Nick Gutierrez | San Diego State University (original) (raw)
I am a graduate of the master's program and former instructor of Philosophy at San Diego State University. My primary areas of academic research include ancient Greek philosophy, early modern philosophy, utopias, hedonism, anarchism, and English literature.
I am currently a communications consultant and independent writer based in the Seattle area.
Supervisors: Mark Wheeler and Robert Francescotti
less
Uploads
Talks by Nick Gutierrez
The dichotomy between physicalism and dualism has become a core topic of discussion in metaphysic... more The dichotomy between physicalism and dualism has become a core topic of discussion in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Many people now reject dualism and instead favor a theory of mind based purely on physicalism. The implications of physicalism, as a result, have also become a hot topic in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. When one looks at physicalism, there is usually a distinction made between reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism, where reductive physicalism (or reductionism) is usually seen as a problem with regard to what may be understood as "higher-order" mental phenomena or properties, such as free will. Accordingly, proponents of non-reductive physicalism (or non-reductionism) want to maintain all the perks and privileges of physicalism without going too far into the mystical realm of dualism or the deterministic, nihilistic world of reductionism. However, as part of a larger investigation into a particular Ancient Greek theory of mind, I argue that two forms of non-reductive physicalism, epiphenomenalism and emergentism, either do not solve the problems of reductionism or are incoherent and unusable as working theories. Thus, any hope that proponents of non-reductionism had in preserving our "higher-order" mental properties, such as free will, can be called into question.
Papers by Nick Gutierrez
It has been argued that Epicurus was a reductionist with regard to the mind. It has also been arg... more It has been argued that Epicurus was a reductionist with regard to the mind. It has also been argued that Epicurus is a non-reductionist with regard to the mind. The proper assessment of Epicureanism as a reductive or non-reductive theory has widespread implications for its plausibility as a working account of the mind, closely tied to the implications and plausibility of reductionism and non-reductionism themselves.
Using research done in contemporary philosophy of mind, I evaluate the views of two scholars of Epicureanism, Julia Annas, a proponent of the idea that Epicurus was a non-reductionist, and Tim O’Keefe, a proponent of the idea that Epicurus was a reductionist. After evaluating these two views, I again use the contemporary research in philosophy of mind to guide my own interpretation of the Epicurean fragments, arguing that not only is there evidence to think that the Epicureans were non-reductionist, but even that they maintained a primitive form of what philosophers of mind may call an “emergentist” view of mental properties.
Despite the claims made by Annas, O’Keefe, and myself, I end this work with a brief note on the plausibility of emergentism and non-reductionism, arguing that they are unusable as working theories, and that all of the consequences of reductionism, for better or for worse, remain.
The dichotomy between physicalism and dualism has become a core topic of discussion in metaphysic... more The dichotomy between physicalism and dualism has become a core topic of discussion in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Many people now reject dualism and instead favor a theory of mind based purely on physicalism. The implications of physicalism, as a result, have also become a hot topic in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. When one looks at physicalism, there is usually a distinction made between reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism, where reductive physicalism (or reductionism) is usually seen as a problem with regard to what may be understood as "higher-order" mental phenomena or properties, such as free will. Accordingly, proponents of non-reductive physicalism (or non-reductionism) want to maintain all the perks and privileges of physicalism without going too far into the mystical realm of dualism or the deterministic, nihilistic world of reductionism. However, as part of a larger investigation into a particular Ancient Greek theory of mind, I argue that two forms of non-reductive physicalism, epiphenomenalism and emergentism, either do not solve the problems of reductionism or are incoherent and unusable as working theories. Thus, any hope that proponents of non-reductionism had in preserving our "higher-order" mental properties, such as free will, can be called into question.
It has been argued that Epicurus was a reductionist with regard to the mind. It has also been arg... more It has been argued that Epicurus was a reductionist with regard to the mind. It has also been argued that Epicurus is a non-reductionist with regard to the mind. The proper assessment of Epicureanism as a reductive or non-reductive theory has widespread implications for its plausibility as a working account of the mind, closely tied to the implications and plausibility of reductionism and non-reductionism themselves.
Using research done in contemporary philosophy of mind, I evaluate the views of two scholars of Epicureanism, Julia Annas, a proponent of the idea that Epicurus was a non-reductionist, and Tim O’Keefe, a proponent of the idea that Epicurus was a reductionist. After evaluating these two views, I again use the contemporary research in philosophy of mind to guide my own interpretation of the Epicurean fragments, arguing that not only is there evidence to think that the Epicureans were non-reductionist, but even that they maintained a primitive form of what philosophers of mind may call an “emergentist” view of mental properties.
Despite the claims made by Annas, O’Keefe, and myself, I end this work with a brief note on the plausibility of emergentism and non-reductionism, arguing that they are unusable as working theories, and that all of the consequences of reductionism, for better or for worse, remain.