Peter T Dijkstra - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Peter T Dijkstra

Research paper thumbnail of Which Arguments are most Persuasive of the Seriousness of Cartels: An Experimental Study

Journal of Behavioral Public Administration

The effectiveness of competition authorities is partly dependent on the public attitude towards c... more The effectiveness of competition authorities is partly dependent on the public attitude towards cartels. In Dijkstra and Van Stekelenburg (2021), we found that the Dutch public considers cartels to be less serious offenses than comparable economic infringements. If the general public better understands why cartel behavior is bad, it might improve firm compliance and could help in receiving more tip-offs about potential cartels. Competition authorities could attain this by investing in raising the negative attitude of the public towards cartels: we therefore examine which arguments are most persuasive in the Netherlands. The most persuasive arguments are on overpricing, consumer deception, cartel secrecy and conformism. Subsequently, we run an experiment to test which term and line of argumentation are most effective communicating the seriousness of cartels. We find that the term “competition fraud” is more effective in conveying the problematic nature of cartels than the traditional...

Research paper thumbnail of Integrating Norms, Knowledge, and Social Ties into the Deterrence Model of Cartels: A Survey Study of Business Executives

Review of Industrial Organization

We expand the rational choice theory of crime, as applied to cartels, with three psychological fa... more We expand the rational choice theory of crime, as applied to cartels, with three psychological factors—personal norms, social norms and social ties—and knowledge of competition law. Through a survey of Dutch businesses, we find that adding psychological factors substantially increases the explanatory power of the model: All predict attitudes toward future cartel behavior, with personal norms as the strongest (negative) predictor. Better knowledge of competition law relates to stronger deterrence and norms against collusion. We conclude that psychological factors and knowledge of the law are likely necessary to understand and prevent potential cartel behavior.

Research paper thumbnail of Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective

This paper studies the interactions between a cartel leniency program and a settlement procedure.... more This paper studies the interactions between a cartel leniency program and a settlement procedure. The EU settlement procedure gives colluding firms that do not apply for leniency an additional opportunity to cooperate with the competition authority in exchange for a reduced fine once a preliminary case has been established against them. We derive the conditions under which colluding firms apply for leniency, settle, or refuse to cooperate with the authority in equilibrium. Our policy results show that settlements can act as a complement or a substitute to the leniency program. We also study the welfare-optimal policy and highlight a novel interdependence between the fine reductions that should be offered to leniency applicants and settling firms. JEL classification K21 · L31 · L41

Research paper thumbnail of The effects of industry structure and yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study

Research paper thumbnail of Sanctions and Leniency to Individuals, and its Impact on Cartel Discoveries: Evidence from the Netherlands

De Economist, 2018

Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact ... more Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact of the introduction of sanctions and leniency for individuals responsible for the cartel, on the number of cartel discoveries. In our empirical study of the Dutch leniency programme, we find that this did not lead to more cartels being desisted as the number of cartel discoveries decreases over time. An analysis of characteristics of cartel members shows harsher enforcement after the revision, which indicates that the decrease in cartel discoveries is in line with higher cartel deterrence. Nevertheless, the number of cartel cases involving leniency actually decreases after the revision.

Research paper thumbnail of Design of yardstick competition and consumer prices: Experimental evidence

Energy Economics

In this paper we analyze the effect of the design of yardstick competition on consumer prices, by... more In this paper we analyze the effect of the design of yardstick competition on consumer prices, by means of a theoretical analysis as well as an economic experiment. We compare four different designs: the uniform yardstick, the unweighted uniform yardstick, the discriminatory yardstick, and the best-practice yardstick. The effect of a specific design on prices depends on two separate mechanisms, one which affects the incentive power to increase productive efficiency and another which affects the risk of collusion. We show theoretically that for the best-practice yardstick these two mechanisms point in the same direction (high prices), which is confirmed by the experiment. The theoretical analysis also shows that the discriminatory yardstick results in lower prices than the unweighted uniform yardstick, which is also confirmed by the economic experiment. The theory, however, does not give a clear answer on the relative performance of the discriminatory versus the uniform yardstick. In the experimental analysis, we find that the advantage of the discriminatory yardstick in terms of giving incentives to improve productive efficiency exceeds the disadvantage of a relatively higher risk of collusion. This conclusion appears to be robust for different degrees of heterogeneity of the industry. Hence the discriminatory yardstick yields the lowest prices for consumers.

