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Papers by Christopher Hauser

Metaphysics, 2024

Many scholars have claimed that a well-known, allegedly 'Rylean' passage in DA I.4 shows that Ari... more Many scholars have claimed that a well-known, allegedly 'Rylean' passage in DA I.4 shows that Aristotle does not think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. However, other scholars have argued against this and invoked other texts to support their rival claim that Aristotle does think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. This article articulates and defends an original interpretation of Aristotle's position vis-à-vis this issue. In particular, this article argues that Aristotle thinks the souls of living corporeal substances are 'things that underlie' (i.e., ὑποκείμενα for) various non-substantial features of the substances to which they belong, including whatever mental capacities those substances have. However, this does not entail that he thinks souls literally have the features they underlie, as if they themselves were alive and could engage in the kinds of mental activities (seeing, hearing, desiring, thinking, reasoning, etc.) that animals and humans can. In fact, there is good reason to think Aristotle does not think souls literally engage in such activities, despite his sometimes writing in a loose manner that suggests they do.

National Taiwan University Philosophical Review, 2022

This article develops an argument in defense of the claim that Aquinas holds that there are some ... more This article develops an argument in defense of the claim that Aquinas holds that there are some kinds of activities which can be performed only by persons. In particular, it is argued that Aquinas holds that only persons can engage in the activities proper to a rational nature, e.g., the activities of intellect and will. Next, the article turns to discuss two implications of this thesis concerning Aquinas’s concept of a person. First, the thesis can be used to resolve a prominent scholarly debate concerning Aquinas’s views on the possibility of human persons surviving their bodily deaths. Second, it also points to a problem with a leading interpretation of Aquinas’ account of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Finally, the article concludes by discussing how a correct interpretation of Aquinas’s views on these matters is related to a broader scholarly debate concerning the history of the Western concept of a person.

Faith and Philosophy, 2020

According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper ... more According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.

In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle articulates a theory of 'science' (epistēmē) accord... more In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle articulates a theory of 'science' (epistēmē) according to which each science is organized around certain indemonstrable principles (archai) concerning the kinds studied by that science. The most prominent of the three types of principles discussed by Aristotle are definitions (horismoi). In this dissertation, I clarify Aristotle's account of how we can come to know what the definition of a kind is. I examine three existing interpretations of Aristotle's views on this issue, namely, the Intuitionist Interpretation (defended by Frede, Irwin, and Ross), the Explanationist Interpretation (defended by Bolton, Charles, and Lennox), and the Socratic Interpretation (defended by Bronstein). I argue that the Explanationist Interpretation is superior to its competitors. In doing so, I provide new arguments against the Intuitionist Interpretation and a serious challenge to the Socratic Interpretation, addressing in particular the as of yet u...

Faith and Philosophy, 2022

The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for on... more The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for one individual to have both the attributes of God and the attributes of a human being. This article examines Thomas Aquinas' answer to this objection. I challenge the dominant, mereological interpretation of Aquinas' position and, in light of this challenge, develop and defend a new alternative interpretation of Aquinas' response to this important objection to Christian doctrine.

Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature, 2021

Thomistic Hylomorphists claim that we human persons have rational or intellective souls which can... more Thomistic Hylomorphists claim that we human persons have rational or intellective souls which can continue to exist separately from our bodies after we die. Much of the recent scholarly discussion of Thomistic Hylomorphism has centered on this thesis and the question of whether human persons can survive death along with their souls or whether only their souls can survive in this separated, disembodied, post-mortem state. As a result, two rival versions of Thomistic Hyomorphism have been formulated: Survivalism and Corruptionism. This chapter makes a new contribution to the debate between Survivalists and Corruptionists by identifying a heretofore undiscussed problem for Corruptionist Thomistic Hylomorphism. In particular, it is argued that if Corruptionists were right that human persons cannot survive their deaths along with their souls, this would undermine the grounds on which all Thomistic Hylomorphists, including Corruptionists, rely to justify their belief that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths. Given this, it is argued that Thomistic Hylomorphists have grounds for thinking that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths only if they allow, as Survivalists do and Corruptionists do not, that we human persons can continue to exist after our deaths, with souls but no bodies.

Metaphysics, 2019

Link to Paper: https://metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/10.5334/met.24/ Essentialists claim tha... more Link to Paper: https://metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/10.5334/met.24/

Essentialists claim that at least some individuals or kinds have essences. This raises an important but little-discussed question: how do we come to know what the essence of something is? This paper examines Aristotle's answer to this question. One influential interpretation (viz., the Explanationist Interpretation) is carefully expounded, criticized, and then refined. Particular attention is given to what Aristotle says about this issue in DA I.1, APo II.2, and APo II.8. It is argued that the epistemological claim put forward in DA I.1 differs from that put forward in APo II.2 and II.8, contrary to what has been claimed by Explanationists, and that each of these distinct epistemological claims rests on a distinct non-epistemological thesis about essence. Consequently, an 'Enriched Explanationist Interpretation' is developed which takes into account both of the aforementioned elements in Aristotle's epistemology of essence. The paper concludes by highlighting an insight the preceding exegetical discussion offers to contemporary essentialists seeking to explain how we come to know what something's essence is.

KEYWORDS: essence; epistemology of essence; non-modal essentialism; Aristotle; Posterior Analytics

Faith and Philosophy, 2020

Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol37/iss1/1 According to the ... more Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol37/iss1/1

According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.

