Frank Hindriks | University of Groningen (original) (raw)
Papers by Frank Hindriks
Economics and Philosophy
When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of ins... more When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of institutions. These are commonly regarded as self-stabilizing. Yet, they can also be subject to endogenous processes of decay, or so we argue. We explain this in terms of psychological and cultural processes, which can change even if the formal structures remain unchanged. One key implication is that the extent to which norms, values and ideals motivate individuals to comply with institutions is limited.
Economics and Philosophy
When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of ins... more When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of institutions. These are commonly regarded as self-stabilizing. Yet, they can also be subject to endogenous processes of decay, or so we argue. We explain this in terms of psychological and cultural processes, which can change even if the formal structures remain unchanged. One key implication is that the extent to which norms, values, and ideals motivate individuals to comply with institutions is limited.
Journal of Ethics
Social sustainability plays a prominent role in the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals... more Social sustainability plays a prominent role in the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, but a proper analysis of the concept is still lacking. According to a widespread conception, a system is sustainable when it is preserved or developed in a robust manner. I argue, however, that social sustainability is best understood in explicitly normative terms. Formulating suitable development goals requires a conception of the kind of society that is worth sustaining. I propose that, for a system to be socially sustainable is for it to secure a range of values, including justice. Furthermore, I argue that social sustainability is first and foremost a property of institutions. I go on to ask what it takes for an institution to secure values and why justice is so important for institutions. The answers culminate in a social sustainability framework, which explains why making institutions more sustainable is so challenging.
Synthese
We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an imp... more We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an important task of philosophy is to provide the bigger picture. To this end, it should investigate folk views and determine whether and how they can be preserved once scrutinized from the perspective of the sciences. However, the sciences typically present us with a fragmented picture of reality. Thus, an important intermediate step is to integrate the most promising social scientific theories with one another. In addition to this, social ontology can provide input to and benefit from other philosophical disciplines that engage in normative theorizing. Thus, we propose that social ontology connects not only with folk ontology and scientific ontology but also with fields such as ethics and political philosophy. Building bridges between them serves to formulate a credible and encompassing worldview that is of theoretical and practical significance.
Synthese
Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The... more Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The worry has been that, because they are artificial agents, it is impossible to attribute blame, even though doing so would be appropriate given the harms they cause. We argue that there are no responsibility gaps. The harms can be blameless. And if they are not, the blame that is appropriate is indirect and can be attributed to designers, engineers, software developers, manufacturers or regulators. The real problem lies elsewhere: autonomous machines should be built so as to exhibit a level of risk that is morally acceptable. If they fall short of this standard, they exhibit what we call ‘a control gap.’ The causal control that autonomous machines have will then fall short of the guidance control they should emulate.
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2022
To unify rival theories is to combine their key insights into a single coherent framework. It is ... more To unify rival theories is to combine their key insights into a single coherent framework. It is often achieved by integrating the theories and forging new connections between their explanatory factors, which leads to an increase in explanatory power. Philip Pettit has proposed an alternative method that serves to establish that their key insights can be coherently combined. Instead of integrating them, he reconciles them by adjusting their domains of application so as to avoid overlap. As a result, the theories no longer compete. I argue that integration is often to be preferred to reconciliation. First, reconciliation retains the original insights, but only for part of the domain. In contrast, integration preserves and enriches the original insights across the board. Second, integration leads to a substantial increase in explanatory power, whereas reconciliation might even decrease it. I substantiate these claims by comparing Pettit's Virtual Control Theory to the Rules-and-Equilibrium Theory, which integrates the theories that Pettit sets out to reconcile.