Research paper thumbnail of Expert Judgment versus public opinion - Evidence from the Eurovision Song Contest

Abstract. For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the qua... more Abstract. For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the quality of cultural output, or whether the taste of the public also has merit. This paper tries to answer that question empirically, using national finals of the Eurovision Song Contest. We show that experts are better judges of quality in the sense that the outcome of finals judged by experts is less sensitive to factors unrelated to quality than the outcome of finals judged by public opinion. Yet, experts are not perfect; their judgment does still depend on such factors. This is also the case in the European finals of the contest.

Research paper thumbnail of Expert judgment versus public opinion

Abstract For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the qual... more Abstract For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the quality of cultural output, or whether the taste of the public also has merit. This paper tries to resolve that question empirically, using national finals of the Eurovision Song Contest. We show that experts are better judges of quality: the outcome,of finals judged by experts,is

Research paper thumbnail of Public Attitude in the Netherlands Towards Cartels in Comparison to Other Economic Infringements‡

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2021

We investigate the public attitude towards cartels in the Netherlands in comparison with other ec... more We investigate the public attitude towards cartels in the Netherlands in comparison with other economic infringements. We examine this in a survey on several types of economic infringements. We find that cartels are considered serious offenses in the Netherlands. People generally think that cartels are not allowed, consider them immoral, and have negative consequences for society. However, on average, most other infringements are considered more serious, are less allowed, more immoral, and have more negative consequences for society than cartel behavior. Furthermore, we find that the considered seriousness of an infringement is explained by people’s personal norms, followed by the infringement’s consequences, whether people think the infringement is allowed and to what extent it has direct impact on people. JEL: L41

Research paper thumbnail of Toepassing van gedragsinzichten in het consumentenrecht door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt

Research paper thumbnail of Price leadership and unequal market sharing

The annual research report, 2014

We consider experimental markets of repeated homogeneous price-setting duopolies. We investigate ... more We consider experimental markets of repeated homogeneous price-setting duopolies. We investigate the effect on collusion of sequential versus simultaneous price setting. We also examine the effect on collusion of changes in the size of each subject's market share in case both subjects set the same price. Our results show that sequential price setting compared with simultaneous price setting facilitates collusion, if subjects have equal market shares or if the follower has the larger market share. With sequential price setting, we find more collusion if subjects have equal market shares rather than unequal market shares. We observe more collusion if the follower has the larger market share than if the follower has the smaller market share.

Research paper thumbnail of Introducing Cartel Sanctions to Individuals: the Impact on Cartel Discoveries of the Revised Leniency Guidelines of the Netherlands∗

Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact ... more Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact of the introduction of leniency for individuals responsible for the cartel, on the number of cartel discoveries. In our empirical study of the Dutch leniency programme, we find that this leads to higher deterrence of cartels, but does not result in more cartels being desisted. The number of cartel cases involving leniency actually decreases. JEL Classification Codes: D43, L12, L13, L41.

Research paper thumbnail of Samenspanning bij maatstafconcurrentie

Research paper thumbnail of Collusion, Antitrust Policy and Leniency Programs

Dit proefschrift probeert ons begrip van samenspanning, mededingingsbeleid en clementieprogramma&... more Dit proefschrift probeert ons begrip van samenspanning, mededingingsbeleid en clementieprogramma's te vergroten. Bij samenspanning maken bedrijven afspraken om de concurrentie te beperken, veelal door gezamenlijk hun prijzen te verhogen. In zulke gevallen spreken we van kartelafspraken. Mededingingsbeleid probeert dit gedrag tegen te gaan. Een van de instrumenten is clementieprogramma’s, waarbij een bedrijf dat zijn kartel opbiecht een boetereductie kan krijgen. In werkelijkheid observeren we niet alle kartels. Daarom voeren we economische experimenten uit waarin studenten deelnemen en op basis van hun prestaties betaald krijgen. Door verschillende situaties te vergelijken onderzoeken we de impact van verscheidene aspecten op samenspanning. Ten eerste onderzoeken we of, en zo ja wanneer, prijsleiderschap samenspanning bevordert. We vinden dat er meer samenspanning is onder prijsleiderschap, mits het marktaandeel van de leider ten hoogste 50% is. We vinden ook meer samenspanning wanneer bedrijven gelijke marktaandelen hebben. Ten tweede onderzoeken we in welke mate de marktstructuur van invloed is op de neiging om samen te spannen in een markt met maatstafregulering. In Nederland kan men denken aan de markten voor energiedistributie. Ook hier vinden we dat er meer samenspanning is wanneer bedrijven gelijke marktaandelen hebben. Verder vinden we op markten waarop alle bedrijven een gelijk marktaandeel hebben, meer samenspanning naarmate het aantal bedrijven groter is. Ten derde, we vinden dat het invoeren van een clementieprogramma leidt tot minder kartels en lagere prijzen. Deze effecten verdwijnen echter na verloop van tijd omdat verscheidene spelers afspreken om hun eerdere afspraken stilzwijgend voort te zetten nadat hun kartel is veroordeeld.