Book Reviews by Christopher Hauser

Religious Studies Review, 2022

Metaphysics, 2024

Many scholars have claimed that a well-known, allegedly 'Rylean' passage in DA I.4 shows that Ari... more Many scholars have claimed that a well-known, allegedly 'Rylean' passage in DA I.4 shows that Aristotle does not think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. However, other scholars have argued against this and invoked other texts to support their rival claim that Aristotle does think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. This article articulates and defends an original interpretation of Aristotle's position vis-à-vis this issue. In particular, this article argues that Aristotle thinks the souls of living corporeal substances are 'things that underlie' (i.e., ὑποκείμενα for) various non-substantial features of the substances to which they belong, including whatever mental capacities those substances have. However, this does not entail that he thinks souls literally have the features they underlie, as if they themselves were alive and could engage in the kinds of mental activities (seeing, hearing, desiring, thinking, reasoning, etc.) that animals and humans can. In fact, there is good reason to think Aristotle does not think souls literally engage in such activities, despite his sometimes writing in a loose manner that suggests they do.

National Taiwan University Philosophical Review, 2022

This article develops an argument in defense of the claim that Aquinas holds that there are some ... more This article develops an argument in defense of the claim that Aquinas holds that there are some kinds of activities which can be performed only by persons. In particular, it is argued that Aquinas holds that only persons can engage in the activities proper to a rational nature, e.g., the activities of intellect and will. Next, the article turns to discuss two implications of this thesis concerning Aquinas’s concept of a person. First, the thesis can be used to resolve a prominent scholarly debate concerning Aquinas’s views on the possibility of human persons surviving their bodily deaths. Second, it also points to a problem with a leading interpretation of Aquinas’ account of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Finally, the article concludes by discussing how a correct interpretation of Aquinas’s views on these matters is related to a broader scholarly debate concerning the history of the Western concept of a person.

Faith and Philosophy, 2020

According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper ... more According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.

In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle articulates a theory of 'science' (epistēmē) accord... more In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle articulates a theory of 'science' (epistēmē) according to which each science is organized around certain indemonstrable principles (archai) concerning the kinds studied by that science. The most prominent of the three types of principles discussed by Aristotle are definitions (horismoi). In this dissertation, I clarify Aristotle's account of how we can come to know what the definition of a kind is. I examine three existing interpretations of Aristotle's views on this issue, namely, the Intuitionist Interpretation (defended by Frede, Irwin, and Ross), the Explanationist Interpretation (defended by Bolton, Charles, and Lennox), and the Socratic Interpretation (defended by Bronstein). I argue that the Explanationist Interpretation is superior to its competitors. In doing so, I provide new arguments against the Intuitionist Interpretation and a serious challenge to the Socratic Interpretation, addressing in particular the as of yet u...

Faith and Philosophy, 2022

The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for on... more The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for one individual to have both the attributes of God and the attributes of a human being. This article examines Thomas Aquinas' answer to this objection. I challenge the dominant, mereological interpretation of Aquinas' position and, in light of this challenge, develop and defend a new alternative interpretation of Aquinas' response to this important objection to Christian doctrine.

Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature, 2021

Thomistic Hylomorphists claim that we human persons have rational or intellective souls which can... more Thomistic Hylomorphists claim that we human persons have rational or intellective souls which can continue to exist separately from our bodies after we die. Much of the recent scholarly discussion of Thomistic Hylomorphism has centered on this thesis and the question of whether human persons can survive death along with their souls or whether only their souls can survive in this separated, disembodied, post-mortem state. As a result, two rival versions of Thomistic Hyomorphism have been formulated: Survivalism and Corruptionism. This chapter makes a new contribution to the debate between Survivalists and Corruptionists by identifying a heretofore undiscussed problem for Corruptionist Thomistic Hylomorphism. In particular, it is argued that if Corruptionists were right that human persons cannot survive their deaths along with their souls, this would undermine the grounds on which all Thomistic Hylomorphists, including Corruptionists, rely to justify their belief that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths. Given this, it is argued that Thomistic Hylomorphists have grounds for thinking that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths only if they allow, as Survivalists do and Corruptionists do not, that we human persons can continue to exist after our deaths, with souls but no bodies.

Metaphysics, 2019

Link to Paper: https://metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/10.5334/met.24/ Essentialists claim tha... more Link to Paper: https://metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/10.5334/met.24/

Essentialists claim that at least some individuals or kinds have essences. This raises an important but little-discussed question: how do we come to know what the essence of something is? This paper examines Aristotle's answer to this question. One influential interpretation (viz., the Explanationist Interpretation) is carefully expounded, criticized, and then refined. Particular attention is given to what Aristotle says about this issue in DA I.1, APo II.2, and APo II.8. It is argued that the epistemological claim put forward in DA I.1 differs from that put forward in APo II.2 and II.8, contrary to what has been claimed by Explanationists, and that each of these distinct epistemological claims rests on a distinct non-epistemological thesis about essence. Consequently, an 'Enriched Explanationist Interpretation' is developed which takes into account both of the aforementioned elements in Aristotle's epistemology of essence. The paper concludes by highlighting an insight the preceding exegetical discussion offers to contemporary essentialists seeking to explain how we come to know what something's essence is.

KEYWORDS: essence; epistemology of essence; non-modal essentialism; Aristotle; Posterior Analytics

Faith and Philosophy, 2020

Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol37/iss1/1 According to the ... more Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol37/iss1/1

According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.

Religious Studies Review, 2022