What is an institution? And what distinguishes one type of institution from another? We answer th... more What is an institution? And what distinguishes one type of institution from another? We answer these questions using a functionalist approach: types of institutions are identified by their function, or the coordination problems they solve; token institutions are specific solutions to these problems, or equilibria of strategic games. The functionalist approach provides some insights into the limits of reform, or the extent to which institutions – like marriage, property, or democracy – can be modified without turning them into entities of a different kind.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Synthese, 2019
Institutions generate cooperative benefits that explain why they exist and persist. Therefore, th... more Institutions generate cooperative benefits that explain why they exist and persist. Therefore, their etiological function is to promote cooperation. The function of a particular institution, such as money or traffic regulations, is to solve one or more cooperation problems. We go on to argue that the teleological function of institutions is to secure values by means of norms. Values can also be used to redesign an institution and to promote social change. We argue, however, that an adequate theory of institutions should not be ‘moralized’ in that they should not be defined in terms of the values they are supposed to promote.
Philosophical Studies, 2019
Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of t... more Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism.
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2010
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2015
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2015
Our goal is to develop a theory that combines the best insights of philosophical and scientific t... more Our goal is to develop a theory that combines the best insights of philosophical and scientific theories of institutions. We are not committed a priori to save the commonsense notion of institution, or the thesis of human exceptionalism. We think that human cognition is important, but we do not claim that common knowledge or collective intentions are necessary for coordination. Like most of our commentators, we believe that there is continuity between simple rules of precedence and sophisticated institutions like property, marriage, or money. Finally, we argue that a satisfactory account of institutions must be compatible with different theories of normativity, specifying the social and psychological mechanisms that make it possible to override selfish desires.
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2014
We propose a new framework to unify three conceptions of institutions that play a prominent role ... more We propose a new framework to unify three conceptions of institutions that play a prominent role in the philosophical and scientific literature: the equilibria account, the regulative rules account, and the constitutive rules account. We argue that equilibrium-based and rule-based accounts are individually inadequate, but that jointly they provide a satisfactory conception of institutions as rules-in-equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we show that constitutive rules can be derived from regulative rules via the introduction of theoretical terms. We argue that the constitutive rules theory is reducible to the rules-in equilibrium theory, and that it accounts for the way in which we assign names to social institutions.
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014
The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2014
Journal of Political Philosophy, 2008
Philosophical Psychology, 2017
Economics and Philosophy
When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of ins... more When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of institutions. These are commonly regarded as self-stabilizing. Yet, they can also be subject to endogenous processes of decay, or so we argue. We explain this in terms of psychological and cultural processes, which can change even if the formal structures remain unchanged. One key implication is that the extent to which norms, values and ideals motivate individuals to comply with institutions is limited.
Economics and Philosophy
When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of ins... more When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of institutions. These are commonly regarded as self-stabilizing. Yet, they can also be subject to endogenous processes of decay, or so we argue. We explain this in terms of psychological and cultural processes, which can change even if the formal structures remain unchanged. One key implication is that the extent to which norms, values, and ideals motivate individuals to comply with institutions is limited.
Journal of Ethics
Social sustainability plays a prominent role in the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals... more Social sustainability plays a prominent role in the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, but a proper analysis of the concept is still lacking. According to a widespread conception, a system is sustainable when it is preserved or developed in a robust manner. I argue, however, that social sustainability is best understood in explicitly normative terms. Formulating suitable development goals requires a conception of the kind of society that is worth sustaining. I propose that, for a system to be socially sustainable is for it to secure a range of values, including justice. Furthermore, I argue that social sustainability is first and foremost a property of institutions. I go on to ask what it takes for an institution to secure values and why justice is so important for institutions. The answers culminate in a social sustainability framework, which explains why making institutions more sustainable is so challenging.
Synthese
We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an imp... more We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an important task of philosophy is to provide the bigger picture. To this end, it should investigate folk views and determine whether and how they can be preserved once scrutinized from the perspective of the sciences. However, the sciences typically present us with a fragmented picture of reality. Thus, an important intermediate step is to integrate the most promising social scientific theories with one another. In addition to this, social ontology can provide input to and benefit from other philosophical disciplines that engage in normative theorizing. Thus, we propose that social ontology connects not only with folk ontology and scientific ontology but also with fields such as ethics and political philosophy. Building bridges between them serves to formulate a credible and encompassing worldview that is of theoretical and practical significance.