Research paper thumbnail of The effect of industry structure and yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition

Research Papers in Economics, 2013

We present an experiment on yardstick competition. Experimental firms set cost levels in each per... more We present an experiment on yardstick competition. Experimental firms set cost levels in each period and can communicate with each other in an attempt to increase the regulated price. We find that when market shares are heterogeneous, collusion is least frequent and prices are lowest. The number of players on a market also infuences prices, but to a lesser extent. Comparing across yardsticks, the discriminatory yardstick yields the lowest prices, while a best-practice yardstick yields the highest prices.

Research paper thumbnail of Gedragseconomische valkuilen bij de energietransitie : Hoe te zorgen voor een gedragsverandering in het kader van verduurzaming en energieverbruik?

Mens en maatschappij

Behavioral-economic pitfalls in the energy transitionThe energy transition requires large investm... more Behavioral-economic pitfalls in the energy transitionThe energy transition requires large investments. The public debate in the Netherlands focuses on the associated costs, and the government uses traditional instruments such as subsidies. From the perspective of behavioral economics this approach has a few drawbacks. The goal of this article is to discuss behavioral-economic pitfalls which are important for two topics regarding the energy transition. First, households need to take measures themselves with regard to the switch to alternative energy sources. Several behavior-economic pitfalls influence households’ decisions. The most important ones are risk aversion, loss aversion, choice overload and motivation crowding out. A number of measures are discussed which the government might employ to facilitate this behavioral change by households. Second, large investments will be needed in the electricity network due to the energy transition. These costs might be mitigated by a behavio...

Research paper thumbnail of Impact Assessment of Competition Policies and Regulation: 10 Years’ Experience from the Office of the Chief Economist in the Netherlands

Research paper thumbnail of Industry structure and collusion with uniform yardstick competition

Research paper thumbnail of The Effect of Industry Structure and Yardstick Design on Strategic Behavior with Yardstick Competition: an Experimental Study

Research paper thumbnail of Expert Judgment Versus Public Opinion

Evidence from the Eurovision Song Contest, …, 2003

Research paper thumbnail of Which Arguments are most Persuasive of the Seriousness of Cartels: An Experimental Study

Journal of Behavioral Public Administration

The effectiveness of competition authorities is partly dependent on the public attitude towards c... more The effectiveness of competition authorities is partly dependent on the public attitude towards cartels. In Dijkstra and Van Stekelenburg (2021), we found that the Dutch public considers cartels to be less serious offenses than comparable economic infringements. If the general public better understands why cartel behavior is bad, it might improve firm compliance and could help in receiving more tip-offs about potential cartels. Competition authorities could attain this by investing in raising the negative attitude of the public towards cartels: we therefore examine which arguments are most persuasive in the Netherlands. The most persuasive arguments are on overpricing, consumer deception, cartel secrecy and conformism. Subsequently, we run an experiment to test which term and line of argumentation are most effective communicating the seriousness of cartels. We find that the term “competition fraud” is more effective in conveying the problematic nature of cartels than the traditional...

Research paper thumbnail of Integrating Norms, Knowledge, and Social Ties into the Deterrence Model of Cartels: A Survey Study of Business Executives

Review of Industrial Organization

We expand the rational choice theory of crime, as applied to cartels, with three psychological fa... more We expand the rational choice theory of crime, as applied to cartels, with three psychological factors—personal norms, social norms and social ties—and knowledge of competition law. Through a survey of Dutch businesses, we find that adding psychological factors substantially increases the explanatory power of the model: All predict attitudes toward future cartel behavior, with personal norms as the strongest (negative) predictor. Better knowledge of competition law relates to stronger deterrence and norms against collusion. We conclude that psychological factors and knowledge of the law are likely necessary to understand and prevent potential cartel behavior.

