Markus Gastinger | University of Salzburg (original) (raw)
Papers by Markus Gastinger
The UK's decision to leave the European Union raised the prospect that other member states co... more The UK's decision to leave the European Union raised the prospect that other member states could follow suit. But are any other states likely to give up their membership? Markus Gastinger (University of Salzburg) presents an 'exit index' that captures how likely EU members are to leave, and finds it unlikely.
Ever since the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union in June 2016, one question has ... more Ever since the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union in June 2016, one question has been on the minds of many Europeans: which other member states could leave the EU in the years ahead? In fact, one argument among Brexiteers in the run-up to the referendum was that the UK needs to break free from the EU as a ’failing political project’, a mantra repeated by Leave supporters to this day. But how likely is it that the EU will fail?
Zusammenfassung Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung fur eine vollstandige Offnun... more Zusammenfassung Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung fur eine vollstandige Offnung des Arbeitsmarktes fur Burger der acht neuen Mitgliedstaaten aus Mittel- und Osteuropa. Seither wurde das britische Beispiel von den restlichen „alten“ Mitgliedsstaaten bemuht, wenn sie eine Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse einer Offnung ihrer nationalen Arbeitsmarkte erstellten. Schlagworter: EU, Grosbritannien, Arbeitsmarkt, Freizugigkeit
The Principal Agent Model and the European Union
This chapter argues that conceiving the Commission as a unitary actor is a legitimate simplificat... more This chapter argues that conceiving the Commission as a unitary actor is a legitimate simplification of empirical reality for most research purposes. Recently, the principal–agent literature has started examining collective-actor features of agents and suggested that internal conflict is as disadvantageous to agents as it is to principals. By contrast, I argue that intra-agent conflict occurs less frequently and with a lower intensity than is typically the case for collective principals. The Commission-as-agent can overcome conflict quickly due to its hierarchical setup and less stringent decision-making procedures. It may even harness conflict through inter-service consultations to draft better initial proposals. On the political level, open conflict among Commissioners can earn it the reputation of credibly defending controversial sectoral interests in the eyes of affected stakeholders. I develop my argument by focusing on five bilateral trade agreements negotiated from 1970–2007. Generalizing it beyond the case of EU trade policy-making, I focus on empirical, theoretical and methodological reasons justifying many scholars’ choice to model agents such as the Commission as unitary actors.
European Union Politics
In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association co... more In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association councils’ or ‘joint committees’. These institutions bring together European Union and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we hypothesise that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in these institutions. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 such joint bodies set up by the European Union since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations except for the agency loss thesis. Our findings suggest that the European Commission is the primary actor in the implementation of many of the European Union's international agreements, allowing it to influence EU external relations beyond what is currently acknowledged in the li...
In late January, President Trump stated that he would be pushing for new “one-on-one” trade deals... more In late January, President Trump stated that he would be pushing for new “one-on-one” trade deals with specific countries to replace multilateral agreements; exploiting US economic clout to negotiate deals which benefit the US the most. Markus Gastinger has created an index of trade and economic power in order to determine which countries Trump might try to target. He finds that countries and blocs with which the US has a large trade deficit, such as China and the European Union are too powerful to make good targets. On the other hand, less powerful countries, such as Vietnam and Japan could simply refuse to negotiate. Either way, Trump’s trade policy may well end up being a continuation of the status quo.
European Union Politics
Which member states could leave the European Union in the years ahead? To answer this question, I... more Which member states could leave the European Union in the years ahead? To answer this question, I develop the ‘EU Exit Index’ measuring the exit propensities of all European Union member states. The index highlights that the United Kingdom was an outlier and uniquely positioned to leave the European Union. While all other states are far behind the United Kingdom, the index still reveals substantial variation among them. Moreover, the index allows monitoring the development of exit propensities over time. It shows that the European Union is in better shape today than before the Brexit referendum and that, currently, no further exits are on the horizon. Still, this could change in the future and the EU Exit Index provides systematic and reproducible measurements to track this development.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Gwp Gesellschaft Wirtschaft Politik, Jan 12, 2008
European Union Politics, 2021
In many international agreements, the European Union (EU) sets up joint bodies (JBs) such as "ass... more In many international agreements, the European Union (EU) sets up joint bodies (JBs) such as "association councils" or "joint committees." These JBs bring together EU and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about the degree of discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal-agent framework, we hypothesize that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in JBs. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 JBs set up by the EU since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations but agency losses. In the conclusion, we set out avenues for future research of what we consider the most glaringly overlooked aspect of EU external relations today.
