Albert Newen | Ruhr-Universität Bochum (original) (raw)

Papers by Albert Newen

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Dec 31, 2022

Quilty-Dunn et al. claim that all complex infant and animal reasoning implicate language-of-thoug... more Quilty-Dunn et al. claim that all complex infant and animal reasoning implicate language-of-thought hypothesis (LOTH)-like structures. We agree with the authors that the mental life of animals can be explained in representationalist terms, but we disagree with their idea that the complexity of mental representations is best explained by appealing to abstract concepts, and instead, we explain that it doesn't need to.

Cognitive Systems Research

Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonl... more Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonly understood to refer to artificial agents possessing the capacity to build up a context-independent understanding of itself and the world and to generalize this knowledge across a multitude of contexts. In our paper, we model the reciprocal interaction of narrative and embodied aspects of the self-pattern within an individual cognitive agent. We do so by extending an approach by Ryan, Agrawal, & Franklin (2020), who laid the groundwork for the implementation of the pattern theory of self in the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) model.

Erkenntnis, 2022

Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or consciou... more Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of 'selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. Call this the Memory Challenge. This paper argues that the Memory Challenge fails to undermine the credibility to reports of selfless episodes, because it rests on problematic assumptions about episodic memory. The paper further argues that we should distinguish between several kinds of self-representation that may be involved in the process of episodic remembering, and that once we do so, it is no longer mysterious how one could accurately remember and report a selfless episode as an episode that one went through. Thus, we should take reports of this kind seriously, and view them as credible counterexamples to the claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2023

Heintz & Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issu... more Heintz & Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issues unclear – not least, whether the lack of expression in nonhuman species is attributable to their lack of the relevant metarepresentational abilities, an absence of trust, or a consequence of other factors. In place of their view, we propose a gradualistic account of the origins of human expression.

Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences, May 12, 2009

Synthese

A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the origi... more A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the original event. However, given the convincing research in cognitive science on the constructive nature of memory, this inevitably leads to the question of the ‘bounds of authenticity’. That is, how similar does a memory have to be to the original experience to still count as authentic? In this paper we propose a novel account of ‘Situated Authenticity’ which highlights that the norms of authenticity are context-dependent. In particular, we show that each of the three core functions of episodic memory (self, social and directive) is correlated with patterned changes in levels of conceptualization (e.g., concrete construal versus abstract construal of the event). We support this theoretical account with existing empirical data. We conclude the paper by showing how our account of Situated Authenticity supplements ongoing discussions on memory contextualism, and providing an outline of how our ac...

International Journal of Social Robotics

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a fundamental process of social cognition. To date, however, o... more Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a fundamental process of social cognition. To date, however, only a handful of studies have investigated whether humans also take the perspective of humanoid robots. Recent findings on this topic are conflicting as one study found no evidence for level 1 VPT (i.e., which object is seen by the agent) and a different study has found evidence for level 2 VPT (i.e., how is the object seen by the agent). The latter study proposed that the human-like appearance of robots triggers VPT and that a mental capacity to perceive the environment is not required (mere-appearance hypothesis). In the present study, we tested whether the mere-appearance hypothesis is also applicable to level 1 VPT. We manipulated the appearance of a humanoid robot by either showing it with a human-like or artificial head, and its mental capacity for perception by presenting it as switched on or off. We found that all manipulations triggered VPT, showing, in contrast to earlier findi...

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2018

The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the featur... more The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer presuppose a common understanding of X being constitutive for P as X being necessary in all possible worlds for P. This metaphysical understanding is increasingly challenged. We also clarify that the question about the role of mental representations needs an independent answer from the question about the role of the 4E features. After a short outline of the central concepts, we present an overview of the nine sections and outline their importance for the debate concerning the role of 4E features in thinking about the mind.

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what make... more One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond low-level sensory representations while also falling s...

The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition, 2018

The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the featur... more The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer presuppose a common understanding of X being constitutive for P as X being necessary in all possible worlds for P. This metaphysical understanding is increasingly challenged. We also clarify that the question about the role of mental representations needs an independent answer from the question about the role of the 4E features. After a short outline of the central concepts, we present an overview of the nine sections and outline their importance for the debate concerning the role of 4E features in thinking about the mind.

