Hekmatullah Azamy - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Hekmatullah Azamy

The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2015

An important question underlies the potential for a successful peace process in Afghanistan: If p... more An important question underlies the potential for a successful peace process in Afghanistan: If political negotiations between the Taliban leadership and the Afghan government succeed, will fighters in the field cease their activities, especially illicit funding practices, and accept government legal authority? Interviews conducted in early 2014—well before the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death or the appearance of Islamic State in the region—indicate that a wide gulf separates the motivations of low-level insurgents from their leadership’s ideological objectives. The rank and file fight for multiple reasons, the most significant of which is the financial advantage of association with the movement. Recent studies of the economics of insurgency describe a crime-insurgency-terror nexus that applies to the contemporary Afghan context, albeit requiring adjustment to account for the distinctive political circumstances and wartime history of Afghanistan. [D74, F51, F52, O53, Z10]

Located at the crossroads of Central, South and Southwest Asia, Afghanistan has a geostrategic im... more Located at the crossroads of Central, South and Southwest Asia, Afghanistan has a geostrategic importance for economic integration and stability in the broader region. Its location can be an asset or a liability for the country itself and its immediate and regional neighbors. Decades of insecurity in Afghanistan have turned the country into a liability in the region. Permanent violence in Afghanistan has invited transnational militants including Central Asians and Russians to seek safe sanctuaries in the country and use it as a launch-pad for their operations across the greater region. These foreign Jihadists have entrenched presence in Afghanistan and developed stronger relations with local militants. They do not only pose a security threat to Afghanistan and their home countries, but in particular Central Asian militants also facilitate drug trade that originates from Afghanistan and “successfully” crosses Central Asia reaching all the way to Russia and Europe.

At the cusp of what is dubbed Afghanistan’s transformation decade (2015- 2024), the Afghan government has promised to return the country into its historical role as a regional trade, transit and transport hub – particularly by serving as a land bridge connecting energy-rich Central Asia with energy- hungry South Asia. To serve this purpose and in order to make Afghanistan an asset for the region, the country has initiated and is pushing for the implementation of major transnational transport and energy projects, including Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline; CASA- 1000 electricity transmission from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan; Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission known as TAP-500 KV Line; Lapis Lazuli Corridor – aimed at connecting Afghanistan to the Caspian, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey and promoting connectivity of these countries. The Five Nations Railways Corridor will connect China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran; and the “Sino Afghan Special Railway transportation” connects Afghanistan and China via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In all of these initiatives, Central Asia is inevitable.

Daesh’s emergence in Afghanistan complicated the militancy landscape and rapidly transformed alli... more Daesh’s emergence in Afghanistan complicated the militancy landscape and rapidly transformed alliances between different local and foreign militant outfits. Elements within the Afghan Taliban and groups like IMU saw Daesh’s expansion as an opportunity to rebrand. Support for Daesh for the first time fragmented the Afghan Taliban, which had prided themselves for maintaining unity since its emergence in 1994. Similarly, IMU—long a close ally of the Taliban—shifted allegiance from Taliban founder leader Mullah Muhammad Omar to al Baghdadi, while its offshoot, called Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and TIP remained with the Taliban. Sharing an adversary with Daesh, al Qaeda, too, reaffirmed allegiance to the Taliban.

Divisions between pro- and anti-Daesh groups were widening as disenfranchised Taliban and those foreign militants with a history of reluctant cooperation with the Taliban were increasingly teaming up with Daesh to counterbalance the Taliban. The shared Salafist ideology, global jihadi agenda, vast financial resources, rapid territorial gains Daesh made in Iraq and Syria and being sidelined by the Taliban leadership, all made Daesh attractive for Taliban and IMU defectors. This fuelled competition between Daesh supporters and the mainstream Afghan Taliban as both appeal to similar recruits.

The Taliban were threatened by losing men, influence and income to the even more aggressive and ambitious Daesh. The Taliban, however, were initially hesitant to directly confront Daesh as it would have undermined the legitimacy of the former’s longstanding jihad, making it appear power hungry and motivated by self-interest.

The Taliban’s immediate approach was to avoid losing men to Daesh and to attract defectors to return. The group created a “recruitment commission” to reach out to those who had defected to Daesh and to prevent its vulnerable members from leaving to join the Daesh. The Taliban were also secretly helping Afghan security agencies to pinpoint Daesh commanders in areas out of the government writ. This worked in Helmand as former Afghan Taliban commander Khadim was killed, resulting in the failure of Daesh to progress in the province. After Khadim’s death, Daesh attempted to gain a foothold in Zabul, Ghazni, Logar, Farah and the northern provinces. The Taliban’s covert anti-Daesh campaign was proving less effective because Daesh was becoming overstretched in several provinces and was vocal against the Taliban and its invisible leader Mullah Omar. This urged the Taliban to fight the group militarily.

Countering Daesh’s influence became an important agenda of the Taliban when the latter launched their annual spring offensive, codenamed “Azm”, in April 2015. The Taliban shifted focus from their traditional strongholds in the south and east to northern Afghanistan to prevent Daesh-affiliated IMU from gaining autonomy. Teaming up with regional countries, including Iran and Russia—also threatened by Daesh in Afghanistan—the Taliban later announced that they were deploying the “special forces unit” the group had created to confront Daesh. The rival groups fought in several provinces, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides.