European Political Science, 2016
Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen, 2012
We argue that one prime source of Commission autonomy in bilateral trade negotiations was the inf... more We argue that one prime source of Commission autonomy in bilateral trade negotiations was the informational advantage that it acquired during the pre-negotiations, which is the phase preceding the adoption of negotiating directives by the Council. Initially, the Commission was entirely unmonitored owing to the lack of Treaty provisions applying to this stage in the negotiations. The Commission used this information asymmetry strategically vis-à-vis the Council to move outcomes closer to its ideal point. Later, member states have stepped up police-patrol monitoring manifesting itself empirically through two different channels. First, they have shifted the institutional arena for more political aspects to annual ministerial meetings. Second, preparatory works on a technical level are today followed by national experts. We examine this argument by adopting a principal–agent perspective and against the backdrop of EU–India relations.
Which issues does the Commission focus on in the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements? How (... more Which issues does the Commission focus on in the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements? How (to what extent) autonomous is the Commission, which sources and causal mechanisms bring this autonomy to bear, and have these sources changed over time? Which is the most effective mechanism of control available to member states in the Council to rein in the Commission? These are the three interrelated questions ad-dressed by this study. Concerning the first question, I find that the Commission focuses on integration issues. These are primarily found in the joint bodies established by the underlying agreements as well as the number of substantive issues mentioned therein. On question number two, I find that the Commission distinctly shapes BTAs slightly over 50 percent of the time. The primary source of Commission autonomy in the 1970s and 1980s was asymmetric information, i.e. the Commission having greater knowledge about all contingencies in the negotiations than the member states. More recently, Commission autonomy is better captured by its agenda-setting power, here defined as its ability to put before the Council an agreement that member states can vote only either up-or-down. With regard to question three I find that, initially, member states’ credible threat of non-ratification provided the most effective backstop to the Commission running lose. Over time, member states have stepped up monitoring mechanisms to take control of negotiations earlier, making direct oversight the most important tool for Council control. I examine and expound this argument by adopting a Principal-Agent (PA) perspective and process-tracing methodology against the backdrop of six in-depth case studies selected in accordance with objective and replicable criteria, of which five are retained for the final analysis. In conclusion, I join the camp of scholars making the case for a significant independent causal influence of the Commission on European public policy outcomes.
Am 12. Juni 2008 sprachen sich im bislang einzigen Referendum zum Vertrag von Lissabon in Irland ... more Am 12. Juni 2008 sprachen sich im bislang einzigen Referendum zum Vertrag von Lissabon in Irland 46,6 Prozent für und 53,4 Prozent gegen die Ratifikation aus. Da die Umfrageforschung reichhaltiges, aber auch widersprüchliches Material zur Analyse der Beweggründe für das Nein liefert, stützt sich diese Studie auf ein eigenständig erhobenes Datenset auf der Grundlage der im Internet umfassend dokumentierten Quellen der Referendumskampagnen. Schließlich ist zu erwarten, dass sich vor allem die Nein-Kampagnen bei einem möglichen neuerlichen Anlauf einer irischen Ratifikation des Reformvertrages auf dem Wege eines Referendums wiederholt engagieren werden und gegen den Vertrag beziehungsweise seine Zusätze und Änderungen ähnliche Argumente ins Feld führen werden.
Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung mit ihren schwedischen und irischen Pendants... more Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung mit ihren schwedischen und irischen Pendants für eine vollständige Öffnung des Arbeitsmarktes für Bürger der acht neuen Mit
gliedstaaten aus Mittel- und Osteuropa. Seither wurde vor allem das britische Beispiel von den restlichen „alten“ Mitgliedsstaaten bemüht, als es darum ging, eine Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse einer Öffnung ihrer nationalen Arbeitsmärkte zu erstellen. Derartige Analysen basieren jedoch nicht nur auf einem unscharfen Bild der britischen Erfahrung, sondern sind aus heutiger Sicht zu eng gefasst: 2009 können die Mitgliedsstaaten, die ihre Arbeitsmärkte noch nicht vollständig gegenüber den EU8 geöffnet haben, eine letztmalige Verlängerung bis 2011 laut Vertragstext nicht mehr auf Basis einer simplen Kosten-Nutzen-Abwägung beschließen,
sondern nur bei einer „schwerwiegenden Störung“ auf dem nationalen Arbeitsmarkt. Und mit Blick darauf, dass der Arbeitsmarkt im Jahre 2011 unwiderruflich vollständig geöffnet wird, muss die Frage jetzt schon lauten, nicht ob sondern wie sich die restlichen Mitgliedstaaten auf die Öffnung ihrer Arbeitsmärkte bis zu diesem Datum vorbereiten können. In dieser Hinsicht können sie von den britischen Erfahrungen lernen.