The perception of danger in the environment can induce physiological responses (such as a heighte... more The perception of danger in the environment can induce physiological responses (such as a heightened state of arousal) in animals, which may cause measurable changes in the prosodic modulation of the voice (Briefer, 2012). The ability to interpret the prosodic features of animal calls as an indicator of emotional arousal may have provided the first hominins with an adaptive advantage, enabling, for instance, the recognition of a threat in the surroundings. This ability might have paved the ability to process meaningful prosodic modulations in the emerging linguistic utterances. Research has shown that humans are able to recognize different levels of arousal in mammalian calls. However, to our knowledge, no study has ever examined humans' cross-cultural ability to identify different arousal levels in calls of species belonging to several phyologenetically distant taxa, including, for instance, mammals and birds. We addressed this issue by developing a task in which human participants of three different cultures (Canadian, German, Mandarin) listened to ten pairs of vocalizations for each of nine different vertebrate taxa. We used amplitude-controlled calls from the following species: hourglass treefrog, American alligator, black-capped chickadee, common raven, domestic pig, giant panda, African elephant, Barbary macaque, and human.

Scientific Reports, Apr 21, 2023

Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abunda... more Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abundant studies have shown modulation of perception by attention, motivation, content and context, there is an unresolved controversy whether these examples provide true evidence that perception is penetrable by cognition. Here we show that tactile perception assessed as spatial discrimination can be instantaneously and systematically altered merely by the semantic content during hypnotic suggestions. To study neurophysiological correlates, we recorded EEG and SEPs. We found that the suggestion "your index finger becomes bigger" led to improved tactile discrimination, while the suggestion "your index finger becomes smaller" led to impaired discrimination. A hypnosis without semantic suggestions had no effect but caused a reduction of phase-locking synchronization of the beta frequency band between medial frontal cortex and the finger representation in somatosensory cortex. Late SEP components (P80-N140 complex) implicated in attentional processes were altered by the semantic contents, but processing of afferent inputs in SI remained unaltered. These data provide evidence that the psychophysically observed modifiability of tactile perception by semantic contents is not simply due to altered perception-based judgments, but instead is a consequence of modified perceptual processes which change the perceptual experience.

Scientific Reports, 2023

Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abunda... more Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abundant studies have shown modulation of perception by attention, motivation, content and context, there is an unresolved controversy whether these examples provide true evidence that perception is penetrable by cognition. Here we show that tactile perception assessed as spatial discrimination can be instantaneously and systematically altered merely by the semantic content during hypnotic suggestions. To study neurophysiological correlates, we recorded EEG and SEPs. We found that the suggestion "your index finger becomes bigger" led to improved tactile discrimination, while the suggestion "your index finger becomes smaller" led to impaired discrimination. A hypnosis without semantic suggestions had no effect but caused a reduction of phase-locking synchronization of the beta frequency band between medial frontal cortex and the finger representation in somatosensory cortex. Late SEP components (P80-N140 complex) implicated in attentional processes were altered by the semantic contents, but processing of afferent inputs in SI remained unaltered. These data provide evidence that the psychophysically observed modifiability of tactile perception by semantic contents is not simply due to altered perception-based judgments, but instead is a consequence of modified perceptual processes which change the perceptual experience.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2020

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what make... more One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy
proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them
to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond low-level sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities.

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2021

Do nonhuman animals (hereafter "animals") possess empathy and if so to which degree? Can we devel... more Do nonhuman animals (hereafter "animals") possess empathy and if so to which degree? Can we develop a conceptual framework that allows us to characterize similarities and differences between implementations of empathy in humans and animals? We aim to answer these questions in two steps. First, we develop a new conceptual framework by distinguishing different levels of empathy starting with paradigmatic cases of human empathy developing in human ontogeny. Second, we describe in detail which of these levels of empathy can be found in other species based on animal studies. This approach allows a detailed characterization of the relation of empathy in humans and other animals.