Research paper thumbnail of Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective

This paper studies the interactions between a cartel leniency program and a settlement procedure.... more This paper studies the interactions between a cartel leniency program and a settlement procedure. The EU settlement procedure gives colluding firms that do not apply for leniency an additional opportunity to cooperate with the competition authority in exchange for a reduced fine once a preliminary case has been established against them. We derive the conditions under which colluding firms apply for leniency, settle, or refuse to cooperate with the authority in equilibrium. Our policy results show that settlements can act as a complement or a substitute to the leniency program. We also study the welfare-optimal policy and highlight a novel interdependence between the fine reductions that should be offered to leniency applicants and settling firms. JEL classification K21 · L31 · L41

Research paper thumbnail of The effects of industry structure and yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study

Research paper thumbnail of Sanctions and Leniency to Individuals, and its Impact on Cartel Discoveries: Evidence from the Netherlands

De Economist, 2018

Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact ... more Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact of the introduction of sanctions and leniency for individuals responsible for the cartel, on the number of cartel discoveries. In our empirical study of the Dutch leniency programme, we find that this did not lead to more cartels being desisted as the number of cartel discoveries decreases over time. An analysis of characteristics of cartel members shows harsher enforcement after the revision, which indicates that the decrease in cartel discoveries is in line with higher cartel deterrence. Nevertheless, the number of cartel cases involving leniency actually decreases after the revision.

Research paper thumbnail of Design of yardstick competition and consumer prices: Experimental evidence

Energy Economics

In this paper we analyze the effect of the design of yardstick competition on consumer prices, by... more In this paper we analyze the effect of the design of yardstick competition on consumer prices, by means of a theoretical analysis as well as an economic experiment. We compare four different designs: the uniform yardstick, the unweighted uniform yardstick, the discriminatory yardstick, and the best-practice yardstick. The effect of a specific design on prices depends on two separate mechanisms, one which affects the incentive power to increase productive efficiency and another which affects the risk of collusion. We show theoretically that for the best-practice yardstick these two mechanisms point in the same direction (high prices), which is confirmed by the experiment. The theoretical analysis also shows that the discriminatory yardstick results in lower prices than the unweighted uniform yardstick, which is also confirmed by the economic experiment. The theory, however, does not give a clear answer on the relative performance of the discriminatory versus the uniform yardstick. In the experimental analysis, we find that the advantage of the discriminatory yardstick in terms of giving incentives to improve productive efficiency exceeds the disadvantage of a relatively higher risk of collusion. This conclusion appears to be robust for different degrees of heterogeneity of the industry. Hence the discriminatory yardstick yields the lowest prices for consumers.

Research paper thumbnail of Expert Judgment versus public opinion - Evidence from the Eurovision Song Contest

Abstract. For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the qua... more Abstract. For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the quality of cultural output, or whether the taste of the public also has merit. This paper tries to answer that question empirically, using national finals of the Eurovision Song Contest. We show that experts are better judges of quality in the sense that the outcome of finals judged by experts is less sensitive to factors unrelated to quality than the outcome of finals judged by public opinion. Yet, experts are not perfect; their judgment does still depend on such factors. This is also the case in the European finals of the contest.

Research paper thumbnail of Expert judgment versus public opinion

Abstract For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the qual... more Abstract For centuries, there have been discussions as to whether only experts can judge the quality of cultural output, or whether the taste of the public also has merit. This paper tries to resolve that question empirically, using national finals of the Eurovision Song Contest. We show that experts are better judges of quality: the outcome,of finals judged by experts,is

Research paper thumbnail of Public Attitude in the Netherlands Towards Cartels in Comparison to Other Economic Infringements‡

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2021

We investigate the public attitude towards cartels in the Netherlands in comparison with other ec... more We investigate the public attitude towards cartels in the Netherlands in comparison with other economic infringements. We examine this in a survey on several types of economic infringements. We find that cartels are considered serious offenses in the Netherlands. People generally think that cartels are not allowed, consider them immoral, and have negative consequences for society. However, on average, most other infringements are considered more serious, are less allowed, more immoral, and have more negative consequences for society than cartel behavior. Furthermore, we find that the considered seriousness of an infringement is explained by people’s personal norms, followed by the infringement’s consequences, whether people think the infringement is allowed and to what extent it has direct impact on people. JEL: L41

Research paper thumbnail of Toepassing van gedragsinzichten in het consumentenrecht door de Autoriteit Consument en Markt

Research paper thumbnail of Price leadership and unequal market sharing

The annual research report, 2014

We consider experimental markets of repeated homogeneous price-setting duopolies. We investigate ... more We consider experimental markets of repeated homogeneous price-setting duopolies. We investigate the effect on collusion of sequential versus simultaneous price setting. We also examine the effect on collusion of changes in the size of each subject's market share in case both subjects set the same price. Our results show that sequential price setting compared with simultaneous price setting facilitates collusion, if subjects have equal market shares or if the follower has the larger market share. With sequential price setting, we find more collusion if subjects have equal market shares rather than unequal market shares. We observe more collusion if the follower has the larger market share than if the follower has the smaller market share.