The UK's decision to leave the European Union raised the prospect that other member states co... more The UK's decision to leave the European Union raised the prospect that other member states could follow suit. But are any other states likely to give up their membership? Markus Gastinger (University of Salzburg) presents an 'exit index' that captures how likely EU members are to leave, and finds it unlikely.
Ever since the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union in June 2016, one question has ... more Ever since the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union in June 2016, one question has been on the minds of many Europeans: which other member states could leave the EU in the years ahead? In fact, one argument among Brexiteers in the run-up to the referendum was that the UK needs to break free from the EU as a ’failing political project’, a mantra repeated by Leave supporters to this day. But how likely is it that the EU will fail?
Zusammenfassung Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung fur eine vollstandige Offnun... more Zusammenfassung Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung fur eine vollstandige Offnung des Arbeitsmarktes fur Burger der acht neuen Mitgliedstaaten aus Mittel- und Osteuropa. Seither wurde das britische Beispiel von den restlichen „alten“ Mitgliedsstaaten bemuht, wenn sie eine Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse einer Offnung ihrer nationalen Arbeitsmarkte erstellten. Schlagworter: EU, Grosbritannien, Arbeitsmarkt, Freizugigkeit
The Principal Agent Model and the European Union
This chapter argues that conceiving the Commission as a unitary actor is a legitimate simplificat... more This chapter argues that conceiving the Commission as a unitary actor is a legitimate simplification of empirical reality for most research purposes. Recently, the principal–agent literature has started examining collective-actor features of agents and suggested that internal conflict is as disadvantageous to agents as it is to principals. By contrast, I argue that intra-agent conflict occurs less frequently and with a lower intensity than is typically the case for collective principals. The Commission-as-agent can overcome conflict quickly due to its hierarchical setup and less stringent decision-making procedures. It may even harness conflict through inter-service consultations to draft better initial proposals. On the political level, open conflict among Commissioners can earn it the reputation of credibly defending controversial sectoral interests in the eyes of affected stakeholders. I develop my argument by focusing on five bilateral trade agreements negotiated from 1970–2007. Generalizing it beyond the case of EU trade policy-making, I focus on empirical, theoretical and methodological reasons justifying many scholars’ choice to model agents such as the Commission as unitary actors.
European Union Politics
In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association co... more In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association councils’ or ‘joint committees’. These institutions bring together European Union and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we hypothesise that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in these institutions. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 such joint bodies set up by the European Union since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations except for the agency loss thesis. Our findings suggest that the European Commission is the primary actor in the implementation of many of the European Union's international agreements, allowing it to influence EU external relations beyond what is currently acknowledged in the li...
In late January, President Trump stated that he would be pushing for new “one-on-one” trade deals... more In late January, President Trump stated that he would be pushing for new “one-on-one” trade deals with specific countries to replace multilateral agreements; exploiting US economic clout to negotiate deals which benefit the US the most. Markus Gastinger has created an index of trade and economic power in order to determine which countries Trump might try to target. He finds that countries and blocs with which the US has a large trade deficit, such as China and the European Union are too powerful to make good targets. On the other hand, less powerful countries, such as Vietnam and Japan could simply refuse to negotiate. Either way, Trump’s trade policy may well end up being a continuation of the status quo.
European Union Politics
Which member states could leave the European Union in the years ahead? To answer this question, I... more Which member states could leave the European Union in the years ahead? To answer this question, I develop the ‘EU Exit Index’ measuring the exit propensities of all European Union member states. The index highlights that the United Kingdom was an outlier and uniquely positioned to leave the European Union. While all other states are far behind the United Kingdom, the index still reveals substantial variation among them. Moreover, the index allows monitoring the development of exit propensities over time. It shows that the European Union is in better shape today than before the Brexit referendum and that, currently, no further exits are on the horizon. Still, this could change in the future and the EU Exit Index provides systematic and reproducible measurements to track this development.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Gwp Gesellschaft Wirtschaft Politik, Jan 12, 2008
European Union Politics, 2021
In many international agreements, the European Union (EU) sets up joint bodies (JBs) such as "ass... more In many international agreements, the European Union (EU) sets up joint bodies (JBs) such as "association councils" or "joint committees." These JBs bring together EU and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about the degree of discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal-agent framework, we hypothesize that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in JBs. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 JBs set up by the EU since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations but agency losses. In the conclusion, we set out avenues for future research of what we consider the most glaringly overlooked aspect of EU external relations today.