Philosophical Psychology, 2022

In this article, we show how the phenomenon of selfdeception when adequately analyzed, can be inc... more In this article, we show how the phenomenon of selfdeception when adequately analyzed, can be incorporated into a predictive processing framework. We describe four strategies by which a subject may become self-deceived to account for typical cases of self-deception. We then argue that the four strategies can be modeled within this framework, under the assumption that a satisfying account of motivation is possible within predictive processing. Finally, we outline how we can ground this assumption by discussing how such a systematic model of motivation may be developed using the distinction between a world-model and a self-model.

Cognition, 2023

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the dist... more The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specifc contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.

Cognitive Systems Research, 2023

Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonl... more Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonly understood to refer to artificial agents possessing the capacity to build up a context-independent understanding of itself and the world and to generalize this knowledge across a multitude of contexts. In human agents, this capacity is, to a large degree, facilitated by processes of self-directed learning, during which agents voluntarily control the conditions under which episodes of learning and problem solving occur. Since self-directed learning depends on the degree of knowledge the agent has about various aspects of themselves (their bodily skills, their learning goal, etc.), an AGI implementation of this type of learning must build on a theory of how this self-knowledge is actualized and modified during the learning process. In this paper, we employ the pattern theory of self in order to characterize different aspects of an agent’s self that are relevant for self-directed learning. Such aspects include agent-internal cognitive states such as thoughts, emotions, and intentions, but also relational states such as action possibilities in the environment. Combinations of these aspects form a characteristic pattern, which is unique to each individual agent, with no one aspect being necessary or sufficient for the individuation of that agent’s self. Here, we focus on the interdependence of narrative and embodied aspects of the self-pattern, since they involve particularly salient challenges consisting in conceptualizing the interaction between propositional and motor representations.

In our paper, we model the reciprocal interaction of these aspects of the self-pattern within an individual cognitive agent. We do so by extending an approach by Ryan, Agrawal, & Franklin (2020), who laid the groundwork for the implementation of the pattern theory of self in the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) model. We describe how embodied and narrative aspects of an agent’s self-pattern are realized by patterns of interaction between different LIDA modules over time, and how interactions at multiple temporal scales allow the agent’s self-pattern to be both dynamically variable and relatively stable. Finally, we investigate the implications this view has for the creation of artificial agents that can benefit from self-directed learning, both in the context of deliberate planning and adaptive motor execution.

Synthese, 2023

A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the origi... more A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the original event. However, given the convincing research in cognitive science on the constructive nature of memory, this inevitably leads to the question of the 'bounds of authenticity'. That is, how similar does a memory have to be to the original experience to still count as authentic? In this paper we propose a novel account of 'Situated Authenticity' which highlights that the norms of authenticity are contextdependent. In particular, we show that each of the three core functions of episodic memory (self, social and directive) is correlated with patterned changes in levels of conceptualization (e.g., concrete construal versus abstract construal of the event). We support this theoretical account with existing empirical data. We conclude the paper by showing how our account of Situated Authenticity supplements ongoing discussions on memory contextualism, and providing an outline of how our account, which is currently elaborated targeting a phenomenological level, may also be elaborated on a processing level using the concept of representational format.

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2023

Products and Services Discover Content Home > Journals > Behavioral and Brain Sciences > Volume 4... more Products and Services Discover Content Home > Journals > Behavioral and Brain Sciences > Volume 46 > Animal thought exceeds language-of-thought Access English Français In response to: The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences Related commentaries (30) Author response Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Dec 31, 2022

Quilty-Dunn et al. claim that all complex infant and animal reasoning implicate language-of-thoug... more Quilty-Dunn et al. claim that all complex infant and animal reasoning implicate language-of-thought hypothesis (LOTH)-like structures. We agree with the authors that the mental life of animals can be explained in representationalist terms, but we disagree with their idea that the complexity of mental representations is best explained by appealing to abstract concepts, and instead, we explain that it doesn't need to.

Cognitive Systems Research

Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonl... more Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonly understood to refer to artificial agents possessing the capacity to build up a context-independent understanding of itself and the world and to generalize this knowledge across a multitude of contexts. In our paper, we model the reciprocal interaction of narrative and embodied aspects of the self-pattern within an individual cognitive agent. We do so by extending an approach by Ryan, Agrawal, & Franklin (2020), who laid the groundwork for the implementation of the pattern theory of self in the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) model.