In the midst of confronting several state and non-state actors, Daesh is struggling to make progress in Afghanistan. After its failed attempt to establish several fronts and to gain a foothold in the southern and northern regions, Daesh has been concentrating on the eastern provinces, particularly Nangarhar and Kunar. Supported by countries like Iran and Russia, the Taliban’s anti-Daesh campaign, coupled with airstrikes as well as ground operations by Afghan forces and private militias and frequent US drone strikes, continues to challenge Daesh’s potency. Nonetheless, the group’s managing to remain operational, though at a smaller scale, is indicative about its future and prospects of imprinting itself in Afghanistan.

Daesh seems determined to build footholds in Afghanistan. Declaring Khurasan as its Wilaya (province) was the first expansion of Daesh-Central outside of the Middle East. For Daesh, the legitimacy of an Islamic State across the Muslim world will be perceived to be defective without its expansion into Afghanistan because of the historical relevance and geostrategic importance of Afghanistan to Khurasan. Being a conflict zone with a history of providing safe sanctuaries to transnational jihadists, Afghanistan also particularly attracts Daesh’s attention. The group aims to turn the country into its “regional headquarters” and to use Afghanistan as a springboard for its operations in the broader south and central Asia regions in the long run. Having a footprint in Afghanistan would allow Daesh fanatics from these regions to go, in relative safety, to Afghanistan instead of the Middle East to get military training. Moreover, Daesh-Central also sees the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as an alternative safe heaven for its leadership should it be cornered in the Middle East.

Daesh’s future in Afghanistan is directly linked to that of Daesh-Central in the Middle East. Should the former become the recipient of regular and large financial and personnel assistance from its mother organization the group would make unprecedented progress in so-called Khurasan. However, there are many local opportunities that Daesh in Afghanistan is keen to exploit which would allow the group to grow in strength in the face of resistance from its foes.

To boost its influence and legitimacy in the Afghan theatre, Daesh is looking to find sustainable financial sources and is trying to justify its presence by Islamic theology using the Khurasan card. Khurasan has significance in Islam and it is predicted that at the end of time black banners will rise from Khurasan and will free the Muslim land. Contemporary Afghanistan is the heart of Khurasan, which included parts of Pakistan, Central Asia, Iran and China.

Daesh is also attempting to trigger sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shia in Afghanistan. Sectarian violence will be the breeding ground for Daesh recruitment and if there is any response from the Shias, Daesh will use it for their propaganda to recruit more hardcore Salafists—who are growing in number.

Lastly, Daesh seems to be following developments within the Taliban post-Mullah Omar closely. Not only can the Taliban leadership crisis supply more defectors to Daesh, in addition, pro-Daesh Taliban leaders gaining prominence within the Taliban can help to create a conducive environment for Daesh to grow.

With patron support waning and the Islamic State expanding, the Taliban may transform into a mili... more With patron support waning and the Islamic State expanding, the Taliban may transform into a militant political group in order to survive.

The delicate yet volatile balance of jihadi movements and insurgents within Afghanistan may be ab... more The delicate yet volatile balance of jihadi movements and insurgents within Afghanistan may be about to shift.

The Afghan Taliban have grown stronger and more deadly over the past 13 years, something Pakistan... more The Afghan Taliban have grown stronger and more deadly over the past 13 years, something Pakistan is often
blamed for by Afghans and some in the international community. Thus, Pakistan is seen as the key player in
bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table. However, the Taliban claims their militancy in Afghanistan is
completely independent of Pakistan. In this context, there are three major concerns associated with materializing
peace talk efforts between Afghanistan and the Taliban. First, it remains unclear whether Pakistan will cooperate in
the Afghan peace process and urge the Taliban to stop fighting. Second, and of most interest, is whether the Taliban
will listen to Pakistan. Third, Afghanistan’s role in a lasting and enforceable settlement has yet to be determined.

The Transformation Decade in Afghanistan won’t transform much if the motivations for the Taliban’... more The Transformation Decade in Afghanistan won’t transform much if the motivations for the
Taliban’s foot soldiers aren’t understood, or curtailed.

After 13 years of conflict in Afghanistan, money has replaced ideology and vengeance as a reason ... more After 13 years of conflict in Afghanistan, money has replaced ideology and vengeance as a reason for Taliban ties.
National or Islamic goals no longer motivate foot soldiers under the organization’s name, making "political
Islamism" and "violent" or "Islamic extremism" ineffective terms.

Afghanistan, India and Pakistan have a history of hostility that threatened regional security and... more Afghanistan, India and Pakistan have a history of hostility that threatened regional security and hindered economic integration in the region. The hostility is chiefly due to territorial disputes – a carryover from the colonial British era. These disputes not only led to inter-state wars but also use of proxies against each other. India and Pakistan fought three wars over Kashmir while Pakistan’s continued interference through its Islamist proxies in Afghanistan has been to keep the Durand Line issue at bay and in the meantime turn Afghanistan into its “strategic depth” against India. However, during last 13 years, it was seen that these proxies instead of serving the interests of their patrons largely constituted an enemy posing threat to all of them. The three countries are now facing the threat of Islamist militancy that has to be tackled collectively and sincerely. This requires a comprehensive approach and a serious regional commitment, which can only be achieved if the three countries put their rivalries behind and work out the way forward.

The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2015