European Political Science, 2016
Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen, 2012
We argue that one prime source of Commission autonomy in bilateral trade negotiations was the inf... more We argue that one prime source of Commission autonomy in bilateral trade negotiations was the informational advantage that it acquired during the pre-negotiations, which is the phase preceding the adoption of negotiating directives by the Council. Initially, the Commission was entirely unmonitored owing to the lack of Treaty provisions applying to this stage in the negotiations. The Commission used this information asymmetry strategically vis-à-vis the Council to move outcomes closer to its ideal point. Later, member states have stepped up police-patrol monitoring manifesting itself empirically through two different channels. First, they have shifted the institutional arena for more political aspects to annual ministerial meetings. Second, preparatory works on a technical level are today followed by national experts. We examine this argument by adopting a principal–agent perspective and against the backdrop of EU–India relations.
Which issues does the Commission focus on in the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements? How (... more Which issues does the Commission focus on in the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements? How (to what extent) autonomous is the Commission, which sources and causal mechanisms bring this autonomy to bear, and have these sources changed over time? Which is the most effective mechanism of control available to member states in the Council to rein in the Commission? These are the three interrelated questions ad-dressed by this study. Concerning the first question, I find that the Commission focuses on integration issues. These are primarily found in the joint bodies established by the underlying agreements as well as the number of substantive issues mentioned therein. On question number two, I find that the Commission distinctly shapes BTAs slightly over 50 percent of the time. The primary source of Commission autonomy in the 1970s and 1980s was asymmetric information, i.e. the Commission having greater knowledge about all contingencies in the negotiations than the member states. More recently, Commission autonomy is better captured by its agenda-setting power, here defined as its ability to put before the Council an agreement that member states can vote only either up-or-down. With regard to question three I find that, initially, member states’ credible threat of non-ratification provided the most effective backstop to the Commission running lose. Over time, member states have stepped up monitoring mechanisms to take control of negotiations earlier, making direct oversight the most important tool for Council control. I examine and expound this argument by adopting a Principal-Agent (PA) perspective and process-tracing methodology against the backdrop of six in-depth case studies selected in accordance with objective and replicable criteria, of which five are retained for the final analysis. In conclusion, I join the camp of scholars making the case for a significant independent causal influence of the Commission on European public policy outcomes.
Am 12. Juni 2008 sprachen sich im bislang einzigen Referendum zum Vertrag von Lissabon in Irland ... more Am 12. Juni 2008 sprachen sich im bislang einzigen Referendum zum Vertrag von Lissabon in Irland 46,6 Prozent für und 53,4 Prozent gegen die Ratifikation aus. Da die Umfrageforschung reichhaltiges, aber auch widersprüchliches Material zur Analyse der Beweggründe für das Nein liefert, stützt sich diese Studie auf ein eigenständig erhobenes Datenset auf der Grundlage der im Internet umfassend dokumentierten Quellen der Referendumskampagnen. Schließlich ist zu erwarten, dass sich vor allem die Nein-Kampagnen bei einem möglichen neuerlichen Anlauf einer irischen Ratifikation des Reformvertrages auf dem Wege eines Referendums wiederholt engagieren werden und gegen den Vertrag beziehungsweise seine Zusätze und Änderungen ähnliche Argumente ins Feld führen werden.
Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung mit ihren schwedischen und irischen Pendants... more Im Jahre 2004 entschied sich die britische Regierung mit ihren schwedischen und irischen Pendants für eine vollständige Öffnung des Arbeitsmarktes für Bürger der acht neuen Mit
gliedstaaten aus Mittel- und Osteuropa. Seither wurde vor allem das britische Beispiel von den restlichen „alten“ Mitgliedsstaaten bemüht, als es darum ging, eine Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse einer Öffnung ihrer nationalen Arbeitsmärkte zu erstellen. Derartige Analysen basieren jedoch nicht nur auf einem unscharfen Bild der britischen Erfahrung, sondern sind aus heutiger Sicht zu eng gefasst: 2009 können die Mitgliedsstaaten, die ihre Arbeitsmärkte noch nicht vollständig gegenüber den EU8 geöffnet haben, eine letztmalige Verlängerung bis 2011 laut Vertragstext nicht mehr auf Basis einer simplen Kosten-Nutzen-Abwägung beschließen,
sondern nur bei einer „schwerwiegenden Störung“ auf dem nationalen Arbeitsmarkt. Und mit Blick darauf, dass der Arbeitsmarkt im Jahre 2011 unwiderruflich vollständig geöffnet wird, muss die Frage jetzt schon lauten, nicht ob sondern wie sich die restlichen Mitgliedstaaten auf die Öffnung ihrer Arbeitsmärkte bis zu diesem Datum vorbereiten können. In dieser Hinsicht können sie von den britischen Erfahrungen lernen.