Erkenntnis, 2022

Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or consciou... more Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of 'selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. Call this the Memory Challenge. This paper argues that the Memory Challenge fails to undermine the credibility to reports of selfless episodes, because it rests on problematic assumptions about episodic memory. The paper further argues that we should distinguish between several kinds of self-representation that may be involved in the process of episodic remembering, and that once we do so, it is no longer mysterious how one could accurately remember and report a selfless episode as an episode that one went through. Thus, we should take reports of this kind seriously, and view them as credible counterexamples to the claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2023

Heintz & Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issu... more Heintz & Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issues unclear – not least, whether the lack of expression in nonhuman species is attributable to their lack of the relevant metarepresentational abilities, an absence of trust, or a consequence of other factors. In place of their view, we propose a gradualistic account of the origins of human expression.

Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences, May 12, 2009

Synthese

A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the origi... more A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the original event. However, given the convincing research in cognitive science on the constructive nature of memory, this inevitably leads to the question of the ‘bounds of authenticity’. That is, how similar does a memory have to be to the original experience to still count as authentic? In this paper we propose a novel account of ‘Situated Authenticity’ which highlights that the norms of authenticity are context-dependent. In particular, we show that each of the three core functions of episodic memory (self, social and directive) is correlated with patterned changes in levels of conceptualization (e.g., concrete construal versus abstract construal of the event). We support this theoretical account with existing empirical data. We conclude the paper by showing how our account of Situated Authenticity supplements ongoing discussions on memory contextualism, and providing an outline of how our ac...

International Journal of Social Robotics

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a fundamental process of social cognition. To date, however, o... more Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a fundamental process of social cognition. To date, however, only a handful of studies have investigated whether humans also take the perspective of humanoid robots. Recent findings on this topic are conflicting as one study found no evidence for level 1 VPT (i.e., which object is seen by the agent) and a different study has found evidence for level 2 VPT (i.e., how is the object seen by the agent). The latter study proposed that the human-like appearance of robots triggers VPT and that a mental capacity to perceive the environment is not required (mere-appearance hypothesis). In the present study, we tested whether the mere-appearance hypothesis is also applicable to level 1 VPT. We manipulated the appearance of a humanoid robot by either showing it with a human-like or artificial head, and its mental capacity for perception by presenting it as switched on or off. We found that all manipulations triggered VPT, showing, in contrast to earlier findi...

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2018

The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the featur... more The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer presuppose a common understanding of X being constitutive for P as X being necessary in all possible worlds for P. This metaphysical understanding is increasingly challenged. We also clarify that the question about the role of mental representations needs an independent answer from the question about the role of the 4E features. After a short outline of the central concepts, we present an overview of the nine sections and outline their importance for the debate concerning the role of 4E features in thinking about the mind.

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what make... more One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond low-level sensory representations while also falling s...

The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition, 2018

The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the featur... more The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer presuppose a common understanding of X being constitutive for P as X being necessary in all possible worlds for P. This metaphysical understanding is increasingly challenged. We also clarify that the question about the role of mental representations needs an independent answer from the question about the role of the 4E features. After a short outline of the central concepts, we present an overview of the nine sections and outline their importance for the debate concerning the role of 4E features in thinking about the mind.

The perception of danger in the environment can induce physiological responses (such as a heighte... more The perception of danger in the environment can induce physiological responses (such as a heightened state of arousal) in animals, which may cause measurable changes in the prosodic modulation of the voice (Briefer, 2012). The ability to interpret the prosodic features of animal calls as an indicator of emotional arousal may have provided the first hominins with an adaptive advantage, enabling, for instance, the recognition of a threat in the surroundings. This ability might have paved the ability to process meaningful prosodic modulations in the emerging linguistic utterances. Research has shown that humans are able to recognize different levels of arousal in mammalian calls. However, to our knowledge, no study has ever examined humans' cross-cultural ability to identify different arousal levels in calls of species belonging to several phyologenetically distant taxa, including, for instance, mammals and birds. We addressed this issue by developing a task in which human participants of three different cultures (Canadian, German, Mandarin) listened to ten pairs of vocalizations for each of nine different vertebrate taxa. We used amplitude-controlled calls from the following species: hourglass treefrog, American alligator, black-capped chickadee, common raven, domestic pig, giant panda, African elephant, Barbary macaque, and human.