Research paper thumbnail of Introducing Cartel Sanctions to Individuals: the Impact on Cartel Discoveries of the Revised Leniency Guidelines of the Netherlands∗

Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact ... more Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact of the introduction of leniency for individuals responsible for the cartel, on the number of cartel discoveries. In our empirical study of the Dutch leniency programme, we find that this leads to higher deterrence of cartels, but does not result in more cartels being desisted. The number of cartel cases involving leniency actually decreases. JEL Classification Codes: D43, L12, L13, L41.

Research paper thumbnail of Samenspanning bij maatstafconcurrentie

Research paper thumbnail of Collusion, Antitrust Policy and Leniency Programs

Dit proefschrift probeert ons begrip van samenspanning, mededingingsbeleid en clementieprogramma&... more Dit proefschrift probeert ons begrip van samenspanning, mededingingsbeleid en clementieprogramma's te vergroten. Bij samenspanning maken bedrijven afspraken om de concurrentie te beperken, veelal door gezamenlijk hun prijzen te verhogen. In zulke gevallen spreken we van kartelafspraken. Mededingingsbeleid probeert dit gedrag tegen te gaan. Een van de instrumenten is clementieprogramma’s, waarbij een bedrijf dat zijn kartel opbiecht een boetereductie kan krijgen. In werkelijkheid observeren we niet alle kartels. Daarom voeren we economische experimenten uit waarin studenten deelnemen en op basis van hun prestaties betaald krijgen. Door verschillende situaties te vergelijken onderzoeken we de impact van verscheidene aspecten op samenspanning. Ten eerste onderzoeken we of, en zo ja wanneer, prijsleiderschap samenspanning bevordert. We vinden dat er meer samenspanning is onder prijsleiderschap, mits het marktaandeel van de leider ten hoogste 50% is. We vinden ook meer samenspanning wanneer bedrijven gelijke marktaandelen hebben. Ten tweede onderzoeken we in welke mate de marktstructuur van invloed is op de neiging om samen te spannen in een markt met maatstafregulering. In Nederland kan men denken aan de markten voor energiedistributie. Ook hier vinden we dat er meer samenspanning is wanneer bedrijven gelijke marktaandelen hebben. Verder vinden we op markten waarop alle bedrijven een gelijk marktaandeel hebben, meer samenspanning naarmate het aantal bedrijven groter is. Ten derde, we vinden dat het invoeren van een clementieprogramma leidt tot minder kartels en lagere prijzen. Deze effecten verdwijnen echter na verloop van tijd omdat verscheidene spelers afspreken om hun eerdere afspraken stilzwijgend voort te zetten nadat hun kartel is veroordeeld.

Research paper thumbnail of The effect of industry structure and yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition

Research Papers in Economics, 2013

We present an experiment on yardstick competition. Experimental firms set cost levels in each per... more We present an experiment on yardstick competition. Experimental firms set cost levels in each period and can communicate with each other in an attempt to increase the regulated price. We find that when market shares are heterogeneous, collusion is least frequent and prices are lowest. The number of players on a market also infuences prices, but to a lesser extent. Comparing across yardsticks, the discriminatory yardstick yields the lowest prices, while a best-practice yardstick yields the highest prices.

Research paper thumbnail of Gedragseconomische valkuilen bij de energietransitie : Hoe te zorgen voor een gedragsverandering in het kader van verduurzaming en energieverbruik?

Mens en maatschappij

Behavioral-economic pitfalls in the energy transitionThe energy transition requires large investm... more Behavioral-economic pitfalls in the energy transitionThe energy transition requires large investments. The public debate in the Netherlands focuses on the associated costs, and the government uses traditional instruments such as subsidies. From the perspective of behavioral economics this approach has a few drawbacks. The goal of this article is to discuss behavioral-economic pitfalls which are important for two topics regarding the energy transition. First, households need to take measures themselves with regard to the switch to alternative energy sources. Several behavior-economic pitfalls influence households’ decisions. The most important ones are risk aversion, loss aversion, choice overload and motivation crowding out. A number of measures are discussed which the government might employ to facilitate this behavioral change by households. Second, large investments will be needed in the electricity network due to the energy transition. These costs might be mitigated by a behavio...

Research paper thumbnail of Impact Assessment of Competition Policies and Regulation: 10 Years’ Experience from the Office of the Chief Economist in the Netherlands

Research paper thumbnail of Industry structure and collusion with uniform yardstick competition

Research paper thumbnail of The Effect of Industry Structure and Yardstick Design on Strategic Behavior with Yardstick Competition: an Experimental Study

Research paper thumbnail of Expert Judgment Versus Public Opinion

Evidence from the Eurovision Song Contest, …, 2003