Synthese
Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The... more Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The worry has been that, because they are artificial agents, it is impossible to attribute blame, even though doing so would be appropriate given the harms they cause. We argue that there are no responsibility gaps. The harms can be blameless. And if they are not, the blame that is appropriate is indirect and can be attributed to designers, engineers, software developers, manufacturers or regulators. The real problem lies elsewhere: autonomous machines should be built so as to exhibit a level of risk that is morally acceptable. If they fall short of this standard, they exhibit what we call ‘a control gap.’ The causal control that autonomous machines have will then fall short of the guidance control they should emulate.
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2022
To unify rival theories is to combine their key insights into a single coherent framework. It is ... more To unify rival theories is to combine their key insights into a single coherent framework. It is often achieved by integrating the theories and forging new connections between their explanatory factors, which leads to an increase in explanatory power. Philip Pettit has proposed an alternative method that serves to establish that their key insights can be coherently combined. Instead of integrating them, he reconciles them by adjusting their domains of application so as to avoid overlap. As a result, the theories no longer compete. I argue that integration is often to be preferred to reconciliation. First, reconciliation retains the original insights, but only for part of the domain. In contrast, integration preserves and enriches the original insights across the board. Second, integration leads to a substantial increase in explanatory power, whereas reconciliation might even decrease it. I substantiate these claims by comparing Pettit's Virtual Control Theory to the Rules-and-Equilibrium Theory, which integrates the theories that Pettit sets out to reconcile.
What is an institution? And what distinguishes one type of institution from another? We answer th... more What is an institution? And what distinguishes one type of institution from another? We answer these questions using a functionalist approach: types of institutions are identified by their function, or the coordination problems they solve; token institutions are specific solutions to these problems, or equilibria of strategic games. The functionalist approach provides some insights into the limits of reform, or the extent to which institutions – like marriage, property, or democracy – can be modified without turning them into entities of a different kind.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Synthese, 2019
Institutions generate cooperative benefits that explain why they exist and persist. Therefore, th... more Institutions generate cooperative benefits that explain why they exist and persist. Therefore, their etiological function is to promote cooperation. The function of a particular institution, such as money or traffic regulations, is to solve one or more cooperation problems. We go on to argue that the teleological function of institutions is to secure values by means of norms. Values can also be used to redesign an institution and to promote social change. We argue, however, that an adequate theory of institutions should not be ‘moralized’ in that they should not be defined in terms of the values they are supposed to promote.
Philosophical Studies, 2019
Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of t... more Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism.
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2010
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2015
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2015
Our goal is to develop a theory that combines the best insights of philosophical and scientific t... more Our goal is to develop a theory that combines the best insights of philosophical and scientific theories of institutions. We are not committed a priori to save the commonsense notion of institution, or the thesis of human exceptionalism. We think that human cognition is important, but we do not claim that common knowledge or collective intentions are necessary for coordination. Like most of our commentators, we believe that there is continuity between simple rules of precedence and sophisticated institutions like property, marriage, or money. Finally, we argue that a satisfactory account of institutions must be compatible with different theories of normativity, specifying the social and psychological mechanisms that make it possible to override selfish desires.
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2014
We propose a new framework to unify three conceptions of institutions that play a prominent role ... more We propose a new framework to unify three conceptions of institutions that play a prominent role in the philosophical and scientific literature: the equilibria account, the regulative rules account, and the constitutive rules account. We argue that equilibrium-based and rule-based accounts are individually inadequate, but that jointly they provide a satisfactory conception of institutions as rules-in-equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we show that constitutive rules can be derived from regulative rules via the introduction of theoretical terms. We argue that the constitutive rules theory is reducible to the rules-in equilibrium theory, and that it accounts for the way in which we assign names to social institutions.