Scientific Reports, Apr 21, 2023

Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abunda... more Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abundant studies have shown modulation of perception by attention, motivation, content and context, there is an unresolved controversy whether these examples provide true evidence that perception is penetrable by cognition. Here we show that tactile perception assessed as spatial discrimination can be instantaneously and systematically altered merely by the semantic content during hypnotic suggestions. To study neurophysiological correlates, we recorded EEG and SEPs. We found that the suggestion "your index finger becomes bigger" led to improved tactile discrimination, while the suggestion "your index finger becomes smaller" led to impaired discrimination. A hypnosis without semantic suggestions had no effect but caused a reduction of phase-locking synchronization of the beta frequency band between medial frontal cortex and the finger representation in somatosensory cortex. Late SEP components (P80-N140 complex) implicated in attentional processes were altered by the semantic contents, but processing of afferent inputs in SI remained unaltered. These data provide evidence that the psychophysically observed modifiability of tactile perception by semantic contents is not simply due to altered perception-based judgments, but instead is a consequence of modified perceptual processes which change the perceptual experience.

Scientific Reports, 2023

Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abunda... more Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abundant studies have shown modulation of perception by attention, motivation, content and context, there is an unresolved controversy whether these examples provide true evidence that perception is penetrable by cognition. Here we show that tactile perception assessed as spatial discrimination can be instantaneously and systematically altered merely by the semantic content during hypnotic suggestions. To study neurophysiological correlates, we recorded EEG and SEPs. We found that the suggestion "your index finger becomes bigger" led to improved tactile discrimination, while the suggestion "your index finger becomes smaller" led to impaired discrimination. A hypnosis without semantic suggestions had no effect but caused a reduction of phase-locking synchronization of the beta frequency band between medial frontal cortex and the finger representation in somatosensory cortex. Late SEP components (P80-N140 complex) implicated in attentional processes were altered by the semantic contents, but processing of afferent inputs in SI remained unaltered. These data provide evidence that the psychophysically observed modifiability of tactile perception by semantic contents is not simply due to altered perception-based judgments, but instead is a consequence of modified perceptual processes which change the perceptual experience.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2020

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what make... more One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy
proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them
to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond low-level sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities.

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2021

Do nonhuman animals (hereafter "animals") possess empathy and if so to which degree? Can we devel... more Do nonhuman animals (hereafter "animals") possess empathy and if so to which degree? Can we develop a conceptual framework that allows us to characterize similarities and differences between implementations of empathy in humans and animals? We aim to answer these questions in two steps. First, we develop a new conceptual framework by distinguishing different levels of empathy starting with paradigmatic cases of human empathy developing in human ontogeny. Second, we describe in detail which of these levels of empathy can be found in other species based on animal studies. This approach allows a detailed characterization of the relation of empathy in humans and other animals.

Philosophical Psychology, 2022

In this article, we show how the phenomenon of selfdeception when adequately analyzed, can be inc... more In this article, we show how the phenomenon of selfdeception when adequately analyzed, can be incorporated into a predictive processing framework. We describe four strategies by which a subject may become self-deceived to account for typical cases of self-deception. We then argue that the four strategies can be modeled within this framework, under the assumption that a satisfying account of motivation is possible within predictive processing. Finally, we outline how we can ground this assumption by discussing how such a systematic model of motivation may be developed using the distinction between a world-model and a self-model.

Cognition, 2023

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the dist... more The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specifc contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.

