Sara Moller | Seton Hall University (original) (raw)
Papers by Sara Moller
Journal of Strategic Studies
For much of history, multinational wars have been the norm rather than the exception. Yet the stu... more For much of history, multinational wars have been the norm rather than the exception. Yet the study of these wars has been largely ignored. Existing scholarship on wartime alliances focuses almost exclusively on the causes of alignment or the onset of conflict ignoring the conduct and consequences of these arrangements. Wartime partnerships exhibit enormous variation in their structure, however. What accounts for the varied multinational security arrangements states adopt in wartime? I argue that the choices states make in constructing these wartime partnerships have important consequences for both the conduct and outcome of conflicts. Following the institutional design literature, I argue that these differences are purposeful and originate from the rational calculations and strategic interactions among the actors creating them. I focus on one design feature of multinational military structures in particular, that of command and control (C2). The enormous variation visible in multinational command and control structures in wartime begs two questions: First, why do states adopt different command and control structures? Second, what drives actors to abandon one structure in favor of another? To answer these questions, I develop a theory of failure-driven change. Because conventional wisdom suggests that greater cooperation is beneficial, yielding gains for all, the puzzle naturally arises as to why all wartime partnerships don't start out in the tightest configuration possible, that of unified command. After all, the benefits of greater wartime integration are seemingly vast; from the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs to the conferral of legitimacy, tightly integrated arrangements confer distinct advantages. Despite the many benefits wartime integration confers, however, I argue states are reluctant to adopt unified command for fear of having to surrender operational control over their military forces. Yet even a cursory examination of wartime multinational partnerships reveals that [...]
As the United States and the world begins to adjust to a Biden presidency, the North Atlantic Tre... more As the United States and the world begins to adjust to a Biden presidency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) once again finds itself at a crossroads. Diplomats and transatlantic supporters on both sides of the Atlantic collectively expelled a sigh of relief last November that a second Trump term —which many feared might spell the end of the 72-year-old alliance—had not come to pass. However, the mood is far from celebratory in either Washington or European capitals because all parties understand that, to steer clear of irrelevancy and remain “fit for purpose,”NATO needs renewal—the question is how? If the allies are not careful, domestic contentions and international disputes over trade and technology regulation could consume their political energy, breaking the promise of transatlantic renewal before it has even begun. To stave off this dim prospect, NATO is embarking on a strategy of transatlantic renewal, the centerpiece of which will be a new Strategic Concept—its fi...
The Concert and its embedding in the existing world order
The global distribution of power is changing. The consequences of this change are instabilities a... more The global distribution of power is changing. The consequences of this change are instabilities and uncertainties in world politics. The current constellation concerning the situation in the Ukraine serves as testimony that great power conflicts are – despite wishful thinking to the contrary – not yet only a thing of the distant past. How can the international society, how can the great powers, their differences and disagreements notwithstanding, prevent the escalation of conflicts and the outbreak of war? More generally, how can they work towards peaceful and constructive solutions for international security governance? A 21st Century Concert of Powers, a new great power based multilateral security institution, could be the timely answer. Based on the norms and practices of the 19th Century "European Concert" but avoiding its shortcomings, a 21st Century Concert, as imagined here, would work largely informally and constitute an effective forum for confidence building, consultation and common preparation of decisions. Given the already tightly institutionalized international order, it would not supersede but complement existing institutions, such as the United Nations.
This Policy Paper is the product of a multi-year research project "The Post-Transatlantic Age: A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers". The project has been conducted by more than 20 researchers from seven different countries. It is funded by the “Europe and Global Challenges” programme, launched by the European foundations Compagnia di San Paolo in Turin, Italy, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond in Stockholm, Sweden, and VolkswagenStiftung in Hanover, Germany.
Journal of Strategic Studies
For much of history, multinational wars have been the norm rather than the exception. Yet the stu... more For much of history, multinational wars have been the norm rather than the exception. Yet the study of these wars has been largely ignored. Existing scholarship on wartime alliances focuses almost exclusively on the causes of alignment or the onset of conflict ignoring the conduct and consequences of these arrangements. Wartime partnerships exhibit enormous variation in their structure, however. What accounts for the varied multinational security arrangements states adopt in wartime? I argue that the choices states make in constructing these wartime partnerships have important consequences for both the conduct and outcome of conflicts. Following the institutional design literature, I argue that these differences are purposeful and originate from the rational calculations and strategic interactions among the actors creating them. I focus on one design feature of multinational military structures in particular, that of command and control (C2). The enormous variation visible in multinational command and control structures in wartime begs two questions: First, why do states adopt different command and control structures? Second, what drives actors to abandon one structure in favor of another? To answer these questions, I develop a theory of failure-driven change. Because conventional wisdom suggests that greater cooperation is beneficial, yielding gains for all, the puzzle naturally arises as to why all wartime partnerships don't start out in the tightest configuration possible, that of unified command. After all, the benefits of greater wartime integration are seemingly vast; from the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs to the conferral of legitimacy, tightly integrated arrangements confer distinct advantages. Despite the many benefits wartime integration confers, however, I argue states are reluctant to adopt unified command for fear of having to surrender operational control over their military forces. Yet even a cursory examination of wartime multinational partnerships reveals that [...]
As the United States and the world begins to adjust to a Biden presidency, the North Atlantic Tre... more As the United States and the world begins to adjust to a Biden presidency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) once again finds itself at a crossroads. Diplomats and transatlantic supporters on both sides of the Atlantic collectively expelled a sigh of relief last November that a second Trump term —which many feared might spell the end of the 72-year-old alliance—had not come to pass. However, the mood is far from celebratory in either Washington or European capitals because all parties understand that, to steer clear of irrelevancy and remain “fit for purpose,”NATO needs renewal—the question is how? If the allies are not careful, domestic contentions and international disputes over trade and technology regulation could consume their political energy, breaking the promise of transatlantic renewal before it has even begun. To stave off this dim prospect, NATO is embarking on a strategy of transatlantic renewal, the centerpiece of which will be a new Strategic Concept—its fi...
The Concert and its embedding in the existing world order
The global distribution of power is changing. The consequences of this change are instabilities a... more The global distribution of power is changing. The consequences of this change are instabilities and uncertainties in world politics. The current constellation concerning the situation in the Ukraine serves as testimony that great power conflicts are – despite wishful thinking to the contrary – not yet only a thing of the distant past. How can the international society, how can the great powers, their differences and disagreements notwithstanding, prevent the escalation of conflicts and the outbreak of war? More generally, how can they work towards peaceful and constructive solutions for international security governance? A 21st Century Concert of Powers, a new great power based multilateral security institution, could be the timely answer. Based on the norms and practices of the 19th Century "European Concert" but avoiding its shortcomings, a 21st Century Concert, as imagined here, would work largely informally and constitute an effective forum for confidence building, consultation and common preparation of decisions. Given the already tightly institutionalized international order, it would not supersede but complement existing institutions, such as the United Nations.
This Policy Paper is the product of a multi-year research project "The Post-Transatlantic Age: A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers". The project has been conducted by more than 20 researchers from seven different countries. It is funded by the “Europe and Global Challenges” programme, launched by the European foundations Compagnia di San Paolo in Turin, Italy, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond in Stockholm, Sweden, and VolkswagenStiftung in Hanover, Germany.