a party's size and ideological profile are major factors accounting for its treatment as a pariah. The findings offer important insights about the applicability of the commonly used strategy of ostracism, which has previously been shown to affect coalition building in established democracies.

Recent studies have shown that the most important factor explaining opinions on European Union is... more Recent studies have shown that the most important factor explaining opinions on European Union issues is attitudes towards immigrants. Two arguments are given to explain this effect. We contend that these arguments are both built on the idea that people with anti-immigrant attitudes frame other Europeans as an out-group. We then test the validity of these arguments by measuring how respondents in a voter survey frame the issue of Turkish membership. We find that framing the issue in terms of outgroups indeed mediates the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support for Turkish membership. This finding offers new insights into why levels of public support vary over different EU issues, because opposition is likely to increase when an issue is more easily framed in terms of out-groups.

Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral 'cost of governi... more Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral 'cost of governing'. This cost varies across coalition partners, and is higher for anti-politicalestablishment parties. This is because, if such a party participates in a coalition, it loses the purity of its message by being seen to cooperate with the political establishment. In order to demonstrate that anti-political-establishment parties suffer an additional cost of governing, this article builds on the work by Van der Brug et al. and refines the standard cost of governing theory by 'bringing the party back in'. The results of the analyses, based on 594 observations concerning 51 parties in seven Western European countries, cast doubt on the conventional concept of a cost of governing that pertains to all parties equally. The findings call for a major revision of the standard cost of governing literature, while adding a significant contribution to the debate on strategies against parties that may constitute a danger to democracy.

Some scholars have found that mass immigration fuels the success of anti-immigration parties, whe... more Some scholars have found that mass immigration fuels the success of anti-immigration parties, whereas others have found that it does not. In this paper, we propose a reason for these contradictory results. We advance a set of hypotheses that revolves around a commonly ignored factor, crime. To test these hypotheses, we examine a setting where an anti-immigration party, the LPF, participated in simultaneous elections in all Dutch municipalities, which form a single constituency. According to our results, the impact of immigration rates on the individual vote for the LPF only manifests itself among those voters who are very 'tough on crime'. In addition, we demonstrate that high local crime rates make an anti-immigration vote more likely, but only among voters who are very 'tough on immigration'. This suggests that immigration and crime rates do not make all citizens more likely to cast an anti-immigration vote, but only those who perceive a link between the two issues. Thus, if one wishes to reduce anti-immigration leaders' electoral support, countering their criminalization of immigrants may be a more fruitful strategy than trying to stop immigrationif at all possible.

The literature meant here are studies that revolve around the research question of why a new clas... more The literature meant here are studies that revolve around the research question of why a new class of party has emerged in Western democracies.

The 2008-2009 worldwide economic crisis serves as a backdrop to this study of the dynamics of cit... more The 2008-2009 worldwide economic crisis serves as a backdrop to this study of the dynamics of citizens' economic expectations. Economic expectations are identified as crucial for a range of political attitudes. This study is the first to consider how information affects evaluations in times of a severe crisis, as prior research of information effects on economic evaluations took place in more stable economic times. It links citizens' news exposure and the content of economic news coverage with changes in prospective economic assessments. Drawing on a three-wave panel study and on a media content analysis between the panel waves, we thus provide a dynamic assessment of media influences on changes in economic evaluations. The results demonstrate that media exposure strongly affected expectations regarding the future development of the national economic situation, while being largely unrelated to personal economic expectations. We furthermore show that media dependency increases the magnitude of the media effect. We discuss the disconnect between personal and national economic evaluations with regard to mass-mediated economic information.

In recent decades, ordinary European Union (EU) citizens have been able to express their opinion ... more In recent decades, ordinary European Union (EU) citizens have been able to express their opinion on the course of the European project on several occasions. Judging from electoral outcomes, there is quite some Euroscepticism among them. What motivations underlie the Eurosceptic vote? Using an extended and comprehensive multidimensional measure of EU attitudes, we investigate which specific attitudes and issue positions were conducive to Eurosceptic voting in the 2009 European Parliament elections. Based on a voter survey in 21 countries, we conclude that concerns about the EU's 'democratic deficit', low perceived utility of the EU for the country, negative affection towards the EU, opposition to EU integration, and an absence of EU identity enhance anti-EU voting. In addition, these effects depend on the dispersion of party positions concerning EU matters, so that the more the parties diverge on EU matters, the stronger the effect becomes of each of the five EU dimensions mentioned on party choice. We conclude by setting these findings in perspective and discussing their implications for the future of the European project.

First, this study tests for media effects on support for EU enlargement in a natural setting, whi... more First, this study tests for media effects on support for EU enlargement in a natural setting, while including actual media content in the analysis. Second, the moderation by anti-immigrant attitudes of media effects is tested, as it is argued that perceptions of 'others' influences how new information on enlargement is received. The study draws on a two-wave panel survey and a media content analysis in 21 countries. The results suggest there is a media effect, although not from individual exposure but from the information environment. In addition, individuals with stronger antiimmigrant attitudes are more strongly affected by a negative information environment.

News about the European Union (EU) looks different in different countries at different points in ... more News about the European Union (EU) looks different in different countries at different points in time. This study investigates explanations for cross-national and over-time variation in news media coverage of EU affairs drawing on large-scale media content analyses of newspapers and television news in the EU-15 (1999), EU-25 (2004) and EU-27 (2009) in relation to European Parliament (EP) elections. The analyses focus in particular on explanatory factors pertaining to media characteristics and the political elites. Results show that national elites play an important role for the coverage of EU matters during EP election campaigns.The more strongly national parties are divided about the EU in combination with overall more negative positions towards the EU, the more visible the news. Also, increases in EU news visibility from one election to the next and the Europeanness of the news are determined by a country's elite positions. The findings are discussed in light of the EU's alleged communication deficit.

A key predictor of support for Turkey's EU membership is citizens' attitudes toward immigrants. H... more A key predictor of support for Turkey's EU membership is citizens' attitudes toward immigrants. How anti-immigrant attitudes relate to support is not obvious and has remained unclear thus far. We argue that the presence of immigrants in a country reduces support for Turkey's membership. Second, the stronger this presence, the stronger the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support. Third, the more salient immigration issues in a country, the stronger the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support. Using cross sectional survey data (N ¼ 26,344) from 20 EU member states, we find support for these claims. Our findings provide a prime example of how politicians and media can influence citizens' thinking about specific issues, and, in doing so, can influence public opinion.

European Union (EU) enlargement evokes strong opposition among its citizens. Meanwhile, EU citize... more European Union (EU) enlargement evokes strong opposition among its citizens. Meanwhile, EU citizens' opinions are likely to become increasingly important in determining the future of the European project. Countries aspiring to EU membership must therefore take public opinion in the EU into consideration. What determines public support for EU entry? A factor that has been ignored in the relevant literature is perceived threat posed by a candidate country's religion. On the basis of data derived from a voter survey fielded in the Netherlands (N ¼ 1394), we show that perceived religious threat is not very relevant for public support for EU access of Croatia or Switzerland. It is, by contrast, a major predictor of opposition to Turkish entrance to the EU. In the Turkish case, religious threat overshadows all other factors suggested in the literature except for immigration threat. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for Turkey's EU accession bid, and that of other Muslim countries.