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014
The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2014
Journal of Political Philosophy, 2008
Philosophical Psychology, 2017
Three papers approach institutions and their relation to social norms from three different angles... more Three papers approach institutions and their relation to social norms from three different angles. In the first paper, I introduce the notion of an institution as a social norm that governs a social practice. In the second paper, I use this account to explain what it means for an institution to be strong or weak. And in the third paper, I discuss why and how equilibrium and rule theories of institutions should be unified. The Rules-and-Equilibrium Theory, as I call it, combines equilibrium theories such as that of David Lewis (1969) and rule theories such as that of Herbert Hart (1961). I compare it to other hybrid theories such as those of Cristina Bicchieri (2006) and Philip Pettit (1993, 2007).
Does the norm against harm extend to probable harms and to collective harms? This has been questi... more Does the norm against harm extend to probable harms and to collective harms? This has been questioned because the harm that someone risks might not materialize, and because a contribution to a collective harm can as such be harmless. Against this, I argue that the norm against harm prohibits an action whenever it is reasonably likely and reasonably clear that the agent can (help) avoid the harm by opting for an alternative course of action. What is reasonable depends on how harmful the outcome is as well as on the burden that not performing the original action imposes on the agent. I go on to compare the causal condition of this ‘prospect account’ to two common alternatives: causal control and causal contribution. Neither of these can accommodate risk in a plausible way. Furthermore, they issue in implausible verdicts when either too few or too many people are disposed to contribute to a collective harm. In contrast, the prospect account limits the risk of contributing to a collective outcome that is not feasible and that of making a contribution that is redundant to morally acceptable levels.
Call for Participation: THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY Freedom, Responsibility and Rights in Collectiv... more Call for Participation:
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY
Freedom, Responsibility and Rights in Collective Contexts
The University of Groningen hosts a manuscript workshop on The Structure of Society: Freedom, Responsibility and Rights in Collective Contexts by Frank Hindriks. This event takes place in Groningen, the Netherlands, on March 8-9, 2018. During this workshop, a number of internationally acclaimed scholars will comment on the penultimate version of the book. PhD students, postdoctoral researchers, and recent assistant professors are hereby invited to apply (< 3 years after receiving a PhD). A limited number of people will be accepted to attend the workshop and actively participate in the discussions. Accommodation and sustenance costs will be covered.
Please send your CV and a brief letter of motivation to Frank Hindriks at f.a.hindriks@rug.nl before February 1, 2018.
Participants by invitation: Gunnar Björnsson, Olle Blomberg, Stephanie Collins, Francesco Guala, Kendy Hess, Arto Laitinen, Abraham Roth, David Schweikard, Kai Spiekermann, Christine Straehle, Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, and Bill Wringe.
Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"
Institutions can be analyzed in terms of constitutive rules that forge intimate connections betwe... more Institutions can be analyzed in terms of constitutive rules that forge intimate connections between facts and norms. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether constitutive rules bridge the gap between is-statements and ought-statements. I use the status account that I have proposed elsewhere to argue that such rules are partly descriptive and partly normative. They support the derivation of objective ought-statements, but only against the background of a normative principle. Hence, they do not as such bridge the is-ought gap.
Many harms require collective solutions. Think, for instance, of rescuing a drowning swimmer by f... more Many harms require collective solutions. Think, for instance, of rescuing a drowning swimmer by forming a human chain. This is a collective harm that can be prevented only if several individuals contribute. It is futile to try and prevent a collective harm on your own. In light of this, I propose that: Whether a collective harm obligates an agent to do something depends on what others (are disposed to) do. To explore this relation further, I consider situations in which (1) too few or (2) too many people are disposed to contribute to harm prevention. In such situations: (1) the outcome is not feasible, or (2) some contributions are redundant. According to most existing proposals, these factors are irrelevant. I argue that a harm obligates an individual to contribute to its prevention only if it is reasonably likely that she can help prevent it. According to the prospect account that I defend here, the risks of infeasibility and redundancy must remain within acceptable limits.