Cognitive Systems Research, 2023

Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonl... more Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonly understood to refer to artificial agents possessing the capacity to build up a context-independent understanding of itself and the world and to generalize this knowledge across a multitude of contexts. In human agents, this capacity is, to a large degree, facilitated by processes of self-directed learning, during which agents voluntarily control the conditions under which episodes of learning and problem solving occur. Since self-directed learning depends on the degree of knowledge the agent has about various aspects of themselves (their bodily skills, their learning goal, etc.), an AGI implementation of this type of learning must build on a theory of how this self-knowledge is actualized and modified during the learning process. In this paper, we employ the pattern theory of self in order to characterize different aspects of an agent’s self that are relevant for self-directed learning. Such aspects include agent-internal cognitive states such as thoughts, emotions, and intentions, but also relational states such as action possibilities in the environment. Combinations of these aspects form a characteristic pattern, which is unique to each individual agent, with no one aspect being necessary or sufficient for the individuation of that agent’s self. Here, we focus on the interdependence of narrative and embodied aspects of the self-pattern, since they involve particularly salient challenges consisting in conceptualizing the interaction between propositional and motor representations.

In our paper, we model the reciprocal interaction of these aspects of the self-pattern within an individual cognitive agent. We do so by extending an approach by Ryan, Agrawal, & Franklin (2020), who laid the groundwork for the implementation of the pattern theory of self in the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) model. We describe how embodied and narrative aspects of an agent’s self-pattern are realized by patterns of interaction between different LIDA modules over time, and how interactions at multiple temporal scales allow the agent’s self-pattern to be both dynamically variable and relatively stable. Finally, we investigate the implications this view has for the creation of artificial agents that can benefit from self-directed learning, both in the context of deliberate planning and adaptive motor execution.

Synthese, 2023

A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the origi... more A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the original event. However, given the convincing research in cognitive science on the constructive nature of memory, this inevitably leads to the question of the 'bounds of authenticity'. That is, how similar does a memory have to be to the original experience to still count as authentic? In this paper we propose a novel account of 'Situated Authenticity' which highlights that the norms of authenticity are contextdependent. In particular, we show that each of the three core functions of episodic memory (self, social and directive) is correlated with patterned changes in levels of conceptualization (e.g., concrete construal versus abstract construal of the event). We support this theoretical account with existing empirical data. We conclude the paper by showing how our account of Situated Authenticity supplements ongoing discussions on memory contextualism, and providing an outline of how our account, which is currently elaborated targeting a phenomenological level, may also be elaborated on a processing level using the concept of representational format.

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2023

Products and Services Discover Content Home > Journals > Behavioral and Brain Sciences > Volume 4... more Products and Services Discover Content Home > Journals > Behavioral and Brain Sciences > Volume 46 > Animal thought exceeds language-of-thought Access English Français In response to: The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences Related commentaries (30) Author response Behavioral and Brain Sciences

We develop a version of a direct perception account of emotion recognition on the basis of a meta... more We develop a version of a direct perception account of emotion recognition on the basis of a metaphysical claim that emotions are individuated as patterns of characteristic features. On our account, emotion recognition relies on the same type of pattern
recognition as is described for object recognition. The analogy allows us to distinguish two forms of directly perceiving emotions, namely perceiving an emotion in the (near) absence of any top-down processes, and perceiving an emotion in a way that significantly involves some top-down processes (including expectations and background knowledge); and, in addition, an inference-based evaluation of an emotion. Our model clarifies the epistemology of emotion recognition.

Is our perceptual experience a veridical representation of the world or is it a product of our be... more Is our perceptual experience a veridical representation of the world or is it a product of our beliefs and past experiences? Cognitive penetration describes the influence of higher level
cognitive factors on perceptual experience and has been a debated topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Here, we focus on visual perception, particularly early vision,
and how it is affected by contextual expectations and memorized cognitive contents. We argue for cognitive penetration based on recent empirical evidence demonstrating
contextual and top-down influences on early visual processes. On the basis of a perceptual model, we propose different types of cognitive penetration depending on the processing level on which the penetration happens and depending on where the penetrating influence comes from. Our proposal has two consequences: (1) the traditional controversy on whether cognitive penetration occurs or not is ill posed, and (2) a clear-cut perception–cognition boundary cannot be maintained.

We report on the design of a blended-learning course in elementary symbolic logic. Challenges and... more We report on the design of a blended-learning course in elementary symbolic logic. Challenges and solutions pertaining to the Blackboard e-learning environment (Blackboard Academic Suite Release 8.0) and a customized Gentzen-style proof checker are described. The purpose is to provide orientation for those in the planning stage of similar projects.